Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

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[JasonC]

Well it worked well enough. Firefights in close terrain with good cover do indeed tend to go long, and the rifles firing semi auto are sometimes the only thing left shooting sometime around 2 or 3 in the morning. And that can make the difference between a unit that can be overrun, and one that would take 5 or 10 times its number with it, if it were.

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[Sergei]

Originally posted by AdamL:

The problem with that logic is that to expend twice as much ammo tactically you will be standing in front of a better calibre weapon for twice as long. You can't achieve that.

Or, you can use your superior amount of ammunition to lay suppressing fire on the enemy so that they wouldn't point that gun at you.

Anyway, hasn't this - as the Stryker thingy - been discussed oh so many times before? You're wiser to spend your time on discussing about politics, religion and climate change.

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[Bigduke6]

My opinion, Blackhorse is wrong, Jason is right. That's the short version.

For the long version, here you go.

I read the article, closely. Here are some elements I think are worth discussing:

The author is one Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, a retired soldier and Vietnam veteran. He did not read the article himself, he used a translator. This to me argues he is probably not as well-read as he could be on the Russian military, if he didn't have to use a translator.

The Russian article appeared in a 2004 issue of Foreign Military Affairs (Translation - Inostrannie Voennyie Dela, usual abbreviation - FMA), which is published by the Russian Ministry of Defence. However, this is not the same thing as writing for Infantry Magazine, which is what Grau did.

Infantry Magazine is published by the Infantry School in Fort Benning, a branch of the US Army with a bureaucratic self-interest in attracting taxpayer money to the infantry branch, especially money that obliges alot of infantry teaching and training. That means we gamers have to treat anything put out by the school on a new infantry weapons system - which the Stryker is - with a grain of salt.

FMA is not the FMA of Soviet days. Now, it is a publication running mostly on inertia, with a token budget, and aimed at giving officers in the thousands of provincial units a basic understanding of foreign military issues. FMA is not a training manual of the Red Army. What does and does not appear in its pages is not a secret tea leaf message on what the Kremlin approves or disapproves.

Nor is FMA, as it once was, the apex of open-source information on foreign stuff available to the Russian military professional. These days, Russians interested in foreign military stuff get on the web like the rest of us. Heck, maybe some of them are here right now.

(In which case I say: Privet, kakie liudi, pozno prishel, shtraf nado platit'!)

Like, almost certainly, the author of the article, who I will bet was about a captain, and maybe even a lieutenant.

All of which undermines Grau's argument that "the Russians" think Stykers are silly. There are little grounds to believe the article represents anything more than the opinion of a single officer interested in getting his name in FMA, so he can advance his career a bit.

The Russian article is not without outright errors. Here is one of the most egregious:

"American military specialists do not consider that the Stryker brigade is any less effective than the US heavy brigades."

This of course is patently false. A pure Stryker force, all other things being equal, would always be at a disatvantage against a US heavy combined arms force. Simple equation of who has more firepower and armor. Thus, the Russian author is - at least to some extent - setting up a straw man.

However, just because a Russian author sets up a straw man to criticize Strykers, does not mean the "Stryker concept" is automatically validated.

Jason is dead on the money, and Grau is just being silly, when one comes to the main US advantage in combat these days: using information-processing technology finding people and objects, and then using computer guidance (usually) to destroy them efficiently.

Here is what Grau writes, when he starts listing the problem he sees with the FMA article:

First, there is no real discussion or excitement about using information technology as electronic judo to outperform an opponent and substitute electrons for armor plate and fire power. The presence of advanced computers and the eventual delivery of advanced computerized C4ISR is noted, but not developed.

This paragraph begs the obvious question, and what prevents a heavy force from using the same information-processing technologies? The question that automatically follows is, if it is the information technologies that make Strykers so buff, then perhaps it is not the "Stryker concept" that is the key, but rather having lots of electronic recon and computerized munitions?

Grau then goes on to list several other very valid FOA criticisms of the "Stryker concept," and as far as I can tell Grau just lets them stand. Even worse, he seems to equate the 1980s Red Army with the modern Russian Army. Here is the key paragraph:

Second, the stand-alone nature of the Stryker brigade is not accepted. The Russians still see this as a underpowered brigade that needs augmentation and lots of air support to carry out a mission when confronted with a well-armed, well-positioned enemy. Third, the air transport issue is not as important to the Russians. Russia is a continental power. In the days of the Soviet Union, they resolved their air transport issues by building wing-in-ground effect aircraft capable of carrying the standard tanks, self-propelled howitzers and armored personnel carriers. Their philosophy was to build a large enough aircraft to hold and move the equipment, so that the optimum combined-arms combat unit could be delivered. They see the U.S. move as sacrificing combat power and soldier protection for the sole purpose of fitting into existing, aging airframes.

As I noted above and Jason pointed out earlier, logically a Stryker brigade is underpowered when compared with a heavy brigade equipped with the same computer stuff, and further could well be under powered when compared with a heavy brigade perhaps not so good at information processing, but backed up by a military capable of supressing information technology processors.

For instance, the Russians can shoot down, easily, the sattelites US forces use to locate targets and to keep from getting lost. The Russians can shoot down, or at least degrade substantially the capabilities of U.S. aircraft. They say they have equipment that will knock Stealth out of the sky, for instance. Remember, these are the people that make the AT-14.

True or no, it therefore makes at least some sense for a Russian officer to wonder whether putting all your eggs in the information-processing basket - which is what the "Stryker concept" does - is valid.

Second, the assertion that military air transport is not very important to Russia is just silly. Russia has the largest air transport fleet in the world, and pretty much every where the Russians might want to get their troops fast - including large swaths of Asian portion of Russia itself - is only accessible by air.

As to the Russians having the attitude "just build a bigger aircraft", this is ridiculous. The workhorse of the fleet, Il-76, was designed 30 years ago, the big Mama, the An-124, about 20 years ago. Now that Russia has cash again, are they building a bigger aircraft? They are not. They are restarting the production line of An-124, is what they're doing. (Don't believe me, Google it.)

The Russian attitude, really, is "build a good rugged aircraft, and then use it a long time." Grau is not just stuck in the Cold War, he's stuck in a pretend Cold War where the Russians are always big, clumsy, and stupid.

Although, theoretically Grau may actually be quite bright, and he's using Russian criticism of Stryker as were he to do it directly Infantry Magazine would never print his article.

But on the other hand, he makes assertions that are little less than stupid. For instance:

The BMD is just too cramped and uncomfortable for long-term patrolling missions.

I will take the liberty of speaking for the Russian airborne infantry by saying, well, maybe too cramped and uncomfortable for Americans. Russians used the vehicle in Afghanistan for years, and it was good enough to grab the airport in Kosovo.

More empirically, if really what the airborne infantry needs is a weapons carrier and troop transport, BMD does those jobs fine. If you want a true fighting vehicle - get a tank.

Grau really gets in trouble when he begins inventing information about Chechnya. He starts by comparing apples and oranges.

Russia is currently engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Chechnya. The United States is engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Which is dead wrong. Russia has, for practical purposes, won a counterinsurgency operation in Chechnya. Nothing like money, secret police, and using the locals to do your dirty work to knock the stuffing out of an insurgency. True, the insurgents manage an ambush here and there, maybe bomb a vehicle or hit a police station once a month or so, but frankly there are probably parts of Los Angeles that are more dangerous for government forces, than central Grozny is for the Russians.

There is no equivalent to the Green Zone or Helmand province, in Chechnya. The Russians are in control.

(It is worth pointing out that the Russians managed this success against an Islamic nation with one of the strongest warrior traditions in the world, in terrain hostile to armored vehicles, precision munitions, and substantial air support.)

But my favorite Grau flight-of-fancy is this:

Russian troops in Chechnya use a combination of BMPs and BTRs. The BMPs are employed for anticipated combat, while the BTRs are used more for patrolling and administrative movements where a truck or jeep would be at risk.

I am convinced he invented that paragraph.

Russian troops use the vehicles they were assigned, pretty much like every other army. BTRs are (well, were) routinely used in raids on villages thought to contain insurgents, in part because the heavy MG is thought to be pretty much as good as the chain gun for smashing Chechen buildings and people, and it has a lot more ammunition, and also the BTR carriers more people and stuff.

BMPs, in contrast, sometimes were actually preferred by the troops for straight transport, as if a mine gets detonated under your vehicle it's better to be in a BMP than a BTR. In some units, a classic punishment for soldiers in trouble with the first sergeant is getting sent on patrol in a BTR.

And if the Russians are really expecting combat in Chechnya, they don't screw around with armored vehicles. They helicopter in Spetsnaz and MVD counter-terrorism teams, and back it up with tanks and aircraft.

Point being, the separation of BTRs and BMPs Grau is talking about, in my book, is fantasy.

The Russian experience mitigates, strongly, against the "Stryker concept". In their experience, you do not win an insurgency with glorified BTRs, nor do you do it with precision munitions. You do it with terror, secret police, mass arrests, group persecution, abandonment of rule of law, and most importantly getting some of the former insurgents to join your side, they will be far more brutal and effective against the remaining insurgents than you could ever be.

The Russian theory is that a spiffy wheeled armored vehicle backed up by first class information processing and target acquisition is hardly a war winner, when advanced information processing and target acquisition can be attacked, in some cases easily. The Russian theory is that numbers, firepower, and attrition will win anything approaching a conventional war.

The "Stryker concept" doesn't buy that logic of course - but then the "Stryker concept" has yet to win a war, conventional or otherwise.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by AdamL:

"The main reason to move to smaller caliber ammunition is to allow larger ammo loads to be carried, tactically. You can carry roughly twice as much 5.56mm as you could full rifle ammo (308 or 30-06). Carbine caliber 30 is in between, though, and the Russians already made that move before Vietnam."

The problem with that logic is that to expend twice as much ammo tactically you will be standing in front of a better calibre weapon for twice as long. You can't achieve that.

Maybe it is useful to have long range scouts carrying small arms, because for them "tactical" could be days. But any engagement where small arms are employed is symmetrical or worse for the typically attacking US or Russian infantry. You can't spend twice as much ammo. Besides it's not a continuous trade-off, below a certain calibre rounds simply stop getting through cover and your extra ammo has no value.

Nothing you against anything you said, just thoughts.

Squad automatics in Vietnam were still 7.62mm, and they are still used as platoon support weapons.

[JasonC]

Well Michael if not Blackhorse is asking, so...

Here are a few of the major principles of warfare we are systematically violating or ignoring, or that the enemy is simply practicing successful without our countering effectively.

Having well trained pros, endless capital and excellent technology covers a multitude of military art sins, but the latter can pile up so fast they become vastly more important than those strengths. And they have.

1. the basic condition of the vitality of military doctrine consists in its strong correspondence with the general goals of the state and those material and spiritual resources which it has at its disposal. (Fundamental Russian military maxim)

2. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. (Our own "prime directive").

3. The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and will to fight. (Our own number two directive).

4. Employ all combat power available... (Our own number 3 directive - miss the big ones and all the little ones are hopeless).

5. flexibility is the concrete expression of the initiative... (the one retreating often has it, it is not a question of who is advancing - this one is Mao's).

6. A battle in which the enemy is routed is not basically decisive in a contest with a foe of great strength. A battle of annihilation, on the other hand, produces a great and immediate impact on any enemy (Mao)

7. the principle of protracted warfare (Mao)

8. the principle of denying battle (Mao)

9. the principle of political mobilization and "base areas" (Mao)

10. the principle of focusing on "change in force" political variables rather than static forces-in-being (Mao)

11. the principle of accomodating the social elements to be mobilized, making their personal and local fights general (Mao)

12. the principle of ignoring terrain and ground control; the army is wherever it is (Mao)

13. the principle of fighting 100 battles - 1 vs. 10 strategy and 10 vs 1 tactics (Mao)

14. the principle of fighting where the population supports one's own force (Mao)

15. the principle of deliberate retreat to lead the enemy force to desired ground (Mao)

16. the principle of rapid dispersion alternating with concentration (Mao)

17. Wars against modern powers are not won in single operations. (Fundamental principle of deep battle, Russian).

18. The overall context of military struggle is a war of annihilation (not of coordination, spatial control, or content of wills - Russian version of the US phrased number 3 above).

19. Maneuver makes operations efficient; it is not a substitute for the strategic coordination of successive operations to annihilate the enemy. (Russian)

20. The principle of parallel pursuit, employed to secure annihilation on favorable terms. (Russian - we misapplied our "pursuit phase" and we still do).

21. The principle of deception, employed to achieve concentration and initiative (Russian)

22. The enduring importance of odds, local and global force ratios, mobilization and forces viewed as flows rather than stocks (Russian)

23. The principle of removing the enemy's best moves first, before undertaking great risks oneself (Russian)

24. Firepower kills (Petain and the USAF, which we've put in the back seat)

25. The defensive is the stronger form of combat (Clausewitz and Petain)

26. The principle of blockade - putting time on one's own side while systematically eliminating enemy opportunities (Grant plus naval tradition)

27. The principle of sheer stubborness, imposing one's will on the shape of the battle regardless of cost (Grant)

28. The principle of much more than enough, overwhelming power both at chosen points and in general (Grant and Nimitz)

29. The principle of no sanctuary, scorched earth, give them their belly's full (Grant and Sherman)

30. The principle of striking at the economic and civilian bases of the enemy's power (Grant, Sherman, Lemay - USAF)

31. The principle of concentration of effort on the major and decisive aim (Napoleon, see also prime directive, but this is specifically about concentration)

32. The principle of helping friends and harming enemies (Thucydides, Machiavelli)

33. The principle of never paying "Danegeld" or protection (Kipling, Henry)

34. The principle of freely employing auxiliaries serving for their own reasons, including outright profit (privateer tradition, British in India and its frontier)

35. The principle of a viable political end state, picked without illusions (Grant, MacArthur, Brits in Burma, negative lessons from Fall and Horne)

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[Blackhorse]

Originally posted by JasonC:

My issue is not with a war but with the stupid doctrine currently losing it. A stupid doctrine foisted on us over the last 20 years by the maneuver warfare, lighter faster more deployable, baffle 'em with static on the command net, win in 3 weeks without fighting by being inside their decision loop, crowd. In other words, the background you cite makes me see you as part of the problem, not an expert.

Your opinion of the military, in particular, those you view as the lighter faster, more deployable crowd is low. I get it. (I never considered myself one, being an armor and ACR guy. And I love the ACR…) If I understand you correctly, The US Army has hosed up its doctrine over the last 20 years. We should have anticipated the situation we currently have in Iraq and as an Army should have prepared for it.

Originally posted by JasonC:

Of course I know current US doctrine. I also know many things wrong with it, something apparently inconceivable to you.

Oookay.

Originally posted by JasonC:

Stating that the nation is losing but the army is not shows a profound ignorance of the basic maxims of warfare.

My point there was that you singled out the Army, I was saying that whatever happens is a collective and shared responsibility.

Originally posted by JasonC:

Shall I start with the Russian way of making the point? "The basic condition of the vitality of military doctrine consists in its strong correspondence with the general goals of the state and those material and spiritual resources which it has at its disposal."

Or would you prefer the classic German formulation, which I presume you can recite in your sleep at the mere mention of his name? Hint, starts with Claus, rhymes with something notoriously missing in our present military direction.

Here you have more low opinion of the military and its current doctrine. I get it. We were discussing the SBCT originally.

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for the cut and paste from the BCT sales brochure, it is utter bromide and fails to say a blessed thing. I just love the part about decisiveness at the infantry company level, that is priceless.

We’ll never agree then, because that cut and paste is directly from Army doctrine (FM 3-21.31 The SBCT); doctrine that you the research analyst find amusing. The doctrine is what it is, and your opinion is what it is. Oh well. We were discussing the SBCT originally, and there may be some folks here who are not aware (unlike you who are intimately aware of) US Doctrine with regards to the SBCT. Again, you find it laughable and absurd. Others might not. Who is to say? The SBCT being the original topic of discussion, the words of the doctrine are applicable.

Originally posted by JasonC:

But the mish mash that is light enough to lose to a tank army because it was once supposed to be deployable but isn't really, but is adequate against light militias though not quite as good as ordinary heavies - that sort of capability one pays 10 figures for, only because those on the other end of the paying think it a capital idea.

You still haven't explained how a BCT is better than an ACR at anything. Of course the ACR would also be up commo'ed and all that.

I never said the BCT was better than an ACR. I’ve stated all along the SBCT has capabilities the HBCTs, BCTs, and ACR do not have and vice versa.

Originally posted by JasonC:

Since you disclaim all responsibility for the tangle that is present US doctrine, and barely seem to even recognize major features of it, or that they are debatable and forcefully debated, I'll spare you the actual strategy lesson.

Unless you ask are actually interested. (I assume this is a mere exercise in weapon-system apologetics for you, and you have no real professional interest in learning the military art, or noticing how the men around you are royally bolixing it up...)

Yeah ok whatever. We were originally talking about the SBCT. This last quoted bit is pure hubris. Debate is indeed good and necessary. I’m not a weapon system apologist, and you, sir, are arrogant for assuming to know my professional interests.

We went from the SBCT to Iraq and the current strategy there…good one. The original topic was about the SBCT. Why are you only a research analyst and not someone making decisions somewhere a’la DoD or as a general in the Army? You seem to have it all figured out.

[ August 05, 2007, 12:27 AM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

[molotov_billy]

Originally posted by AdamL:

"There is no equivalent to the Green Zone or Helmand province, in Chechnya. The Russians are in control.

(It is worth pointing out that the Russians managed this success against an Islamic nation with one of the strongest warrior traditions in the world, in terrain hostile to armored vehicles, precision munitions, and substantial air support.) "

Since you know a fair bit about this, do you have specific recommendations for reading about how they accomplished that?

This might have something to do with it:

Population

Chechnya - 1.1 Million

Iraq - 26.7 Million

Area

Chechnya - 15,300 km²

Iraq - 438,317 km²

[Blackhorse]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

My opinion, Blackhorse is wrong, Jason is right. That's the short version.

Bigduke, I agree with you with regards to the article.

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

The "Stryker concept" doesn't buy that logic of course - but then the "Stryker concept" has yet to win a war, conventional or otherwise.

Alone it won't. I'll quote doctrine (FM 3-21.31 The SBCT) again here.

The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) is designed to be a full spectrum, early entry combat force. It has utility in all operational environments against all projected future threats. It possesses significant utility for divisions and corps engaged in a major-theater war; however, the SBCT is optimized to meet the challenges of smaller-scale

contingencies.

[ August 05, 2007, 12:26 AM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

[adminttd]

Man i love this beast heh some nice specs btw they are going or already did change the armor.

http://www.army.mil/features/stryker/stryker_spec.pdf

[John Kettler]

Kalashnikov himself was horrified at the selection of the 5.45mm cartridge for the AK-74, considered it a big step backwards, and would've much preferred a reworked, improved 7.62 cartridge for the new assault rifle. Saw him say it on camera in a documentary on small arms development the History Channel aired.

Regards,

John Kettler

[General Jack Ripper]

One thing nobody has struck on yet...

Have you ever changed a tire on a Stryker? They can be pierced by grenades and such, and it takes a long damn time to change the tires.

[Splinty]

Jason, I'm in Baghdad right now and I'm going to tell you what I've heard from most Stryker infantry. They love the things, they can see around them (as a Squad not as individuals)unlike in Bradleys, they can take a hit that would cripple most tracked vehicles (mobility kills) and they're a dream to drive. Most Stryker grunts above the rank of PFC have spent time either as light or heavy mech or both in some cases and would never go back.

Finally on another point, although I greatly respect your opinions on WWII and warfare in general, I think you go to far in some of the things you've said to Blackhorse he IS an active duty Armor/Cav officer, he just might have a clue about what he's saying. BTW I'm an MP NCO, and I like to think I have a clue also.

[SgtMuhammed]

Keep your head down Splinty and come back to us in one piece.

Thanks.

[Blackhorse]

Splinty,

Thanks for your service to our country. You stay safe.

Also, to set the record straight, I recently retired.

[Splinty]

Oops! Sorry BH! Glad you did your 20. Thanks for the thanks guys. I'm down to 39 days in country and will be very happy to leave. Baghdad + open/broken sewers + 130 F heat = one horrid reek! :eek: Let's not even mention the IEDs, mortars etc....

[Blackhorse]

The following excerpt is taken from the Analysis chapter of From Transformation To Combat The First STRYKER Brigade at War

by

Mark J. Reardon

Jeffery A. Charlston

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2007

It provides background and unique insights and analyis into the first combat deployment of a STRYKER Brigade.

At the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Sullivan, understood that the future held many dangers and that the Army would have to transform itself to fit a new strategic mold. Sullivan’s successor,General Reimer,expanded upon the concept. Concerned that the Army’s combat units relied solely upon vehicles such as the M1 Abrams tank and the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle that were too heavy for rapid deployment, Reimer took the first steps to create medium-weight units capable not only of fighting traditional wars but also of responding quickly and effectively to smaller emergencies.

The job of completing this effort fell to Reimer’s successor, General Shinseki. Since no one could predict with certainty where conflicts would occur or how extensive they would be,the general sought to create a force that would be easy to deploy and supply anywhere in the world and as lethal as in the past. Able to meet a broad range of challenges, it would be versatile enough to shift from irregular to conventional warfare should the need arise. To achieve these goals, Shinseki’s planners decided to equip light infantry units with medium-weight armored systems.The reconfigured forces would possess improved logistical capabilities and the latest communications and intelligence-gathering devices.Their troops would receive arms and equipment designed to enhance their effectiveness in combat.

When the War on Terror began in September 2001, the Army found that to respond effectively it would have to accelerate its efforts to field medium-weight units. This involved much more than downsizing heavily armed brigade combat teams or reequipping light infantry units with medium-weight vehicles. Doctrinal changes also had to occur, particularly the creation of a basic unit that commanders could deploy quickly and customize to meet particular problems. Since World War I the service’s building block had been the division. Brigades, regiments, and battalions had been divisional components, and field armies and corps had been groups of divisions and their supporting organizations. In the new Army of 2001, however, the ideal component would be the brigade,an organization normally less than one-third of a division,highly

adaptable, and easy to deploy.

The Army also altered its outlook on fighting alongside other services. It was no longer sufficient for its forces to accept joint interoperability, an approach that emphasized improving communications between the various services and establishing common doctrine. To function properly, the transformed brigade had to be organized,equipped,and trained along joint-force lines so that it functioned as part of an inter-service team. This would enhance its mobility, intelligence resources, firepower, air support, logistics, and survivability.

The debate over wheeled versus tracked platforms that followed General Shinseki’s October 1999 Association of the United States Army speech for a time diverted attention away from the Army’s effort to transform itself, but the program continued nonetheless. In November 2000 the service chose the eight-wheeled LAV III, soon to be renamed the Stryker, as its new medium-weight armored vehicle. Transformation proponents also settled upon the Rapid Fielding Initiative as the best means to acquire advanced technologies to meet soldiers’ needs. This permitted the purchase of commercially available products off the shelf to avoid the extended delays often imposed by traditional acquisition processes. It was through this program that the soldiers of the Army’s first transformed brigade, named the Stryker Brigade after its new vehicle, received redesigned body armor and ballistic goggles, personal communications gear, and improved individual weapons-sighting systems that promised to enhance their ability to carry the fight to the enemy.

The term network centric also sparked much debate as the Army learned more about Transformation. The concept required that each vehicle in the new Stryker Brigade have the ability to connect with all the information systems serving the unit.Under this arrangement, the force’s digital network would be able to share real-time battlefield information with virtually all of its soldiers while also easing and accelerating decision-making at all levels of command. Relieved of many of the burdens associated with continuously gathering information and updating the battlefield situation, unit commanders would in theory be able to focus more of their attention on shaping future events. Army leaders hoped that this capability would extend the new brigade’s capacities enough for it to assume responsibility for an area of operations previously allotted to a division-size organization.

When the new unit arrived in Iraq, however, theory diverged from operational reality just as soon as the brigade received its first mission to conduct stabilization operations, a process that depended heavily on constant presence rather than rapid maneuver. Added to this were the unforeseen missions of protecting key facilities, training Iraqi units, and safeguarding the newly formed Iraqi government. While the brigade,ably assisted by other elements of TF olympIa, performed all these tasks well, success had its price. The unit had to convert its field artillery battalion and cavalry squadron into de facto infantry units.

The performance of the brigade during its year-long tour in Iraq became the first step toward validating the Army’s vision of a strategically, operationally, and tactically flexible brigade-based force. The unit’s movement from the continental United States into theater proceeded quickly and effectively, requiring only commercially chartered aircraft and two specialized sealift vessels. At the operational level, the brigade demonstrated its flexibility almost at once by changing missions in mid-stride while deploying from Kuwait to Mosul. It did so without requiring even a small measure of logistical assistance from higher headquarters.

Over the course of the year that followed, the force repeated the process many times at levels ranging from platoon through brigade. It operated with virtually every major U.S. command in the country, including the 4th Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, TF olympIa, the 1st Infantry Division, the 13th Corps Support Command, and the I Marine Expeditionary Force. There were, however, limits. When the brigade assumed the mission of the reinforced 101st Airborne Division, it managed to maintain a high level of security in Mosul while continually detaching up to one-third of its infantry to assist units in other parts of Iraq. It could do this, however, only by assigning security responsibilities to units that normally would have never received that sort of mission.

Since TRADOC planners expected the Strykers to operate for sustained periods over a large area, they were hardly surprised to learn that the operational reach of the brigade often spanned more than two-thirds of Iraq, extending from the upper reaches of the Syrian-Iraqi border in the north to Al Kut and An Najaf in the south. Despite daily challenges, the unit was also able to maintain an extremely high operational tempo. This was a tribute to the individual skills of its soldiers, their equipment, and the logistical system that sustained them.

The experiences of the brigade’s subordinate units demonstrated that this flexibility extended deep into the organization. The no-notice deployment of TF arrow to An Najaf, which involved rifle companies from three different battalions, highlighted the operational and tactical flexibility of the brigade’s components and the improved ability of Stryker-equipped organizations to sustain themselves logistically. The task force proved itself so capable of reconfiguring its internal organization to meet changing requirements that it interacted as effectively with the 1st Infantry Division as it did with the 13th Corps Support Command and every other unit that its Strykers encountered during their daily 160-mile trip along Highway 1.

Compared with the battle that occurred in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, the fight that Stryker Brigade elements fought at Tall Afar on 4 September 2004 served as a good indicator of the progress Army Transformation had achieved. Although the rules of engagement and the friendly and enemy forces involved were not identical, there were clear parallels. Even so, the outcome in each case was different.

At Mogadishu, U.S. forces were called upon to rescue the crews of two downed Black Hawk helicopters; at Tall Afar, the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry, encountered a similar situation when it had to retrieve the pilots of a stricken Kiowa Warrior. At Mogadishu, the Americans were pinned down overnight by strong opposition. In the end, although they inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, they had to fight their way out on foot at considerable cost. At Tall Afar, the Stryker unit ensured the retrieval of the aircraft and its crew while inflicting serious casualties on the enemy and suffering only a few wounded of its own. Those results were not achieved by good luck or happenstance. Although the enemy gained the initiative when he shot down the Kiowa, the Strykers could move and mass very rapidly. They reached the helicopter first, set up a defense, and overwhelmed the forces attempting to overrun the site.

The Stryker battalion that fought at Tall Afar had capabilities that the U.S. Army force in Somalia lacked. Although the American soldiers in both engagements had similar skills and equipment,the Stryker-equipped unit also had the advantage of access to real-ime intelligence; responsive joint firepower; mobile, armor-protected combat systems; and shared awareness down to the squad level. The advantages the unit’s communications offered in this case were not always present in its other operations, where the enemy employed weapons and tactics that allowed him to blend easily into the civilian population; but the force’s technological advantages at Tall Afar made a decided difference.

The crucial test of the Stryker Brigade, and of Army Transformation, did not take place in a laboratory or amid the dusty trails and hills of Fort Irwin’s National Training Center. It came in Iraq, where the soldiers of the Stryker Brigade faced a resilient and dedicated foe. The effort cost the unit over the course of that year a total of 13 combat deaths, 13 noncombat deaths, and some 300 other casualties. The price to its opponents was immeasurably greater.

The fielding of the initial Stryker Brigade represented but the first step in an ongoing process to change the nation’s Army. The entire force, not just a few select organizations, must be capable of providing combat commanders with well-led, well-trained, and well-equipped fighting units. The scope of this effort becomes apparent only with a realization that the Army is focusing not only on organizational and technological solutions but also on the military culture that gives those attributes their strength: the sum total of the training, education, and leadership qualities of the people who make change happen. Throughout the process, the American soldier will figure large, for he is the centerpiece of the entire organization.

[Blackhorse]

And from pages 64-65

Not only had the brigade documented tactical lessons for future use, it had also cultivated a reputation within CJTF–7 as a highly mobile

infantry force capable of responding rapidly and effectively to changing operational conditions. The command and its successor had made use of this unique capability again and again, calling upon the Stryker Brigade to take the fight to the enemy not only in northwestern Iraq but also in Samarra,Balad,AnNajaf,Baghdad,and Babil Province. As the unit had conducted those operations,it had also trained Iraqi National Guard units and had carried out numerous civic action programs.

The Stryker had played a substantial role in the brigade’s success.The 5thBattalion,20th Infantry’s operations officer, Major Baker,who replaced Major O’Steen when he moved up to become battalion executive officer, summed up its unique capabilities. Bradleys “could not have accomplished the mission in as large an area,” he said. “They were not fast enough, they had a much larger logistical tail, and they were not mechanically reliable when traveling great distances. We would have had comparable mobility if we had been equipped with Humvees, but they were inadequate in terms of protection. The soldiers gained a lot of confidence in their vehicles when they realized they had a platform that could take a lot of punishment. It represents just the right mix of light and heavy mentality, providing the Army with a full spectrum of capabilities.”

[Guest Guest]

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[Pinetree]

It's probably the best COTS solution.If you built your own, the army probably wouldn't see it until 2020...

[Blackhorse]

If by other specific vehicle you mean the BFV, then my answer is no. I do not believe the STRYKER is necessarily better or tougher. Both vehicles represent different capabilities. each has advantages and disadvantages compared to the other.

Could we have built a tougher vehicle more cheaply? I don't believe so. That would have entailed a full life cycle acquisition program and those typically last 10 or so years. If the current FCS is any indication, then the cost over-runs may have been substantial. Would the end result have been better? I have no idea. We could very well have ended up with a successor to the BFV. Honestly though, that is speculation and I just don't know.

Could we have bought something else off the shelf at the time? Yes. We could even have used our numerous mothballed M113s (upgraded to M113A3s or better of course) and realized substantial $$ savings.

$$ savings aside, after the tests conducted at Ft. Knox in '99 the Army chose the LAV-III as the vehicle for the new Bde concept. The Army tested a wide variety (35 different types) of vehicles back then before settling on the LAV-III.