what order should you launch/land airstrikes in a carrier game?

[Lars]

Yep.

The US ones had their own problems. As most of the pre-war carriers were laid down on cruiser hulls, flaws were to be expected. And everyone was still learning.

But I wouldn't just go dismissing the Japanese ones as crap. In some respects, they were better, in others, worse. Some of it depends on where you plan on operating. Stormy North Pacific, I would think an enclosed hanger deck might start to look like a good idea. Probably why the Brits went that way too.

As you say, little of A, little of B.

[Other Means]

We went the way we did because we expected to be operating in the North Atlantic or the Med where we were in range of land based aircraft, hence armoured flight decks etc. I've seen comparisons where it was shown that the US design was better vs the British as it could fit on more aircraft and wield a bigger axe - but really, they both suited their environments. Nice feature to be able to brush a kamikaze off the deck though

I imagine in the N Pacific they US would roll the shutters down when they weren't running the engines. Before reading your article I never appreciated why they were there and what a vital part they played.

[Lars]

Interestingly, this doc shows that the Japanese were aware of the dangers, and designed the upper hangers with thinner walls to allow a blowout in case of explosion.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/kojinshavolume6.pdf

Didn't work to well, but hey, they tried.

[Stalins Organ]

the British design was a failure because the armoured flight deck and enclosed hangar were part of the hull girder box.

With battle damage they became twisted and were essentially impossible to get straight again - they were almost all scrapped after the war due to damage - the Illustrius was able to steam at a max 22 kts so was only good for experimetnal purposes, Victorious had a "refit" that was a disaster as a project, etc.

Their design failed through no fault of the designers tho...well not particularly - they were constrained by size, and designed for the weapons they thought would be used - 6" guns and 500lb bombs.

See this article/review for an overview.

[Other Means]

the British design was a failure because the armoured flight deck and enclosed hangar were part of the hull girder box.

With battle damage they became twisted and were essentially impossible to get straight again - they were almost all scrapped after the war due to damage - the Illustrius was able to steam at a max 22 kts so was only good for experimetnal purposes, Victorious had a "refit" that was a disaster as a project, etc.

Their design failed through no fault of the designers tho...well not particularly - they were constrained by size, and designed for the weapons they thought would be used - 6" guns and 500lb bombs.

See this article/review for an overview.

Pff that'll buff out. Bit of filler, good as new.

[Stalins Organ]

You forgot to add a lick o' paint!

[Rob Ross]

It's called a book fat boy. Read it. I was taken in by your picture and your text when you said 'it was one of mine'. WTF did I take anything you say seriously...

BTW a Lars/Kettler alliance - bwahahaha.

Dunno why I'm bothering to explain to a pair of retards but: The IJN settled on unarmoured carrier decks and enclosed hangars. The worst possible combination. The US had unarmoured decks and open hangers and shovelled the **** overboard when things started exploding. The UK had armoured decks and enclosed hangers which reduced the blast enough to not be so devastating.

Oh and the IJN had just one pump line to the hanger deck which of course when severed made damage control impossible. Not like they had dedicated teams to do it anyway.

Read the ****ing book and I'll discuss it further. Alternatively carry on in your own 1950s world.

[Blackhorse]

Dude,

Why the venom?

whiskey tango foxtrot?

[Blackhorse]

Here is the Japanese account taken from here:

http://www.history.navy.mil/library/special/midway.htm

Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy

June 1947

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

On the fifth anniversary of the Battle of Midway, the Office of Naval Intelligence publishes the official Japanese action report of this engagement, recently translated under the supervision of the Naval Analysis Division, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, and here available in English for the first time.

Although this document is not perfectly complete (part IV for example is missing), it is believed that nothing of any importance will be discovered in the future to change the story in any of its essential details. The report was prepared in the first place under difficulties. It must be remembered that the war diaries of many of the ships engaged, their charts and other valuable papers were lost as a result of the ships having become "inoperational," in the Japanese euphemism.

There is nothing to indicate that the Japanese were not perfectly frank in this report. It was intended only for the highest echelons in the Japanese Navy and Government, and was guarded very closely throughout the war. There have been no alterations or corrections, omissions or additions to this report, beyond the supplying of a few clarifying footnotes.

PART III. DESCRIPTION OF THE OPERATION

1. Direction of Operation by the Commander and his Movements

The Mobile Force departed Hashira Jima at 0600 17 May. Maintaining strict anti-sub screen and a rigid radio silence, the force headed for the area to the northwest of Midway following course 1 as given in Mobile Force Secret OpOrd 35.

On 1 and 2 June,4 all ships were refueled.

Visibility steadily decreased from about 1000 2 June so that by 2300 on the 3d, all ships were being navigated blindly. No visual signals could be employed during this period. Since there seemed little likelihood of the fog's lifting, the radio was used as a last resort at 1030 on the 3d (long wave) to give change of course.

Shortly after this, the fog lifted somewhat, making visual signals barely possible. By the morning of the 4th visibility on the surface improved greatly, but there were scattered clouds overhead.

At 1640 the Tone reported sighting about 10 enemy planes bearing 260 degrees. Three fighters immediately took off from the Akagi in pursuit of these but they were unable to sight the enemy. There is some element of doubt in the reported sighting.

At about 2330 on the same day, the Akagi twice sighted what was thought to be enemy planes weav-

--6--

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ing in and out of the clouds. All hands were immediately ordered to battle stations. There is considerable doubt as to the reliability of this sighting.

At 0130 on the 5th,5 under command of flight officer of the Hiryu, Lieut. Tomonaga, Organization #5 composed of 36 ship-based fighters, 36 ship-based bombers, and 36 ship-based torpedo planes, took off to attack Midway.

Between 0130 and 0200, 1 ship-based torpedo plane each from Akagi and Kaga, 2 Type 0 Float Recco each from Tone and Chikuma (distance 300 miles, to the left 60 miles) and 1 Type-95 Float Recco from the Haruna (distance 150 miles, to the left 40 miles), took off in search of enemy task forces to the South and to the East.

From about 0230, two to three enemy flying boats maintained continuous contact with us.

Shortly after taking off, the attack unit was contacted by enemy flying boats. When about 30 miles short of the target on Midway, the above mentioned flying boats suddenly dropped illumination bombs over our attack plane units to attract overhead cover fighters.

Thereafter, while engaging in bitter air combats, bombs were dropped on military installations on Midway between about 0345 and 0410. Fires resulted. All but 2 ship-based fighters, 1 ship-based bomber and 3 ship-based torpedo planes returned to their carriers by about 0600.

After our attack unit had taken off, enemy flying boats maintained contact with us. At about 0400 the first enemy wave attacked. From then until about 0730, the enemy attacked almost continuously. We counter attacked with fighters and AA fire and were able to bring most of the attackers down by 0645. About 30 carrier-based bombers then attacked us resulting in fires aboard the Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu, forcing them to fall behind and leaving only the Hiryu untouched.

Prior to this and subsequent to the take off of the initial attack unit, the fleet had Organization Number 4 (ship-based torpedo planes) stand by in readiness to act against any enemy surface vessels. However, at 0415, the command plane of the Hiryu radioed that:

"There is a necessity for carrying out a second attack (0400)."

It was decided, therefore, that a second attack would be directed against Midway. Orders were issued for the ship-based attack planes to remove their torpedoes and replace them with #80 land bombs.

At about 0500, Tone's #4 plane reported:

"Sighted what appears to be the enemy composed of 10 (ships), bearing 10 degrees, distance 240 miles from Midway, on course 150 degrees, speed 20 knots (0428)."

Two subsequent reports concerning the weather (0440) and the enemy's course and speed (0455) were received but since we had not been advised of details, the plane was ordered to:

"Advise ship types."

At 0530, Tone's plane reported:

"The enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier in a position to the rear of the others (0520)."

and again at about 0540:

"Sight what appears to be 2 cruisers in position bearing 8 degrees, distance 250 miles from Midway; course, 150 degrees; speed 20 knots (0530)."

Thus, it was definitely established that enemy carriers were operating in the vicinity. The following dispatch was, therefore, sent to CinC Combined Fleet:

"(Info: CinC 2nd Fleet) At 0500, the enemy composed of 1 carrier, 5 cruisers, and 5 destroyers, was sighted in position bearing 10 degrees, distance 240 miles from Midway. We are heading for it."

Under orders issued at 0415, the ship-based attack planes were already being re-equipped with #80 land bombs which made immediate take-offs of the ship-based attack planes in Organization Number 4, impossible. It was therefore decided that we would await the return of the Midway attack unit and then carry out a grand scale air attack. The Fleet was advised as follows:

"After taking on the returning planes, we shall proceed north to contact and destroy the enemy task force."

This was sent at 0605.

In reply to this CarDiv 1 advised that its ship-based attack planes (torpedo equipped) would be ready for the take-off at 0730 and CarDiv 2 that its ship-based attack planes (to be equipped with torpedoes upon their return from the first attack), would be ready for the take-off by from 0730 to 0800. Subsequent to this, every effort was made to expedite completing preparations for the take-off of Organization Number 4. (Akagi: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based attack planes. Kaga: 3 ship-based fighters; 27 ship-based attack planes. Hiryu: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bombers. Soryu: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bombers).

--7--

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

While we were engaged in this, the enemy struck. Communication facilities were knocked out of all damaged ships. There was little likelihood of the fires being extinguished in the immediate future. For these reasons, I decided to direct the operations from the Nagara, and transferred to her at 0830.

After our ships had been damaged, the commander of CarDiv 2 decided to carry out the attack against the enemy carrier sighted by Tone's float recco plane. At 0758, Hiryu's attack unit (6 fighters and 18 bombers) took off and carried out the attack. Direct hits by 5 #25 ordinary and 1 land bombs were scored on an Enterprise class carrier, inflicting serious damage to her (possibly sinking her).

Prior to this, at 0530, a type 13 experimental ship-based bomber from the Soryu was ordered to maintain contact with the enemy carrier but due to break-down in radio facilities, it was not known until the return of this plane that, in addition to the aforementioned, there was a task force which had as its nucleus a carrier of the Enterprise class and another of the Hornet class. This task force was operating in waters to the north of the other one.

With this information at hand, the Hiryu attack unit (4 fighters and 9 torpedo planes, supplemented by 2 fighters from the Kaga and 1 torpedo plane from the Akagi) was ordered to the attack. Three torpedo hits were scored on a carrier of the Enterprise class, seriously damaging her. Heavy damages were also inflicted on a heavy cruiser of the San Francisco class.

NOTES

Report of Chikuma's recco plane at 1413, 5th:

(a) Sighted an enemy carrier of the Enterprise class listing and stopped in position 30-15N, l76-50W. (No evidence of fire. No damage to flight deck.) Three cruisers and 5 destroyers were in the vicinity. At about 1420, leaving the carrier on the scene, the others proceeded eastward on course 80 degrees, speed 20 knots.

( Sighted 2 enemy carriers (Yorktown or Hornet class) at 1510, in position 30-23N, 176-05W. Each was being directly escorted by 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers. Distance between the two groups, 3 miles; course 270 degrees; speed 12 knots.

© Two other carriers (class undetermined) escorted by 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers sighted at 1516 in a position about 4 miles to the south of the others. Course 260 degrees, speed 12 knots.

(d) Since the above sightings were made by the #2 plane while it was proceeding southward on a course of about 180 degrees from about 1500, and were seen one after another along this line, there is no chance of duplication.6 Moreover, sightings described in ( and © above, were from below cloud level, or at about 300 meters altitude.

Judging from these reports, it seemed probable that the carrier damaged by torpedoes remained adrift until the following morning.

Subsequent searches failed to locate the carrier damaged by 5 ordinary bombs and 1 land bomb.

From these evidences, it was possible to estimate that one carrier was sunk by bombing while another was seriously damaged by torpedoes. The damaged carrier was sunk the following day by submarine torpedoes.

The three attacks resulted in the loss of most of Hiryu's attack unit. At 1240, she only had 6 fighters, 5 bombers, and 4 torpedo planes left. Contact was maintained, however, with Soryu's Type 13 experimental ship-based bomber (the plane which was ordered to the Hiryu because of fire on board the Soryu after returning from reconnaissance). Preparations were pressed for a fourth attack, aimed at the destruction of the Hornet class carrier.

During this time, the Hiryu had the planes of her air cover maintain constant cover. At 1403, at the very moment when a type 13 experimental ship-based bomber was about to take off, the Hiryu was subjected to dive bombing attacks from 13 enemy ship-based bombers. The Hiryu, also, broke out in flames.

Damages to our carriers up to this time were as follows:

(a) AKAGI

The enemy attack unit which carried out a sustained attack from about 0400 was almost totally destroyed by friendly cover fighters. Up to 0650, our surface units had suffered practically no damage and the skies were clear of enemy planes.

At 0700, the second wave struck. Fourteen enemy torpedo planes, splitting into two groups approached from the northwest. One group carried out a torpedo attack against the Kaga and was followed up with several planes dive-bombing her.

At 0706, enemy torpedo planes were sighted bearing 118 degrees. To minimize the target area, the Akagi turned to course 300 degrees and stayed on this course. At a time when all of our surface

--8--

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

units had maneuvered themselves into maximum defense against the torpedo planes, enemy dive bombers were suddenly noted among the clouds overhead at 0726. Resorting to evasive tactics, every effort was made to avoid the bombs, but one direct hit was sustained on the aft rim of the lift amidship and another on the rear guard of the port flight deck. (Neither were fatal hits.)

Since the Akagi was at the time preparing to carry out the second attack, the fire spread over the entire hangar area and with induced explosions, the fire gradually moved from the aft quarters, forward with great intensity, spreading even to the immediate vicinity of the bridge.

Ammunition rooms were immediately ordered flooded, and all hands were ordered to fire-fighting stations. The pump system aboard, however, failed to function and it became apparent that the fire would not be extinguishable in the immediate future. The headquarters, therefore, was moved to the Nagara at 0746. Subsequent to this, every effort was made to bring the fire under control but it became increasingly evident that there would be little hope of success.

At 1038, the Emperor's portrait was transferred to the destroyer Nowake. By 1620, the situation was deemed hopeless, and the captain of the Akagi decided to order all hands to abandon ship. A report to that effect was made to the commander of the Mobile Force and the order was issued at 1625. Personnel began transferring to the destroyers Arashi and Nowake at 1700. At 1925 CinC Combined Fleet ordered: "Delay disposition." While standing by awaiting further orders, CinC Combined Fleet ordered: "Dispose," at 0150 on the 6th. In accordance with this order, the ship was scuttled at 0200, in position 30-30N, 178-40W.

( KAGA

Against enemy torpedo plane attacks which were carried out after 0400, AA fire and evasive action proved completely successful. While still engaged in evasive action at about 0715 against the persistent enemy torpedo planes, 9 enemy dive bombers were suddenly sighted among the clouds at 0722. Every effort was made to counter these through evasive action and AA fire cover. These efforts were successful against the first, second, and third bombs, but #4 hit starboard, aft, while #7 was a direct hit in the vicinity of the forward elevator. Glass on the bridge was shattered and because of the smoke from the bombs, visibility from that point was reduced to zero. The captain ordered emergency steering apparatus put in operation. Bomb #8 hit in the vicinity of the forward elevator. Practically nothing of the bridge remained after this hit. All persons who were on the bridge at the time, including the captain, were killed in action. Bomb #9 also hit amidship. Fire-fighting was conducted under the direction of the air officer, but since there seemed to be little hope of getting the fire under control, the Emperor's portrait was transferred to the Hagikaze at 1025. The situation became hopeless by 1340 and all hands were ordered to abandon ship. They were transferred to the destroyers Hagikaze and Maikaze. The fire on board spread to both the forward and aft fuel tanks by 1625, causing two great explosions and the ship's sinking. Position of Kaga's sinking: 30-20.3N, 179-17.2W.

© HIRYU

Fire broke out as a result of dive-bombing attacks by 13 enemy dive bombers at 1403. From then until 1803 she resorted to evasive action under battle speed #1, while efforts were made to escape from the battle area and to fight fires. The flames could not be brought under control, however, and the fires killed one man after another in the engine rooms until further operation of the ship became impossible. Telephone communications with the engine rooms were maintained until the last. The manner in which the engine room personnel from Engineer Commander Kunizo Aimune down to the last man, carried on in the face of death which finally overtook them, can only be described as heroic.

The ship's list, due to shipping water, constantly increased to about 15 degrees.

At 2058, it seemed as if the fires might be brought under control, but at that time there was another induced explosion and the fierce fires were rekindled. It became evident that further fire-fightng operations were useless and all hands were ordered to prepare to abandon ship at 2330. At 2350 Captain Tomeo Kaki and Squadron Commander Rear-Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi delivered messages to the crew. This was followed by expressions of reverence and respect to the Emperor, the shouting of Banzai's, the lowering of the battle flag and command flag. At 0015, all hands were ordered to abandon ship, His Imperial Highness' portrait removed, and the transfer of personnel to the destroyers Kazagumo and Makigumo put underway. The transfer of portrait and men was completed at 0130.

--9--

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

After completion, of the transfer operations, the Division Commander and Captain remained aboard ship. They waved their caps to their men and with complete composure joined their fate with that of their ship.

At 0210 the Hiryu was scuttled by torpedo (1) from the Makigumo. Position of Hiryu's scuttling: 31-27.5N, 179-23.5W.

(d) SORYU

The Soryu was attacked by 13 dive bombers from 0725. Three hits were scored on her at 0725, 0726, and 0728. By 0730, the fires quickly spread and caused induced explosions from the bomb-storage room, torpedo-storage room, AA and machine-gun-ammunition rooms as well as from gasoline tanks. Fires enveloped the entire ship in no time. By 0740 both engines had stopped. At 0743, attempts were made to steer her, but with the entire ship in flames, she was helpless. "Abandon ship" was ordered at 0745.

While most of the officers and men, including the Executive officer, had congregated on deck, having been forced to leave their posts due to the flames, a terrific explosion occurred. The explosion sent them flying into the water.

Every effort was made to pick these men up and put them on the forward deck. Medical aid was given those needing it there. Transfers to the destroyers Hamakaze and Isonami were completed at about 1600.

As soon as the fires broke out aboard ship, the captain, Ryusaku Yanagimoto, appeared on the signal tower to the starboard of the bridge. He took command from this post and pleaded that his men seek shelter and safety. He would allow no man to approach him. Flames surrounded him but he refused to give up his post. He was shouting "Banzai" over and over again when heroic death overtook him.

Fires died down somewhat by about 1600, and the air officer who was the acting commander, organized fire fighters with the intention of reboarding the ship. However, the ship sank7 at 1613 and there was a great underwater explosion at 1620.

Position: 30-42.5N, 178-37.5W.

At 0828, after the headquarters had been transferred to the Nagara, a plane from the Chikuma reported: "The enemy is in position bearing 70 degrees, distance 90 miles from us (0810)." It was decided that the enemy would be destroyed in a daytime attack. Therefore, the following order was issued at 0853: "We are now going to attack. Assemble." At 0900, our course was set at 60 degrees, speed 16 knots; at 0945, course 0 degrees, speed 20 knots; 1000, speed 24 knots.

At 1045, the enemy changed its course to 90 degrees and the opportunity for battle seemed to be close at hand. Somewhat later, Tone's #4 plane reported: "The enemy is in position bearing 114 degrees, distance 110 miles from my position of 1230." From this it became evident that the enemy was trying to put distance between himself and us.

It was deemed that if under these conditions, the enemy chose to strike, we would be at a distinct disadvantage in that we would be unable to carry out a decisive battle.

We, therefore, turned about and proceeded westward, with the expectation of destroying the enemy in a night encounter.

Prior to this, at 1120, the following order was issued to the Second Mobile Force:

"The First Mobile Force is in (grid) position TO E WO 33 at 1100, 5th. After destroying enemy striking force to the east, we plan to proceed northward. The Second Mobile Force will rendezvous with us as soon as possible. Our (grid) position at 1130 will be: YU YU KE 44, on course 285, speed 24 knots. Plan to rendezvous with Landing Force at 1600."

While thus laying plans for the night attack, the Hiryu also broke out in flames at 1405. That meant that while all four of our carriers had been lost, the enemy had at least one. Moreover, as long as we were in the operational radius of their shore-based air, we would be at a very distinct disadvantage.

By 1433, the enemy began to retreat to the east on course 70, speed 20 knots, which further reduced our hopes for a night engagement. However, we still were determined to carry it out. Nagara's plane was ordered to prepare for a take-off and all the ships were ordered to assemble in the vicinity of the Nagara. At 1450, CinC Second Fleet, issued the orders for the night battle.

At 1530, the commander of DesDiv 4 ordered the destroyers under his command to stand by the various carriers assigned to them and to protect them from enemy submarines and task forces.

At about this time the commander of the Chikuma made the following report: "This ship's #2 plane reports that at about 1530 he sighted 4 enemy carriers, 6 cruisers and 15 destroyers proceeding westward in a position about 30 miles east of the listing and burning enemy carrier."

[Stalins Organ]

. The UK had armoured decks and enclosed hangers which reduced the blast enough to not be so devastating.

.

nope - this combination usually resulted in the internal fires or other damage twisting the whole box girder structure of the hull, resulting in the ships becoming useless even if not destroyed.

eg Formidable was rendered scrap by a corsair's guns that went off on board after the war, raked the hangar deck with 20mm shells and turned it into a furnace.

Indeed even minor hits could do so - such as the kamikaze hit that she famously "shrugged off" in 1945 which resulted in an unrepairable warp to the hull.

Her sister ships also suffered irrepairable hull warpage from otherweise repairable hits - Illustrious from German bombs in the Med in 1941, susequently being limited to 22 kts and her centreline shaft being permanently unusable, and Indomitable, which suffered bomb hits in 1941 that fortuitously did no warp her hull and was refitted to "as new" condition 1948-50, but then had a internal fire that did warp her hull - she was repaired with concrete and towed into place for Queen Elizabeth's coronation review in 1953, returned to the "unmaintained reserve" in October of that year and scrapped in 1955.

the only "up" side of the British system was that they carried fewer a/c so hangar deck fires were not "otherwise" as damaging - ie they didn't tend to sink the ship...but then gthey didn't tend to sink US carriers eitehr, and the British ships were still writeoffs anyway! plus with fewer a/c they were arguably less of a target priority for the Japs than the US carriers were!

So the Brits really got nothing from their design philosophy at all - it's a whitewash to teh Yanks on this particular score - depending on your game the yanks get some high score, the brits get 0, or an innings defeat.....

[JonS]

Depends how you count it, Stalin. There are examples of RN carriers able to resume flight operations with in hours or days of hits that would have sent USN carriers back to the builders yards for months.

And that, after all, is the raison d'etre for a carrier - flight operations during armed conflict. Not longevity or steaming speed.

[Stalins Organ]

And yet only 1 US carrier was ever sunk by flight deck hits (USS Princeton, an aunarmoured light carrier, as were RN light carriers) .

And of course the trouble with the british system was that even if the carrier could be repaired & fly off that particular day, it sometimes becamse effectively useless - either due to unrepairable damage as with Illustrious, or with their small airgroups the losses they suffered made them even more marginal.

Probably one of the reasons US carriers would often return to the US was because they could - they had masive repair facilities at Puget Sound on hte west coast, and they had a lot of carriers.....so if a couple needed to head off for repair then after 1943 it wasn't too much of a problem!

Looking through Wiki for carriers that took flight deck hits:

Yorktown took a hit at Corral sea that penetrated several decks and killed 66 men, but was able to repair herself sufficiently to continue with operations pretty much immediately. Structural repairs were carried out in 2 days at Pearl Harbour.

At Midway she took 3 flight deck hits, but was able to repair and conduct flight ops with her remaining a/c against the Kate torpedo bombers that hit her with 2 torpedoes (and then was still able to be taken under tow until finally sunk by 2 more torpedoes from a Japanese submarine but that's anotehr story...).

Saratoga took 6 bomb hits on 21 Feb 1945, was still able to recover her a/c (but not launch - her forward flight deck was wrecked), and took 2 1/2 months to fully repair.

Hornet took 5 bombs and a Val that followed its bomb, but was only rendered hors de combat by 3 torpedoes delivered by Kates....(and then then took 9 US torpedoes and 400 5" gun shells, finally being sunck by 3 more Japanese torpedoes!!)

Essex took a kamikaze hit among planes fueling on her flight deck, but was back in action 20 days later.

Intrepid took 2 kamikaze hits in December 1944 and was out of action for 20 days, then took 1 more in april 45 and was flying again 3 hours later (in comparison it took 6 hours to repair Formidable's armoured flight deck by concreting in the dent)

Franklin took a bomb on the outboard edge of he deck elevator that didn't affect air ops, took a kamikaze on her flight deck that required about 9 weeks repair. After that she took 2 flight deck hits that left her dead in the water 50 miles off the Japanese coast, was taken in tow but eventually was able to steam at 14 kts - she arrived back in the US on 28 April & I don't know how long repairs took but she was opened to the public on Navy Day (Oct 27)

ticonderoga took 35 days to repair 2 kamikaze hits Feb-april 45 (there's a damage report for these here)

Randolph took a kamikaze hit on its aft flight deck that left a hole - she was at anchor so they repaired it before setting sail several days later - the photo on her wiki page shows she could probably have continued flight ops if required.

Bunker hill took a pounding on 11 May - 2 kamikazes struck her with 2 bombs (one of which passed straight through without exploding) and then themselves within 30 seconds, setting fire to fully fuelled aircraft on deck and in the hangar - many pilots died in their cockpits on deck. she returned to the US for repairs and was serviceable again by "september" of 45.

Wasp received a bomb hit in March of 1945, but stayed in action off Japan for several more days before returning to the US for repairs, and was back in action in july "after a brief sojurn at Pearl Harbour"

[Michael Emrys]

S.O., you left out the USS Enterprise, which suffered bomb hits in both the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and the Battle of Santa Cruz. It was further hit on three more occasions later in the war, but was still serviceable at the end.

You can read more here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Enterprise_%28CV-6%29

Michael

[Stalins Organ]

Thanks - I should probably look at the detail of the RN carriers too.......but it's time for breakfast and to stay ahead of my kids on Runescape...

[Rob Ross]

Oh yeah, the RN design was probably (definitely) not so good as the USN, but the armoured deck/enclosed hangar philosophy worked occasionally, whereas the IJN unarmoured deck/enclosed hangar philosophy was a consistant disaster!

[Rob Ross]

BTW stop giving undue credence to the contemporary 'eyewitness' IJN reports regarding Midway. They all had a vested interest in portraying what happened as a minor miracle.

There's always 'Shattered Sword'

[Stalins Organ]

OK - some brit carriers -

Indomitable - hit by 2 bombs during Peedestal in August 42, repaired in the US until Feb 43. Hit by a Kamikaze in 45 with no great effect. Spent 3 years being refitted in late 40's but a fire warped the hull in 1950 & she was unrepairable.

Illustrious - hit by 8 bombs January 1941, returned to service May 1942 - there was a bit of travel and work up time, but out of service for 16 months, lost centre shaft & reduced to 22-23 kts. Took 2 kamikaze hits in 1945 without too much obvious effect, but as with Indomitable hull deformation meant she was a writeof.

Formidable - hit by 2 x 1000kg bombs in May 1942 in the Med, out of action 6 months, hit by 1 kamikaze in 1945 that sent a splinter down through several decks penetrating steam lines and a fuel tank causing a major fire & destroyed 11 a/c. Fire was bought under control and dent in deck repaired with concrete - able to operate a/c 6.5 hrs later. Took another kamikaze hit later on which had no effect. Wiki says that the earlier bomb hits had left her "permanently mained" - other sites repeat this (or are repeated by wiki) with no further explaination. Was considered uneconomic to repair after war & was placed in reserve 1947 & never reactivated.

Victorious took 2 Kamikaze hits in 1945 with no effect due to armoured fligth deck.

Indefatigable tok 1 kamikaze hit but was able to operate again after 5 hours.

Adn I think that's it for the armoured deck carriers and bomb/kamikaze hits. Several were lsot to U-boats of course.

So overall - in the context of warfighting the armoured deck certainly seems to have helped with survival from kamikazes, but had no benefit vs AP bombs. The cost was smaller carriers with smaller airgroups and unrepairable damage when they were penetrated, which was pretty much all eth time by any AP bomb hit since hte deck armour was not strong enough and could not be strong enough to stop really heavy bombs then in use.

the damage from such bomb hits was often unrepairable leading to seriously degraded performance and/or early retirement as unrepairable - the reason for this being that the armoured flight deck was part of the hull box, so any deformation of it affected the structural integrity of the ship as a whole.

As for the Japanese carriers - there's a page here that describes the problems associated with their hangar design quite well I think.

[Lars]

It's called a book fat boy. Read it. I was taken in by your picture and your text when you said 'it was one of mine'. WTF did I take anything you say seriously...

BTW a Lars/Kettler alliance - bwahahaha.

Dunno why I'm bothering to explain to a pair of retards but: The IJN settled on unarmoured carrier decks and enclosed hangars. The worst possible combination. The US had unarmoured decks and open hangers and shovelled the **** overboard when things started exploding. The UK had armoured decks and enclosed hangers which reduced the blast enough to not be so devastating.

Oh and the IJN had just one pump line to the hanger deck which of course when severed made damage control impossible. Not like they had dedicated teams to do it anyway.

Read the ****ing book and I'll discuss it further. Alternatively carry on in your own 1950s world.

So in other words, they don't have a photo either.

[Other Means]

OK - some brit carriers -

As for the Japanese carriers - there's a page here that describes the problems associated with their hangar design quite well I think.

It was worth a read when Lars gave it further up the thread

[Stalins Organ]

How is his premature quotation my problem??!!