Are Shermans THAT bad?

[JonS]

Originally posted by Rankorian:

you have to move 90 battalions (oh...throw in the airborne/glider too)

Oh, I included the 33 para and glider bns, but I did forget the Rangers and Commandos, so that makes the total of inf-types over 100.

"Over 100." Sobering thought.

[JasonC]

Let's look at the latest figures mk gives. As usual with A Z acolyte, they don't remotely say what he wants to conclude, but they say enough to see what actually happened anyway.

"The breakdown of the 4415 American tanks that went ashore in Normandy is then:

2205 Shermans

192 Shermans with the 105mm gun

1262 light tanks

756 tank destroyers

As of 20 August 1944 ETOUSA had on hand:

2,423 M4 75mm and 76mm

163 M4 105mm

1,696 M5 37mm

763 M10 3" TD

179 M18 76mm TD"

First point - notice that the totals are higher despite losses. That is because the date chosen is 20 August and the second category used is ETO not Normandy. By 20 August ETO includes southern France. The landings there took place on 15 August.

Second point - US tanks include Stuarts, German tanks figures do not include their own light armor. For that matter, the German figures he gives don't even include Jagdpanzers or Marders, which are medium TDs not light armor.

"As of 20 August First Army had operational:

865 M4 75mm

218 M4 76mm

69 M4 105mm

691 M5 37mm

As of 19 August Third Army had operational:

782 M4 75mm

17 M4 76mm

90 M4 105mm

365 M5 37mm"

Compared to the totals given for actually arrived in Normandy that yields delta operational of -357 Shermans all types. He doesn't give TDs operational.

As for the German tank strength in Normandy figures, obviously it is cumulative sent and not reduced for losses. It is right that 2200 were sent. There were not, of course, remotely 2200 still running at the time of the breakout (more like 600) or after Mortain (more like 300).

Allied Losses in Normandy:

US to August 5:

463 M4 (75mm)

18 M4 (76mm),

4 M4 (105mm), and

144 M5,

Total = 629

Notice, this is the actual Normandy fight. Everything after it isn't the fight in Normandy, because by 6 August they are out of Normandy. The breakout has been underway for over a week by then. Mortain occurs in the next week. Notice also the Sherman losses are under 500.

His next is for 20 August and totals 1014, includes TDs (though the number is quite low, order 50), includes 200 light tanks - and now the time and theater includes 5 days of the landing in southern France, plus 3rd Army taking Britanny, etc. 800 is an upper bound, 500 is more realistic for US mediums lost in Normandy, through the end of Mortain.

And of course I am maintaining a proposition about US not US and Brit portion of the front etc.

Next by formation and period he gives, 1st Army (the force actually engaged in Normandy) 187 Shermans in June and 214 in July, total ~400 to July 29. But this does not include the later portions of the breakout fight. The next 1st Army figures is for 30 July to 2 September, which is emphatically not spent in Normandy. They are at Aachen by the end of that. 281 more mediums in August. That gives us a 1st Army figure of 400 low by the breakout losses and 700 high by including the whole race across France. These are also missing TDs though his figure for those is only 50 lost so a small error there. Basically fits the previous 500-800 numbers.

Then he gives 3rd Army. Um, 3rd Army didn't even come into operation until the breakout, which was led by 2nd AD which was not in 3rd Army. It exploited rather than fought in the breakout proper. 3rd Army fought for Britanny and for France, not for Normandy.

That is why his first figure for is is August 1 to 2 September. Um, 2 September 3rd Army is in Lorraine. Lorraine is really not Normandy. Not content with that, he throws in September as well (!), which is the actual fight *for* Lorraine, including the capture of Nancy (not in Normandy last I checked) and brawling with 4 Panzer brigades and 2 divisions sent from Italy and another from the south of France.

Next he will toss in Russian losses on the push to Poland. None of these have anything to do with Normandy.

At a maximum, half of the 3rd Army losses for August might be added to the above, which is another 110 Shermans. It is extremely doubtful the 3rd Army lost anything remotely like 100 Shermans in the actual Normandy fight, if they lost any to speak of. But it won't change the conclusion so is doesn't hurt to allow it.

I've now got 850 as an upper bound on US medium losses in Normandy through Mortain, including delta operational landing to running and very generous boundaries as to time units and space. The actual figure might be as low as 500.

Watch his magic version of this summary, done purely by time and extended to the westwall -

"Thus roughly:

‘June’ 231

‘July’ 291

‘August’ 665

‘September’ 350

Total = 1,537"

522 for June and July, perfectly believable. 665 for August, not remotely all Normandy. Very generous to award even half to that, giving 850. September, just insane - I can only assume he tossed it in to get a US loss figure comparable to the British one.

Then we get to German loss accounting, where he waits for the QM back in Germany to get around to writing them off. Notice he gave actual operational for US and it showed only a drawdown of a few hundred to early August, compared to landed over the beach totals. You will not find a reference to German runners or operational. His source Z gives them unit by unit sometimes down to the day. Obviously they are critical for timing of loss, particularly when the German reporting system was in such chaos. The US reporting system did not have to evacuate France in a hurry etc.

Next how he gives the figures

"German losses to July 27:

224 PzIV

131 Panther

23 Tiger

60 StuG

Total = 438"

2 AFV categories are simply missing. (Actually there were also a handful of Brumbars with one unit but who cares?) Jagds and Marders. Also, he gives 2000-2200 AFVs sent to that date and 438 lost. Does he think there were 1550-1750 German tanks running on the day of the breakout? It is just nonsense. Only a third of that figure were left by then, that is why the allies broke out. The armor ratio in theater hit 5 to 1 before the breakout and more like 10 to 1 after Mortain.

Then he gives losses by type and gets a numbner that is over a third higher

"Thus a total of 598."

But Jagds and Marders still don't exist. The strength in runners if this were true would be 1600 when it is 600.

The next two months he gives as -

"August – 49 Pz-IV(l), 41 Pz-V, 15 Pz-VI (L56) = 105"

Anybody think the Germans lost only 105 tanks more in August? Now supposedly they've lost only 700 since D-day, so they still have 1500 critters running around - at the end of August, at the westwall. Yeah right.

The TWO reporting is just months behind. In September what actually happened is they send a half a dozen fresh Panzer brigades west and lost most of them (well over 2/3rds) by the end of the month. But he reports -

"September – 12 Pz-IV(k), 581 Pz-IV (!!!), 540 Pz-V (!!!), 72 Pz-VI (L56), 23 Pz-VI (L70) = 1,228

Bringing acknowledged losses to date to 1845.

Which is still low, but finally acknowledges the actual losses incurred way back in July. I say still low because AFV strength at the westwall before reinforcement is order of 300, and they send another 500 fresh but have lost much of it by the end of the month, not reflected in this figure. 2200 plus 500 fresh gives 2700 plus sent west by this date - and running strength is not 850 at the end of September. In fact in Lorraine they have continued their counterattacks until that sector has about 50 left in action, out of ~450 used there.

I gave the unit by unit runner strength and gave the source. It is trivial to check it, and he will (perhaps did) find it right. Units sent to the US sector brought 950 AFVs and left with 150 AFVs or so by the end of Mortain. Which fully matches the most generous allowances for actual US losses actually in Normandy.

The Germans did not lose those 600 Panzer IVs and 600 Panthers in September at the westwall. They lost them in Normandy, field KOed and sent to the shops, and then left there when the front moved. After which the QMs hoped against hope that more might trickle out of the chaos. And only finally wrote off each vehicle when they closed the books on the whole campaign - because they simply did not know whether it had got out, until they could be sure it hadn't.

Since we have the unit by unit runner returns, there is no reason to settle for such slapdash and delayed accounting, when we know better.

Are the US losses also delayed in that fashion? All the evidence is against it. Notice the 220 losses recorded in 3rd Army in the race across France. They in fact faced trivial amounts of armor in that period. They weren't committed beforehand, in Normandy proper. They still lost 220 because they drove clear across France and still faced all the other usual causes of loss. Those are not cases of tanks hit in Normandy and left on the books, written off later. They are instead simple tanks that were used later by other units that did not face the already destroyed German tank fleet.

"it is clear that no matter which set of figures you use Germany always had lower losses than the Allies."

First, no it isn't, and second, I said lower US than Germans facing them.

"compiled for differing dates and criteria. Thus they do not exactly match up. They never will be definitive."

It is pointless to hide behind data that has problems you know of when you also have data that does not have those specific problems. You cannot seriously maintain that the German tank fleet was destroyed in September. All that is needed to determine when it was destroyed, is to look at the returns of runners for a dozen units, a trivial exercise and less work than you've already done.

So look at them. You will instantly see that the German fleet had evaporated long before September. That in fact the half life of a German tank from the time it reached Normandy to the time it permanently left running status was about 2 weeks. The *running* fleet had already halved twice by the time of the breakout and halved again during it and the Mortain attempt.

On cause of loss, I awarded 50-70% to AFVs, you report that 50% is more like the right figure for the US portion from all AP shot. Naturally the figure is higher against the Brits. Since that includes ATGs, and your one figure that distinguishes those puts them in a ratio about 2:3 ATG vs. AFV, only about 60% of those figures are AFV as cause of loss. I allowed a much higher portion to AFVs knowing it was conservative.

On the US part of the front, 50% to AP shot and 60% of those AFVs might mean as low as 30% of their already low losses were to AFVs.

German side causes of loss are going to be more AFV centered, though arty and air were also undoubtedly a higher portion. But you won't see the 25-33% to panzerfaust figures or the ~15% to mines.

(As for the loss figures in tanks when hit, obviously the lower one for the Stuart is due to a portion of the KOs being from much smaller caliber rounds etc.)

Allied armor losses were highest when they faced German armor in numbers. But they continued to lose meaningful numbers to the PF, mine, ATG portion (50-70% of the total overall) long after there weren't any German tanks left to score against. That means if you extend the periods considered to include lots of time when the Allies faced only the other stuff, the loss ratio will move in the German's favor. Not because they outscored tank to tank in the periods when armor actually faced armor, but because the Allies could not score at all against a non-existent tank fleet the rest of the time.

In Normandy in the hedgerow period the US lost around 500 mediums, perhaps half of them to German tanks. These were quite low losses and bely the usual deathtrap nonsense spread about the period, and up to half of them were to non-AFV causes of loss. The Germans lost similar amounts on the same portion of the front in the same period. Extended to the breakout proper and the German attempt to stop it by counterattack, 25 July to 10 August, the losses on the US portion of the front to date were more like 850 on both sides. There was no German outscoring.

The same is true in Lorraine and the same is true again in the Bulge. When the Germans sent armor at the Americans it exchanged off at 1 to 1 ratios, despite the quality difference in the mix. The rest of the time, the Germans bled the US of meaningful amounts of tanks by other means, while the US could not "score" back, because there wasn't anything to score against.

That is why overall US loses in armor for the whole war were tiny - as in 1/20th what the Russians lost etc. The Germans simply didn't send that much armor against the US, and what they did send was used poorly enough that it did not exact a high price per item.

[MikeyD]

By coincidence I read this in Harry Yiede’s “The Tank Killers” on the subway this morning. I don’t know his sources, but its another pile of numbers to add to the mix.

“Germans between 6 June and 9 July lost two thousand officers and eighty-five thousand men and recieved only five thousand replacements. They had also lost one hundred fifty Mark IVs, eighty-five Panthers, fifteen Tigers, one hundred sixty-seven 75mm assault guns and antitank guns, and almost thirty 88mm guns” About the opening of Operation Cobra the author writes “Panzer Lehr was virtually annihialted by the air strikes. Generalleutenant Fritz Bayerlein estimated that 70 percent of his mean were killed, wounded , or stunned”

Oh, and he also states that U.S. towed Tank Destroyer units were virtually useless in Normandy. The 801st, which landed on 13 June and supported the 4th Infantry Division, knocked out a single panzer (using a bazooka) in mid-July. Sounds like they had as much luck deploying their AT guns on the offensive as WE do in the game!

[DavidFields]

JasonC, you have clearly tried to look through the numbers with the intent of trying to get at the reality underneath--tryin, I suppose, to be unaffected as much as possible by preconceptions.

So I pose this question because my guess is that you have thought about it: The TWO Allied/German was, clearly (?), affected by the fact that the Germans were retreating. (repair shops overrun. Inability to recover damaged AFVs due to not owning the battle terrain)

Right?

[One of these days I am going to have to sit down to some good books about WW2 AFV repair/recovery issues, and the organization of medical services for the wounded soldiers in the respective armies. Maybe they would not make as good of movies as snipers in Stalingrad, but, in the end, my sense is that there was likely as much heroism]

[pamak1970]

Speaking about recovery repair time , i am sure i have somewhere data about it.

For the time being , the only relative information i have is from Dupuy's book "Numbers prediction and war".

There is an annex at the end talking about tank recovery repair issues.

The data is used by the author to estimate tank returns in cold war .Also unfortnately there is not any type of footnote to direct the reader to an original sourse or to explain how he arrived to these figures .

Anyway , according to this annex, Dupuy claims that in a 1970's tank engagement,50% of tank losses are recovered in a period of 5 days .The number of returns per day is about equal to one fifth of the total amount of returns.

[pamak1970]

Another thing i find surprising in this thread is the lack of information from Allied archives regarding the number of German tanks left inside Normandy ,Falaise and west of Seine.

In another thread one of the posters here gave information about number of German tanks found in Mortain-Falaise pocket and west of Seine.

This came from Zetterling but it does not really specify the original sourse.

[pamak1970]

I've now got 850 as an upper bound on US medium losses in Normandy through Mortain, including delta operational landing to running and very generous boundaries as to time units and space. The actual figure might be as low as 500.

Watch his magic version of this summary, done purely by time and extended to the westwall -

"Thus roughly:

‘June’ 231

‘July’ 291

‘August’ 665

‘September’ 350

Total = 1,537"

522 for June and July, perfectly believable. 665 for August, not remotely all Normandy. Very generous to award even half to that, giving 850.

The number provided above are actually first appear in one of Andreas link.

Here is your remark regarding these numbers.

This took place in the same link we are now!

Notice in the loss figures by nation and date at the link Andreas provided, that half of all Allied losses in the June to September period occur in August. Gee what happened in August? Were German Tigers at their peak? Epic tank battles that were fiascos? Um, no. Every tank in the allied fleet drove clear across France, that is what happened in August.

and later you add............

But most simply failed to drive 400-500 miles across France - out of thousands that had to do so, 10-15% didn't stand it.

So regardless if these American August losses were in Normandy or rest of France, you do not seem to dispute there the actual numbers for August.

Are You disputing it now,or are you saying that the number is correct but it does not express American tank losses in Normandy?

The other thing is that assuming you claim the latter, if Americans as winners of the battlefield and with much better technical-logistical support see "10 to 15% of the vehicles failing to drive this distance" " ,woild not be possible for someone to argue that for Germans the actual percentage can be much higher?

Let me put it in a different way.

How many German tanks according Your data DID make it to drive the distance retreating from Normandy?

This will give (again according to your calculations) a rough idea about the number of tanks that similar to American ones could not make it.

Of course there is going to be again some judgment call.

If 10-15% of American tanks could not make it , how much you will accept as a decent percentage for German side?

For example, if you judge that a reasonable percentage for Germans is 30% and you beleive that 300 German tanks DID manage to complete the retreat ,then the above gives about 128 tanks unable to complete the march.

[JonS]

Originally posted by pamak1970:

Another thing i find surprising in this thread is the lack of information from Allied archives regarding the number of German tanks left inside Normandy ,Falaise and west of Seine.

In another thread one of the posters here gave information about number of German tanks found in Mortain-Falaise pocket and west of Seine.

This came from Zetterling but it does not really specify the original sourse.

Somewhere - here or at AHF - I've posted the relevant OR Report covering those numbers. I suspect that Zet used that report as the basis for his numbers, but off hand I don't know (and am not inclined to look, since I have some ... 'issues' with the ways Zet trys to prove things one way or another).

Jon

[JasonC]

On Lehr and strategic air, the source is simply not credible. Most of Lehr and the grab bag of remnant infantry KGs attached to it were reduced to mere cadres long before the carpet bombing. Few tanks were KOed by it, the Pz IV battalion in particular being entirely outside the impact area in reserve. K gives figures, suffice it to say the idea that Lehr was destroyed in the air attack is a known and exploded myth.

On TWOs, the Germans were late to do them but sure, losing the battlefield increases the portion of them.

On how many drove out, less than 300 German AFVs sent to Normandy made it back to the westwall, and the real figure may be as low as 125. But this does not reflect large losses in September (sic), nor in August from driving, since the number operational had already fallen from 2200 sent to theater to ~600 before the breakout, and by half again by the end of Mortain around 11 August.

If you want to call the non-operational tanks that failed to drive across France successfully, parallel losses, you are free to. But why weren't they operational in the first place? Did they have hangnails?

The calculated loss is very simple. A tank goes into Normandy, put in on the left side of the ledger. An operational tank is still running on August 11, put it on the other side of the ledger ("survived"). Otherwise, it's toast. If it doesn't come out operational in August it didn't come out at all. Very few made it to the westwall, and ones that weren't running had no chance of making it through the Falaise chaos etc.

As for recovery rates, what one sees in the operational figures is that a major force committed to combat sends a quarter to half its strength into the shops in about the first week of combat. Those in short term repair are actually still useful vehicles and do come back - if the unit is intact and holding its positions etc. Then all categories evaporate. TWOs accumulate very slowly, "long term repair" accumulates somewhat faster and means "dead as a doornail but being stripped for parts". Basically the Germans only TWO things if they burn or are captured by the enemy.

There is no mystery as to the timing of loss. The entire campaign makes sense only because of the reality, that the German operational fleet was quartered (halved twice) - that is what enable the breakout - before the end of July. It happens again to the end of Mortain, with PDs reduced to a company or two worth of armor.

As for US losses, I never disputed the totals, I certainly dispute 3rd Army being a major combatant in Normandy, and including its September losses in Lorraine in an accounting of them is absurd on its face etc.

Compare a situation like Kursk. The Germans send several thousand AFVs and brawl with the Russians. They don't lose all that many TWO but do see their number operational fall significantly, despite large scale ongoing replacement - enough to have operational consequences etc. But they also clearly outscore the Russians by a large factor. Like, 5 times.

Large scale commitment of superior armor causes large scale attrition at favorable exchange ratios. There is simply no sign whatever that the same was achieved against US forces in Normandy, or Lorraine, or the Bulge, or Alsace. Which were the times the Germans used large scale armor against US forces in the ETO.

That is why total US armor losses for the war are not a quarter of Russian ones but more like a twentieth.

As for tactical rates of tank recovery, typical PDs during the battle of Kursk were averaging a platoon a day returned to action. Some smaller PDs averaged more like half that, and sometimes only 1 AFV per day.

E.g. over 28 days in July 43, LAH returns 108 IVs and 30 IIIs to operational from all repair categories, or about 5 per day from those major types. In the 10 days 11-20 July, 6 Tigers, 11 StuG, 21 IVs, and 7 IIIs made it back into action, or 4.4 per day. This is a big division and it was getting about 5 a day back into the fight. A little less when the action is heavy and a little more when it lightens up.

On the other end, 19 PD reports for the first 6 days returning to service 5 Pz IVs and 7 Pz IIIs. 3 PD later in the battle got back into action in 6 days, 1 StuG, 5 Panzer IVs, and 10 Pz IIIs. These are smaller Heer PDs and are getting more like 2-2.5 per day back into the fight.

Both figures are still enough to involve large scale "churn" from the short term repair category on an operation-long time scale of 2-6 weeks. As already mentioned, the half life of the operational count in Normandy was basically 2 weeks, net of achieved returns.

[JasonC]

From the gerob site, sent overall, operational at the start of July (equals previous if still arriving - uncommitted), around the breakout, and on 13 August.

Some reports are nearest to those in time, and sometimes if a specific day is off the trendline a day next to it is used, etc.

This is a unit by unit account and does not include the modest number of StuGs and Marders in the IDs. It accounts for over 90% of the AFVs in Normandy but a hundred or so are off in the IDs.

I also dropped the modest number of obsolete French types (~50) because there are basically no returns for them later - all lost of course.

Reinforcements are not shown as to timing but are included in sent total. In one case (2 Panzer just before the breakout) I interpolate because there is no report - that introduces an error bar of about 30 in the pre-breakout figure.

In the case of 116 PD, the last figure is from a little later (Aug 20) because there is no report listed right around Aug 11-13. It's pre-breakout figure is also for a few days later than the others (28 July) and therefore reflects the first part of its combat commitment.

If replacements were received post Mortain they are simply not included in the figures sent or on strength, as not having taken part.

Notice the a number of units arrive in July and others are committed to stop the breakout, and therefore aren't really evaporating until the later period. Notably 116 PD and 341 StuG.

Summary -

2060 sent

1133 running start of July (1-4)

789 running pre-breakout(~July 25)

267 running post Mortain (August 11-13)

Specific units

Lehr - 248, 96, 38, 23

2 Pz - 196, 118, (70), 22

21 Pz - 188, 61, 30, 20

116 Pz - 208, 208, 146, 18

1SS - 220, 133, 111, 29

2SS - 208, 112, 113, 16

9SS - 163, 67, 58, 40

10SS - 77, 52, 25, 20

12SS - 205, 61, 58, 15

17SS - 85, 30, 10, 10

503 - 45, 45, 20, 11

101SS - 45, 11, 13, 8

102SS - 45, 35, 27, 15

217Sturm - 17, 17, 11, 5

12FJ StuG - 31, 11, 10, 0-10

341 StuG - 45, 45, 45, 15

902 StuG - 34, 31, 4, 0

Now, just for a sense of how useless the TWO figures are in comparison, the least destroyed division above is 9SS, with 40 runners after Mortain. It used 163 AFVs and still had 40 running at the end, and 58 before the breakout, so delta operational - permanently - is over 100 by the end of July and over 120 overall. But it only recorded 47 TWOs through the end of July - not because they weren't lost, but because TWO reporting inherently lagged actual effective loss. And that is the formation in the best shape of all of them.

[pamak1970]

Now, just for a sense of how useless the TWO figures are in comparison, the least destroyed division above is 9SS, with 40 runners after Mortain. It used 163 AFVs and still had 40 running at the end, and 58 before the breakout, so delta operational - permanently - is over 100 by the end of July and over 120 overall. But it only recorded 47 TWOs through the end of July - not because they weren't lost, but because TWO reporting inherently lagged actual effective loss. And that is the formation in the best shape of all of them.

Actually reading the numbers in this particular case , i do not see any problem with the 9ss reporting only 47 TWO till end of July.

Actually this seems beleivable and it does not give an indication that many of the rest are actually lost but not counted cause

" TWO reporting inherently lagged actual effective loss"

I will be more specific.

According to what i read on 1 of june the division has a total of 120 tanks and stugs (ready and in repair).

i also see a farhter delivery of 39 Panthers in june so i see a total of 159 AFV.

I miss why you claim it is initialy 164 AFV but it is not a big deal .

Anyway according to the numbers you give the division has 58 runners before breakout.

Seeing the numbers i guess you talk about the numbers on 25 of July.

You seem to be surprised that the division gives a total of 47 TWO till end of July.

Why?

Actually i find the ratio logical. I am not surprised to see a force claiming that from a total number of 150 AFV out of action ,one third is TWOs and 2 thirds are repairable (the last includes both AFV KO cause of enemy action and AFV with mech failures) .

But i am going to see it here more specifically.

So i am looking at the numbers for 30th of July.

There i see a total of 78 operational AFVs (20 more than 25th of July) and all these must came from repair shops since there is no reinforcement of any type between these days.

So, 78 operational + 47 TWOs = 125

From the initial force of 159 AFVs we miss the situation of the rest 34 AFV (or 38 according to your initial 163 figure).

It is very beleivable to have these missing numbers "under repair".

Seeing some examples from the division when actual numbers of vehicles under repair are provided ,we see for eexample that on June 1 before even the start of any battle it has 11 AFV under repair,while on 8 of July ,the only date where actual data are provided for repairs during the Normandy fight , 25 AFV are under repair ,actually short term repair.

In other words i do not see anything strange with the TWOs provided by the division for the period till the end of July.

[ November 04, 2006, 01:07 PM: Message edited by: pamak1970 ]

[JasonC]

It may be fine as a time-tactical indicator of loss within that division, but it is totally misleading as an indicator of the state of the German panzer arm in Normandy, its ability to stop the breakout, the course of the whole campaign, etc.

If taken as the only sort of figure on what is happening, it misleadingly suggests 70% of the tanks sent are alive on the eve of the breakout. In reality only about 40% are still running in the best formation in the entire theater, more like a third overall. That then falls by more than half in the next 2 weeks.

Remember the overall context of this discussion. Figures are being presented as supposedly meaningful that suggest the panzer fleet was fine until September. Which is nonsense.

[Guest Mike]

So after all that, are Shermans not THAT bad, or not??!!

[michael kenny]

D/P

[ November 05, 2006, 12:51 AM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

[michael kenny]

D/P

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Let's look at the latest figures mk gives. As usual with A Z acolyte,

You are so far off the mark...............

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=89139

Your use of the figures is the problem. You are using incomplete and partial German strength reports. Anything not listed on paper is,in your eyes, 'destroyed'.

The 'figures' you try and disparage are not mine. I got them from varoius postings by Rich (Richard Anderson)at AHF,

http://forum.axishistory.com/search.php?search_author=RichTO90

Feldgrau

http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/search.php?search_author=Rich

and The Dupuy Forums.

He has been compiling this data for years and, unlike you, knows what he is talking about.

I reccomend you spend some time looking through his posts. It will show you just how foolish it would be to question his data.

Several times I pointed out that the figures were for TANKS and/or AFV's. I do not need any help identifying the different types of AFV's.

I also clearly stated that the German August figures were incomplete and the September figures would include most of the August losses. Did you miss that bit or is it a deliberate attempt on your part to pretend you have 'discovered' important information to back your guesswork on the real losses?

Did you also miss the bit where I said the true scale of the German losses will never be known? (by anyone except you that is)

Keep it up Jason, gamers are the true historians...............

a link well worth checking.....

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=87408

[ November 06, 2006, 04:10 AM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

[JasonC]

mk - in my eyes, a tank sent to Normandy that never makes it back to operational status in any unit outside of Normandy later in the war, is destroyed in Normandy.

You cite figures of loss that everyone knows are wrong as to timing, you acknowledge that they are wrong as to timing, then you pretend nothing further can be known about the matter. Which is utter nonsense. You might as well measure the distance to the moon with a protractor and a piece of string, get it wrong by a factor of 2, and say the real distance can never be known.

We have a much more accurate measure of timing of loss - permanently leaving operational status. Yes there are other circumstances in which leaving operational status is not "loss" - but the Germans in Normandy before losing all of France is not one of them.

Non-operational tanks from July did not successfully rally to the westwall. We know because we can see the strength of units at the westwall, and it doesn't jump by an extra 500-1000 tanks emerging from Falaise. They have the new production sent to them - mostly in the form of fresh panzer brigades - and they have the merest trickle left from France.

I have seen nothing at any of the sites you indicate showing Rich or anyone else arguing that the Germans only lost 500 tanks in Normandy. I saw one post at the Dupuy institute that says 1000 of the losses recorded for September probably belong in August, but not based on any close analysis like that I did above, only based on a general awareness that TWOs were clearly running late and the repair categories were well as truly lost by August at the latest.

I've interacted with Rich before at Dupuy, about Germans in Russia specifically. I know his arguments on ineffectiveness of air, which I consider by now common knowledge among OR types and on this board.

And my disagreement with you over figures you cite from him is not with the numbers at each month, but their supposed relevance to the thesis being disputed here, which not Rich nor his numbers but only you are disputing. Rich is not responsible for advancing the losses of 3rd Army in Lorraine in September, into a discussion of US armor losses in Normandy. You are. You can't hide behind him.

[michael kenny]

Lets get back to the basics here.

Originally posted by JasonC:

The US outscored the Germans in Normandy in tanks lost, despite being on the attack and largely equipped with inferior Shermans with short 75.

We will start with a time frame where the figures are undisputed.

US tank losses

June 231

July 291

total 522

German tank losses

June 224

July 288

total 512

Now if Jasons pet theory is correct then ALL the German tanks lost must have been destroyed in the US sector. The Commonweaalth forces then did not destroy a single German tank!

Sample wiggles?

Do not count US Stuarts because they are not really tanks..........

Most US tanks were knocked out by mines, pak and infantry.........

Where are the Stugs ect (same place as the M10's I suppose)

I was wrong and admit it (sorry that is a fantasy scenario!)

Now for the next period we must go to September because there are no concrete figures for the German losses in August.

US tank losses to September 1537

German tank losses to September 1845.

Thus between them the entire fleet of Commonwealth tanks got less than 300 German tanks!

Can we stick to this one point for now. I will go into all the others in detail later if you want. I just want the figures Jason has that allow him to make such strange assertions about US tank forces ability to master the panzers.

Back your original claim or withdraw it.

Do you have any souces other than a gaming site?

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

[QB] I've interacted with Rich before at Dupuy, about Germans in Russia specifically. I know his arguments on ineffectiveness of air, which I consider by now common knowledge among OR types and on this board.

Well good for you but if you do the most basic search you will find that there are several old posts and threads where I tackle Zetterling and his opinion on Allied Air Power in Normandy head on.

from 2005:

"When I first got Zetterlings book on Normandy it seemed 'the' answer to everything. I have a rather narrow field of interest so I have to accept 99% of his book on trust. However the more I looked into those areas where I had some special insight the more I became aware of discrepancies.

eg:

The total of Tigers lost during Goodwood.

The effect of the bombing of sPzAbt 503/21st PD.

The complete absence of any knowledge that sSS PzAbt 101 was also successfully bombed.

The suggestion the bombing of Villers Bocage was not actually carried out.

The difference between Zetterling's daily total of Tigers in SS 101 and SS102 and those given by Wood and Dougdale.

There are others but is it that the only errors happen to be in an area where I just happen to specialise or that I just dont know enough to find other mistakes?

I am not out to pick faults with Zetterling as no work is perfect. Zetterling himself admits he is not error free so I suppose my main gripe would be with those who promote his Normandy book as 'the' absolute reference on the Normandy Campaign.

I also share the view he is way too disposed towards the German forces in Normandy and the impression I get is his Kursk book showed the Germans did not really lose at Kursk and that the Normandy book showed Germans were not decisively beaten in France. I also think Reynolds has far too much of a pro-German bias, just to show I have no anti-Zetterling bias!

from 2003:

"Niklas Zetterling wrote his Normandy book in 2000 and in his section on the effects of Air Power on German armour losses seems to have become the 'bible' for this subject. However as I specialised in a rather narrow field it became obvious (to me anyway) that the figures he quotes for the Tiger losses in particular was far too low. It has since been conceded that his figure of only 4 Tigers in total lost during Goodwood is wrong by a factor of x3 because Heer 503 alone lost at least 10 Tigers on 18/7/44. That is old ground and I have gone over it at length on several forums and from experience I realise that any criticism of Zetterling arouses a strong reaction in his supporters. I have been subject to many jibes as to how he is far more qualified than an amateur like me to know what he is talking about and as a result of the many taunts of 'prove it' leveled at me I have had to do a bit of digging in this area which I admit is not my forte. Leaving aside the fact Zetterling does not seem to know that sSS PzAbt 101 was bombed on 15/6/44 I found other references in the Heimdal book on 21st Panzer Division that say 1/Panzerregiment 22 was 'wiped out' (page 386, 394,395) and in 45 Tiger en Normandy (Didier Lodieu 2003) it mentions how StugG. Abt 200 suffered similar heavy losses. Both books have photos of the destroyed vehicles. This is only me scratching the surface and it seems clear Zetterling's assertion that only 503 suffered any bombing damage on 18/7/44 is not correct.

Could anyone else shed more light in this area? Could I also ask if someone could help sort out the claim of 60 German tanks of Panzer Brigade 112 destroyed at Dompaire on 13/9/44 were mainly due to TAC Thunderbolts? The number destroyed is not disputed just the cause. German accounts credit the aircraft with the kills."

Have you been able to add to our understanding in this area in another forum?

What is an 'OR type by the way? Some sort of superior being who is beyond challenge?

Note that I mention the Panther Units you keep harping on about in one of my posts. See you are not the only ones who knows anything about them!

[JasonC]

mk - you want a back to basics restatement? You are incapable of following the actual argument?

I do not believe the 500 figure for German tanks lost June and July. I consider it hogwash, because they were reduced to ~300 runners in theater by August 13. Losses they actually incurred that early and in Normandy, are not acknowledged until long after the battle. Not because they weren't incurred until long after the battle. And no, their not being acknowledged promptly does not mean a Sherman destroyed in Lorraine at the end of September was actually lost in Normandy.

You have already acknowledged that the German loss figures are inaccurate as indicators of the *time* of loss. So, reason - you cannot rely on an indicator of time of loss you yourself regard as inaccurate, to conclude German losses in Normandy were only 500.

US losses in Normandy - not the westwall, not Lorraine, not the south of France, not September - were around 500. I have allowed a very generous range of 500 to 850, the latter to include Stuarts etc. As for "and M10s", your own source gives M10 losses at only around 50, so it is immaterial. German StuG losses were not a mere 50, since they lost nearly everything sent and sent hundreds.

I have no objection to including Stuarts if you like, or M8 armored cars if you like. I'd just also want to include German light armor if you want an overall armored vehicle accounting instead of a real AFV accounting. I don't include Somuas or PSWs etc.

And I have identified German losses of around 900 AFVs in units facing US forces in Normandy, by the standard "permanently left operational status". Not in September, not at the westwall, and not while facing the Brits. We can count the tanks sent against the Americans and we can count the ones that got away. We don't have to wait for some QM in Germany two months later.

See page 4, I give the unit by unit count of German armor sent against US units through Mortain and how little of it survived. ~1050 sent and ~150 survived is the basic story. Not in September, gone by August 13 and never coming back. Your own figures for US losses, on the most generous interpretations, only show 850 US losses to the same date. Ergo, the Germans did not outscore the US in Normandy.

I've never cited any wargame site in any of it. The gerob website is originally from Z, and has nothing to do with any wargame. It relays concisely the actual strength returns for all the involved armor formations, some daily some a bit more spotty, but all quite sufficient to establish the reduction in panzers left alive by early August, which your own figures are not.

[JasonC]

"OR type" simply means operations researchers.

[pamak1970]

I think the biggest portion of the unaccounted German AFV were actually somewhere in Normandy waiting for evacuation or evaluation regarding their status as able to be repaired or TWOs.

At least for June and July ,i do not see a reason for German confusion and lag to report the number of TWOs.

It makes more sense to me to see the Germans unable to cope with all this massive effort to evaluate and evacuate out of action tanks ,either cause of enemy action or even cause of various breakdowns.

So these AFV were neither with units (therefore do not appear as combat ready), neither in repair workshops (therefore do not appear as under repair).

On the other hand it would be logical in this case for the Germans not to rush in writting them off.

If they had the opportunity ,time a lot of them could be evacuated and repaired.

Still with little time to have the Panzer divisions rest and reorganize, with few transports and a total allied superiority that makes evacuation even more difficult at least during day and a gradual loss of ground by the allied offensive ,they did not have the chance they were looking for.

I recall a study by duppuy institute about the battle of Alamein and tank losses cause of mines.

It is interesting that at some point it is mentioned that a large amount of tanks (i think over 400!!) were unaccounted at first for the British.

We are talking here about a smaller area and a force which is winning the battle.

Still at the end,actually 2 weeks after the end of battle , according to Royal engineers who were responsible for tank repairs, it is reported that only around 120-130 were total write offs and among them there were only about 40 Grants and Shermans.

If i have the time ,i will find the study to confirm the numbers.

[pamak1970]

i found the study.

From

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/m-8mixedminesys.pdf

Tank Losses

British tank strength for Second El Alamein is well documented and a daily record for

those units examined in this study may be found in Appendix III.

36

However, losses, particularly

35

It should also be noted that on the morning of 27 October the cumulative total of missing-in-action in the 51

st

Division was reduced by 290 – evidently men who had returned to duty.

36

PRO WO 169/3861 and 201/440 ‘A.F.V. State (Eighth Army). Time is given as 0700. Another series of reports,

‘Tank State – Egypt’ is also available, with time given as 1200. The first is used except for 25 and 26 October,

which are missing in the first set.

Page 27

27

as to cause, are less well documented. The AFV State (Eighth Army) only records ‘casualties to

date’ and ‘unaccounted for’ beginning with 27 October and only for the army as a whole, rather

than for individual units. The Tank State – Egypt only gives cumulative army totals for ‘unfit

with units,’ ‘in bde [brigade] workshops,’ ‘in army workshops,’ and ‘under evacuation from fwd

[forward] area,’ figures which are also totals for the entire army, rather than for units. It may be

taken that these include all battle damaged and mechanical losses recovered by formations, with

the last being those so badly damaged as to require evacuation to the base workshops found in

Egypt proper.

A total of 38 losses can be definitely attributed to mines, with another 15 as possible

mine casualties. At least 118 may be attributed to tank gunfire. Initially, at least 746 tanks were

fit for action with the units studied. By the end of the battle, 353 were left, including the 92 of

the 22

nd

Armored Brigade. Thus, of the initial units involved in the battle, 261 were left. That

would indicate that at least 485 were lost.

Further illumination may be gained by studying the losses of tanks in the Eighth Army as

a whole. On 23 October the army had a total of 1,038 tanks serviceable with units, 157

serviceable in replacement units and in transit to the front from depots, 26 serviceable with

training units, and 209 unserviceable in unit or army workshops. These totaled 1,430 serviceable

and unserviceable. In addition, there were 1,240 serviceable and unserviceable in the Middle

East Command, not assigned to the Eighth Army. Of these, 156 were in schools and units in

training, 1,016 were in base workshops awaiting repair or modification (many were obsolescent

types), 13 were in preparation for issue, 37 were unaccounted for (but not casualties), and 18

were being evacuated from the front. Thus, 2,670 serviceable and unserviceable tanks were in

the Middle East.

By 4 November the army was reduced to 525 tanks serviceable with units, 87 serviceable

in replacement units and in transit, and 15 serviceable in training units. Unserviceable included

133 under repair, 78 awaiting recovery from the battlefield, 41 in process of evacuation, and 416

unaccounted for. It was also noted that the unserviceable categories included “some casualties”

but were “known to be incomplete.” In addition, 165 were now in Middle East Command

schools and units in training, 1,032 were in base workshops (apparently many of them were the

same vehicles that were reported on 23 October), and 11 were being prepared for issue. Thus, by

this time there were only 2,503 tanks in the Middle East, which would imply that at least 167 –

the difference between the 23 October and 4 November total – had been ‘written off’ as

destroyed.

Further evidence for the number of tanks lost may be gleaned from two reports filed later

in November. In the first, dated 10 November, the losses are given as:

‘Up to the evening 27

th

Oct’

100

‘Slogging period, 31/10 and 1/11’

66

‘9

th

Armd Bde Losses 2/11’

85

‘Losses by other formations from

2/11 to 6/11’

81

‘Total Casualties up to 6/11’

332

It was also noted that “not included in the above are 100 tanks unaccounted for in the

forward area. Doubtless some of these are casualties.” It is unclear whether or not these include

the units of 13

th

Corps, which are not considered in this analysis. In any case it appears that at

Page 28

28

least 232 apply almost exclusively to the breakout battle in the north after 27 October (there was

little or no activity on the 13

th

Corps front after that time). A separate report on the same day

estimated that 50 Sherman and 30 Grant tanks were ‘written off’ and that a further 75 Shermans

and 60 Grants had been recovered and were repairable. The last report that addresses this subject

is dated 22 November 1942. It is probably the most accurate, since it was from the Royal

Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME), which was responsible for the repair, maintenance

and recovery of tanks and other vehicles. That report gives the total number of tanks ‘written off’

as of 19 November as 128, of which only 22 were Grants and 23 were Shermans.

Overall, from these data the following assumptions may be made:

1. Eighth Army as a whole lost between 128 and 167 tanks destroyed between 23

October and 4 November.

2. Eighth Army lost about 449 were damaged or broke down between 23 October and 4

November (the difference between the unserviceable and unaccounted for on those

dates).

3. The 10

th

and 30

th

Corps lost between 332 and 485 tanks.

4. The 10

th

and 30

th

Corps lost at least 38 tanks to mines and probably at least 53.

5. The 10

th

and 30

th

Corps lost at least 118 tanks to antitank or tank gunfire.

6. If the overall proportion of tanks lost to mines and gunfire – 38 (or 53) versus 118 –

were maintained throughout the sample of 332 to 485 tanks assumed lost, then 107 –

at minimum – and 218 – at maximum – were lost to mines. Of course this

methodology posits the insupportable assumption that all of the tanks were lost to

mines or gunfire and that none were lost to mechanical breakdown or other non-battle

causes.

7. Twenty-one of the 38 tanks identified as lost to mines were lost by the morning of 25

October. That is, roughly within 33 hours of the beginning of the British attack.

8. The second largest incident, 6 known mine losses and 15 suspected mine losses,

occurred during the 28 October Australian attack on a previously unbreached mine

sector. In effect, it was a return to the night of 23-24 October, with apparently similar

results

[pamak1970]

Now in the that battle, El Alamein, Germans lost as TWOs much more tanks since they had to retreat also.

I think overall is about 450 and if we count only the worthy ones for a tank engagements ,it is about 200.

Still these ratios do not really say anything about the perfomance of machines or armies in general.

[JasonC]

Many of them are carried on the unit rolls are under repair until early August. Then as the front starts to move, they stop reporting long term repair figures, and by mid August most units are only reporting operationals.

The reason is obvious - all the others are hopeless when the front starts to move. A few units outside the pocket still have a meaningful "short term repair" category. For all the others, non operational becomes dead.

But they don't say so, they just stop reporting in August. The higher ups don't write anything off because they aren't getting any reports. The units aren't reporting repair categories because they do not know what is happening and cannot get any use out of anything but the operationals (a few outside pocket excepted, Tigers particularly unwilling to write things off etc).

At the end of August, they take stock at the westwall as the front stabilizes. They know if it hasn't shown up by then it isn't going to. So they write off anything they can't locate in early September.

That fully accounts for the timing of the *accounting*. But the timing of the actual *loss* must then be assigned back to the reason that vehicle was lost in the first place, which is "it was in no shape to move when the front did". For a reason - it had been knocked out in action previously etc.