Was it a victory? You decide!

[Bruce70]

[Edit: I'm too old and slow, Steve has already said most of this and more, but anyway...]

It seems quite likely that the majority of the insurgents involved believed that their mission was to defend the mosque. If we assume that the Americans did not march into the mosque after the battle, then I would guess that the majority of the insurgents did indeed believe that the battle was a success.

Of course from the American POV the battle was probably also a success (I say probably because the effect of civilian casualties, and damage to property is a variable that would be hard to pin down even with all the details).

However, I believe the battle can be divided into two parts. The part where the insurgents have firepower superiority and know their goal (I assume that the initial attack was a spontaneous attempt to capture the helicopter) and the second part where the Americans had superior firepower and the insurgent's goal was not clear.

In the first part it seems clear that this was an American success. The insurgents had a clear window of opporunity when success was achievable. A decisive and committed attack at that time, would quite possibly have been successful. The Americans achieved their objective of holding the position until reinforcements arrived. Clear American success.

In the second part it is less clear (because the two sides had different objectives, and for other reasons already stated), but it is also less important. Probably a draw - or more accurately a success for both sides.

I also believe that it is a success story for the Stryker. A less mobile force might not have been able to reach the site quickly enough to secure it initially or to provide reinforcements in a timely manner. The stryker force achieved these goals while suffering only minor vehicle damage, and arguably fewer casualties than a dismounted force. I would like to know where the Strykers actually were and who stayed with the vehicles. It seems that they were not far away, possibly parked 'behind' some buildings? But we know that at least a TOW vehicle was deployed, I would like to know whether the firepower of any of the other vehicles was utilised.

[ January 04, 2006, 04:51 PM: Message edited by: Bruce70 ]

[Ardem]

The problem is tactical battles success cannot be measure just by casualty ratio anymore. Success is "not" we killed more men then the other side. If you still think this, you need to get with the times, its not 1945 anymore.

Ever since Vietnam the world of conflict has changed of what is understood as a tactical success, Vietnam is a perfect example how you can have every 'percieved' tactical successes and lose the war. Therefore changing how to make an assessment of tactical success.

You have to incorporate your strategic goals into your tactical fights, otherwise you will lose the war.

So tactically the American achieved there goals as did the Iraqis but to say who really won, I think BigDuke post sums it up.

On a side note I think you will find Iraqis goals were a lot simplier, 'There is an american presence in our town let boot them out and show them we are fighters too', I doubt it was anymore detailed then that.

[Bruce70]

A few questions that hopefully someone can answer or at least make a guess at:

a) Where was the CO? We know that the recon platoon and the CO were both 1000m away from the crash site, and B company was a further 500m away. But exactly where was the CO, and who else was there?

How did the CO get to the crash site so easily, and why was it apparently considered safe to drive there in a single vehicle?

c) What happened to the wounded ING soldiers that were B companies original mission? Were they being evacuated in Strykers? How many Stryker med evac vehicles would have been available?

d) When and how did the Stryker med evac vehicle get to the crash site? Was it also escorted?

e) Was this a cooridnated attack? Everyone else except B company was able to drive without incident to the crash site. Yet B company was more or less ambushed, and the detached platoon was again attacked before reaching the site. Or was it all just a coincidence.

f) Did the police insurgent really think the mosque was under attack or was it just a ploy to get non-insurgent Iraqis to respond? Was this also pre-planned? Perhaps the rumour had already been spread that the Americans were going to attack a mosque?

[Bruce70]

[double post]

[ January 04, 2006, 05:58 PM: Message edited by: Bruce70 ]

[akd]

Originally posted by Bruce70:

A few questions that hopefully someone can answer or at least make a guess at:

a) Where was the CO? We know that the recon platoon and the CO were both 1000m away from the crash site, and B company was a further 500m away. But exactly where was the CO, and who else was there?

"He assured them that he could see their icon on his computer screen’s digitized map page and knew they were less than 1,000 meters from his position.

“A killed or captured pilot began to race through my mind, but we were lucky we were so close,” Reed said.

B Company commander Capt. Damien Mason was coordinating the medical evacuation of three Iraqi national guard soldiers who had been injured in a separate RPG attack.

That’s when he heard that the Kiowa went down. He soon regrouped his forces, anticipating the order to move to the scene.

The Scout Platoon’s four Strykers, also less than 1,000 meters from the shoot-down, arrived at the scene within five minutes. Soldiers dismounted about 75 meters from the Kiowa and quickly secured the crash site and set up a perimeter."

Answer: Unknown, and there are several possibilities. If the CO was moving with the forces sweeping in Tal Afar, his CP might have been mobile with the scout platoon, or less likely, on it's own. There seem to be indications that there was a "front" and a "rear," and it would seem that the CP was along this front with the other units.

How did the CO get to the crash site so easily, and why was it apparently considered safe to drive there in a single vehicle?

"A section of A Troop, 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry, was blocking avenues of approach to the rear and did not have the dismounts to help"

"...We had a static helicopter that wasn’t going anywhere; I had a static Stryker that wasn’t going anywhere, and we were taking fire from three different directions — from the south, north and west,” said Mason."

Answer: As usual, the insurgents were not operating with a larger plan. They were simply congregating on a point. This is typical of the insurgency and generally allows U.S. forces freedom of movement. The problems usually arise when U.S. forces stop at a point and the insurgents congregate there. Also, the above would seem to indicate there was some security along the approach to battle site, with at least one direction open.

c) What happened to the wounded ING soldiers that were B companies original mission? Were they being evacuated in Strykers? How many Stryker med evac vehicles would have been available?

"B Company commander Capt. Damien Mason was coordinating the medical evacuation of three Iraqi national guard soldiers who had been injured in a separate RPG attack.

That’s when he heard that the Kiowa went down. He soon regrouped his forces, anticipating the order to move to the scene."

Answer: The article simply says "coordinating" and that the company was "regrouped." The task waw either completed or simply handed off.

d) When and how did the Stryker med evac vehicle get to the crash site? Was it also escorted?

"The Scout Platoon’s four Strykers, also less than 1,000 meters from the shoot-down, arrived at the scene within five minutes. Soldiers dismounted about 75 meters from the Kiowa and quickly secured the crash site and set up a perimeter.

The engine was still smoldering. The tail boom had crushed a rock wall. The Kiowa was a total loss. The pilots were huddled nearby.

“They were very happy to see us when we showed up,” McChrystal said.

Both pilots were disoriented and had suffered back injuries. One could walk, but Scout Platoon soldiers carried the other on a litter to the Stryker medical evacuation vehicle."

Answer: Several possibilities, but most likely it simply rushed there along with the scouts. Once again, if U.S. forces move quick, they are usually safe.

e) Was this a cooridnated attack? Everyone else except B company was able to drive without incident to the crash site. Yet B company was more or less ambushed, and the detached platoon was again attacked before reaching the site. Or was it all just a coincidence.

""We were definitely outnumbered,” McChrystal said, recalling he had about 20 soldiers with him. Unmanned aerial vehicle surveillance counted about 60 insurgents moving toward the crash site from different directions.

“I knew their resolve to get that Kiowa was high, based on the volume of fire,” he said.

“They hit us from the west — I could tell it was coordinated because they would back up and hit us from the south.”

Sgt. Charles Foster, a sniper team leader and another sniper set up on a rooftop on the southeast corner from the crash site.

They started to take heavy machine gun and small-arms fire, but answered with deadly accuracy. Foster said the sniper he was with shot 12 enemy with his M24 sniper rifle in the first 20 minutes.

Still, the enemy continued to try to close in on the disabled Kiowa.

“The enemy was moving on us in a matter of 10 minutes from the time the bird went down,” Reed said. “This was very unlike the enemy we had encountered before in Tall Afar — they were forming and attacking in our direction with courage and coordination.”

...It was a long, linear, near ambush.”

...Insurgents fired machine guns and RPGs all along the main road that B Company advanced along. “It was a gauntlet,” Mason recalled.""

Answer: The insurgents were reacting, rushing to were the U.S. forces were, but this should not be confused with the insurgents operating with a clear plan or unified command. That would be atypical of the insurgents.

f) Did the police insurgent really think the mosque was under attack or was it just a ploy to get non-insurgent Iraqis to respond? Was this also pre-planned? Perhaps the rumour had already been spread that the Americans were going to attack a mosque?

Answer: Doesn't really matter, but it was unlikely pre-planned. Attacking mosques is not in the U.S. forces M.O. unless directly receiving fire and the insurgency had been going on long enough for this to be fairly well known. But the end result was the same: cause all the insurgents in the area to rally on a single point in an attempt to overwhelm U.S./coalition forces.

They failed.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Abbott:

..Bigduke is one of the most biased posters to this website, a chip on his shoulder for all things American and an inferiority complex when it comes to being Russian. I don’t doubt he is a decent chap and he does write detailed combat science fiction, always using good grammar and excellent punctuation.

woah. in my honest opinion Bigduke is one of the best posters on this board. his posts are an exceptional combination of vast knowledge, creative out-of-the-box thinking and good writing skills, finished with a very friendly down-to-earth touch.

isn't he an American living in Ukraine?

[Battlefront.com]

Ardem,

The problem is tactical battles success cannot be measure just by casualty ratio anymore. Success is "not" we killed more men then the other side. If you still think this, you need to get with the times, its not 1945 anymore.

Here we go again... confusing tactical with strategic. For assessing a TACTICAL battle one looks no further than that tactical battle. It doesn't matter if the cumulative effect of damage to civilians ultimately loses the war when you are looking at an individual slice of the war. What matter is who went into battle, what were they supposed to do, and did they acheive what they set out to do. Other factors, such as stepping on tribal toes of banging around a few too many suspects, are not significant factors at the tactical level. Cumulatively they might have a strategic effect, but tactically they rarely do. In the case of this battle for the helo, this tactical battle could have had much wider implications. And it didn't BECAUSE the US forces nipped that one in the bud. So again, US forces success. Open and shut case.

Ever since Vietnam the world of conflict has changed of what is understood as a tactical success, Vietnam is a perfect example how you can have every 'percieved' tactical successes and lose the war. Therefore changing how to make an assessment of tactical success.

Er... I don't know where you got your history lessons from, but that isn't what I got out of the Vietnam conflict. The US lost Vietnam for a host of reasons, but the largest ones were at the super strategic level. The war was not lost because 2nd Platoon, C Company successfully defended itself from a company sized enemy attack.

Again... keep the tactical separate from the strategic. Or do you think the German's conquest of France in 1940 was an operational defeat for them and a victory for the French because ultimately the Germans lost the war? Or do you think the famous attack by Wittman at Villers Boccage was a German defeat because after the battle he got killed and after that the Allies swept the Germans out of France? And I suppose you think the US forces won the battle at Kasserine because ultimately they ejected the Germans out of North Africa?

Because you've already decided (by consulting Ms. Cleo, I presume) that the war in Iraq has been lost by the Coalitionm and therefore all tactical battles are failures, by your definition the US can never win a tactical battle. Ever, no matter how badly the insurgents get spanked, how little they acheive, and how intact the US forces are at the end of the battle. That is what you are saying.

I don't know why you ardent anti-Iraq war drum beaters can't see that you're allowing your bias to get the better of you. You are twisting things to fit your predrawn conclusions instead of looking at things as they really are. I'm no fan of the war in Iraq (and don't get me started on how it is we got there!), yet I'm not turning rational military outcome assessment methodology on its head to support a preconceived political/social agenda. Sorry, but that is what a handful of you are doing. It's blatently obvious.

Even if you and Ms. Cleo turn out to be correct and the US leaves Iraq in the hands of the insurgents, I will still say that the US forces protecting that helo and evacuating it and the crew acheived success. The ultimate end of the campaign is irrelevant from a tactical assesment standpoint. That's the way it is in real life and that is the way it will be in CM:SF.

Steve

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Ardem:

The problem is tactical battles success cannot be measure just by casualty ratio anymore.

...

So tactically the American achieved there goals as did the Iraqis but to say who really won, I think BigDuke post sums it up.

there's also yet other side to measuring these battles. the one of trying to find out objectively how troops are performing in battles, without concern for strategical or even tactical objectives. this is essentially what Bigduke6 did.

it can lead to pretty surprising results. for example the Second Invasion of Fallujah was a failure if one considered how troops performed. instead of achieving the expected norm of 1:25 casulty ratio (for MOUT in which attacker has considerable combined arms assets but defender only few or none), the occupation forces managed only roughly 1:3 casulty ratio, even when they had extraordinarily excessive combined arms superiority and other advantages.

many of the battles, the one being discussed in this thread included, contain such surprising facts. it is a shame that people get such knee-jerk reactions to attempts of discussing these things, for they are very interesting.

[Battlefront.com]

AKD,

Answer: Unknown, and there are several possibilities. If the CO was moving with the forces sweeping in Tal Afar, his CP might have been mobile with the scout platoon, or less likely, on it's own. There seem to be indications that there was a "front" and a "rear," and it would seem that the CP was along this front with the other units.

I am struck by the number of times I have read about a Brigade CO tooling around on his own with minimal staff. In fact the CO of SBCT-2's 1-24 (Duece Four) was doing a foot patrol with only a few guys when he was shot by an insurgent. It was all caught on camera by a journalist who was embedded and tagging along.

We have a notion that this high level of command moves around with tons of men and material surrounding him when in fact it is often the opposite. The state of communications has unteathered the commander from the command trains, which is sometimes good and sometimes bad.

URC,

woah. in my honest opinion Bigduke is one of the best posters on this board. his posts are an exceptional combination of vast knowledge, creative out-of-the-box thinking and good writing skills, finished with a very friendly down-to-earth touch.

I agree. However, in this case Bigduke is wrong. He's allowing his personal opinion of the validity of the action in Iraq, and his opinion of how it will turn out, get in the way of sound logic. I hope he can see that.

Steve

[ January 04, 2006, 10:12 PM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[Battlefront.com]

URC,

it can lead to pretty surprising results. for example the Second Invasion of Fallujah was a failure if one considered how troops performed. instead of achieving the expected norm of 1:25 casulty ratio (for MOUT in which attacker has considerable combined arms assets but defender only few or none), the occupation forces managed only roughly 1:3 casulty ratio, even when they had extraordinarily excessive combined arms superiority and other advantages.

I don't know where you got that 1:25 ratio from, but I'm not aware that the US uses that as a gauge for success/failure. Also, I don't know where you came up with the 1:3 figure. The KIA ratio was more like 1:16. Not sure about the wounded, but I think it was around the same. Also 1000 insurgents were captured. And this was one of the biggest, most prepared fights since the fall of Saddam for both sides.

But aside from the body counting, what was acheived? Fallujah was a city completely out of Coalition control. It was never, ever friendly to the US and central Iraqi authority and had many, many reasons to want to keep it that way. Armed patrols wouldn't even venture into the center of the city unless it was a dire emergency. The insurgents were also using Fallujah as a base of operations for other activities all around Iraq, in particular Mosul. By the time the operation was over, the city was subdued and the insurgent problem reduced to something that is probably no worse than any other dominate Suni city, where as before it was in its own class. By all judgements the operation to clean out Fallujah and reestablish control was a success. Tactically and (for now at least) strategically. Whether the latter holds is yet to be seen, but it doesn't remove the tactical success.

Steve

[Ardem]

No they lost because, 2nd Platoon, C Company while under fire decided to ask for air support which used napalm that exploded on a village and then caught on the 5'clock news.

And continual examples of that which stop the resolve on a nation to continue the fight.

I (personal) do not believe you can when fighting an insurgent war forget the strategic importance of things while at the same time doing the tactical.

A soldier now has to be a poltician, Mother Teresa and Rambo all rolled into one.

and steve this not about america this is about every country, look at the soviet in afgan, exactly the same problems.

To me its not a matter who wins the tactical battles its the end result, and if you win all your tactical battles and lose the war you need to look at your measurement of success for it would be wrong.

It like a company that make a profit on every sale, but goes into bankrupcy. The accounting measurements for that company must change in future.

[ January 04, 2006, 10:18 PM: Message edited by: Ardem ]

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

I don't know why you ardent anti-Iraq war drum beaters can't see that you're allowing your bias to get the better of you. You are twisting things to fit your predrawn conclusions instead of looking at things as they really are.

wishful thinking. i don't know if you noticed, but i actually pointed out that in the end occupation forces seem to have been succesful in pacifying Tal-Afar and that thus these insurgents lost in the end. i was against the war but i honestly wish it all the possible success.

I'm no fan of the war in Iraq (and don't get me started on how it is we got there!), yet I'm not turning rational military outcome assessment methodology on its head to support a preconceived political/social agenda. Sorry, but that is what a handful of you are doing. It's blatently obvious.

there are a number of separate things mixed in this discussion, which seems to have confused you.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

I don't know where you got that 1:25 ratio from, but I'm not aware that the US uses that as a gauge for success/failure.

it's the more-or-less standard expected casulty ratio from these kind of battles. i think it was originally based on some Israeli studies.

Also, I don't know where you came up with the 1:3 figure. The KIA ratio was more like 1:16. Not sure about the wounded, but I think it was around the same. Also 1000 insurgents were captured.

it's a simple casulty ratio. i admit that it rises up to 1:5 if you include the captured, but i'd hesitate doing that because i'd imagine many of the captured were not necessarily active combatants.

But aside from the body counting, what was acheived?

yes, the historical outcome of the battle was of course a clear victory.

[Battlefront.com]

Ardem,

No they lost because, 2nd Platoon, C Company while under fire decided to ask for air support which used napalm that exploded on a village and then caught on the 5'clock news.

Oh, I forgot. The US action that saved that helo and crew resulted in the US pulling all of its forces out of Iraq to the cheers and jeers of all the Iraqi people. Thanks for the factual correction.

And continual examples of that which stop the resolve on a nation to continue the fight.

If you think the majority of people in Iraq give a flying fig how many Sunis are killed... you know nothing. They would have been perfectly happy to have seen Fallujah wiped off the map if it weren't for the Jihadists. They are a different breed.

I (personal) do not believe you can when fighting an insurgent war forget the strategic importance of things while at the same time doing the tactical.

Again exposing your ignorance of how the US is fighting this war. Do you know how many checks and balances are in place to restrain firepower? The decision to call in the JDAM and use the TOWs was not made lightly. They are an exception and not the rule in the war against the insurgency.

A soldier now has to be a poltician, Mother Teresa and Rambo all rolled into one.

Absolutely, but when you are surrounded by guys firing at you that doesn't matter. Again, you are confusing the tactical mission with the strategic one.

and steve this not about america this is about every country, look at the soviet in afgan, exactly the same problems.

Quite frankly (in my opinion) the lack of foreign forces in afgan now, actually is most of the reason for it success.

Still has nothing to do with assessing tactical battles.

To me its not a matter who wins the tactical battles its the end result, and if you win all your tactical battles and lose the war you need to look at your measurement of success for it would be wrong.

You keep dodging the challenge I've posed for you. So I'll do it more directly. Answer me this before posting again... who won each of these battles and why?

Kasserine

Arnhem

Villers Boccage

Monte Casino

Dieppe

Kiev 1941

Kharkov 1943

It like a company that make a profit on every sale, but goes into bankrupcy. The accounting measurements for that company must change in future.

Wrong. It is like a company that makes money off of every transaction it conducts, but the market vanishes because senior management made the wrong call about how to direct company business. There is nothing wrong with the accounting.

Or another example is a company that makes money on some sales and loses money on others. Upper management wrongly decides to emphasise the money losers and winds up going out of business. The accounting is still spot on, it's the sales strategy that failed.

By your definition a if 2 out of 3 games made by a publisher suck and the company goes out of business, the other game that was voted "best game of all times" was a complete and utter failure.

Accounting should never be confused with policy and policy with accounting. But at least your bad logic is consistently applied!

URC

wishful thinking. i don't know if you noticed, but i actually pointed out that in the end occupation forces seem to have been succesful in pacifying Tal-Afar and that thus these insurgents lost in the end. i was against the war but i honestly wish it all the possible success.

You missed the point. The ones that are saying that you can only judge a tactical battle by its ultimate strategic outcome are (not coincidentally) ardent anti-Iraq war voices on this Forum. I don't see that as being a coincidence.

And as it so happens, I'm with you. I am on the record of thinking the war in Iraq is a strategic mistake in a long line of political mistakes made by the Bush Admin (domestically and abroad). But I don't confuse my dislike of the war with what is actually going on in Iraq. I am also not so presumptuous as to claim I know how Iraq will look in the near and far future. Some have already declared it a total failure now, in the near future, and forever more. I wish I could get that kind of info on the stock market!

there are a number of separate things mixed in this discussion, which seems to have confused you.

No, there is only one discussion going on... how to assess the "success" or "failure" of a tactical engagement. Ardem and Bigduke are taking the position that there is no separation of tactical from strategic. If the strategic picture is crap, then whatever happens tactically is also crap because one can not be separated form the other. That is an opinon that doesn't hold much water when examined carefully.

Steve

[ January 04, 2006, 11:02 PM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[Battlefront.com]

URC,

it's a simple casulty ratio. i admit that it rises up to 1:5 if you include the captured, but i'd hesitate doing that because i'd imagine many of the captured were not necessarily active combatants

What casualty figures are you using for your ratio? I just did a quick check and found 71 US KIA and 1200 insurgent KIAs (I've seen a high of 1600 mentioned by Marine sources). That comes out to 1:16 on the low end or 22:1 on the high end just for the KIAs. The US has never had much luck estimating insurgent WIA because they are taken off the battlefield and often counted as civilian casualties. When there is a guy in civilian clothes in a hosptial with a gunshot wound and no weapon, the local Iraqis (who are sympathetic or fearful of reprisals) count the man as a civilian casualty even if they know for sure he is an insurgent. So it is difficult to assess this ratio since the US side is accurate and the other one is (largely) unknown.

yes, the historical outcome of the battle was of course a clear victory.

Tactically, for sure. Operational and Strategic levels... the jury is still out. The success in Fallujah on the whole will likely take years more to assess. And in that time it is possible for it to swing back and forth, just like a small battle can.

Steve

[ January 04, 2006, 10:57 PM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[WineCape]

Good discussion thread. Points by Drussus and Steve et al, as well Mikey's important input as what constitutes/defines victory vs success puts this battle account, IMHO, as a clear tactical success, despite what the other side of the hill might claim.

As Steve pointed out, a distinction should be made between strategic success/victory and tactical success/victory in analyzing this interesting account.

7. Securing the Mosque - this was never a part of either insurgent or US's battle intentions, so it is irrelevant. It would be like the Germans in the middle of Arnhem deciding to "keep secure" a wine cellar full of choice wine on the outskirts of town.

Depending on your battle thirst and troop morale, always worth fighting for. Damn the objective...

[ January 05, 2006, 01:15 AM: Message edited by: WineCape ]

[lucero1148]

How does calling in airstrikes and firing off a couple of TOW's constitute a defeat?

This being a tactical game I thought the description of victory for a scenario had already been clarified a while ago in pass discussions. That we weren't going to confuse the issue with strategic overlays because for a battle set in the future it would be too ephemeral anyways.

I would think if I were an Iraqi watching Al-Jazeera re-tell this tale as a insurgent victory I wold be shaking my head as it would be a spin no matter how you spin it. Zero US dead, no captured POW's or equipment to show off etc. The fact that the town was still in insurgent hands would be about the only positive thing but it would ring hollow as a victory bell toll.

As for the 17 insurgents wounded I would assume that they were captured wounded? That hasn't been clarified.

I think it's still a bitearly to crow about this current Iraqi campaign as a strategic loss to the US? If the new Iraqi government is able to stand on its own 2 feet and police their own country wouldn't that make it a US victory? It's not that way ..yet but it certainly doesn't look like the S. Vietnamese government back in 1974.

If we look at Afghanistan today all in all it looks more positive than when the Russians occupied it back in the 80's. It's being done with less foreign troops and the local population seems to be more pro government than anti.

[lucero1148]

I think Big Duke put out some provocative thoughts but to include a strategic overlay on how a tactical victory should be gauged isn't stretching it a bit too much. Especially since the strategic conditions aren't even relevant for the time frame involved which is the actual time fought on the ground in any tactical battle.

[Kip Watson]

The US army was overwhelmingly victorious in Vietnam. They vapourised the Viet Cong, and castrated and disembowelled the NVA.

The fact that, at the point of outright victory, the American nation, for almost unrelated reasons, suddenly surrendered unconditionally will ultimately go down in history as a bizarre one-time event.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

You missed the point. The ones that are saying that you can only judge a tactical battle by its ultimate strategic outcome are (not coincidentally) ardent anti-Iraq war voices on this Forum. I don't see that as being a coincidence.

it's true in general, but i wouldn't jump to conclusions regarding Bigduke6. he seems like a rational fellow.

But I don't confuse my dislike of the war with what is actually going on in Iraq. I am also not so presumptuous as to claim I know how Iraq will look in the near and far future. Some have already declared it a total failure now, in the near future, and forever more. I wish I could get that kind of info on the stock market!

too true. it's also strange how certain types are not able to accept good news. what ever happens it is bad news, often in self-contradictory ways.

No, there is only one discussion going on... how to assess the "success" or "failure" of a tactical engagement. Ardem and Bigduke are taking the position that there is no separation of tactical from strategic. If the strategic picture is crap, then whatever happens tactically is also crap because one can not be separated form the other. That is an opinon that doesn't hold much water when examined carefully.

perhaps it's wishful thinking from my part, but in my opinion Bigduke6 also did analyze the actual battle quite objectively, which is what i was trying to point out.

the US side wasn't necessarily outgunned or even considerably outmanned. if you look at the casulty ratio, it was 7:129 --> 1:18, which is still lower than the 1:25 ratio. on the other hand the US side was at least partly on defence and there were only small combined arms elements present. still Bigduke6 made some good commentary on the tactical side.

for an example let's consider one area which Bigduke6 did not address; the role of communications and intelligence. it was vital for the success of the US mission, but on the other hand it failed totally (abushes etc). with only slight changes to the enemy equipment (e.g. proper ammunition for the RGPs) the battle would have likely changed dramatically. this rises numerous thoughts along the lines of "how to protect mechanized infantry in hostile terrain: slat armour and air-based surveillance vs intelligence gathering on the ground". this kind of neutral study, that doesn't pay attention to either tactical or strategical goals, is what i had in mind. in my opinion Bigduke6's post was doing just that, at least partly.

[Drusus]

In Vietnam the ultimate problem was that there were very few local people who were willing to support the USA and the majority of the population was against the USA. Now, the reason for this might be part in what happened at the tactical level but mostly in the setup of the war. USA was trying to plant a government which wasn't exactly popular amongst the people, etc. The reason was also partly in air bombings and what the troops did between the battles and so on. But to claim that the tactical level battles were a failure because US lost the war is just not correct. If the USA would only have used air bombing and artillery in tactical battles the view we have of the war might be much different. If they hadn't used them at all the result would have been a disaster.

To win the war I think it would have been necessary to end up in some kind of reasonable political decision. Now, the really interesting question is, if they had ended up in some political decision which could have been described as a draw, would every tactical battle been a draw also? BTW Vietnam era history isn't my strongest area, so, as always, feel free to correct...

The same in Iraq. The insurgency is coming from different sources, but I think the most important reasons are in the setup for the war. The WMDs and all. And what was done and more importantly what wasn't done in the first months after the mission was accomplished. Ofcourse USA in middle east is red herring to most of Arabs. And then the major one, the problem that the Sunnis don't exactly like Shiias. Now if we take all this into account, it is very much possible that it is impossible to win the war with the style USA is currently trying (I am not claiming it is impossible). So, should we conclude that every tactical battle is lost even before they started? I don't think so. And what happens if we claim that the tactical battles were lost and it turns out the USA won the war? Should we change the result of the battles?

One could take into account also the amount of collateral damage done. But it is a case of considering if there was too much collateral damage vs the damage done to the enemy. In Tal Afar this might make the victory less total, but the amount of damage done wasn't excessive.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

What casualty figures are you using for your ratio? I just did a quick check and found 71 US KIA and 1200 insurgent KIAs (I've seen a high of 1600 mentioned by Marine sources). That comes out to 1:16 on the low end or 22:1 on the high end just for the KIAs. The US has never had much luck estimating insurgent WIA because they are taken off the battlefield and often counted as civilian casualties. When there is a guy in civilian clothes in a hosptial with a gunshot wound and no weapon, the local Iraqis (who are sympathetic or fearful of reprisals) count the man as a civilian casualty even if they know for sure he is an insurgent. So it is difficult to assess this ratio since the US side is accurate and the other one is (largely) unknown.

i just lumbed total casulties together, though it does not contain separate figures for wounded insurgents. i thought that they would likely belong to the captured ones. it would be interesting if someone could come up with at least a rough estimate of separate wounded insurgents. the numbers i had in mind were 500:3000.

it's true that on KIA terms the ratio is close to 1:25, but in my opinion KIA ratio gives wrong idea about the actual performace, because the attacking side had so much better body armour and medical services and because the defending side was, i believe, preferring death over captivity to an exceptional degree.

if the 1:6 figure is even close to truth, the battle for Fallujah was much harder that would be expected. contrary to what is commonly believed, studies show that the attacking side has a huge advantage in MOUT if he has large combined arms assets and the defender has only very small ones. in Fallujah this disparity was unnaturally large so the 1:6 figure would seem to hint that either something didn't go well or there was some special condition which caused such high casulty rate for the attacking side.

Tactically, for sure. Operational and Strategic levels... the jury is still out. The success in Fallujah on the whole will likely take years more to assess. And in that time it is possible for it to swing back and forth, just like a small battle can.

true and there were even immediate negative military consequences as the insurgents were able to capture Mosul largely because of the operation in Fallujah. it's quite possible that insurgents planned it that way from the beginning as the fall of Mosul contained curious stuff like the simultaneous disbanding of the whole police force from within. it's telling that the US forces had to abandon their bases in Mosul and set up defences outside the city.

[Bigduke6]

(Long post, you are warned)

*Sticks head out of entrenchment*

Hehehehehe. I had hoped this thread would get the juices going after all that holiday overeating and excess. Thanks to every one for contributing.

Ok, on to business.

First, Abbott. As I have said before, you make great scenarios, you really have a touch for creating a tense situation requiring smart tactics. One a hint: There are plenty of grammatical and punctuation errors in my posts. You just have to look.

Next, Steve. I am questioning the validity of calling this engagement a simple victory on several levels, including tactical. It's nice to see you and I seem to agree on all but the tactical. As to your comments:

However, if the insurgency got itself a true tactical victory, such as captured pilots, then that would all change. It would likely be a humiliation for the US, yet another example of failed US policy in Iraq, and yet another blow to Iraqi confidence that the Americans are in control of things. But that DID NOT

HAPPEN because 5-20 prevented it from happening.

As to control, my opinion, the issue of control was decided before the fight began. I do not see how you can assert preservation of the pilots demonstrates U.S. "control", when the U.S. needs two regular infantry companies, more than 30 Strykers, and air strikes just to keep the pilots alive. So clearly, my standard for U.S. "control" is higher than yours. We shall see which standard was more accurate, in a year or two.

As to tactical victory, since when are a pair of pilots remaining uncaptured a "true tactical victory?" Clauswitz certainly wouldn't have said so. A tactical victory is destruction of the enemy force, control of ground, stuff like that. That's the classical definition.

You are expanding your definition of tactical victory to include the prevention of captured U.S. pilots, I think, precisely because you understand that tactical success in modern war must include results beyond the classic "Clauswitzian" definition. In this case, keeping those pilots off of Al Jazeera prime time made 5-20 victorious.

Fair enough. But - that is already a strategic, not a tactical, result. Something by definition outside the realm of CM. And all I am saying is that what's sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander: if the performance of U.S. forces is to be judged, in part, by tactical results giving strategic effect, then the judgement must include all tactical results giving strategic effect. For both sides, good and bad.

To put a fine point on it, one shouldn't praise 5-20 for kicking Semite tail and taking no names, and saving the pilots; without also taking into account their use of air strikes and .50 caliber machine guns in an inhabited region to get that result. Not if the goal is judging tactical victory, in modern terms.

Of course, if your goal is creating a definition of tactical victory that may contradict the strategic result, or one that presupposes U.S. tactical success...nah, of course it isn't.

Did you read the same report that I read? I read a report that showed 20 men and 4 machines holding off a superior force, armed with light and heavy small arms, mortars, and RPGs, until reinforcements arrived. Sure, ultimately the weight of numbers came down on the US' side. That doesn't always happen in time, though. Things could have gone VERY badly for the US forces. In Ramadi nearly a dozen Marines were wiped out in a few minutes by a well executed ambush. That was an insurgent "success". This was not.

See below. In my opinion, the Iraqis were very likely to have been not all that superior. Think armed mob.

The insurgents feel that murdering Iraq civilians and collaborators is "victory". A single Humvee being blown up is "success". They have different standards because they aren't fighting a conventional war (something the West still needs to learn a LOT about). So in that sense, yes the simple fact that they were able to resist the Americans at all in that one, singular firefight was a sort of "success" for them. However, they didn't get what they were after, so I'm sure someone in the insurgency feels they missed a golden opportunity. And that is, by definition, not a success.

Well, I disagree. I think that the typical Iraqi willing to take up arms against the Americans thinks in Biblical terms: he is fighting the fight of a moral man, and the main thing is to fight, rather than to achieve a particular result. So you have these kids and young men taking on U.S. regulars, soldiers of the superpower, backed up with all the combat tail Uncle Sugar sticks behind his troops. I'd bet, in the Iraqi fighters' view, the simple act of resisting is already heroic. By doing so, they achieve their main goal.

If you're talking the people organizing the insurgency - inasmuch as it is organized - then sure they saw a missed opportunity. But a defeat? I doubt it. Helicopter shot down, and U.S. forces run out of town after heroic resistance, talk about great advertising for your recruiting.

And if that helps the insurgent "war effort", why should we ignore things like that when trying to decide who won the battle? In the present war, simply fighting against the Americans for three hours in a row is an achievement, and arguably some form of a tactical success for the insurgency. It's not easy to do, and when the insurgency manages it they probably gain recruits. So why shouldn't you call that a victory of some kind?

I agree. However, in this case Bigduke is wrong. He's allowing his personal opinion of the validity of the action in Iraq, and his opinion of how it will turn out, get in the way of sound logic. I hope he can see that.

Just like you, I am certainly am capable of allowing bias to skew my judgements. Here, I am suggesting - suggesting mind you:

Conventional definitions of tactical victory are at best misleading, and at worst false, when applying them to an "asymetric" conflicts like Iraq, or indeed Syria.

In CMSF terms, I would be really disappointed if VPs didn't take into account a whole bunch of the stuff falling outside the conventional definition - collateral damage, civilian and indeed non-U.S. casualties, media exposure, and so on. I am cynical enough to even hope that there will be a lot of victory conditions in the game that exist in real life, but so far one hasn't seen in simulations, things like officer career enhancement, inter-service rivalry, potentially corrupt allies, and the like.

Sure, you the designer can say stuff that has nothing to do with the tactical battle, so why program it?

And I respond: In real life, it does.

Do you know how many checks and balances are in place to restrain firepower? The decision to call in the JDAM and use the TOWs was not made lightly. They are an exception and not the rule in the war against the insurgency.

Meaning, I would say, some kind of U.S. VP penalty for using big boomers like that in a built-up area. If the insurgents put up a fight strong enough to force the U.S. infantry to resort to air, I would call that, on some levels at least, an insurgent success.

Ok, on to the new stuff. Thanks to every one with me so far.

One of the things missing from this discussion, I think, is a calculation of what the Iraqis brought to this fight, and how effective those forces were, and what they really were capable of.

Here's my guess, my attempt at trying to get inside the insurgents' head. I'll preface this by saying I personally am not on the insurgent side, nor do I condone their terrorist tactics. Know you enemy and all that. Here goes:

The Americans are driving around Tal Afar in force. Even though the city is pretty much on our (insurgent) side, our fighters are lying low as the only way we have a chance of hurting the Americans is by ambush, and the Americans aren't telling us where they're going, and our fighters are not S.S. troopers but civilians with little command structure and less discipline. A lot of the random shooting that is going on is out of our control, how can we order every citizen of Tal Afar to hold fire when Americans drive into his neighbourhood?

Each believer makes his own decision as to when to fight the invaders - that is how jihad works.

However, by whatever means, a Kiowa gets clipped and it crashes in the square next to a mosque. (Which makes sense, BTW, mosques usually open up onto open spaces large enough to handle a force-landing helicopter, and in older cities in the region are, soccer statiums aside, just about the only place you could put down a bird).

We the insurgent leaders get the word by mobile phone: Christian infidel flying machine has crashed next to the mosque. What do we do?

Well, grab the opportunity if possible. Get fighters to the crash site, grab the crew alive or dead. Also, since we know the Americans will rush there too, take advantage of that, ambush them if we can. This is a rare chance to hurt the Americans, we can predict their next moves. They have to send troops to the helicopter.

So we go to the mullah(s) and get him to call for fighters to convene on the mosque to defend it from the infidels. No, the helicopter crewmen aren't attacking the mosque, and we are well aware the only time the Americans will attack a mosque is if we put a defense in one. But no need to tell our fighters that. Besides, it's not like we're calling out a Volksturm that has been training for this days since the Red Army broke into East Prussia. All we have is the promise of the faithful to their mullahs: "If and when the Americans come, we will fight them if we must."

Do we have anything resembling a military unit under our command? Doubtful. Even if Tal Afar is the center of insurgent resistance, our dedictated terrorist-type guys are scattered around the city digging in roadside bombs and killing collaborators and so on. We need people to get to the mosque fast, and that means the local population and whatever security forces are in the vicinity.

So the word goes out: "Every one defend the mosque from the infidels." The message via minarets, mobile phones, and word-of-mouth.

Ok, what happens next? Well, in drips and drabs our fighters show up, as it takes time for Akhmed to call up Abdul, to unlimber the AKs, to get the groups together, and so when the first fighters show up about 20 Americans are already there, and they are backed up by 4 of those Stryker thingies with the bad-ass .50 calibers. The Americans have body armor and are far better shots than our guys, and they are defending. The only real way we have to hurt them is with massed small arms fire, or by pelting them with LOTS of RPGs.

Too bad we don't have a crack German Sturm platoon, they would come in real useful right now. All we have is a bunch of, effectively, conscript infanrtry, without officers, without marksmanship training, and pretty much able to join or leave the fight on their own accord. If one gets hurt three more leave the fight to drag him back to his relatives.

So all we can do is keep putting out the word: Defend the mosque, the infidels are there!

American reinforcements are coming, and so in about half an hour the message comes in from a neighborhood a kilometer away: Our rockets damaged one of the infidel's Stryker machines! They towed it away true, but we hurt it! Allahu Akhbar!

The American reinforcements show up at the mosque, but they are unwilling to charge the faithful, in part because our guys have set up machine guns and maybe mortars, and in part because, frankly, the Americans are afraid to die. They prefer to fight by shooting their big weapons, and not getting close to fight like men.

However, we are no closer to the helicopter, and more Americans are coming. The Americans have a perimeter and it is really hard to hurt them, without getting shot up badly in return. We don't even have grenades, and it's not like we have limitless RPGs. We are sending civilians in their clothes with AKs against armored infantry backed up with .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. It would be great if we had two or three dozen British-style NCOs to put a backbone into our fighters. But we don't.

What can we do? We say again: Defend the mosque, destroy the infidels!

Time passes. Eventually the Americans get one of their evil war birds to drop a bomb in the middle of a residential neighborhood; many faithul died as a result, and now we can depend on businessmen whose businesses the bomb ruined to be more friendly to the resistance. Outstanding.

However, we're no closer to the helicopter. It would be nice to bring in that team of AT missile operators to help out, but they're on the other side of the city, and the Americans have checkpoints set up stopping traffic. And this isn't London, there is no underground to sneak bombs around in. So what to do?

Say once again: The infidels are at the mosque, destroy them.

More time passes, more Americans show up, and eventually they go away. We probably killed dozens of them, we know this to be true because our fighters say so, and also because it is impossible that there were dozens of dead on our side, and none on the side of the infidels. So clearly, we won!

How many Iraqis were involved in the fight?

We the insurgent leadership guess potentially several hundred, that's a rough estimate of how many men with weapons would hear about the mosque being under attack and respond over a three hour period. But only dozens at a time, it's not as if the faithful have vehicles carrying extra ammunition or water. Our fighters showed up, shot off what they have, and went home. There was very little organization. We can't make them show up, and we can't really stop them from going home. So at any given time we probably had between 50-150 fighters on the ground trying to harm the Americans. Considering the Americans had roughly the same numbers, we did very well indeed.

Ok, that's the end of my WAG of what 5-20 came up against in Tal Afar. And now for the provocative questions:

Could the Americans have achieved more against a enemy force like that? Should they have? Or is the combat effectiveness of the insurgents routinely overestimated by U.S. forces, because if it were described accurately, taxpayers paying for it all might start asking why it costs so much to support a high tech force that achieves such mediocre results, against a mostly hapless opponent?

*ducks*

[WineCape]

Aha, the real issue I venture to say BigDuke.

***EDIT: Deleted the rest as tried to get witty with booze in the cellar underneath the mosque and added, as usual, nothing to this interesting discussion. Apologies.***

[ January 05, 2006, 04:24 AM: Message edited by: WineCape ]

[Drusus]

If the US side had lost 10 wounded and 2 dead in the battle it would still have been a victory for them. I think CMSF is going to have victory conditions based on the idea that even if you won the battle, you still wasn't good enough given the situation. You are given result based on the point of view of the batallion commander, for example. I think there are examples of battles that were won by the side performing badly. Two different things, again.

Example from CMx1. Put 10:1 odds in a meeting engagement. The 'ten' side will almoust always win. Still, if the 'ten' side plays poorly, it is possible the 'ten' side takes too much losses given the situation. CMx1 doesn't take this into account, CMSF propably will. But to lose a battle like that means you tried to lose...

So, it is possible to claim that the US side didn't do as well as was expected given the situation but that doesn't mean they lost the battle. In my opinion they did well enough. If they did well enough or not is an open question, we really don't know enough of the battle.