How to attack like a Soviet Rifle Corps in 1944

[Andreas]

Funnily enough, this is actually CM size, at least when you look at the map size.

Iasi-Kischinjow Operation, August 1944 (Kischinjow would probably be called Kischinew in German unit histories)

Operations of 3rd Ukrainian Front (GOC General Tolbuchin)

Main effort of the front is in the sector of the 37th Army (GOC Lieutenant General Scharochin). Main effort of 37th Army is 66th Rifle Corps and 6th Guards Rifle Corps. The 37th Army has a 4km wide breakthrough frontage assigned to it. It is divided in two groupings, two corps up, one corps reserve. According to plan, it is supposed to break through the depth of the German/Romanian defense in 7 days, to a distance of 110-120km, with the distance to be covered in the first four days 15km each.

66th Rifle Corps (GOC Major General Kuprijanow) consisting of two groupings (61st Guards RD, 333rd RD up, 244th RD reserve). Attached are 46th Gun Artillery Brigade, 152nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 184th and 1245th Tank Destroyer Regiment, 10th Mortar Regiment, 26th Light Artillery Brigade, 87th Recoilless Mortar Regiment, 92nd and 52nd Tank Regiment, 398th Assault Gun Regiment, two Pioneer Assault Battalions, and two Light Flamethrower Companies.

Corps frontage 4km

Corps breakthrough frontage 3.5km (61st RD 1.5km, 333rd RD 2km)

Densities per kilometer of frontage:

Rifle battalions 7.7

Guns/mortars 248

Tanks and assault guns 18

Superiority

Infantry 1:3

Artillery 1:7

Tanks and assault guns 1:11.2

There is no man-power information for the divisions, but expect them to have between 7,000 - 7,500 men each, 61st GRD maybe 8,000-9,000. The soldiers were prepared over the course of August by exercising in areas similar to those they had to attack, and being brought up to speed on special tactics needed to overcome the enemy in their sector.

Density in 61st GRD sector per kilometer of frontage:

Rifle battalions 6.0

Guns/mortars 234

Tanks and assault guns 18

Density in 333rd RD sector per kilometer of frontage:

Rifle battalions 4.5

Guns/mortars 231

Tanks and assault guns 18

The initial attack

333rd RD did not bother with niceties like reserves and put three regiments up. 61st GRD attacked in classic two regiment up, one reserve formation. This proved to be lucky, since its right wing of 188th Guards(?) Rifle Regiment got stuck in front of the strongpoint Ploptuschbej. 189th Rifle Regiment on the left wing made good progress though, as did 333rd RD on its left. The GOC 61st GRD therefore inserted his reserve (187th GRR) behind 189th RR and off they went. When darkness came, 244th RD was inserted to break through the second line of defense. It lost its way though, and only arrived at 2300, by which time elements of 13th Panzer were counterattacking.

The German/Romanian opposition was XXX. and XXIX. AK, with 15th, 306th German ID, 4th Romanian Mountain Division, and 21st Romanian ID. 13th PD was in reserve. At the end of day one, 4th Romanian Mountain, and 21st Romanian Divisions were almost completely destroyed, while 15th and 306th ID were heavily damaged (according to a German source: 306th lost 50% in the barrage, and was destroyed apart from local strongpoints by evening). Almost no artillery survived the fire preparation.

13th Panzer counter-attacked 66th Rifle Corps on day one, and tried to stop it on day two but to no avail. A study on the divisions history says 'The Russian dictated the course of events.' 13th Panzer at the time was a materially understrength, but high manpower unit, with a high proportion of recent reinforcements. It only had Panzer IV, Stugs and SP AT guns. The division was at the end of the second day in a condition that it was incapable to attack or of meaningful resistance.

At the end of day two, the Red Army stood deep in the rear of German 6th Army. No more organised re-supply of forces would be forthcoming, and 6th Army was doomed to be encircled and chopped up. Franz-Josef Strauss, who was to become a very important German politician after the war, served with the Panzerregiment of 13th Panzer. He comments that the division had ceased to exist as a tactical unit on day three of the Soviet offensive: 'The enemy was everywhere.'

The comment on the result of 66th Rifle Corps operations in Mazulenko is: 'Because of the reinforcement of the Corps and the deep battle arrangements of troops and units the enemy defenses were broken through at high speed.'

This post is based on two German language sources, one being Mazulenko, 'The destruction of AG South Ukraine', and the other Hoffmann, 'Die Magdeburger Division', a history of 13th Panzer.

This is what the Red Army saw as a late war set-piece attack. It is a relentless meat-grinder, that was protected by Maskirovka, full control of the air, and prepared with almost scientific rigour. This kind of stuff made Blitzkrieg look like Kindergarten.

Almost exactly after a month the Red Army had destroyed AG South Ukraine completely. On the 6th September it had reached the Jugoslavian border at Turnu-Severin, on the 16th September it stood in Sofia, on the 19th it had reached the Hungarian border at Arad. Before that, on the 17th the old lands of the Danube Swabians at Temeschwar (Timisoara) were occupied.

I posted this because I thought some people maybe interested in this rather 'secondary' theatre, and also because it is one of the few accounts I have come across that details almost down to battalion level for some aspects the organisation and preparation for a Soviet offensive of this scale.

[ July 20, 2002, 10:18 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Determinant]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Funnily enough, this is actually CM style, at least when you look at the map size.[snip]

Andreas,

Thanks for that. Very interesting. I look forward to the CMBB scenario conversion and after-action report!

Toodle pip!

Nigel

[Blackhorse]

Andreas,

Very nice post.

I can only imagine what it must have been like to see that juggernaught approaching one's own lines.

Cheers,

Chris

[Andreas]

Chris - you don't really. One of the German officers on the receiving end commented 'By the end of the barrage, Russian tanks were deep into our position.' (Hoffmann)

A German battalion commander (Hauptmann Hans Diebisch, CO II.IR579, 306.ID) commented: 'The fire assets of the German defense were literally destroyed by the Soviet fighter bombers attacking the MLR and the rear positions. When the Russian infantry appeared (auftauchte - indicating they did not see them coming) inside the positions ofthe battalion and it tried to retreat, the Russian air force made this impossible. The battalion was dispersed und partly destroyed through the fire of the air force, mortars and machine guns.' (quoted from Mazulenko)

[Blackhorse]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Chris - you don't really. One of the German officers on the receiving end commented 'By the end of the barrage, Russian tanks were deep into our position.' (Hoffmann)

A German battalion commander (Hauptmann Hans Diebisch, CO II.IR579, 306.ID) commented: 'The fire assets of the German defense were literally destroyed by the Soviet fighter bombers attacking the MLR and the rear positions. When the Russian infantry appeared (auftauchte - indicating they did not see them coming) inside the positions ofthe battalion and it tried to retreat, the Russian air force made this impossible. The battalion was dispersed und partly destroyed through the fire of the air force, mortars and machine guns.' (quoted from Mazulenko)

Andreas,

Indeed. It must have been pure hell on the receiving end of that attack.

The Attritionists won that day eh?

[Moon]

7.7 rifle battalions per kilometer frontage? Cough... I wonder if each rifleman had to carry another soldier to fit them all into that space

Martin

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Moon:

7.7 rifle battalions per kilometer frontage? Cough... I wonder if each rifleman had to carry another soldier to fit them all into that space

Martin

My mistake, it is 6.0 for 61st GRD and 4,5 for 333rd RD, actually. 7.7 is over the whole frontage of 66th Rifle Corps. I will edit that.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Blackhorse:

The Attritionists won that day eh?

Don't they always

I am sure they did some beautiful maneuvering after 24th of August though. Encircling two Army Groups, rushing to the Romanian borders, and all that.

[von Paulus]

Are you sure that Russian batallions were at full strenght ?

But an attack of this type is totally possible and historically true ofr the Soviet side.

Yup, Germans were often outnumbered.

Paulus

[imported_argie]

Originally posted by Von Paulus:

Are you sure that Russian batallions were at full strenght ?

But an attack of this type is totally possible and historically true ofr the Soviet side.

Yup, Germans were often outnumbered.

Paulus

ummmmm... If you didn't noticed, it is historically true, then, a bit more than totally possible...

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Von Paulus:

Are you sure that Russian batallions were at full strenght ?

But an attack of this type is totally possible and historically true ofr the Soviet side.

Yup, Germans were often outnumbered.

Paulus

Err, this is an historical attack, please read the info on the sources again.

And no, they were not full strength. The divisions were (as I said) at far below strength, it is therefore logical to assume that their consituent parts were below strength too. The authorised strength was ~9,200 men based on the 1943 shtat. These divisions are at about 80% of that.

One way to deal with that was to lose specialist personnel. Interestingly, according to Zaloga in order to reach 8,000 men division in October 1944, 3rd Ukrainian Front (the front undertaking this operation) ordered a specialist TO&E under which each rifle platoon would lose a squad. So the rifle battalions here would have about 2/3 TO&E strength. Assume a bit more for 61st GRD, since Guards divisions seem to have received more reinforcements.

Still, at 4.5 rifle battalions to a km, and 2/3 strength, you are effectively putting 3 full-strength rifle battalions in there per km. Open a CMBO map and have a look at what that looks like.

The Germans were heavily outnumbered at this point (as they were at many other points). But this did not happen because of some accident, or because the Germans overlooked something. It was the result of successful planning, Maskirovka that led to the Germans expecting the attack elsewhere or not at all, and consequent superior concentration of overwhelming force in a narrow breakthrough sector. Once resistance there was smashed, rapid movement would bring about the complete disintegration of the German rear areas as well as troop command and control.

[Grisha]

The deception operation of the Yassi-Kishinev operation also contributed greatly to success. German intelligence situational maps had the 7th Mech Corps placed in the operational rear behind 5th Shock Army when in reality it was across the Dnestr bridgehead within the 37th Army sector, prepared for exploitation. A discrepency of over 60km.

[Michael Emrys]

Andreas,

Was the troop density achieved by putting the companies of battalions in echelon with some interval between them? Thus, they would be attacking in waves with each succeeding wave arriving just as the preceeding one started to run out of steam? This would seem to me to be a reasonable thing to do in this case, but I am unsure if that is the technique they actually followed. Does your source indicate?

Michael

[Andreas]

Michael, I have a scanned page showing how the late-war assault battalion was organised, I just have to ask someone to allow me to show it here.

Basically the assault battalion was organised in two waves, as was the assault regiment and assault division, as I understand it. They also formed one or two battalions for specific tasks (e.g. assault strongpoints, or night fighting).

In operational analysis, the Red Army appears tp use this frontage idea regardless of depth. What is hidden behind that is that the organisation extended not only in space, but also in time. Reserves that were an integral part of the assault organisation, or a different unit, would be committed at the point where things go well, and not where problems develop (see e.g. the commitment of the reserve regiment by GOC 61st GRD in his attack - he does not bother using it to overcome the strongpoint). Reinforcing failure seems to have been out of vogue by 1944.

[Andreas]

Michael, this is hopefully self-explanatory. Source is the November 45 Handbook on USSR Military Forces, TM 40-430. Thanks to Kip for the scan.

[ May 21, 2003, 04:50 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Michael, this is hopefully self-explanatory.

Ah well, but it doesn't really answer my question. While it shows how groups were organized (i.e., their components), it doesn't show how they were deployed in the attack.

Michael

[Andreas]

Would that help? Same source.

[ May 21, 2003, 05:04 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Determinant]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Michael, I have a scanned page showing how the late-war assault battalion was organised, I just have to ask someone to allow me to show it here.

If you get clearance I will be pleased to see that.

This is the big nutty question about how the Red Army went about its business. We all have this conception of herds of men, like a flock of sheep, being pushed forward anyhow.

The attack frontages that you quote are spookily similar to those used by the British Army in Jul 16 on the Somme. The key difference I suppose is the crushing weight of artillery deployed by the Red Army.

But this raises the essential question of how the Red Army attacked: was it just herds of men plodding forward shoulder to shoulder (a la Somme) or was there something more sophisticated going on there?

This is a critical problem for CMBB. As tactical wargamers we expect to encounter a measure of balance - it makes for a fair (and therefore an interesting) fight. The art of the operational commander is to ensure that an attack is a foregone conclusion: no fairness, just overwhelming victory - as seen above. Where does this leave the tactical wargame on the horrific broad canvas of the Eastern Front?

[Grisha]

Determinant,

"Plodding like herds of sheep?" This might have been the case in some instances in 1941 or even 1942, but by and large Soviet troops did understand such concepts as tactics

Soviet tactics were pretty much like everybody elses really, it's just that they didn't have the same level of command control or initial training. Experienced Soviet troops were every bit as adept at their job as the next nation, but just went about it in a different manner. By mid-1943 assault tactics came under great scrutiny, resulting in the devising of ad hoc combined arms assault groups tailored to the needs of the situation. These assault tactics were based on experience as well.

Soviet losses were also the result of their inability to rely on on-call indirect artillery to assist in a new development on the battlefield - or bail them out of a bad spot. Their own solution to this was to have many more self-propelled assault guns (SUs, ISUs) on hand for infantry support, but it wasn't quite the same thing as a barrage of incoming. Kind of the difference between the USMC and the US Army, the former relying on their own organic firepower, the later, on additional assets, i.e. artillery and air power.

[Michael Emrys]

Ugh. Double post. {how do I manage to do that?}

[ July 20, 2002, 04:13 PM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Would that help?

Ahhhhhhh! Very cool! That's what I was looking for. Wonder where I can get a copy of that book...

:cool:

Michael

[ July 20, 2002, 04:12 PM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Mud]

Determinant --

I'd figure that there are plenty of "fair" fights available, especially when looking only at a limited tactical action, and when considering that attacks were also made under less-than-ideal conditions (e.g. far from dominating ratios, insufficient supplies, communications snafus...). And the very first units in an assault may encounter a "fair" fight for at least a while. If the first hour or so of a battle is even enough to be interesting, that should be good enough for a single battle; there may even be "fair" operations, depending on the victory conditions (e.g. if the attacker needs to go a long distance, then the forces don't need to be that even...).

Remember: CMBB is a tactical wargame. It deals with small actions, mostly. Even if one side largely had the upper hand at any given time, it doesn't mean it had it /everywhere/ and /everywhen/ (e.g. every 0.5-1 hour or so that might be turned into a CMBB battle).

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

That's what I was looking for. Wonder where I can get a copy of that book...

Michael

Ebay, 2nd hand bookstores... Not being published at the moment.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Mud:

CMBB is a tactical wargame. It deals with small actions, mostly. Even if one side largely had the upper hand at any given time, it doesn't mean it had it /everywhere/ and /everywhen/ (e.g. every 0.5-1 hour or so that might be turned into a CMBB battle).

Indeed. Looking at my first post from the scenario designer's PoV, there is an obvious instance that could become a CMBB scenario. The right wing of 61st GRD that got stuck in front of the strongpoint Ploptuschbej. Obviously the German/Romanian occupants of that strongpoint failed to get the message and kept resisting the juggernaut to a degree that necessitated readjusting plans on the Soviet side. Sounds like a CMBB operation in waiting to me.

[Tero]

Any data of the topology of the terrain for this operation ?