The armoured fist vs. the combined arms breakthrough

[von Lucke]

Originally posted by redwolf:

I also don't see that the horse-speed movement of the non-motorized divisions was a decisive disadvantage at any time. Certainly they were where needed in Barbarossa.

There were several occasions between June and August '41 when the Panzer Groups were directly ordered by OKH to halt and wait for the foot sloggers to catch up. This hesitation often allowed Soviet units to escape encirclement, and gave the Red Army in general the time it needed to re-group.

[von Lucke]

Originally posted by Foxbat:

Considering that 'Blitzkrieg' is essentialy "Deep Operations lite" I don't see why it would not work for the germans. For example properly expoiting and encircling was very much a part of soviet doctrine, whereas the germans generally just let their spearheads run off until they ran out of steam/panzers/conquerable country.

The german army was still fighting the last war (invasion of France) when they invaded russia and seemed to have clung to that in the abscense of an actual doctrine.

I pretty much agree with you --- to a point. I think the Soviets learned from the Germans how not to conduct Deep Battle operations: The Germans would bite off more than they could swallow, and as a result encircled Soviet soldaten often made their escape (usually sans heavy equipment).

This is a result of, as you point out, the Germans preference for a running long-jump into the enemy backfield --- while the Soviets prefered to hop-skip-jump their way in. The Soviet method allowed for more fine-tuning of strategic goals, while the German method was pretty much all-or-nothing.

As for the German inability to figure out what they were doing wrong, that, to me, seems somewhat inexplicable. As I mentioned before, I think it was a combination of arrogance (they'd developed a low opinion of the Ivans in '41, but it didn't hold true by '43), hidebound stubborness (hey, spearheading with the Panzers worked in '39, and '40, and '41, and '42, --- why not in '43?), inexperienced commanders falling back on dogma instead of using initiative ("what would von Clauswitz do?"), and generally being overcome with inertia (even Hitler felt queezy about attacking the Kursk salient --- yet he also felt he had no other alternative).

The Red Army, on the other hand, had reached the point where experience, equipment, and training had finally come together to form a true combined-arms force. (There was even an entire section of Stavka devoted to the study and dissemination of "War Experience" based on extensive studies of each battle and campaign.) The follow-on operations to Kursk (Kutuzov, Rumaniatsev,and Suvorov) pretty much illustrate that the Sovs had learned how to conduct effective mechanized break-though and exploitation.

[ October 11, 2002, 04:43 AM: Message edited by: von Lucke ]

[von Lucke]

Originally posted by Grisha:

I'm curious to hear what some people think an operation is at the operational and strategic level, because some of the comments are more than a little confusing. Maybe there should a separate discussion on this so that we're all in agreement here. Otherwise, what one may call an 'operation,' I may call extended tactical actions.

"Tactics make the steps from which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path".

--- A. A. Svechin, Strategiia, 1926

[von Lucke]

Huh? I'm encircling my own posts!

[ October 11, 2002, 04:42 AM: Message edited by: von Lucke ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

This is an interesting discussion and certainly a peg or two above the usual dross

We aim to please, as they say in the Royal Artillery. Say, were we playing a game??

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by von Lucke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by redwolf:

I also don't see that the horse-speed movement of the non-motorized divisions was a decisive disadvantage at any time. Certainly they were where needed in Barbarossa.

There were several occasions between June and August '41 when the Panzer Groups were directly ordered by OKH to halt and wait for the foot sloggers to catch up. This hesitation often allowed Soviet units to escape encirclement, and gave the Red Army in general the time it needed to re-group.</font>

[Andreas]

Time to dredge this one up from the netherworlds of the forum.

I have not really had time to think through all that has been said here. I agree that the initial statement was simplistic to some degree (intentionally so - I do not really know any better, and it was to start off a debate). I certainly have learned quite a bit from the discussion, so thanks to all who posted.

[Tarquelne]

Dredged from the netherworld, eh? There's always the Peng thread, you know.

Anyway, some questions:

Could the German Army have created a Soviet-style plan for the late-war Ardennes offensive that wouldn't have clearly demonstrated that the offensive's goals were unrealistic or would have required too much men/material pulled from other duties? (Not the "strategic" objective, but the operational objective of driving to (IIRC) Antwerp.) Or, at least, would it have shown that the operation was far more of a gamble than Hiter/high-command was willing to admit?

How reliably could the German's move their formations and supplies after say Jan 44, once it was clear to the Allies where their forces were concentrated? I'm wondering how complex/far-reaching a "detailed" plan would have to be if considerable amounts of Allied interdiction were to be factored in. Would it be enough to just make sure that a general surplus of men, supplies and transport were avialable?

Any examples of systemic flaws in late war Soviet planning?

Any examples of post mid-43 German offensives that were "worth it" in your judgement?

[KG ThorsHammer]

I cant beleive what I am hearing....Germans not learning from the Russians??!! It was the German armed forces that pioneered combined arms tactics in which tanks, infantry and artillary(ground or air), worked together to smash through the enemy front lines. The Russians eventually learned these lessons and put them to use with their own style. The problem the Germans faced as the war dragged on, was massive numerical superiority of their opponents in every department, especially the air. During the Kursk offensive, Model, (having only a few Pz Dvs), attempted to use his infantry Divisions to breach soviet lines for his armour, but they were simply outnumbered. Manstein had much more armour to play with and attacked with his Pz units which broke through to the last defensive lines. Although the offensive failed, the Russians suffered 850,000 casualties to the Germans 100,000. Inflicting an 8.5 to 1 casualty ratio attacking against a well prepared superior forces and coming close to victory is not indicative of faulty tactics. The biggest problem facing the Germans was Mr Adolf. Not allowing withdrawls cost huge numbers of troops and equipment, sapping the strength of the army. Generals did the best they could to cope under the circumstances. With ever increasing losses in men and material throughout the bulk of the army, The panzer and panzer grenadier divisions were given priority in men and equipment, making them the only units with the strength for offensive operations, and yet many were still really to weak to be effective. During the bulge, the hurridly raised volksgrenadier divisions did poorly, forcing the pz units into action prematurely. Most did well, but were too weak to maintain combat for long. Too summarize; when Pz Dvs were at a good strength level, their combined arms attacks were effective at breakthroughs, and pursuits, but deprived of manpower, vehicles, fuel and under air attack, success was fleeting.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by KG ThorsHammer:

I cant beleive what I am hearing....Germans not learning from the Russians??!! . . .

Hmm ... a number of incorrect assumptions in your post, some of it based on too narrow a view of military art, and some of it just incorrect. KG, have you read any Soviet-based material, such as Erickson, Glantz, Armstrong, Sharp, or Zaloga? Also, Ziemke, while focusing primarily on the Germans does do a good job of shedding light on Soviet capabilities and abilities. But, for now I'll have to pass on this post - for it's Christmas, and I want to get my rest to see my 3 year old son's face when he looks at all the presents under the tree However, I will come back to this post and give a suitable reply.

[KG ThorsHammer]

hmm,,,the question was armoured fist or combined arms and how the germans should have learned from the russians and used combined arms. I havnt read the Russian books you listed, but if you are saying the Russians invented combined arms I will have to ask you to put down the crack pipe .

[Andreas]

Originally posted by KG ThorsHammer:

hmm,,,the question was armoured fist or combined arms and how the germans should have learned from the russians and used combined arms. I havnt read the Russian books you listed, but if you are saying the Russians invented combined arms I will have to ask you to put down the crack pipe .

Ever heard of two chaps called Triandafilov or Tuchachevsky?

[Foxbat]

Nice to see this interesting topic ressurected, albeit in a peculiar way

Originally posted by KG ThorsHammer:

hmm,,,the question was armoured fist or combined arms and how the germans should have learned from the russians and used combined arms. I havnt read the Russian books you listed, but if you are saying the Russians invented combined arms I will have to ask you to put down the crack pipe .

More hits from the Bong: The soviets also invented the paratroop and assault jumps, they invented the main battle tank*, they pioneered winter cammo, I could go on and on.

* not in the modern sense of course, but they were first to create a tank that combined good anti-tank with good anti-infantry capabilty rather than sticking with the old cruiser/support dichotomy.

[ December 25, 2002, 12:53 PM: Message edited by: Foxbat ]

[KG ThorsHammer]

well...the russians were of course the first to use paratroopers, but not as a tactical weapon..and sliding off the wing of an aircraft is not the best way to do it:P

[Andreas]

Originally posted by KG ThorsHammer:

well...the russians were of course the first to use paratroopers, but not as a tactical weapon..and sliding off the wing of an aircraft is not the best way to do it:P

You are either joking, or revelling in your ignorance.

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by KG ThorsHammer:

well...the russians were of course the first to use paratroopers, but not as a tactical weapon..

Using Paratroopers as a tactical weapon is tantamount to suicide, or murder if you're commanding them. So I guess that's a good thing.

and sliding off the wing of an aircraft is not the best way to do it:P

And yes they did have para's sliding off the wing, but it isn't a particularly bad way. In fact when you are jumping out of door, or hatch in the side of the aircraft (as was sop in ww2) you have a good chance of slamming into either the frame of the airplane or the tailplanes.

It is also a tool-for-a-trade planes in the mid-30s didn't have the cabin space to get a sufficient of men in (or out in the case of para's) the soviet solved this problem in a crude but effective way. Other nations did not, I don't see why the soviets are wrong for using a working solution just because you think it's silly

[ December 25, 2002, 06:43 PM: Message edited by: Foxbat ]

[Grisha]

Originally posted by KG ThorsHammer:

hmm,,,the question was armoured fist or combined arms and how the germans should have learned from the russians and used combined arms. I havnt read the Russian books you listed, but if you are saying the Russians invented combined arms I will have to ask you to put down the crack pipe .

I was preparing to respond to your original post, but it seems you might not be too interested in a serious discussion. If I'm incorrect, please let me know.

[ December 25, 2002, 08:09 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[KG ThorsHammer]

by all means..if you have some info from the russian books you mentioned earlier that would be of interest..I may have misinterpreted your post as being somewhat "meow".....well anyway..carry on

[KG ThorsHammer]

weapon..[/qb]

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by KG ThorsHammer:

In this case I must apologise for not phrasing what I meant to say properly (at this time I was falling asleep at the comp lol). What I should have said was, the Germans were the first to employ them on a large scale...

The russians were also the first to pioneer large-scall drops, I guess you mean the germans were the first to actually employ para's in large-scall combat drops in enemy territory. Like the invasion of Crete which came agonisingly close to being suicide (the Para Corps survived, barely, but spent the rest of the war comatose or limping).

although I guess you could call the soviet paratroop drop along the kneiper a tactical (suicide) one

The Kneiper? Is that a nickname for someone (because he pinches women in the buttocks probably).

Or do you mean the Dnjepr? Yes that went all wrong, but it would only have been suicide if they had intended to jump right on top of the enemy formation, a good example of how quickly tactical intelligence becomes stale and useless.. the drop had been delayed, troop movements that had not been detected -or begun- when the last intel mission had been completed, some diabolically bad luck and it all came together to turn the most hopefull of the soviet para-drops into the worst disaster.

[Stalin's Organ]

KG you've missed the point - no-one has said that the Sov's invented combined arms tactics - rather they are saying that they saw the German inplementation of them, then applied lessons that they had learned and figured in their own limitations and came up witha better implementation of htem than the Germans did.

And the germans did not learn from the change of Sov tactics to improve their own.

as for who invented what - AFAIK the earliest known combined arms forces date to Summer and Akkad about 2500 BC - so you'd better watch out for those Iraqi's 'cos they've been doing it longer than anyone else!!

[Grisha]

Originally posted by KG ThorsHammer:

I cant beleive what I am hearing....Germans not learning from the Russians??!! It was the German armed forces that pioneered combined arms tactics in which tanks, infantry and artillary(ground or air), worked together to smash through the enemy front lines. The Russians eventually learned these lessons and put them to use with their own style.

Actually, the Soviets had a combined arms concept fully developed by the end of the 1920s, called deep battle. With the Soviet industrial revolution occurring from the late 1920s till the early 1930s, the theory of deep operations began to develop, incorporating the entire spectrum of military weapons available at that time. This theory was never fully developed before the purge of the military in 1937-39 swept away the core of the Soviet military elite. Were the Germans the first to have a valid combined arms concept? No, it was the Soviets. Did the Germans have the first combat effective combined arms concept? Yes. One thing I wonder about is if there was any passing of knowledge between the USSR and Germany during the time following their 1922 treaty, since the Germans conducted much of their training in the Kazan region of the USSR – but, to be honest, I tend to doubt there was any of that. Due to a lack of experienced officers, and incorrect conclusions drawn concerning the use of armor from the Spanish Civil and Winter Wars, the Soviets actually regressed with their military theory until the German campaign in 1940 shook them out of their wishful thinking. At that point there was but one year to undo all that had been done to the Red Army since 1937. It was nowhere near enough time.

Once Barbarossa began, the Soviets had two means of developing their military art to the point where it would be effective against the Germans: one, an unspoken reference to the brilliant works of those Soviet military analysts who died in the 1937 purge, and two, the collection and analysis of war experience. By winter of 1942/43, this approach was making its effects felt. By 1944, Soviet operational art (In the modern examination of military art, there are three levels of war: tactics, operations, and strategy. The Soviets pioneered the development and practice of operational art during WWII) was reaching refinement.

What the Soviets witnessed of the German combined arms concept during WWII no doubt helped to further develop their own theories on deep battle and, more importantly, deep operations. But, the Soviets also knew what to discard of German military art, since the Soviets were basically alone in correctly understanding the true scale of war at that time. By developing and refining the concept of successive and continuous operations, the Soviets recognized the necessity for a newer middle level of military art, called operational art. This was no small event, since it impacted both strategy and tactics, redefining and expanding on their more traditional meanings. The result was that the Soviets determined ongoing victory or defeat from the operational level, rather than from the tactical. Incidentally, the concept of operational art first appeared in Soviet military works in the mid 1920s, roughly.

The problem the Germans faced as the war dragged on, was massive numerical superiority of their opponents in every department, especially the air.

Strategically speaking, the Soviets didn’t solidly reach a 3:1 numerical superiority until October 1944. A 2:1 advantage didn’t occur until either late 1942, or early 1943, I believe. And while Soviet airpower could attain large numerical odds against the Luftwaffe, one has to remember that the VVS (term for the Soviet air force) was subordinated to the ground campaign, and only operated in numbers over main attack sectors. This allowed the Luftwaffe to exist and even operate on the Russian front until the end of the war. Had the VVS been given the task of an unfettered air superiority operation, I’m sure they would’ve sweep the skies of the Luftwaffe much like the USAAF did in May-June 1944.

That being said, in main attack sectors the Soviet did achieve large, sometimes very large, numerical odds. This was achieved through deception of both a demonstrative and passive nature. In fact, by the time of the Vistula-Oder operation in January 1945, literally half of all Soviet forces assigned to this operation were not identified by German intelligence before the attack (that equates to about a million men).

However, the Soviets didn’t stop there. Rather then rely on such massive odds, the Soviets also conducted extensive reconnaissance/intelligence operations to insure that major offensives had around 60% of German defense systems, dispositions, and reserves in the tactical depths (and operational depths to a degree) mapped and identified.

During the Kursk offensive, Model, (having only a few Pz Dvs), attempted to use his infantry Divisions to breach soviet lines for his armour, but they were simply outnumbered. Manstein had much more armour to play with and attacked with his Pz units which broke through to the last defensive lines. Although the offensive failed, the Russians suffered 850,000 casualties to the Germans 100,000. Inflicting an 8.5 to 1 casualty ratio attacking against a well prepared superior forces and coming close to victory is not indicative of faulty tactics.

Actually, Kursk absolutely failed on the northern pincer much earlier, around 9 July, I believe. This means von Manstein was operating from a single, narrow front. The prospects of making any sort of major victory from a single pincer were slim to none. Regarding the mention of numbers, the point at which the Soviets would have numbers would be after the reserves has responded to the attack. Before that time, it is more accurate to say that German armor attacks at Kursk were initially conducted with numerical supremacy, if for only a number of hours. Finally, I should also contribute one last point regarding von Manstein’s south pincer at Kursk. Throughout that entire operation, three rifle armies were not only not committed to the front from the Steppe Front, but they were also unidentified by German intelligence. A tank and mech corps were also uncommitted, though their location was more or less known by the Germans. Just as Hitler called off Zitadelle, this entire force was deploying just northeast and east of Prokhorovka in anticipation of further German attempts to advance.

The biggest problem facing the Germans was Mr Adolf. Not allowing withdrawls cost huge numbers of troops and equipment, sapping the strength of the army. Generals did the best they could to cope under the circumstances. With ever increasing losses in men and material throughout the bulk of the army, The panzer and panzer grenadier divisions were given priority in men and equipment, making them the only units with the strength for offensive operations, and yet many were still really to weak to be effective. During the bulge, the hurridly raised volksgrenadier divisions did poorly, forcing the pz units into action prematurely. Most did well, but were too weak to maintain combat for long. Too summarize; when Pz Dvs were at a good strength level, their combined arms attacks were effective at breakthroughs, and pursuits, but deprived of manpower, vehicles, fuel and under air attack, success was fleeting.

Hitler had a telling impact on the conduct of German forces, no doubt. Especially later in the war, after Kursk. But, while Hitler’s influence can’t be ignored, German military art must also be blamed. Why? Because it relied on the campaign of annihilation, the quick war. It was a short-cut method to winning wars, dependent on a preset condition to attain victory: that it invade a country that could be overpowered within a single campaign, or operation. This placed self-imposed limits not only on equipment capabilities, but also logistical support. Of vital importance, it placed a limit on how a nation prepares and conducts war. Finally, by requiring this condition for successful war, it made further study of the higher levels of war, such as operations and strategy, seemingly superfluous.

So, for all their tactical and lower operational excellence, German military forces were never truly prepared for a war with the Soviet Union. They almost pulled it off (the Soviets did everything possible to make the task easier in summer 1941 through a series of continuous blunders beginning with the purges in 1937), but didn’t. Once the USSR had acquired an equilibrium from an economic and military perspective, their more advanced knowledge of modern warfare insured Germany’s defeat.

[Frunze]

Originally posted by Grisha:

But, while Hitler’s influence can’t be ignored, German military art must also be blamed. Why? Because it relied on the campaign of annihilation, the quick war. It was a short-cut method to winning wars, dependent on a preset condition to attain victory: that it invade a country that could be overpowered within a single campaign, or operation.

Wasn't this produced by Germany's goals and situation in the world? That is, trying to achieve world, or at least European domination against competitors with larger areas, populations, and industrial bases. Given these facts, Germany would lose regardless in any war that did not end quickly, but turned into a contest of attrition.

[Fionn]

The discussions here seem to be treating operational art and/or durchbruch/extension operations as being decisive. This is disquieting.

I won't wade in to deal with all the points but a few things need to be pointed out:

1. The disparity in mobility between mechanised, motorised and footborne forces was a major problem for all sides.

2. The Germans lost the Battle of Kursk due to two primary factors on the field of battle( once we forget about the Soviets having prior knowledge about it etc):

a) Too few infantry divisions.

The invasion of Sicily.

Both of the above robbed the Germans of the ability to concentrate ALL of their armoured striking power into simply unstoppably concentrated and fast armoured stossgruppen either by tieing down panzer and panzergrenadier units holding off Soviet counter-attacks on the flanks of the Schwerpunkt thus robbing the tip of the spear of the power to penetrate even more deeply or by simply removing mech and motorised divisions from the theatre of operations.

3. When you get right down to it the reasons the Germans failed to win in 1941 have more to do with logistics ( influenced by lack of mechanisation and the decision to go for a hi-low quality mix in their line formations) than anything to do with the strengths or lack of thereof of their doctrine EXCEPT insofar as it is true to say that the lack of any doctrine of deep battle meant the Germans had never truly dealt with the problems of supplying deep operations ( such as those of their Panzergruppen) and therefore failed to supply them adequately during the campaign.

They needed to defeat the Soviet armies before the Leningrad to Kiev line was reached and despite inflicting massive casualties their advance was too slow and poorly co-ordinated ( mostly for logistical reasons) to do so. hence they failed

4. As to German combined arms or armoured fist breakthrough... German doctrine was to use infantry formations toughened by some tanks ( if necessary) to break through the immediate enemy defences, As the quality fo their infantry decreased it became more and more necessary to attach tanks to toughen them. So, there was no real change in doctrine it was just that they couldn't rely on their infantry in 1944 in the same was as they could in 1944.

One important caveat is that as the war went on even infantry-only breakthroughs featured the earlier introduction of tanks in the exploitation phase because enemy tank counter-attacks were developing at earlier and earlier stages.

I know that the introduction of a tank force mere minutes after the clearance of the MLR can look like a tank force committed during this clearance but really it isn't and the doctrinal role fulfilled by this force ( staving off enemy counter-attacks and paving the way for the committment of the main tank body in an environment free of enemy strongpoints ( which would act to rob the main tank body of its momentum)) was quite different to that carried out by a tank force tied to the break-in infantry.

The Soviets institutionalised these differences with the establishment of many tank gruppe of different structure and different and precise doctrinal roles while the Germans were much more ad hoc about the whole thing.

Lastly, logistics, logistics, logistics. The German "blitzkrieg" ( not a doctrine but merely a new given to the 1930s iteration of sturmgruppen from the Michael offensive in 1918) failed to have decisive consequences ( anihilation of the Soviet Army) because of 2 factors:

1. Hi-low mobility mix made it impossible for the Germans to accompany their panzers with enough infantry to seal off pockets quickly and thus annihilate the enemy formations inside them thoroughly and

2. The failure to adequately motorise the supply services AND to adequately train the railway construction battalions and pre-prepare the rolling stock/infrastructure at switching points led to logistical difficulties which sometimes resulted in 2/3rds of German forces along an axis of advance having to slow down to a walking pace or complete halt due to paucity of supply.

If they had had a better prepared and motorises supply plan AND had motorised infantry divisions ( just infantry on trucks, no change in OOB etc) then Barbarossa would have been winnable since the Germans would have been able to play with a greater operational depth in which to conduct their encirclements ( better supply) and those encirclements would have had a tougher perimeter ( more infantry to prevent leakage).

of course they did neither and so they lost their best chance of winning the war on the Eastern Front ( not due to doctrine or tactics etc but simply due to logistical considerations).

To paraphrase an American election phrase "It's the logistics stupid!"

I won't contribute any more to this but I just felt that no-one was addressing the root cause of all these failures. ( NB. Decreased Soviet operational depth vis a vis German offensives was more due to their inability to supply themselves once they got more than 100 km from their starting lines than it was to do with any lack of ambition.)

[Fionn]

Andreas of course he hasn't heard of Triandafilov or Tukhachevsky...

KG.

Suffice it to say that what you may or may not have heard of as the Operational Art was first stated as doctrine by some Soviets in the 1920s and that your views re: any correlations in doctrinal complexity or temporality vis a vis the Germans are, to put it bluntly, bassackwards if you catch my drift.