The Day of Battle

[flamingknives]

Having first heard of "An Army at Dawn" on this site I got it, and read it - very good.

Whilst knocking about on Amazon this afternoon, I find that the sequel has been released. (for almost a year - you can't accuse me of being with it)

Has anyone here read it?

[stoat]

Yes. .

[flamingknives]

I was rather hoping for an opinion or some form of comment rather than an attempt to break the minimum character count for a post.

[Runyan99]

I'll spoil it for you. The Allies conquer Sicily and Rome. Italy surrenders.

[Bigduke6]

It's a good book, but to my mind worse than Dawn. It seemed like the second book quotes reporters over-much, and average Joe soldiers under-much. Also there is a pretty thick thread of "Greatest Generation All Heroes" running through the book, it kind of dehumanizes the soldiers and turns them into conquering giants. Also I would say the book doesn't cover much new ground historically and frankly spends more time on big strategy than the soldier's battle. So all in all a pretty good campaign book, but there are plenty of others on the Italian campaign. I think what sets his Dawn book apart is that there are no other properly comprehensive books about the Tunisia campaign.

I would recommend getting the book discount.

[REVS]

Like Big Duke, I'd agree in the sense that it's not as enjoyable a read as An Army at Dawn. But Dawn is a better story, while the Italian campaign was a sad, grim affair, and so the book can't help but be a bit downbeat. The writing is every bit as good, the research equal in excellence, but I did a couple of times wonder whether I should bother finishing it, but finish it I did.

I'm sure that the final Normandy part of the trilogy will share the tone of Dawn once more. I'll be glad to keep all three books on my shelf for the rest of my days.

[Michael Emrys]

Like Big Duke, I'd agree in the sense that it's not as enjoyable a read as An Army at Dawn. But Dawn is a better story, while the Italian campaign was a sad, grim affair, and so the book can't help but be a bit downbeat. The writing is every bit as good, the research equal in excellence, but I did a couple of times wonder whether I should bother finishing it, but finish it I did.

I'd pretty much agree with all of that. But unlike BD6, I did learn some new things about several of the battles. Once or twice, mainly during Diadem, the Allies actually used their noggins and employed some tactical sense. Naturally this was done at the initiative of lower levels of command because most of the guys at the top were, shall we say, less than top drawer.

Michael

[Soddball]

I was rather hoping for an opinion or some form of comment rather than an attempt to break the minimum character count for a post.

I found it disappointing. I felt Atkinson swallowed too readily the criticisms of British fighting performance in Italy while being too prepared to excuse failings in US command. Atkinson also seemed, to my mind, to be an apologist for the ghastly (IMO) Mark Clark. One example - Atkinson continually berates Montgomery for 'taking his time' to advance. Montgomery was a cautious commander, and didn't want to risk unnecessary casualties - probably a legacy of his WW1 experience. Atkinson sees that as some kind of weakness instead of what I see it as, which is a virtue. Britain didn't have essentially unlimited manpower.

His apologism for Mark Clark grated most, though. The man was a poor commander (again, IMO), and was profligate with mens' lives in a way that would have fitted in well on the Eastern Front.

I did enjoy An Army at Dawn, but having reread it a couple of times and having also read other stuff about the fighting in Torch, I have gone off Atkinson. Take, for example, his complaints about the plan to take the port of Oran by US Rangers. Atkinson coruscates the plan, the execution and the whole concept and (IIRC) hints that Perfidious Albion was prepared to spend any amount of lives to regain their empire. He doesn't put the attack in to context at all by mentioning the success of Operation Chariot in March 1942. There was also some stuff about the fighting with Vichy troops, which Atkinson skipped over and which I read elsewhere wasn't quite the walkover he implies.

I probably won't buy the last of his trilogy.

All just my opinions, of course.

[dumrox]

I believe it's due out in paperback form at the end of September, so you could wait a month a save a few dollars.

[flamingknives]

At this rate, I'll see if the local library has it in.

[Michael Emrys]

I felt Atkinson swallowed too readily the criticisms of British fighting performance in Italy...

I thought he was a bit harsh too, which surprised me because in an interview he gave about the time the book appeared he made a point of observing how surprised he was at the Anglophobia he discovered among the ranks of US commanders. Maybe some of that leaked over into his account, I don't know.

...while being too prepared to excuse failings in US command. Atkinson also seemed, to my mind, to be an apologist for the ghastly (IMO) Mark Clark.

Now this I have to flatly disagree with. He pretty well fries Clark's performance and that of some other US commanders as well. I think the difference is that he also finds things to praise now and then on the US side but generally does not for the Brits. He does say some nice things about the French and the Poles. But keep in mind that this is a book about the US army. It is really not intended as a fair and balanced account of all the Allied forces. Atkinson includes those only to the extent necessary to understand what was happening to the Americans. Maybe that leaves non-Americans unsatisfied, but then accounts of the British army usually do the same from that side.

One example - Atkinson continually berates Montgomery for 'taking his time' to advance. Montgomery was a cautious commander, and didn't want to risk unnecessary casualties - probably a legacy of his WW1 experience. Atkinson sees that as some kind of weakness instead of what I see it as, which is a virtue.

But it cost extra lives in the Salerno beachhead, British and American both. Montgomery for all his virtues (and my own opinion is that he was a better general than he is given credit for in many circles) was not much of a player on the Allied team. Exactly the same can be said for Clark, for instance. Inter-Allied cooperation was always a bit rocky.

Britain didn't have essentially unlimited manpower.

Nobody did, not even the USSR. Personnel shortage, especially among the infantry, was a serious problem for the US just as it was for the BCE.

His apologism for Mark Clark grated most, though.

What apologism? He presents Clark as a human but doesn't relent on his criticism of him as a commander.

The man was a poor commander...

I'd agree with that. He should have been kept on as Eisenhower's CoS as he was an excellent, even brilliant staff officer. But he was too ambitious for his skills as a commander and a glory seeker. He really wasn't very good in high command.

Michael

[JonS]

[On unlimited supplies of manpower]Nobody did, not even the USSR. Personnel shortage, especially among the infantry, was a serious problem for the US just as it was for the BCE.

No, it wasn't. Not overall.

The US manpower problems - even in the winter of 1944-45 - where primarily in terms of (mis)allocation of resources, not in terms of an overall shortage. The US had a shortage of infantry replacements, but that was due to faulty (though reasonable) assumptions about where casualties would be incurred. They had an excess of reinforcements for other arms (which is why, for example, AA gunners could be - and were - re-roled in-theatre).

The UK had an absolute shortage of men they could put in uniform. They, too, re-roled AA gunners (and others) as infantrymen, but that was at the expense of disbanding units. The BCE started disbanding divisions in the UK to free up men as replacements for active theatres as early as 1942. By 1944 the BCE were disbanding active divisions (and bdes) in active theatres to keep other divisions up to strength.

Strawman alert: Obviously the US didn't have a literally inexhaustable pool of manpower That's not my argument. However, and especially compared compared to the BCE, their manpower problems were at a much lower level. The BCE problems went much deeper, and started a lot earlier.

Regards

Jon

[Stalins Organ]

But it cost extra lives in the Salerno beachhead, British and American both.

Being cautious is no guarantee of getting it right every time - sometimes cautious is the wrong approach. But it's the only sensible approach when you have limited resources and the opportunity to completely wreck a nation's war effort by getting it BADLY wrong.

[Soddball]

I thought he was a bit harsh too, which surprised me because in an interview he gave about the time the book appeared he made a point of observing how surprised he was at the Anglophobia he discovered among the ranks of US commanders. Maybe some of that leaked over into his account, I don't know.

I know that there was Britophobia and Yankophobia and nobody's immune. Montgomery's snobbery is legendary, but Alan Brooke's constant carping is no better. Maybe Atkinson lets it get to him. There is a story to tell there and I remember it weaving through An Army at Dawn but it bothered me less.

Now this I have to flatly disagree with. He pretty well fries Clark's performance and that of some other US commanders as well. I think the difference is that he also finds things to praise now and then on the US side but generally does not for the Brits. He does say some nice things about the French and the Poles. But keep in mind that this is a book about the US army. It is really not intended as a fair and balanced account of all the Allied forces. Atkinson includes those only to the extent necessary to understand what was happening to the Americans. Maybe that leaves non-Americans unsatisfied, but then accounts of the British army usually do the same from that side.

I have plenty of stuff on British performance so that wasn't the problem for me. The problem for me was that, as the book went on, I felt that Atkinson's impression was that the British and Americans were failing to fight like the Germans. He seemed to me to suggest that Clark and Patton both wanted to fight German-style, with no regard for short-term casualties, and he seemed to think that it would have shortened the war. As Max Hastings points out, that only works when you have a completely different structure of army to the allied armies of the time. It simply wouldn't have worked and Atkinson doesn't seem to recognise this.

But it cost extra lives in the Salerno beachhead, British and American both. Montgomery for all his virtues (and my own opinion is that he was a better general than he is given credit for in many circles) was not much of a player on the Allied team. Exactly the same can be said for Clark, for instance. Inter-Allied cooperation was always a bit rocky.

Montgomery was a primadonna, a thoroughly unpleasant man who saw everyone else's faults as a mirror for his own perceived virtues. He was, though, aware of what his men were capable of after 4 years of warfare and aware of his promise made when he took over from Auchinleck not to waste their lives. The criticism that he moved too slowly has to be taken in context with both those points and I don't think Atkinson did that.

Don't assume that this is chauvinism on my part. I assure you it isn't. I think it's Atkinson's perceived notions of how the war could have been won faster which cause him to lay the blame he does.

[Michael Emrys]

I think it's Atkinson's perceived notions of how the war could have been won faster which cause him to lay the blame he does.

I didn't notice that going through the text the first time. When I get my own copy, I may have another go at it to see if I find something like that. What I do recall is him saying on the one hand that fighting in Italy was inevitably going to be a mess and a slow, hard grind. But he also does freely point out the many blunders that made it even more slow and costly.

I'm not so sure that he is advocating fighting German-style exactly. I suppose you could derive that from the fact that he derides going up against the strongest parts of the defense more or less head-on, and praises the few occasions when the Allies sought out a weak spot and exploited it. But that's just good tactics. The Germans practiced in their better days, but they didn't exactly patent it. IIRC though he also says that sometimes going against a strong defensive position was the only option available. It was just a consequence of a narrow front in mostly mountainous terrain.

Michael

[stoat]

No, it wasn't. Not overall.

Strawman alert: Obviously the US didn't have a literally inexhaustable pool of manpower That's not my argument. However, and especially compared compared to the BCE, their manpower problems were at a much lower level. The BCE problems went much deeper, and started a lot earlier.

The US had plenty of young men to throw into the fight. When the Joint Chiefs were analyzing what would be required of the American military machine during the war in the dark months of early 1942, they estimated that the US would need to field 180 divisions. After the Japanese and Germans reached high tide at Guadalcanal, Stalingrad, and Alamein, and the campaign in France went far better than expected, this estimate was reduced to 100 divisions. Of the units that were formed, many only saw action in the last few months of the war. A majority of the mechanized cavalry regiments served only in the last 3 months of the war in Europe, and there were infantry and armored divisions just coming off the boats right up to the end. Even the airborne arm was just coming into its own at the end of the war, with the 11th, 13th, and 17th divisions all coming on line very late, in addition to the 555th PIR which served in the Pacific. By comparison, the Empire was largely spent, and certainly could not have come up with an additional 80 divisions should the need have manifested itself.

[stoat]

One example - Atkinson continually berates Montgomery for 'taking his time' to advance. Montgomery was a cautious commander, and didn't want to risk unnecessary casualties - probably a legacy of his WW1 experience. Atkinson sees that as some kind of weakness instead of what I see it as, which is a virtue. Britain didn't have essentially unlimited manpower.

His apologism for Mark Clark grated most, though. The man was a poor commander (again, IMO), and was profligate with mens' lives in a way that would have fitted in well on the Eastern Front.

Monty is a character that is revered in the UK, but largely unliked in America. In my own opinion, his bite-and-hold mentality was an anachronism from the First World War, and one that reduced his effectiveness. In the Italian campaign, breakthroughs were few and far between. When a line was breached, pushing hard and fast into the German rear area before they could establish another defensive line was far preferable to waiting until everything was properly supplied and emplaced before advancing, and in so doing wasting days at a time. His penchant for using airborne divisions as heavy infantry after their drops also earned him few friends in the States.

However, I've never liked Clark as a commander, either. I believe he should have been tossed out, but instead he remained in command for the duration. There were a number of generals sitting on their tushes waiting for Overlord, and any of a number of them likely would have been more effective.

[stoat]

I was rather hoping for an opinion or some form of comment rather than an attempt to break the minimum character count for a post.

This book suffers from a flaw that quite a few history books do: it is too large in its scope. Too many authors try to cram in a theater's worth of action into four or five hundred pages, and attempt to do so both from a larger strategic perspective and with ample narration from the guys in the lines. From what I have seen, this is an impossible task to accomplish in a work of such size, and as a result the quality of the work suffers. If you are unfamiliar with WWII, or just want a generic overview of the early Italian campaign, The Day of Battle or something like Neillands' Eighth Army would do you well. But if you want a more informative an detailed read, I would recommend reading a variety of books that focus on individual battles such as Sicily, Anzio, Monte Cassino, and the fall of Rome.

[JonS]

Monty['s] ... bite-and-hold mentality was an anachronism from the First World War, and one that reduced his effectiveness. In the Italian campaign, breakthroughs were few and far between. When a line was breached, pushing hard and fast into the German rear area before they could establish another defensive line was far preferable to waiting until everything was properly supplied and emplaced before advancing, and in so doing wasting days at a time.

Being cautious is no guarantee of getting it right every time - sometimes cautious is the wrong approach. But it's the only sensible approach when you have limited resources and the opportunity to completely wreck a nation's war effort by getting it BADLY wrong.

Incidentally, I often see reference to use of WWI tactics - like yours above - as if that's a bad thing. Just because it's old doesn't mean it's a bad, else why is everyone still trying to "do a Cannae"? In very general terms, for the British, ...

1916 tactics were pretty bad.

1917 tactics were pretty good.

1918 tactics were great.

Where Montgomery dipped into the WWI toolbag he was recycling and re-using 1918 stuff. Not the 1916 stuff.

[stoat]

Incidentally, I often see reference to use of WWI tactics - like yours above - as if that's a bad thing. Just because it's old doesn't mean it's a bad, else why is everyone still trying to "do a Cannae"? In very general terms, for the British, ...

1916 tactics were pretty bad.

1917 tactics were pretty good.

1918 tactics were great.

Where Montgomery dipped into the WWI toolbag he was recycling and re-using 1918 stuff. Not the 1916 stuff.

Bite-and-hold itself is and was a proven tactic. I don't believe anyone would criticize a general for taking ground. But these tactics also limited him. If the objectives were taken, the capturing forces settled down and prepared for the next assault after waiting for guns to be resited and supplies to be brought up. Little thought was given to further advance, even if the ground could have been cheaply won, as it was outside of the scope of the limited objectives and the logistical contingencies weren't drawn up. It's said where the army goes, the logistics will follow. While that is not absolutely true, a greater flexibility in the execution of his battle plans would have made Monty a better general, in my opinion.

[Michael Emrys]

The US had plenty of young men to throw into the fight. When the Joint Chiefs were analyzing what would be required of the American military machine during the war in the dark months of early 1942, they estimated that the US would need to field 180 divisions. After the Japanese and Germans reached high tide at Guadalcanal, Stalingrad, and Alamein, and the campaign in France went far better than expected, this estimate was reduced to 100 divisions.

I think it was actually reduced to ninety-something. And that fairly early on. The decision was made to keep as much manpower working in the defense industries as possible. The Germans went the other direction and put most of their available manpower into uniform and replaced them in industry with increasing amounts of slave labor, to their detriment (although in their case the alternatives were sorely limited). Could more Americans have been put into uniform and replaced with, say, female workers? Possibly. But the efficient running of technical industries requires a core cadre of experienced and trained workers. Cutting into that cadre would have interfered with production. The preferred American way of fighting was to use a flood of matériel rather than a flood of bodies.

Michael

[JonS]

90, of which 89 saw combat. I guess the five USMC divs should be added to that total though.

[stoat]

94 plus 6 Marine Divisions makes 100. Not that it was outlined to make exactly 100, and some of these divisions should have asterisks, such as the Phillipine Division (12th), the 39th, and the 2nd Cav.

[Stalins Organ]

By contrast in 1939 the UK determined to maintain 50 active field divisions - including 32 UK and 18 commonwealth formations. Supply was planned for 55, incorporating a 10% buffer.

However reality made this a pretty onerous objective, and even 20 divisions by September 1940 seemed like too many - the 1939 plan had not realised thattotal manpower required to field and support a field division was 42,000 men.

Eventually the army was to be 100 division equivalents - but this was including all arms and not just field divisions

[kenfedoroff]

This book suffers from a flaw that quite a few history books do: it is too large in its scope. Too many authors try to cram in a theater's worth of action into four or five hundred pages, and attempt to do so both from a larger strategic perspective and with ample narration from the guys in the lines. From what I have seen, this is an impossible task to accomplish in a work of such size, and as a result the quality of the work suffers. If you are unfamiliar with WWII, or just want a generic overview of the early Italian campaign, The Day of Battle or something like Neillands' Eighth Army would do you well. But if you want a more informative an detailed read, I would recommend reading a variety of books that focus on individual battles such as Sicily, Anzio, Monte Cassino, and the fall of Rome.

Good point. I was glad the book ends with June '44, so he could concentrate on some of the toughest decison making faced at all levels, and the events that followed from them.

I enjoyed both his books, as Atkinson weaves the political-strategic-logistic setting with what what was possible (and impossible) at an operational and tactical level, on the ground.

For what it's worth,

Ken