Was it a victory? You decide!

[akd]

Originally posted by Tarquelne:

1) Issue of whether or not pilot recovery means the battle must be judged a US victory: Hypotheticals used to demonstrate possible conditions that'd result in US srategic loss despite pilot recovery.

(The point of doing so was to show that there's still room to debate the issue of strategic victory or loss even given that the pilots were rescued, which is what I though was being implied. Hypotheticals are relevent because a "must" statement is equivilent to saying "despite anything else that might happen." So, countering with some things that "might happen" which would falsify the claim is relevent.)

Come now, your just clouding the issue with these hypotheticals. No one is claiming that every single time a U.S. pilot is rescued all related or concurrent operations are judged a victory. Desert One would be an obvious example to the contrary.

The point made is that the mission to rescue these U.S. pilots must be considered a success for the U.S. side as it denied the insurgent side their only chance for success in the circumstances.

[Tarquelne]

Come now, your just clouding the issue with these hypotheticals. No one is claiming that every single time a U.S. pilot is rescued all related or concurrent operations are judged a victory.

Oh! Good!

[Caesar]

Steve, Can I get some clarification on how success will measured in CMSF then. Will success be measured simply in terms of points accrued/lossed by casualty counts and controlled areas? Will there be penalties applied for damage to buildings and in particular building such as Mosques etc or will such damage instead change the fanaticism/motivation of the Syrian forces? Will U.S. forces be penalised more heavily for casualties than the Syrian forces (over and above the inherent troop values I mean)?

As far as the example in this thread goes, viewed simplistically, it appears to me that it was a U.S. victory as the U.S. forces appeared to achieve their aims for minimal casualties while inflicting a fair number of casualties. If say, the use of the JDAMs accrues a penalty then I suppose it could be viewed differently.

I have been following the boards fairly consistantly and I have not seen any details on this subject - is it yet to be decided? If so, the general theme of how you are approaching this would do.

[Battlefront.com]

Yeah, what AKD said. The pilots and the helo are, basically, irrelevant in terms of what they represent. They are only relevant because the mission was based around them and the mission was ultimately successful. The mission could have been to secure a really good place for lunch and to defend against all hungry Jihadists. If the troops held onto the place and got a good square meal, despite the attacks against them, then they succeeded in their mission and they should all get promoted and bronze stars

Seriously though, I don't know why it is such a difficult concept to grasp. A tactical mission stands on its own and therefore needs to be judged on its own. It could be irrelevant or relevant to the broader war. It could be a wise mission or a foolish one. It could have been to take advantage of a situation or to react to a bad one thrust upon them. And in doing so perhaps thousands of rounds were fired against them, or perhaps none at all. Maybe the force took no casaulaties or damage or took 10% losses in manpower. A school might have been struck by accident or on purpose or not at all. From a success/failure standpoint, none of that inherently matters. All it matters is that they were ordered to do something and they were expected to do it. If they did what they were ordered to do within the parameters they were assigned (whether you agree with those parameters or not), they succeeded in fulfilling their mission. If they did not, then they failed.

That's all there is too it.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

No, the specifics of "victory conditions" have not been decided. They will be far different than in CMx1, that's for sure. And they should be allowed to be different for the different sides. That is going to be quite tricky from a game standpoint, but I'm sure we can pull it off.

Steve

[Tarquelne]

I am SURE that all of these things are, in some way, counting against the US occupation score card. But to judge these things victories just because the insurgents say they are is a horrible basis for a simulation.

It would be akin to ending every battle, no matter what the outcome, with an insurgent win simply because the very fact there was a fight means the US lost. Ludicrous.

I agree. OTOH, I hope you don't begrudge the bandwidth used by some of us interested in disucssing matters beyond what are suitable to fit into the sim. Even if some or all doing so are anti-war drum beaters.

The parameters for judging the success or failure of a tactical engagement must be MOSTLY, if not entirely, based on the elements that are important to that tactical engagement. Looking at wider implications is just not workable.

I don't think there's any reason to include "mostly". It'd be "entirely". (At least as some have defined "tactical victory.")

Judging a tactical military engagement success/failure based on events that have not yet happened (i.e. overall victory/defeat) is also not workable.

IMO it's not just "not workable", it's inappropriate or even nonesensical.

Events that have not yet happened aren't merely difficult to judge with regard to tactical victory, they have nothing to do with tactical victory. They belong to the realm of operational/strategic victory.

So it's for that reason, not reasons of practical difficulty, that they aren't included when judging tactical victory: Wholly different definitions of success are being measured.

[Imperial Grunt]

Originally posted by El_Operative:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />The helo was evacuated and the pilots rescued without any major damage/casualties for the US side, despite being out numbered, out gunned, and on the defensive for most of the engagement.

“Outgunned” with what? Here’s with what according to BFC,

poor quality of RPG rounds. Many fail to go off or do not "work as advertised. Many of the RPGs being fired are anti-personnel and not anti-armor. Therefore, even when a round hits and works as it should, that doesn't mean it is going to cause significant damage

How anyone can claim that a non mechanized insurgency, with Paleolithic Russian armament, can outgun a US Stryker force with American gunnery, TOWs and state of the art communications is beyond me.

The insurgents didn’t have UAVs reporting enemy numbers, location and formation. They didn’t have the morale boosting knowledge that the cavalry and pulverizing air support were minutes away. Their only advantage? Mild surprise, modest numerical superiority, for they were on offense (after the helo), and a reckless willingness to die.

If one carefully reads the battle’s AAR, a US combatant expresses fear of overrun should reinforcements and air support be delayed much longer. The AAR clearly shows the tide only turned after F16s dropped precision ordinance, strafed insurgents’ positions and TOWs were introduced into the battle. Yet even with the F16s, here’s what was reported, “but it turned out that even JDAMs had not put an end to the attacks that day.”

Until debilitating air support arrived, the insurgents exceeded expectations mano a mano vs. Marines. So if put into perspective, you’ve the most trained, most equipped and mightiest army on the planet that can’t end an infantry battle without aerial bombardment and a prodigious supply of TOWs.

Ultimately, yes, the US had the day, but with what assets and against whom? With F16s against suicidal maniacs with Soviet trinkets. No wonder Rumsfeld no longer talks about North Korea.

I think, and I could very well be wrong, duke was unimpressed with the assets and doctrine employed to secure that bird. In this instance, Bigduke wins. </font>

[Tarquelne]

dbl pst

[ January 05, 2006, 10:18 PM: Message edited by: Tarquelne ]

[Tarquelne]

Originally posted by Tarquelne:

[qb]

Whoa there. I've been thinking the same thing.

I think the point made earlier that missions are best seen as a success of failure is a good one.

My problem, to be more specifc, is that I don't understand why judging a mission on it's own precludes other ways of juding not the mission but the "battle." The event that took place.

I think you may be confusing the refusal of some to confine their discussions to tactical victory and the sim. with the position that a "higher" (op or strat) level of failure means that the tactical victory then has to be considered a tactical defeat. Or that the status of a battle vis a vis operational or strategic success has to be included in the game. Or something... I'm not really sure who's posts you've been responding to, since you sometimes seem to be responding to arguments I don't see stated. (See page 3.)

Hmm... I was wondering how to wrap this up since I'm way over my time budget for posting and I suspect this thread isn't over. So: For every response to any of my points please take as given me posting "See the top of page 3."

The first three "See page 3" replies time will be polite, the second three increasinly testy and stubborn, the 7th rude and the 8th will get me temporarily banned until I make an suitable apology.

[ January 05, 2006, 10:47 PM: Message edited by: Tarquelne ]

[WineCape]

To answer BigDuke's question: The mission/battle was a complete success/victory for the USA forces. The war and its strategic/operational aims are another issue and debate.

Inferring any operational/strategic and political aims, as derived from this specific battle account is - given the microscopic nature of small encounters and no benefit of hindsight - pure speculation.

[ January 06, 2006, 03:32 AM: Message edited by: WineCape ]

[Drusus]

I really hope we are going to see victory conditions where you can succesfully accomplish your mission while still losing in game terms. There are two separate things, performance and accomplishing your mission. The critical difference between this and CMx1 way of thinking is that if for example you are fighting against a single squad of infantry with a company of infantry, it is not enough that you take out that squad while losing 2 squads yourself. In CMx1 this will be a victory for you, that is you got the flag and eliminated the enemy. In CMSF I hope we will see that while managing to do your mission, you took too many casualties _given the situation_, thus your performance was bad and the end result is failure. Jet you accomplished your mission. The same goes if you took zero casualties but you leveled the whole village containing one enemy sniper.

This might prove impossible to do in quick battles, but in scenarios it should be easy to do some testing to see what should be the end result given decent performance. If you manage to do a lot better, you will get a major victory, if you do a lot worse, the result is a failure. In all cases you might have managed to do your mission. Or from the Syrian point of view, in might be that you 'won' even if you didn't do your mission.

The difference to the mission of securing that village while taking less than x casualties is that you don't know the criteria in advance. This is realistic. I think it goes something like this in reality (of course simplified):

Mission: Secure that village.

If there was a company of special forces hiding in that village, and you took only a few casualties, you did a good job even if you had to destroy most of the village. If you took 4 casualties and destroyed 6 buildings while taking out ten insurgents you did a lousy job. In both cases the mission was a success. It is always the case that you must take minimum casualties and do minimum collateral damage. It is not part of the mission briefing. If there was a holy site in that village, it might be part of the mission briefing to not damage it in any case.

This brings an interesting aspect to CMSF. You must _decide_ what is the maximum amount of force you are allowed to use. It is _not_ told to you and I think this is the usual case. If you try to attack that Special Forces company without any heavy weapons it is sure you will lose. If you level the village just in case, you might end up losing. But if you accidentally destroy one building (or even more buildings) which doesn't have any enemy soldiers in it, this in itself isn't a reason to lose. It depends on the situation.

In the Tal Afar "rescue the pilots" battle I think it is clear that the mission was a success from the US point of view. The performance of the troops isn't as clear. We really don't know enough of the situation to tell how good or bad it was.

[c3k]

Bigduke6,

You've done a credible job analyzing the weaknesses of a one-sided intelligence/media report, yet you also created a fictionalized account of AIF (anti-Iraqi Forces) motivations and procedures.

Your posts have referred to AIF individuals and loose groups as, more or less, responding on their own initiative to defend against a presumed attack on a mosque. You have NO hard information on which to base this.

Here is my interpretation:

The hard-core, driven, foreign-born anti-American fighters rule the local neighborhood through intimidation, threats, reprisals and their ruthless executions of family members of those who oppose them. They call a meeting, regularly scheduled, to infuse the locals with fighting spirit. This meeting is at the usual spot, the armory; it's the mosque.

When the helicopters fly over, of course they try - and succeed - at shooting one down. The various contingents, sent out to shoot it down, begin to converge on the rally point - the mosque.

As the fight escalates, the cadre forces groups of locals to fight the Americans. They arrive in motley groups after being threatened with family retaliations. They fight as much as the need to, under the careful eye of the cadre, then leave as soon as it seems appropriate.

Okay, totally baseless, but only so much so as your version.

Comments?

Ken

[Saviola]

Originally posted by LtCol West:

1) Stryker units are in the US Army and not the US Marines. Styrker squads are small since they are tailored to move inside and operate in vicinity of the vehicles and not leave them as a seperate manuever element.

2) Unless you were there, be careful with your "analysis".

Those soldiers did a fine job with the sitution that they had to deal with, without hindsight.

1) This sounds like a precarious threat.

2) You weren’t there either, nor was anyone on this thread who’s offering not particularly careful “analysis”. Opinions are being offered based on a posted AAR, to suggest one had to be there to inject a not so suitable or accurate “analysis” is preposterous.

Lest anyone forgets, this ain’t no military intelligence, DoD or NORAD debriefing, it’s a consumer orientated forum which hosts consumers interested in a product.

3) If “careful” means massaging, stroking and burnishing every action the US forces undertake, few will partake.

4) The Marines instead of Army boys oversight was my bad, I’m guilty on this one. In future, I will be careful with the accuracy of US organizational aspects, but not with your implied definition of “careful”.

5) “Those soldiers did a fine job”. Well, this thread’s views on their performance vary, some agree, some believe they stunk, and some believe it was the F16s and TOWs that “did a fine job”.

6) Will you respectfully delineate the consequences that’ll beset those who post without having fought battles in Iraq and aren’t “careful”?

7) The notion that everything Marines merits worship, is beyond reproach and should be awe-inducing will be destroyed, it’s unrealistic, non representative of the Iraqi theater’s realities and akin to fanaticism. So you be “careful” too.

[Battlefront.com]

Let's keep it civil kiddies!

OK, so there seems to be general consensus that tactical battles must be judged on their own, irrespective of the operational or strategic implications. Sometimes a tactical battle can have higher level implications, but these are rare. In all of WWII I can think of only a handful. Dieppe and Remagen come to mind. That's two out of a couple million engagements. I'm sure I could come up with a few more, but there are still the other couple million that weren't to consider

In CMx1 the victory conditions were partly based on flag posession, partly based on friendly casualties, and partly based on the ratio of forces. It was entirely possible to take flags in CMx1 and still get a poor end result. It was possible to take no flags, or lose your own, and get a good result. Expect the same sort of thing in CMx2, but with more sophistication.

One element that we must consider is the overall player performance for the Campaign. This is not the same as the overall performance of the war. Just the player's part in it. For a WWII analogy, think US General Mark Clark. One of the worst rated field commanders of the war, but the war was still a victory for the US. So in Campaign mode it is possible for the player to get a fairly poor score, but the impact on the wider war will not be considered. If you fail to take that block of residential housing, it does not mean that the war in Syria fails and the US forces retreat back into Iraq. That would be silly

Steve

[Imperial Grunt]

Originally posted by El_Operative:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by LtCol West:

1) Stryker units are in the US Army and not the US Marines. Styrker squads are small since they are tailored to move inside and operate in vicinity of the vehicles and not leave them as a seperate manuever element.

2) Unless you were there, be careful with your "analysis".

Those soldiers did a fine job with the sitution that they had to deal with, without hindsight.

1) This sounds like a precarious threat.

2) You weren’t there either, nor was anyone on this thread who’s offering not particularly careful “analysis”. Opinions are being offered based on a posted AAR, to suggest one had to be there to inject a not so suitable or accurate “analysis” is preposterous.

Lest anyone forgets, this ain’t no military intelligence, DoD or NORAD debriefing, it’s a consumer orientated forum which hosts consumers interested in a product.

3) If “careful” means massaging, stroking and burnishing every action the US forces undertake, few will partake.

4) The Marines instead of Army boys oversight was my bad, I’m guilty on this one. In future, I will be careful with the accuracy of US organizational aspects, but not with your implied definition of “careful”.

5) “Those soldiers did a fine job”. Well, this thread’s views on their performance vary, some agree, some believe they stunk, and some believe it was the F16s and TOWs that “did a fine job”.

6) Will you respectfully delineate the consequences that’ll beset those who post without having fought battles in Iraq and aren’t “careful”?

7) The notion that everything Marines merits worship, is beyond reproach and should be awe-inducing will be destroyed, it’s unrealistic, non representative of the Iraqi theater’s realities and akin to fanaticism. So you be “careful” too. </font>

[Drusus]

Well, I still think that there are two different things when thinking about the result of the battle. How well you did given the situation and did you do your mission. CMx1 has these sort of mixed (objectives, casualties and it seems ratio of forces). But if you do poorly it is still very much possible to win the battle. Ofcourse it is also possible to do so poorly you lose the battle. Defending against 1:1 odds in CMx1 even if you lose nearly as many points as your enemy, you still win (and you should win as in win the battle). But the reality is that you didn't play well. Or in other words your superiors wouldn't like the result even if you did your mission.

The best example I can come up is this. You are the _attacker_ in CMx1 1:1 odds battle. It should be expected that you won't take the flags or that you won't make that much casualties either. You have only little chance of getting an acceptable end result (as in CMx1) of that battle. But still you can play badly. Or play well. The difference is that you may only get a tactical defeat and not total. Another example is that you have an attack with the normal odds but the terrain is strongly in favor of the defender.

In CMSF we are going to see a lot of battles like this. The US player has odds something like 10:1, so even if the Syrian player can't accomplish the mission given to him it is still possible he did well in that situation. In CMx1 he would still be loser. CMx1 was ofcourse more about balanced battles, so it didn't matter so much. But I hope in CMSF it is possible to have a result that says you performed well, given the situation. I think this should be doable in human made battles. It is kind of doable by playing around with the flags, but if the falgs are not where your objective should be given the mission briefing, you know there is going to be something funny hapening. This will change even more when you add in the collateral damage based points.

So, my point is this: I think it should be possible to be the Syrian player in a (human made) battle where you are attacking with an x amount of infantry. It might be that the "real world" odds are actually against you, but still it should be possible to win (as in you did well). You were able to kill a whole squad of enemy infantry, while still not gaining any of your mission briefing objectives.

Play the CMAK scenario A Ranger Last Stand. It would be much more fun if the mission briefing would be the same the rangers got and the objectives where they should be. And the battle could last till the bitter end. But this would mean (in CMx1) that the battle was lost even if the rangers did well. And no matter how you look, the rangers did lose that battle. But I hope it will be possible to make that ranger scenario as it was with CMx2 victory conditions. And it is possible to win (as in you did well) with the rangers.

If this could be done in QBs that would be just awesome. Now you know quite exactly what you are playing against. If you make the point values random, it will unbalance the game. But don't worry, even if you are not able to take those flags, you could still manage to play better than your enemy given the situation and thus win. This would add a lot of reality into quick battles.

Ofcourse what I think is doable or should be done doesn't matter that much. So I hope something like this is what you have in mind when saying the system will be more sophisticated in CMSF.

[cassh]

Steve

Agreed, this is still common usage - but from the standpoint of military education and training the definitions of the levels of war are now expressly declared with battle being restricted to the tactical.

This has come about to help enable commanders to start thinking in terms of operational art; there is a tendency to think of operations and campaigns as merely pumped-up battles.

Whereas what those wishing to instil coup d'oeil in their commanders hope to achieve is a true appreciation of operational art as a form of warfighting in its own right, distinct from the tactical battle.

By making this pedagogic distinction they can demonstrate where and how operations are separate and different in their physical, moral and mental aspects from battle.

The USMC's doctrinal work FMFM 1 Warfighting neatly sums up the position thus:

As strategy deals with wars and tactics with battles and engagements, the operational level of war is the art of winning campaigns. Its means are tactical, and its end is the military strategic objective.

FMFM 1 Chapter 2 Theory of War: The Levels of War

A Battalion can fight as the sole player in an Operation or even Strategic conflict

Indeed; hence why I stated the levels of command were more ambiguous.

Strategic and operationally tasked units can be as small as a single operator with an assassination mission for example.

Commonly though the smaller units we usually associate with strategic and operationally significant missions are elements such as Special Forces, airborne / desant units used in deep operational manoeuvres. Here they have force multipliers of stealth/shock/tempo etc that means their combat worth far outweighs what their tactical value would be if deployed in a straight battle or engagement.

It's because your parachutists could conduct a coup de main against your enemy's parliament buildings they have strategic/operational value!

However, the battle to take the buildings would be tactical in execution.

[Bigduke6]

c3k,

As they say in Sovietese "your version certainly has a right to life".

Or in normal language, yeah, it coulda been the way you describe it. I don't discount the thug factor, it's just that thugs generally make pretty poor shock troops against some one who can fight back, and that's the U.S. military in spades. My logic is only a foolish or truly, ah, dedicated fighter would seek out U.S. forces staked out around the carcass of a Kiowa in next to a mosque in a town next to the Syrian border.

But it's a guess, which I meant to clearly label as such by describing it as a WAG.

So guilty as charged. I was speculating on the nature of the enemy force 5-20 went up against, like I said "to get into the enemy's head." I didn't mean to sell that as the only way things could have been. T

I don't know exactly what 5-20 fought, but that's the nature of intelligence interpetation, and after all until the war is over and the memoirs are out, educated speculation, built on what information we can find, is as close as we are going to get to the "facts." The little story I drew was my best guess.

Polling contributers in a thread like this is an excellent way for me to gather POVs different from mine. Maybe you have a point. Maybe we need to be discussing how often hard-core terrorist operatives have meetings when U.S. combat ops are in progress in the neighborhood, I dunno. If that sounds snide I don't mean it to be, I really have no idea. I know (ok, I'm pretty close to sure) in Chechnya the insurgents head south the moment Russian army units get any place close, but that's a long way from Iraq and Syria.

Originally posted by c3k:

Bigduke6,

You've done a credible job analyzing the weaknesses of a one-sided intelligence/media report, yet you also created a fictionalized account of AIF (anti-Iraqi Forces) motivations and procedures.

Your posts have referred to AIF individuals and loose groups as, more or less, responding on their own initiative to defend against a presumed attack on a mosque. You have NO hard information on which to base this.

Here is my interpretation:

The hard-core, driven, foreign-born anti-American fighters rule the local neighborhood through intimidation, threats, reprisals and their ruthless executions of family members of those who oppose them. They call a meeting, regularly scheduled, to infuse the locals with fighting spirit. This meeting is at the usual spot, the armory; it's the mosque.

When the helicopters fly over, of course they try - and succeed - at shooting one down. The various contingents, sent out to shoot it down, begin to converge on the rally point - the mosque.

As the fight escalates, the cadre forces groups of locals to fight the Americans. They arrive in motley groups after being threatened with family retaliations. They fight as much as the need to, under the careful eye of the cadre, then leave as soon as it seems appropriate.

Okay, totally baseless, but only so much so as your version.

Comments?

Ken

[Bigduke6]

I'll say this too, I think the U.S. soldiers themselves up to about and perhaps including captain did just as good a job as was expected of them.

Once you start talking field grade and up then I start getting suspicious U.S. command decisions get entwined with officer career enhancement; but I've ranted about that repeatedly so no need to rehash that here.

Point is, the Americans doing the fighting at Tal Afar did the job, and handled themselves like the pros they are. I can't honestly say I'd compare them to Marines at Hue or 1st Divison at Omaha; but that's just me grumping.

I have no doubt that had those Americans been trained in tactics risking their lives more, and Iraqi property and civilian lives less, those Americans would have done that job as well. There are plenty of problems with the U.S. presence in Iraq, but the effectiveness of the small units isn't one of them.

[Imperial Grunt]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

I'll say this too, I think the U.S. soldiers themselves up to about and perhaps including captain did just as good a job as was expected of them.

Once you start talking field grade and up then I start getting suspicious U.S. command decisions get entwined with officer career enhancement; but I've ranted about that repeatedly so no need to rehash that here.

Point is, the Americans doing the fighting at Tal Afar did the job, and handled themselves like the pros they are. I can't honestly say I'd compare them to Marines at Hue or 1st Divison at Omaha; but that's just me grumping.

I have no doubt that had those Americans been trained in tactics risking their lives more, and Iraqi property and civilian lives less, those Americans would have done that job as well. There are plenty of problems with the U.S. presence in Iraq, but the effectiveness of the small units isn't one of them.

Well said. Being a field grade officer I have seen some careerism, but fortunately never in Iraq. I am sure it happens though. When my civil affairs team worked with 1-32 IN, I was very impressed with the professionalism and leadership of the Bn Cmdr. He has a great BN staff and great CoCmrds as well. On the officer level, the biggest difference was how Army lieutenants are treated as compared to Marine lieutenants. Just a different service culture.

The war in Iraq is not Vietnam, especially in I Corps. And it is not a high intensity conflict like Korea and WWII. Same for Afghansitan. There are intense moments for sure, but not the sustained combat that I have studied and read about so much. Modern war always evolves.

The victory conditions in the game have to be focused on tactical objectives given the missions of each side. But, in my opinion, these tactical objectives should be held in the perspective of the operational and stragetic objectives for each side.

For example, the US player has to accomplish the stated mission given in the scenario. Usually that mission is going to go and get some key location or to secure something. Simple and cut a nd dry and if not held in the operational and strategic context of the US strategy, the US player would win every time against Syria.

But accomplishing the mission within the operational and strategic parameters make the mission much more difficult. The game should have a standard set of "strategic objectives* for every scenario. This will capture the "strategic corporal" effect.

Some standard objectives that the US player must keep in mind while crushing insurgents with M-1 tanks and Stryker vehicles should be the following:

Some

[Imperial Grunt]

Well that was messed up. See, an example of a US Marine making a mistake.

Anyways...

Some of the "stratagic objectives" should be:

1) Not violate the ROE. (Hopefully the game simulates civilians moving around and even approaching US forces, to include armed civilians)

2) Not take alot of casualties or, worse, have soldiers/Marines captured by the enemy.

3) Not cause excessive collateral damage.

More can be tailored to specific scenarios and they should be kept measurable. Ambigious operational and stratagic objectives, such as the level of local support for insurgents, should not be an objective.

From the Syrian side, the operational and strategic objects should be the following:

1) Cause as many US casualties as possible, things like helos and tanks are especially valuable.

2) Capture US soldiers, especially HQ elements

3) Keep leadership alive to continue the fight later.

So if the Syrian player loses all tactical objectives, which will occur often, then there is still a chance he might win the game if he caused excessive casualites or if the US player used excessive force.

In game terms, the Strykers rescuing the pilots might have been a draw. The soldiers did a good job of accomplishing their tactical mission, but a Stryker vehicle was destroyed. Lets say a TOW missle was fired and missed and traveled down range and blew up a school and killed a bunch of Iraqi kids. That is excessive collateral damage, something that the US player has to avoid.

So, in all but the most kinetic scenarios (and I hope there are Fallujah 2 type scenarios for the pure fun of it), the US player cannot simply sit back and use barrage after barrage of airstrikes and rotary wing. In most scenarios the US player should not even be able to engage until one of his units positively ID's the enemy or is fired upon. And only units that have positive ID can engage. Just because one unit was shot at by group X, does not neccessarily mean the US player has cart blanch to engage everythinge else that moves. Every spotted enemy unit must be positively ID's as enemy. During OIF 1, the ROE that was established stated that any Iraqi in uniform was a legitmate target. Any Iraqi that shot as US forces was a legitimate target. But a little mob with AK's slung could not be engaged immediately. So when the Saddam Fediyeen showed up in civilian clothes, this made target ID more difficult. This will negate alot of the firepower advantages.

I can't wait to play as the Syrians. Especially if alot of asymetric tactics are in the game. Hide a couple of tanks in houses next to a mosque. Put my conventional troops in camoflagued attack positions, while I send out my fanatic Baathists out to fake surrender and run away (US troops cant shoot them, but they can chase them if they want to), and have a car bomber drive up to a Stryker to stop them in my kill zone...

If the game is done right, playing as the US will be very difficult most times...

[akd]

Originally posted by LtCol West:

1) Not violate the ROE. (Hopefully the game simulates civilians moving around and even approaching US forces, to include armed civilians)

Sadly, BFC has said no civilians whatsoever. Obviously, this removes a lot of the possible complexity you outline above.

[Caesar]

I don't think that it need remove most of the complexity.

- Suffering a points penalty for property damage (particularly for holy sites)

- Restricting area fire weapons (Arty/Air etc) to areas within an arc of known enemy or if not restricting it, they could put a risk of points loss due to unseen civilian losses (the restriction is a better idea IMO)

- Use of certain weaponry could (depending on the scenerio) cause an automatic points loss (those seen as excessive force). This would give the US forces realistic firepower available but a strong incentive not to use it.

- They could even possibly include the option of penalising excessive enemy casualties so that being 'too successful' is also a bad thing. I am not too sure how realistic this one would be though. It sounds like an ok idea when sitting here in a nice safe place, that inflicting massive enemy casualties may give your forces the reputation of being brutal etc but I don't really know enough to judge.

[akd]

Originally posted by Caesar:

I don't think that it need remove most of the complexity.

- Suffering a points penalty for property damage (particularly for holy sites)

- Restricting area fire weapons (Arty/Air etc) to areas within an arc of known enemy or if not restricting it, they could put a risk of points loss due to unseen civilian losses (the restriction is a better idea IMO)

- Use of certain weaponry could (depending on the scenerio) cause an automatic points loss (those seen as excessive force). This would give the US forces realistic firepower available but a strong incentive not to use it.

- They could even possibly include the option of penalising excessive enemy casualties so that being 'too successful' is also a bad thing. I am not too sure how realistic this one would be though. It sounds like an ok idea when sitting here in a nice safe place, that inflicting massive enemy casualties may give your forces the reputation of being brutal etc but I don't really know enough to judge.

Yes, but in way you are just adding abstract complications to pretend there are civilians present on the battlefield. I'd rather not play a scenario where I have to pretend there are civilians in the line of fire when I know there are not (reduces a real and difficult judgement call to a gamey restriction). Not that ROE could not still play a very important role, or that excessive damage to civilian structures should not count against you, just that without civilians present, it should be the absolute last of "victory conditions" considered, after accomplishing mission goals and minimizing or preventing any friendly casualties.

Even the importance of holy sites is being somewhat exaggerated when you consider the tacticial nature of a CM battlefield:

1. The immediate area around the, for example, mosque is already a battlefield.

2. You know there are no civilians present in the mosque or surrounding area and that there are definitely enemy combatants present in the area.

3. If the enemy gives you any reason to engage the mosque, you would more the likely be able to do so without your decision being judged a "failure" (at least, similar situations have played out in Iraq, even post-OIF I).

[ January 06, 2006, 09:20 PM: Message edited by: akd ]

[Imperial Grunt]

That is too bad that civies are not moving about the battlefield. They certainly were in OIF 1 and more so subsquently. And suicide bombers made their appearance in OIF 1. It was my Marines, and mine, greatest fear. We really wanted an Iraqi to shoot at us, we went everywhere looking for a fight (and got a few). But suicide bombers just suck.

Im not sure how too difficult modelling civies would be. Just make a mob that hangs out in the middle of town and a few small groups that randomly move. If in the line of fire, then they attempt to move out of the way. Same for vehicles.

And, a few of those civilian "units" could really be under the control of the Syrian player and could have a suicide bomber or hidden shooters.

As far as penalizing the US player for excessive enemy casualties..umm...say what?