Balanced treatment of suvorov's claim that Stalin was going to attack Germany first

[Stalins Organ]

As a matter of interest exactly _1_ russian medium tank factory was captured or KO-ed in WW2 - STZ at Stalingrad (the "Tank Factory"). Factory 264 producing light tanks was also knocked out in hte battle. Neither of these ever produced another tank after 1942.

1 heavy tank factory was also stopped from producing in 1941 in Leningrad - TKZ - but it produced a handful of heavy tanks in 1945. the Leningrad light tank factories also stopped producing after 1941 & never restarted.

the Kharkov tank factory was relocated to Nizhniy Tagil & restarted production there in 1941, and Factory #75 at Kharkov started producing T44's in 1944.

Factory No. 37 was relocated from Moscow to Sverdlovsk in 1941, restarting production in 1942.

Factories that started production in 1942 were No. 174 (Omsk), Uralmashzavod (Sverdlovsk), No. 38 (Kirov), and No. 40 (Mytishchi)

A full list of tank factories and their products is available at the RKKA website.

Russian steel production is tabulated here, and according to the list of LL materials supplied to the USSR they got over 425,000,000 tons of hte stuff.....but I think it's a misprint for lbs, since everywhere else the total tonnage shipped was only 17.5 million total!

[Wrath of Dagon]

I don't claim to be an expert on this, and may be someone already posted the link, I didn't notice, but here's an interesting rebuttal: http://www.battlefield.ru/content/view/208/108/lang,en/

[Der Alte Fritz]

Hi John

I think it is time for a short re-cap.

Suvurov claims Stalin wanted to attack Germany in 1941.

Glantz disputes this but his arguments are entirely based on the military unpreparedness of the Red Army following the Winter War and the advance into Poland.

Everyone agrees that Stalin had a long term aim of intervening in a European war towards its end to gain the maximum advantage for the USSR. Probably planned for 1943 onwards.

Likewise the Zhukov plan for a pre-emptive strike or 'offensive defence' is reasonably well known and agreed.

The problem with anything to do with the study of the USSR and to an extent the modern day Russia is the sheer amount of disinformation about and the large amount that still remains unknown and in sealed archives. Who killed Kirov? How did Stalin die? How did the Imperial Family die and were there any survivors? We just do not know.

Can we test any of Suvorovs claims? Yes he is backed up in many of his claims by the Mitrokhin Archive but other of his claims have been shown to be untrue. So he is a bit of both. But to my mind the underlying basis of his argument is that Stalin can be shown to have wanted it. And that is where the argument falls down. Because anything to do with Stalin is full of contradictions and misinformation (often by Stalin himself) and downright re-writing of history afterwards, often several times over. You have a speech in which Stalin outlines the attack. It may be true, it may be disinformation by Stalin, it maybe made up after Stalins death. To set against that I have the transcript of the commission of enquiry into the debacle of the Winter War and a dozen others that show that Stalin had the most intimate knowledge of the Red Army, the generals and its capability. Of course he over-estimated it during the WW and the early days of the GPW but I just do not see him going to war with the Red Army as he knew it to be.

On the other hand there is a lot of evidence that Stalin did everything possible to avoid a confrontation with the Germans. He allow German recce planes to overfly Soviet territory, he maintained deliveries of raw materials to the end, he would not allow his general to activate their defences, to deploy and even cancelled the activation of one command. This well documented list just does not fit with a man who was going to launch a pre-emptive strike.

But good fun discussing it!

[Stalins Organ]

Germans were still investing heavily in creating industrial capacity in 1942. Soviets had created the industrial capacity already a decade earlier.

This article (pdf about 200kb) argues that the German production increase from 1943 was in fact due to investments made prior to 1939 coming to fruition, and better use of available manpower and facilities - ie nothing much at all to do with any investment 1941-42.

From the conclusion:

As a result, in the period before 1942 the growth rate of labor productivity was considerably higher than under Speer’s reign. It came to 17.3 % both in 1938 and in 1939, to 9.2 % in 1940, to 6 % in 1941, and only to 3.5 % and 3.7 % in 1942 and 1943 respectively. After 1941, it was primarily the ongoing

growth of the capital and labor endowment combined with a higher capacity utilization that enabled aircraft producers to raise their monthly production continually until summer 1944.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

This article (pdf about 200kb) argues that the German production increase from 1943 was in fact due to investments made prior to 1939 coming to fruition' date= and better use of available manpower and facilities - ie nothing much at all to do with any investment 1941-42.

indeed, but that's aircraft production. Germans are still building some of their largest tank factories in 1942. these factories, together with stuff like "Adolf Hitler Panzer Programme" (shift of resources from other armaments sectors to tank production), are what causes the boost in German tank production in the following years.

the point is, in 1942 Germans are still building their capacity to build tanks, where as Soviets built their capacity years ago. Soviets made their production plans already in 1920ies. for example the famous STZ at Stalingrad opens production in 1930 -- Nazi Germany doesn't even exist yet.

[Stalins Organ]

My point is that any increased investment in production facilities in 1942 had little to do with increased production from 1943 - I'm sure it helped, but the vast majority of the increase was due to improvements in use of facilities that had been there for a few years already.

I'd be interested in any figures on how much extra capacity was actually generated in 1942.

I don't know about German tank factories, but Russia was still building tank factories in 1942 - Plant #40 at Mytishchi started production in 1943, plants 37 (Sverdlovsk) 38 (Kirov) Uralmashzavod (Sverdlovsk) 174 (Omsk) all started production in 1942 - betwen them these plants produced about 20% of the total Tank/SPG production after 1942 (RKKA site)

STZ itself only produced 3600 tanks before being over-run by the Axis in 1942.

German tank production doubled from 1939-1940, and again from 1940-1941. they expected the war won in 1942 and so the increase was only about 25%, and then about tripled from that to 1943 - it is my contention that the majority of this last was from increasing labour input rather than increasing efficiency.

Even with all the tank factories "built" by 1941 the Soviet Union was still able to roughly quadruple tank production from 1941 to 1942. In their case the cost of production also fell quite considerably - so they WERE introducing greater efficiencies - eg the cost of a T34 fell from 270k roubles in 1941 to 193k in 1942 (Zaloga), and a T34/85 in 1945 was a "mere" 142k (Wiki)

the aircraft industry example shows how the German economic system works, and how they did the same thing from 1943 - not by building more factories (which they did for aircraft too....), but by making better use of those they already had - just like the soviets did earlier.

However it points out how the extra labour was not accompanied by great increases in efficiency - the amount produced per unit of labour only increased by small percentages compared to earlier.

It's not trying to say that the increase in production didn't happen - it's pointing out that the pre-conditions that allowed it to happen all come from before the war which is when the efficiencies came.

The late war boost in numbers came from sheer volumes of labour poured into the industries for which the majority of production facilites already existed.

[Grisha]

I can't believe this thing keeps crawling out of the woodwork. The reason why Suvorov's claim seems to jive with Zhukov's statement is because it's a half-truth exploited by Suvorov. Soviet military doctrine was closely aligned with Russian Communist doctrine which would not accept a defensive response to an external threat. Rather than wait for the enemy to attack and ravage the Motherland, the thought was to pre-empt an invasion with an attack. All Soviet plans for repelling an invasion were based on premptive attacks. There was no 'defensive' plan, because that would have been construed as 'defeatist'. Even as great a Soviet military mind as Svechin was discredited in the 1930s after his insistence on a defensive response to an invasion. It was simply unacceptable to the Soviet ideology. But, to somehow ascribe this as evidence that the Soviets planned on an expansionist world policy is stretching it. The fact of the matter is that the author of "Workers of the World Unite!" died in Mexico, an outcast in his own country, with an icepick in his head, and Stalin was more interested in keeping what he had.

If you want to read an article written by John Erickson on the subject, here's the link. The actual article is only available online via payment it seems (do a google search of the title: BARBAROSSA JUNE 1941: WHO ATTACKED WHOM?, and you'll see what I mean). Anyway, I thought this ugly beast was long dead and gone, but I guess not. As in most things in life, it's a matter of not seeing the forest for the trees. I'll admit 'Suvorov' is a clever man, but that doesn't make him right, just misleading.

[Stalins Organ]

Yes it's a bit of a drag...it's like saying that Churchill's planning to return to the continent in July 1940 meant he was going to invade during the Battle of Britain!

[Stalins Organ]

There's an intersting monograph on development of Red Army doctrine and its application in the Winterwar at the HyperWar site

Among things that might be of note are that the regulations of 1936 (PU-36) recognised the need for defence and the increased capabilities of modern defensive weapons of the time - although noting that the offensive was the decisive form of warfare - I dont' think the Soviets were alone in that idea!

And PU-39 (1939 Regs) noted

The role of the Red Army was to repel an enemy attack "with the entire might of the armed forces of the Soviet Union," and to transfer the fight to the invading nation's territory.

Manouvre was seen as the key to both offensive and defensive warfare - and positional warfare should only be engaged in when the troops were poorly trained or ill prepared.

Tukhachevsky and Svechin argued about annihilation vs attritional warfare - Svechin favouring the later due to natuer of hte Soviet State....whereas Tukhachevsky thought the increasing industrial might of the USSR was giving the army sufficient powerful weaponry to accomplish the former.

with the destruction of senior personnel during hte purges the Red Army was no longer able to follow this doctrine. And since it was essentially aimed at destruction of enemy forces in the field it utterly failed when confronted with operations against fortified lines such as in Finland where all the principles of mass and amnouvre were completely useless.

To quote the monograph:

Stalin and the Soviet High Command began to push a strategy of attrition and positional warfare. Red Army doctrine focused on maneuver, initiative, and annihilation of the enemy.

It's a good read.

[John Kettler]

Stalin's Organist,

Will have a look. Thanks for letting us know!

Regards,

John Kettler

[Tero]

By Stalin's Organist

And since it was essentially aimed at destruction of enemy forces in the field it utterly failed when confronted with operations against fortified lines such as in Finland

Nice to see this piece of turd.... er info float ever so often. I would not say Mannerheim line was "fortified" in the extent to earn its name as "one of the most formidable defence lines in the annals of WWII" according to the official Red Army history. The defenders were prepared though (even if insufficiently equipped).

where all the principles of mass and amnouvre were completely useless.

Please ! The same force composition and mass hit the Mannerheim line in December 1939 and February 1940. The first time around they failed, the second time around they managed the breach the line "even stronger than the Maginot line" after they got their act together.

The Red Army failed mostly because of a combination of its internal command level weakness, unfortuitous selection in timing and overly optimistic projections and planning when it comes to their own and the enemy performace.

Here is a comparison on the opposing text book tactics.

[Stalins Organ]

Tero there's no need for being rude

the failure of the Red Army doctrine is one of the reasons for its failure in finland - no-one ever said it was the only one, but DOCTRINE is what the monograph is looking at, not the other factors which you mention.

Red Army doctrine envisaged a mobile field battle - it had almost nothing at all in it dealing with a situation where there was insufficient room to undertake the kind of operations that entailed. Of course it may also have failed even with that room, but it seemed to work vs Japan in 1939.

The degree of fortification of the Finnish lines is not in question - and this monograph does not say it was the most heavily fortified line nor anything like it - however it points out that the Red Army was required to fight a type of war for which it had made no preparation whatsoever.

Certainly by 1940 they had sorted out some of their problems and approached the battle with a moer realistic plan - which jsut goes to show how their doctrine was forced to change by experience.

Your little rant is irrelevant to the monograph - it's like saying that the KV-2 wasn't a failure as a tank because there weer otehr problems in the REd Army armoured forces at the time.

[Tero]

By Stalin's Organist

Tero there's no need for being rude

My sincerest apologies. The remark was and is not inteded to be personal against you in any level. I did not pay enough attention to the turd remark when I proof read it. It does come across worse and misdirected in a way other than I intended. After reading too many Red Army endorsed "facts" about Mannerheim line and its strenght my remark was automatic.

the failure of the Red Army doctrine is one of the reasons for its failure in finland - no-one ever said it was the only one, but DOCTRINE is what the monograph is looking at, not the other factors which you mention.

True. I was a bit amazed when the conclusions stated that the Red Army could not execute its doctrine and that the doctrine was not faulty as such without really going into much detail why the doctrine could not be executed under the circumstances.

Red Army doctrine envisaged a mobile field battle - it had almost nothing at all in it dealing with a situation where there was insufficient room to undertake the kind of operations that entailed. Of course it may also have failed even with that room, but it seemed to work vs Japan in 1939.

My thoughts exeactly.

The degree of fortification of the Finnish lines is not in question - and this monograph does not say it was the most heavily fortified line nor anything like it

Yes. And IMO the reasons for the failure of the doctrine are bypassed almost too lightly. Yes, it is easy to say they could not execute doctrine but no real attention is paid to the actual causes of the failure to execute (extreme weather, lack of lateral space to manouver, enemy counter measures and the effects of premature deployment to the advance speed due to enemy actions, strategic effects of this decrease in speed etc).

- however it points out that the Red Army was required to fight a type of war for which it had made no preparation whatsoever.

Not really. The monograph states there were two schools of thought. One which called for thorough preparations and planning and one which favoured the arrogant "we knock the door in and they will surrender in droves" approach.

Certainly by 1940 they had sorted out some of their problems and approached the battle with a moer realistic plan - which jsut goes to show how their doctrine was forced to change by experience.

The monograph states they had doctrine for assaulting prepared positions and they failed to execute doctrine when it comes to exploiting breaches in the defences. This is IMO redundant to some extent faulty because the first assault failed because arrogantly illprepared planning and the second "failed" because the Finns sued for peace before the defences collapsed. It did not help the Soviet situation as things developed so that it was very close the British and the French were going to be deglaring war at the USSR within days.

Your little rant is irrelevant to the monograph - it's like saying that the KV-2 wasn't a failure as a tank because there weer otehr problems in the REd Army armoured forces at the time.

IMO the monograph is using 20/20 hindsight from later events when it comes to manouver doctrine vs attrition doctrine and how Winter War affected development of the Red Army doctrine. The conclusions:

The study then analyzed Soviet operations during the "Winter War" to determine if doctrine was the cause of the disaster in Finland. This monograph determined that the Soviets were incapable of executing the doctrine and, therefore, doctrine was not the primary cause of the disaster. This demonstrates that doctrine, by itself, cannot ensure victory on the battlefield. Leaders, soldiers and units must be trained, organized, and equipped to execute in accordance with doctrine.

The Red Army's doctrine, however, must be faulted for not serving the Soviet national interests. The doctrine presented Marshal Tukhachevsky's 1936 vision of modern war. The same doctrinal ideas would later serve Soviet interests in the drive to victory in World War 11. But in 1939-1940, doctrine did not align with Stalin's vision or the strategic requirements of the Soviet nation. After the purge the Soviet High Command began to reorganize the army and transition to a strategy of attrition and positional warfare. Voroshilov, the Commissar of Defense, should have taken action to modify doctrine and make it consistent with the changing national strategy. Voroshilov failed to change the doctrine. His inaction left the Red Army caught between the conflict of doctrine and the strategy of the Soviet Union.

The result of saddling the Red Army in 1939 with an inappropriate doctrine was initial military defeat at the hands of the tiny, but effective, Finnish Army. The disastrous losses suffered by the Red Army in this operation highlights that a sound military doctrine, well calculated to serve the national interests in a given situation, will contribute to the accomplishment of military missions in an economical manner. A poorly developed doctrine, not linked to national interests, will lead to disaster.

The Red Army doctrine was supposedly poorly developed, yet it won them the WWII. IMO the conclusions are more than a bit skitsophrenic. It also disregards totally the effects of politics in the execution of military operations.

As an aside I must say the rather dated sources they used in the monorgraph may not have been the best when it comes to accurately analyzing the Red Army operations during Winter War.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

My point is that any increased investment in production facilities in 1942 had little to do with increased production from 1943 - I'm sure it helped, but the vast majority of the increase was due to improvements in use of facilities that had been there for a few years already.

yes, the most important factor in increased production was the relocation of labour and raw materials to the armaments sector. it's directly related to productivity (efficiency). economies of scale, retooling and such also play a role. with tank production, though, the investment in mass production factories did make a difference, not least because early production sufferent from wide scatter at various smaller workshops.

I'd be interested in any figures on how much extra capacity was actually generated in 1942.

i don't have any specific numbers to give, and i am not even sure the numbers exist. there's a hard to get paper by Knittel about panzer production, but i have been waiting for it to arrive for more than a year. there are some German papers online but so far i haven't found any good statistics.

there are some general armaments statistics with labour & raw material input, though. for example check out Tooze's excel sheet at his page.

I don't know about German tank factories, but Russia was still building tank factories in 1942 - Plant #40 at Mytishchi started production in 1943, plants 37 (Sverdlovsk) 38 (Kirov) Uralmashzavod (Sverdlovsk) 174 (Omsk) all started production in 1942 - betwen them these plants produced about 20% of the total Tank/SPG production after 1942 (RKKA site)

sorry but you should have looked a bit deeper into the subject. none of the factories you list are new factories.

number 37 - not a new factory, moved from Moscow

number 38 - not a new factory, originally in Kolomna

number 40 - not a new factory, just switched to tank production

number 174 - not a new factory, originally in Leningrad

Uralmashzavod - not a new factory, just switched to tank production

STZ itself only produced 3600 tanks before being over-run by the Axis in 1942.

3600 isn't a huge number if you compare it to the number of total Soviet production during the war, but during the period when many of key tank factories were being evacuated the role of STZ was significant.

It's not trying to say that the increase in production didn't happen - it's pointing out that the pre-conditions that allowed it to happen all come from before the war which is when the efficiencies came.

The late war boost in numbers came from sheer volumes of labour poured into the industries for which the majority of production facilites already existed.

that depends entirely on what type of production we are talking about. coal, steel, ammunition, aircraft, submarines, halftracks, Tigers...

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Red Army considered Mannerheim line a real fortification line still in 1944, when it had already been destroyed by Red Army during earlier years. Finns didn't even consider it a defensive line. it didn't prevent Red Army commanders from calling the "destruction" of this non-existent line in 1944 a great accomplishment.

in general Red Army reporting standards are so low that i wouldn't trust any information based on them. the commanders are just trying to make themselves look good. destruction of imaginary enemy regiments, under reporting own losses and so forth. it makes planning at higher levels a stupendous task, because you draw wrong conclusions and end up giving impossible orders to units because of all the erroneus data.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

The late war boost in numbers came from sheer volumes of labour poured into the industries for which the majority of production facilites already existed.

i did a quickish look for stats, but didn't find anything good enough. so here's a quick look on German tank production. i think it's good enough to make the point.

in 1933 there is no tank production in Germany. in 1934 two tank factories open PZ-I production. by 1939 there are six tank factories (plus two got in Czechoslovakia).

in 1940 and 1941 the six factories open new tank productions lines, and in 1941 two new factories are converted to tank production. during this period the plans are laid for future tank production boost.

in 1942 three new tank factories open production. the three new tank factories that open up in 1942 are to large part behind the boost in 1943 and 1944.

in 1943 component production becomes a bottleneck with the result that tank factories are not running at 100% efficiency. thus component production industry starts expanding. the new factories make 36.5% of all tanks already in 1943.

in 1944 three new German tank factories become operational (too late to make an effect) and two Czech factories are expanded. tank production is focused on maximizing production of a few specific vehicles. Allied bombing raids begin but with limited effect. component bottleneck has been reduced. note: tank production almost doubles from 1943 where as workforce allocation to tank production is basicly the same.

in 1945 it's game over.

[Stalins Organ]

sorry but you should have looked a bit deeper into the subject. none of the factories you list are new factories.

number 37 - not a new factory, moved from Moscow

number 38 - not a new factory, originally in Kolomna

number 40 - not a new factory, just switched to tank production

number 174 - not a new factory, originally in Leningrad

Uralmashzavod - not a new factory, just switched to tank production

I got 37 and 174 wrong my misreading the data sorry - however none of the others were producing tanks prior to 1942 - that makes then new tank factories in my book.

where did you get that 38 came from Kolomna? I can't find anything about that.

Uralmashzavod - not a new factory, just switched to tank production

number 40 - not a new factory, just switched to tank production

so new TANK factories - ie factories that were now producing tanks that did not before.

Kolomna had KPZ - an arsenal expanded from gun and gunpowder production (it was hte oldest explosives manufacturing facility in russia) to include making T60 tanks - again increase in existing manufacturing capability.

Thanks for the info about German tank production facilities - do you have an links to details?

On the Mannerheim line - you're still completely mising the point, which is how soviet doctrine was insufficient to cope with the nature of the war vs Finland. What Soviet historians thought of the line is completely irrelevant.

[Tero]

By Stalin's Organist

On the Mannerheim line - you're still completely mising the point, which is how soviet doctrine was insufficient to cope with the nature of the war vs Finland.

I disagree.

Before hostilities began, the Soviet Union increased diplomatic pressure on Finland. The Soviet political leadership felt they only had to threaten the use of military force and the Finns would concede. If threats did not work, the Soviets believed a few shots across the border would cause the Finns to instantly surrender. Stalin expected a quick victory.

The Red Army Chief of the General Staff, General Shaposhnikov was less optimistic than Stalin. Shaposhnikov anticipated stubborn Finnish resistance. He proposed a plan based on extensive preparations that used the entire might of the Red Army. Stalin ridiculed Shaposhnikov's plan. Stalin assigned the task of defeating the Finns to General Meretskov and the Leningrad Military District.

The Soviet plan for the invasion of Finland was based on the Soviet political assessment of internal political dissension and weakness within Finland. The Soviets believed the oppressed Finnish workers would greet the Red Army as liberators and join the Red Army in driving the "White Finns" out of Finland. The Soviets used propaganda and "fifth column" subversion to incite internal dissension within Finland.

This passage clearly spells out the main failing was not the doctrine being completely unsuitable or insufficient. The failing was at the political level when the original planning was done with political considerations dictating the parameters which turned out to be totally contrary to the doctrinal requirements.

General Mannerheim, Commander of the Finnish Forces, described the Soviet performance in the initial stages of the war as a "badly conducted orchestra in which instruments were played out of time. The Soviets could not maximize the capabilities of their forces because they did not operate in concert with each other. The effects of the lack of coordination were piecemeal attacks that the Finns could easily defeat.

This passage clearly points out the effects of poor initial planning had in the execution of the doctrine.

As a result of this analysis, it is apparent the Red Army was not capable of successfully executing doctrine. In December 1939 the Soviets attempted to achieve a quick victory using operational maneuver. The tactical and technical capabilities of soldiers, units and commanders did not support Red Army attempts at a maneuver solution.

This passage shows IMO the main fault of the monograph. The WHY is disregarded. The political leaderships role in dictating the parameters, the poor initial preparation and planning, the execptional weather and terrain conditions disregarded as a part of the poor planning.

Breakdowns in command and initiative, and a lack of combined arms coordination prevented Red Army units from successfully adhering to doctrine.

Ie. it was bad for the line officers to stand out from the rest of the troops with fur coats so that they could be picked out by snipers and sharpshooters. Lack of coordination was due to poor preparation and planning more than poor caliber of the soldiers.

As a result, Red Army units were unable to successfully maneuver, attack the enemy in depth, or mass the effects of their attacks. A combination of inexperienced leaders, poorly trained soldiers, and unprepared units combined to prevent the Soviets from executing their plan. Decisions by Stalin and the Soviet High Command effectively prevented commanders from initially employing plans they thought appropriate for the situation.

In essense an accurate assesment. Except the importance of the political leaderships overruling the military planners is downplayed.

In the second operation, the operational commander had time to prepare his forces. He abandoned the maneuver doctrine and relied on mass to accomplish the mission.

He also concentrated his main effort to just one main front the Isthmus with supporting attacks continued in the Kollaa front to keep pressure on the keepers of the rear of the Mannerheim line defenders. Halting operations elsewhere in the 800-1000km frontier is IMO not even remotely close to abandoning maneuver doctrine. Especially when the area was clearly the main axis of advance to Finland and the Russians had known that from time immemorial (well, at least since 1809 to 1917 when they occupied Finland).

He was ultimately successful, but at a very high cost. Stalin's demand for a quick, decisive victory combined with his restraints of the ways and means available also contributed to the Red Army's poor performance.

Here the monograph is clearly right. Yet this does not affect the assesment of the doctrine in the least. They sever the political aspect from the military aspect and draw their conclusions from there. And IMO the conclusions are deficient in disregarding the political leaderships role in the Soviet strategies and development of the military doctrine.

The disastrous losses suffered by the Red Army in this operation highlights that a sound military doctrine, well calculated to serve the national interests in a given situation, will contribute to the accomplishment of military missions in an economical manner. A poorly developed doctrine, not linked to national interests, will lead to disaster.

So, on one hand the Red Army was not in shape to execute the doctrine which has to serve the national interest, on the other hand the otherwise sound doctrine failed because it was not serving the national interest.

What Soviet historians thought of the line is completely irrelevant.

Lets not forget the Soviet historians are the main source the writer of the monograph draws his data from.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

where did you get that 38 came from Kolomna? I can't find anything about that.

figuring out Soviet factories is detective work. same factories have different names, the names change, parts of the factories move around, get united, get split apart, get sent back, different sources use different transliterations for Russian names etc.

you have already found some good basic sites. one other such basic site is wikipedia page about Soviet tank factories (gives an idea about the naming mess).

then there are a bit more academic pages. for example here (PDF) is a basic list of almost all Soviet factories. for example for that factory 38 at Kirov it nicely shows the history at Kolomna (38 at Kolomna: steam locomotives 1869-1956, tanks from mid-1930s; numbered from c. 1939; evacuated Kirov 1941. 38 at Kirov: evacuated from Kolomna; self-propelled artillery and light tanks).

then there are the sites of the factories themselves (most of them are operational still today), which typically contain some information about WW2 era. e.g. here's the one for the factory 38 at Kolomna (quote: As enemy troops approached Moscow major part of the plant was evacuated to Kirov where military machinery (tanks, mortars “Katyusha”, self-propelled plants) were launched during a short period of time.).

then there are sites about some specific vehicle/tank, which usually deal with production history. e.g. here about T-60, which states that initially production begun at Kolomna (and other four factories, but not the 38 in Kirov), then later also at 38 in Kirov.

all the information is doomed to be partly contradictory. you just have to try to figure out how things really went by combining different information from different sources. e.g. the T-60 site doesn't know about evacuation from Kolomna to Kirov.

so new TANK factories - ie factories that were now producing tanks that did not before.

yeah, in that sense, but conversion to tank production is a lot faster and easier than the building of a whole new factory. the formed can take just some weeks, the other years.

Thanks for the info about German tank production facilities - do you have an links to details?

here's a good starting point. then google around when you know locations, company names and so forth. basicly it's the same detective work as with Soviets, with the difference that much of the stuff is in German.

if you are really interested in tank factories, there are academic papers about all kinds of stuff, but if you want online material you usually need an access to non-open e-libraries and journals. if you are a student, or work for companies that deal with this type of stuff, you might easily get access for free.

[Stalins Organ]

thanks - should keep me busy for a bit...