Nebelwerfer effectiveness in Normandy - help please.

[Kingfish]

Epsom and others

Click on the 'Hill 112' tab for info on Epsom. For some reason the 'Epsom' tab talks about Operation Perch and the battle of Villers Bocage instead :confused:

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Also, was not part of 12th SS together with a part of Panzerlehr rather busy fending off Operation Martlet (started on the 25th), the attack by XXX Corps using 49th West Riding supported by 8th Armoured Brigade (another 180 tanks on the left flank of the Odon attack). I have been looking for confirmation that it really was a part of 12th SS, but only have Delaforce, and I don't trust him. But that would further push the odds in favour of the British.

I have the divison history of 12th SS.

They mention that Pz Lehr was supposed to get replacements for their lost 2300 Greandiere from the replacement pool of 2nd Pz (Heer).

The Divisionsbegleitkompanie of 12th SS was with Lehr (I assume that is the heavy weapons divisons escort company in CMBO terms). The 12th Panzer regiment is on the left hand of 12th SS, near to Lehr, but part of 12th SS.

Other bits:

This history describes that the Germans were in progress for an own bigger offensive to be due in the first days only July.

The number of operational tanks at 24.6.1944 is given as 58 Pz IV, 44 Panther, 233 pieces of light armor, 17 heavy AT guns (lost since 6 June: 36 Pz IV, 19 Panther, 44 light armor, 11 heavy AT guns). Based on other passages in this text I can imagine that the AT guns are actually Jagdpanzer IV, but probably they are towed guns.

The forces for Epsom are given as:

British: 31 battalions infantry, 15 tank battalions, 900 artillery pieces.

Germans: 5.5 battalions infantry, 2 panzer battalions, "probably" 1-2 tank companies of Pz Lehr. 36 artillery pieces, "probably" 6 more of Pz Lehr.

[Simon Fox]

Well irrespective of the actual tank numbers I agree with Jason's overall assessment of Epsom. Anyway these armour odds are pretty irrelevant, we're talking bocage here if only for the initial phase, if anything the British pushed too much armour in and ended up with a great bit traffic jam. The 4th Armoured Bde's task for the operation was rear/flank security and mopping up in the initial phase. The appearance of II SS Pz Corps on the western side of the salient which the British were aware of prior to it's employment. The arrival of elements of 2nd Pz there (it's panther Abt). Arrival of elements of 1st SS Pz on the eastern flank (Kampfgruppe). Pz Lehr sitting on the Western side about to be releived by 276 Inf. Constraints of the terrain within the salient itself (bocage) and the narrowness of the salient which restricted transport and exposed it to the powerful artillery which these German formations could muster including just about every Werfer unit in Normandy. The difficulties of providing artillery support to units at the apex of the salient for these reasons. The total unsuitability of a British armoured division for holding ground. The insufficient Odon bridges. The exposed nature of 112. In these circumstances closing down Epsom seems prudent rather than timid.

This is validated by the walloping administered to subsequent German counterattacks.

Neither the 4th nor 8th armoured Bdes could be said to be at full strength for Epsom. Both had already been involved in action since D-day or just after. The 4th Armoured especially heavily.

I think it would be fair to see Martlet as part of Epsom, they can hardly be seen as two distinct thrusts at the 12th SS. Launched on the 25th June most seem to consider Martlet the preliminary phase of Epsom which commenced 26th June. 49th infantry division were supported by 8th armoured Bde in this endeavour. Fontenay was 'cleared' by 26th and Rauray by 27th/28th. I would have thought this attack fell upon the right flank of Pz Lehr and the left of 12th SS.

The 8th Armd Bde captured a Tiger in Fontenay and another in Rauray as well as reporting a number operating on their front in addition to Panthers and SP guns indicating that it is likely that elements of 101 SS Pz Abt. was operating against Epsom/Martlet from the 26th on.

According to Zetterling 12th SS tank strength on 26th of June was 60 Pz IV and 37 Panthers with a further 12 PzIV and 27 Panthers requiring minor repairs only.

I don't see much point in a numbers game considering the British couldn't possibly hope to apply them over such a limited frontage. However, the figures given by redwolf seem rather excessive "15 battalions" of Brit tanks? also I fancy the Germans had a fair bit more arty than 36. As Jason has correctly pointed out the bulk of Epsom was borne by the 15th Scottish and the 11th Armd Divs both fighting their first battle. If nature had not intervened and the Op had been launched on 22nd June with better preparation the result may have been a little different.

Sources:

Delaforce "Black Rat and Red Fox", "The Polar Bears"

Zetterling ""Normandy 1944, German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness"

amongst others

[JasonC]

I understand and agree that the initial attack had high odds against 12SS, when that was the only German unit engaged. The point is that it no longer had such odds once 9SS and 10SS joined the battle. Only half of 12SS was in front of 15th Scottish and 11th AD, say. But all of 9SS and 10SS were. None of either formation was committed to stop other parts of the attack. Even the half of 12SS in front of the Scots and 11th AD was not destroyed, as 12SS lost only on the order of 1500-2000 men in the whole battle. II Pz Kps lost about as much again.

II Panzer Kps have not only 160 runners, it had more like 250. About 1/3rd Panther, 1/3rd Pz IV, and 1/3rd StuG. If half of 12SS with 100 (which I agree is the right ballpark for 12 SS, with a bit less than half of them Panthers) was in front of the Scots and 11th AD, even supposing they were cut in half by then, the German armor ahead of that part of the thrust was on the order of 300 tanks, once the counterattack went in. 11th AD alone had lost 100 tanks. They can't have had any local armor odds, and nothing opposite the other half of 12SS would have helped. (The other portion of German armor in the battle was about 50 tanks from 2 Pz, all Panthers).

As for redwolf's figures, the problem again is they refer only to the initial odds, before the German reinforcements arrived. 12 SS may have had 5.5 battalions of infantry - although by TOE they have 7.5 not 5.5 (3 per regiment plus engineers and half in the recon battalion). The 5.5 figure is correct for a Heer Panzer division but not an SS one. The 5.5 figure might have been meant to adjust for reduction in strength due to losses earlier in July, however.

But the reinforcements make the 5.5 figure irrelevant. II SS Pz Kps brought 15 fresh infantry battalion equivalents to the field (4 regiments each of 3 Pz Gdr battalions, plus 2 pioneer battalions, and half a battalion in each of two recon battalions). 2 more from the 1SS KG supported the other half of 12SS, but that is less important than what was happening along the "Scottish corridor", which is the only place there was a significant break-in.

There you have the Scots division and the 11th AD, with perhaps 15 battalions of infantry, being generous about things like engineers. But the Scots also lost 2700 men, and the 11th AD 1000. In front of them was whatever was left of half of 12SS - perhaps 2 battalions - and the whole II SS Pz Kps. The infantry odds were probably negative by then, therefore (near even in nominal battalions, except the Brit losses so far, which were a high portion of the front-line rifle strength of one infantry division).

The armor situation was similarly bad. All of II SS Pz Kps comes in opposite only the *successful* half of the Epsom attack force, *after* its losses are taken out. That is how defensive use of reserves works. (Nearly) The whole reserve meets the successful attackers, without needing to be dissipated over the other portions of the attack, that hadn't made as much progress.

On the other half of the attack, half of 12SS, reduced by losses, was facing the rest of VIII corps. The odds were undoubtedly higher in the Brits favor there, than up near Hill 112. The one KG from 1SS helped hold the line, but without armor (beyond 12SS own contribution, which could not be large by then). About 5 infantry battalions and perhaps 1 tank battalion were holding off half the original attack force, without being penetrated.

The penetration instead came where the Brits decided to mass their armor. The Germans then put in the bulk of their reserve - II SS Pz Kps - on only that part, opposite the massed British armor. Easily stopping it, because the reserve was as large as that half of the attack force (15 infantry battalion equivalents and 250 AFVs), which was already reduced by losses.

As for my comment about a 'ringing success', which was meant to be ironic, I did not mean to put words in anybody's mouth. There are some later observors who blame the British commanders from breaking off the attack, and believed that Hill 112 was theirs for the keeping if only the commanders had kept their nerve. This primarily reflects the disappointment and bitterness of the infantry formations left on the hill when the armor pulled back, who felt like their sacrifices to date had been in vain.

The infantry blamed the armor branch, its lack of nerve, for the failure. I don't think that historical assessment, made by some at the time and some writing later unit histories, was an accurate assessment of the battle, and that is why I mentioned it. I did not mean to imply others here were making that argument, only that it has been made but seems to me to be without merit.

The reason for the failure was the presence and commitment of a large enough German reserve, not nerve (or the rival tech-specs of the tanks present, an alternate plea by some of the tankers). Before that reserve arrived, the attack did have odds and therefore made progress. After the German reserve arrived, the attack did not have odds and therefore did not make progress, and calling it off was the proper, prudent course.

[Andreas]

If you count all the infantry involved on the British side you get:

11th Armoured - 4 Battalions

15th Scottish - 9 Battalions

49th West Riding - 9 Battalions

4th & 8th Armoured - 2 Battalions

24 involved in the first line

43rd Wessex (guarding the corridor) - 9 Battalions

33 battalions total

15 armoured battalions is certainly wrong. At most you get 12 I think.

So I wonder how these other figures were arrived at.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

Neither the 4th nor 8th armoured Bdes could be said to be at full strength for Epsom. Both had already been involved in action since D-day or just after. The 4th Armoured especially heavily.

Simon, I have looked at the what looks like he online version of the 1945 History of the 4th Armoured Brigade and it does not say anything about heavy engagements prior to Epsom.

Here is the relevant passage:

On the 11th we concentrated near Colomby-sur-Thaon, on the main road from Courseulles to Caen to support 9 Canadian Brigade of 3 Canadian Division against a supposed threat. The Sharpshooters took up fire positions among the infantry near Villons Les Buissons, the rest of the Brigade being on either side of Colomby. Main Brigade HQ in the chateau at Beny sur Mer was an obvious target for the enemy artillery and was finally forced to evacuate it on the 13th, after several direct hits had set the chateau on fire. From then till the 25th the Brigade was engaged in supporting 51st Highland Division and 3 Canadian Division in the same area.

3 CLY's war diary (transcribed here) also does not mention any major engagements or any tank losses prior to Epsom.

8th Armoured Brigade's history is here, and it looks to me as if they may have had the higher losses.

Casualties were heavy and 124 tanks were put out of action in 25 days. The Brigade claimed 86 enemy tanks and S. Ps destroyed, knocked out or captured during the same period.

BTW - have you seen that Tank Museum has reprinted the 1945 history of the 7th Armoured?

[ March 29, 2002, 04:02 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

Well irrespective of the actual tank numbers I agree with Jason's overall assessment of Epsom. Anyway these armour odds are pretty irrelevant,

This is validated by the walloping administered to subsequent German counterattacks.

Neither the 4th nor 8th armoured Bdes could be said to be at full strength for Epsom. Both had already been involved in action since D-day or just after. The 4th Armoured especially heavily.

I think it would be fair to see Martlet as part of Epsom, they can hardly be seen as two distinct thrusts at the 12th SS. Launched on the 25th June most seem to consider Martlet the preliminary phase of Epsom which commenced 26th June. 49th infantry division were supported by 8th armoured Bde in this endeavour. Fontenay was 'cleared' by 26th and Rauray by 27th/28th. I would have thought this attack fell upon the right flank of Pz Lehr and the left of 12th SS.

According to Zetterling 12th SS tank strength on 26th of June was 60 Pz IV and 37 Panthers with a further 12 PzIV and 27 Panthers requiring minor repairs only.

Sources:

Delaforce "Black Rat and Red Fox", "The Polar Bears"

Zetterling ""Normandy 1944, German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness"

amongst others

Jason’s whole thrust was that 1:1 odds were what decided the battle, even with the addition of II SS Panzer corps on the last day operation that had already halted those odds were never reached by the Germans. Now Jason’s is stating that the Germans achieved some sort of parity with infantry numbers. Considering that only one of the Panzer Grenadier battalion had the joy of achieving 83% of its toe in infantry coupled with its shortage of AFV the II SS corps might as well have been in combat before Epsom.

'Short term' category means two to three weeks in the shop for Panzers, these reports went all the way back to Armee level.