Are Shermans THAT bad?

[Sergei]

You can probably find the same references by doing some searching in these forums. Airpower effectiveness in reports vs. reality has been discussed (argued) over and over again.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Aco4bn187inf:

What is the best infantry support tank of the war? I would suggest the Sherman

I would suggest you are right. It was also probably the most numerous tank used in that role; Canadian Shermans were almost exclusively infantry support by late 1944 and I suspect British and American tank battalions may have had similar experiences. Of course, doctrinally, I think that was what they were supposed to be doing in any event.

[MikeyD]

Somewhere on this forum (or CMBO forum?) is an oooold discussion on the effectiveness of air power. If I recall correctly, the Brits inspected all the German vehicles they found as part of a survey of how they got knocked out. Artillery did worse than expected. Air power did worse than expected. Of course if most airpower kills happen fifty miles behind the front lines from maurading Thunderbolts the vehicles wouldn't be showing up in the Brit survey, would they.

Yes, best infantry support tank probably was Sherman. The problem came in when the Top Brass (ahem - Patton) elected to actually restrict Sherman's capabilities in the hope crews would be dissuaded from using them for tank hunting. By war's end about half the Sherman fleet was upgunned to 76mm, and bow armor was often being doubled-up in the field. Imagine if they had a tank mix like that in June of '44.

[ October 10, 2006, 12:42 PM: Message edited by: MikeyD ]

[Sergei]

I would argue that T-34 was just as good but with the difference that it was there years before Sherman.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Hpt. Lisse:

Andreas - I'm more than willing to accept this statement, if you kick out some data to prove it.

I'd be happy to research your statements, of course.

Well, only because JonS made it easy

All the best

Andreas

[Corvidae]

There is no such thing as THE best tank of the war.

There are the best tankS of any particular class.

The sherman was one of the best general purpose tanks of the war, and remained a very good infantry support tank long after it became outclassed as an anti tank weapon.

Its a simple but ergonomical design that works.

The sherman shares its place with the T34 and the long PzIVs as being what a general purpose tank COULD be,

[Hpt. Lisse]

Andreas - Man, even I raised an eyebrow to the "up tp 80% of Panther tanks" were destroyed from the air when I read it. But - and I don't want to sound like I'm badgering you - JonS excellent reports only serve to demonstrate the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of rocket & 500 lb. bomb attacks on AFV's. When a Panther had "been left on the road in perfect condition with full complement of petrol and ammunition," it wasn't KO'ed by a Sherman's 75 or 76mm gun. A perfectly good AFV which is abandoned due to air attack is still a loss due to air attack, so to speak...

In the context of this thread, I think we're trying to ascertain the battlefield effectiveness of Shermans vs. Panthers, as in, the ones that made it to the battlefield (a la Combat Mission.) I do realize that not every Panther tank was commanded by Sgt. Barkmann. Do you or JonS have any insight here?

[JonS]

Originally posted by Hpt. Lisse:

When a Panther had "been left on the road in perfect condition with full complement of petrol and ammunition," it wasn't KO'ed by a Sherman's 75 or 76mm gun. A perfectly good AFV which is abandoned due to air attack is still a loss due to air attack, so to speak...

I quite agree, but that is not the usual sense that these claims are made.

It seems indisputable that very few German (or anyone elses for that matter) tanks were destroyed as a result of direct hits by aerial weapons (20mm, 37mm, bombs, rockets, etc). However, more than a few were lost because the crews collectively shat themselves under air attack and legged it. Still more were lost when the trucks bringing up their fuel, ammuntion, and spare parts were destroyed by enemy a/c miles behind the lines. And finally, not a few were lost because they felt they couldn't maneauvre under the threat of enemy a/c, and so wound up in tactically disastorous psoitions vis a vis enemy ground forces.

But very few were directly destroyed by enemy a/c, and that flies directly in the face of cllaims of the Rudel fanbois and the Typhoon boosters.

BTW, read the whole thread that Andreas linked to. It wanders off topic (although a big chunk of the worst off-topicness was removed), but gets back on track after all the stupid fanboi stuff about Rudel, near the bottom of page 2.

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by Sergei:

I would argue that T-34 was just as good but with the difference that it was there years before Sherman.

1 year should not be spoken of as plural.

[JasonC]

pak - most of the British tank fleet was US supplied Shermans, of course, by the time of the campaign in France. They had some Churchills for their heavy tank units and some Cromwells in some formations for the line tanks, and in armor recce. Tiny numbers of other types. The rest were on US chassis - e.g. Achilles, Sexton - or were mods - e.g. Firefly Shermans - or were outright US made (e.g. Sherman II, V). Roughly a third had been US made even in the westen desert (Honeys and Lees before El Alamein, then Shermans as well).

Tanks weren't scarce (crews were scarcer etc), and when the front line moved clear across France the game was to get enough fuel and other supplies to the spearheads - not to haul Sherman wrecks from the outskirts of Caen to the Dutch border.

On Panthers supposedly being KOed from the air, it is just a laughable farce. If you believe air to ground kill claims they destroyed everything, but then again the moon is made of green cheese. They regularly claim 100 tank KOs in incidents when the German side reports 2-4 lost AFVs.

The Panther was the best tank of the war by a long way, but its operational handling was hopelessly botched in the last year or so of the war, in the west especially. And tactical handling was no great shakes either.

Examples - Panzer Lehr drives a bunch on them into US ID positions in the hedgerows in early July. Initial range is typically 200-400 yards. The US have M-10s and usually shoot first, winning outright. Sometimes they exchange off evenly. Sighting differential is the main reason - the Germans are in the US defensive zone and buttoned, the Americans are told by other units where they are, etc.

The green Panzer brigades attack 3rd Army as it pushes into Lorraine. Entire formations evaporate on contact. On one occasion, a brigade with 40 Panthers hits a single French combat command with plain 75mm Shermans and a battalion of Priests. They get stuck in a village on low ground and trapped there, taking flanking fire from 3 sides whenever they poke over the crest.

The French then drop arty on them all day and creep in closer to get LOS to more of the valley. Support Pz IVs try to get them out, duel plain 75 Shermans no better than evenly, and withdraw. By the end of the day, the Panthers are pretty much all dead and the entire Panzer brigade is reduced to a couple of companies of Pz IVs.

Or take Arracourt. Panthers hit M-10s in morning fog, initial LOS point blank. They never do better than trade off evenly. Elsewhere in the same fight, plain Sherman 75s get the drop on them from a ridge flank and blow up a whole company column for trivial loss.

Or take a dozen cases in the Bulge, mid part of the fighting. Panthers are strong from the front on the narrow roads, but the same narrow roads let a few AT mines or a fallen tree roadblock or a blown bridge stop 50 of them at a time. They are also used recklessly enough that they lead ones are frequently KOed by stronger than average US AT shooters - SP TDs the leading scorers, also towed 90mm AA occasionally. When they get into villages they find it is knife fighting and a Sherman is their equal. Both sides score with zooks-fausts as well.

Or take the death of 2nd Panzer at the hands of 2nd AD at Celles, out at the tip of the Bulge. 2AD runs along ridges on either side of them and traps them in a low ground village area again. Cross fire, called arty. Some try to withdraw, most are KOed or abandoned.

Or take Peiper's column. Cut off by an ID taking a village behind them, all the bridges in front blown. The entire armor complement of an SS PD is worthless, trapped in a narrow valley and pinned there by infantry that outnumbers those accompanying them by about 10 to 1.

Reckless offensive employment basically turns them into just a decent medium tank, and a good gun and thick glacis can't rescue their units from the inevitable consequences of their operational situation.

They were at their best as linebackers on defense, destroying penetrating enemy armor. About the only time they got to do that in the west was against the Brits from Epsom to Goodwood. (In the east they got to do it all the time). The rest of the time there either wasn't any armor to speak of in the west, or it was on some grandious death ride that made no sense whatsover on the map.

[Corvidae]

JasonC So the Panthers ( specialized medium to long range tank killers,for use in open country ) were pressed into use as general purpose tanks. And deployed at short to medium ranges in closed country?

-And the shermans were designed as general purpose tanks, who did best IN closed country at short to medium ranges.

-Alowing the shermans to decimate panther formations.

-And because shermans were as common as dirt, they would be abandoned by their crews, for as little as a broken fan belt, because allied formations could just requesition another whole sherman to replace it,

- Hence the seemingly high loss rates for shermans

Please clarify that I'm actualy making sense here.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Corvidae:

Panthers (specialized medium to long range tank killers, for use in open country)

They weren't specialised. They were bog standard, making up ~half the German fleet from 1944 onwards. They were the Sherman or the T-34 of the German tank park (albeit better armed and armoured than either of those).

[Hpt. Lisse]

Thank you for the elaborations, gents, it does help make more sense of the stats provided.

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Corvidae:

Panthers (specialized medium to long range tank killers, for use in open country)

They weren't specialised. They were bog standard, making up ~half the German fleet from 1944 onwards. They were the Sherman or the T-34 of the German tank park (albeit better armed and armoured than either of those). </font>

[Andreas]

How to deal with German heavies, according to a UK Sherman tank platoon leader:

1) Find one (that's the difficult bit)

2) Keep him interested by dangling the 2-3 75mm Shermans on his frontal arc (that's the dangerous bit)

3) Turn the Firefly turret to 90 degrees off the line of advance in the direction of the heavy

4) Revv the engine

5) Break cover to the left or right of the heavy with the Firefly. Move at high speed past the German heavy. (that's the bit that shows that you know that their turret rotation is slower than your running speed)

6) Stop when you are at a right angle to his side armour. (that's the exciting bit)

7) Fire the gun into it. Repeat as required. (that's the easy bit)

8) Pray that a second one/an ATG was not in overwatch. (that's the hairy bit)

9) Breath out, if you are still alive. (that's the 'You have earned a pint or the MM, whichever you prefer' bit).

Just remember that the platoon leader is not in the Firefly.

All the best

Andreas

[MikeyD]

Some plusses for the 75mm gun Sherman were its excellent HE shell (significantly more bang than a Panther's 75mm HE) and its useful smoke rounds. And they carried an excellent radio, much more capable than the German units. And thier turret drive was state-of-the-art. But for AP, there's no getting around the fact that the 75 was a medium pressure gun. The HVAP round went right up to the limits of the gun's capabilities and still couldn't hope to pierce a Panther's front.

Yes, every Panther ever made eventually fell to the Allies, whether holed through the side during battle or abandoned on a flatcar after strategic bombing cut the rail lines. But that doesn't make a 1:1 comparison between Shermans and Panthers any less uneven.

[pamak1970]

Someone mentioned Rudell which reminded me of something i read pretty recently and ask for confirmation.

I have read that this guy was shot down-forced landing more than 30 times!!

If this is true , then it is not unbeleivable to accept his claims.

His claims are way above statistics calculations but then again it seems that this is true in general about his whole life and we can agreee that he could not lie about the number of times he was shot down!

[JasonC]

pak - it is hopeless horsefeathers from start to finish. Every air to ground kill claim ever made has been directly refuted by on the ground evidence, with the typical overestimate being a factor of 10 to 50 times. Nothing can save the fantasy, it is a known falsehood.

[pamak1970]

exaggeration may be present anyway but it is different to just hear about a guy that destroyed 500 tanks

(i guess a large portion of them were repair to put back on action soon), and hear the whole story.

For example, a very quick look at one site (possibly biased) about his biography , reveals that he had more than 2500 missions under his belt and was shot down or forced to landing 32 times.

This makes things look more realistic.

For example this gives an average of 78 missions before his plane was either shot down or heavily damaged.

It is true that not all mission were tank hunting ones , but the vast majority of them were indeed that (about 2000?)

Now it makes more sense to claim that an exceptionally good pilot had about 15 tank kills for every 78 missions (or 60 based on a 2000 missions figure), before he was shot down .

It makes much more sense if we accept that this 500 figure of destroyed tanks does not imply total write offs but tanks put out of action in general ,some destroyed while others were simply repaired.

(A russian link i saw in the past claimed that on average each tank had about 4 major repairs during its service)

I am not saying that there is no room for exaggeration from his part, but this is true to other pilots also who still did not even come to close to his claims .

By the way ,the same site about his biography claimed a total number of destroyed enemy equipment of any kind-tanks,trucks, artillery and so on ,of about 2000 which i do find difficult to beleive.

2500 missions resulting in 2000 kills is a very high effectiveness , even if the tergets were not just tanks .

[JasonC]

And it makes about as much sense to believe that 2000 anythings were hurt by him as to believe in Santa Claus. Air to ground kill claims need to be reported from the ground by the losing side, or substantiated by contemporary ground surveys of cause of loss by objective OR researchers. Air to ground claims made by pilots themselves are worth absolutely nothing, and not one has ever withstood objective scrutiny.

[civdiv]

Just throwing my own $.02 in here. I haven't really heard this particular aspect discussed, but then I also haven't read through the entire thread yet. One thing that would tend to slew the numbers a bit is the very fact that the Germans were on the defensive and gradually losing ground. A certain number of knocked out tanks can be returned to service. I mean, even within the CM series we see tanked gettings M-killed, and the crew bailing out. I would suspect that probably at least half of tanks 'knocked-out' can be fairly rapidly returned to service. Basically any tank that doesn't burn should have a very good chance of being repaired. But when you are the Germans and you are losing the actual battlefield terrain as you retreat, you also lose all those tanks sitting out there in no man's land. That would tend to limit actual allied tank losses and increase those of the German's.

Also, air power. While I know there is still a dispute going on regarding the actual effectiveness of allied tactical air power, especially against armored vehicles, that COULD end up increasing German armor losses, and thus further slewing the actual rates of losses on both sides in tank-vs-tank duels.

[michael kenny]

Total US Sherman losses from:

http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=11051&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=60

we may find the following facts about the situation of M-4 tanks by the end of the war (VE-Day).

A.) Actual on hand and unit requirements were:

Total on hand with units of 12th AG as of 5 May 1945 was circa 3,738

Total T/E 12th AG as of 30 April 1945 was 4,184

Total on hand with units Seventh Army as of 30 April 1945 was 996

Total T/E Seventh Army as of 30 April 1945 was 1,029

Total T/E 15th AG as of 1 May 1945 was 561

Total T/E PTO as of 1 May 1945 was 789

Total T/E CONUS and en route was 240

Total on hand with units was circa 6,324

Total T/E with units was 6,731

B.) Known losses were:

Total Losses 12th AG to 12 May 1945 was 3,255

Total Losses 15th AG to 14 September 1944 was 588

Partial Losses 6th AG 15 August – 1 May 1945 was 295

Total Losses II Corps, Tunisia, 15 March-9 May 1943 was 60

Total Losses Seventh Army, Sicily was 8

Total Losses 1st AD, Tunisia, 14-21 February 1943 was 94

Total Known Losses was 4,300

C.) Reserves required and known reserves/transits were:

Reserves required for Seventh Army, 12th and 15th AG (total T/E 5,774) was set at 35% or 2,021

(As of 20 March 1945 12th AG reserve requirement was 1,704 of which 848 were in theater and another 2,629 were on release, but not received – i.e., were in CONUS)

(A total of 4,384 M-4 were received by ETOUSA – 6th and 12th AG – 1 February-20 May 1945)

(As of 29 April Seventh Army reserve requirement was 342 – including 2eme DB – of which 63 were on hand)

Reserves required for PTO (total T/E 789) at 35% = 276

Reserves required for CONUS (total T/E 240) at 0.5% = 12

Total reserve requirement was circa 2,309

D.) Total Lend-Lease shipped were:

Total Lend Lease shipped was 22,098 (It is difficult to identify when the last LL shipments went out. However, it is known that Britain had received 33,246 ‘tanks’ from “overseas,” including 5,381 Canadian production by the end of the 2nd QTR 1944. Given that the total ‘tanks’ shipped by the US to the Commonwealth –the only other source for ‘overseas’ tanks – were 30,267, then it seems likely that the bulk had been shipped by May 1945. ‘Tanks’ in this context included SP AT guns and SP artillery.)

Total other were:

E.) Total M-4 conversions through 2nd QTR 1945 to M-36, T-5 ARV and various MX was 3,610

F.) Total M-4 rebuilt 3rd QTR 44-2nd QTR 45 was 3,735 (no rebuilds are known to have reached a war theater)

Thus the total ‘consumption’ (total with units, total reserve requirement, total Lend-Lease, total in re-build, and total conversions) of M-4 through about 8 May 1945 was 42,376 (6,324+4,300+2,309+22,098+3,735+3,610).

G.) To this may be added all or part of those M-4 ‘just completed,’ which were:

1st QTR 1945 4,076

2nd QTR 1945 2,687

These last two (F and G) represent the bulk of the ‘intangibles’ in this equation. It may justly be said that G is probably partly duplicated in C (in transit), although those ‘recently built’ in E and F are excluded from G. However, we may also say that although B probably includes the bulk of the M-4 losses, it cannot be said to include all M-4 losses, and thus may balance any error in overstating the totals in E, F and G. Thus we may estimate that the total ‘consumption’ and ‘just completed’ M-4 to about 8 May 1945 was +/- 49,139. Given that total M-4 Production through 2nd QTR 1945 was 49,204, we may assume that the ‘balance sheet’ is substantially accounted for and that there are no ‘missing’ M-4. We may also fairly assume that the ‘excess’ of M-4 amounted to +/- 6,422 (the rebuilds known to have remained in the US and probably the bulk of the 2nd QTR production), most of which were likely in CONUS as of May 1945. Other sources have indicated that there were "7,000" M-4 in CONUS as of 1 February 1945. Given that 4,384 were shipped to ETOUSA after that, and that production was 4,096 February-April 1945, it is unlikely that the 'excess' could have been reduced much below 6,700 by 1 May 1945.

Although it appears likely that the ‘excess’ of M-4 in the US probably amounted to over 6,000 (it is still possible that my original off the cuff estimate of 9,000 could be valid), it cannot be claimed that the US Army had ‘more than they needed’ since the end-users – the units in the field – were still experiencing shortages through VE-Day. 12th AG was at 89.3 percent of T/E and Seventh Army was at 96.8 percent of T/E – even after many of the bottlenecks had been eliminated and after massive shipments (note the number received by ETOUSA) to rebuild the losses suffered that December and January had been received. Shortages during earlier periods had been severe and had been masked in part by expedients such as the decision to delay the replacement of 9 M-8 HMC Assault Guns in the armored divisions in December and the elimination of the 'replacement' tank sections in 2nd and 3rd AD.

One final requirement probably weighing on the minds of Army planners was that much of the armored force in the ETO and MTO were slated for the invasion of Japan. This may account for the retention of much the 'excess' in CONUS, since it was impracticable to ship tanks from Europe to US east coast ports, ship them by rail to the west coast and issue them to the units reconstituting for the invasion. In other words, they did in fact have to plan for at least 'one more war' - even if that war was never actually fought

=================================================================

The 'real' Goodwood losses from:

http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=9009&postdays=0&postorder=asc&highlight=tank+losses+normandy&start=30

Here's what I have for GOODWOOD - originally this was a posting I made at TankNet. Sorry, but the middle is missing because I had a disk problem and haven't been able to go back and correct it yet (and can't find the archived thread at TankNet ). Hope it supplies some more food for thought. Can't wait for a Mortain discussion.

One of the recent mental excursions I have wandered into regarding Normandy is the generally accepted view of the results of Operation GOODWOOD. The general consensus regarding the battle is that - regardless of Montgomery's initial intent - it was an unmitigated disaster for British arms...right? But, when I began digging into the actual results of the battle - in terms of the relative numbers of casualties inflicted - I began to see a very different picture. The following is a summary of my research to date.

It is difficult to directly compare German and Commonwealth strengths and losses in GOODWOOD, mostly because there is a dearth of accurate and timely casualty reports for the German units involved. However, we do have extensive data for the UK forces and (thanks largely to the untiring work of Niklas Zetterling) a considerable body of data on the German forces.

To summarize, UK forces began with approximately 139,000 men, 1,369 tanks, and at least 732 artillery pieces. Losses were 4,120 men (2.97%) (844 KIA, 2,951 WIA, 325 MIA) and 493 tanks (35%). Only 361 of the tanks were knocked out - that is, they were either written off or were so damaged as to require long-term repair, 132 were damaged - that is, they required less than 24 hours for repair. At the end of the battle tank strength was 1,047.

German strength may be estimated with some accuracy as 79,750 men, 325 tanks, assault guns, and SP AT, and 291artillery pieces (not including infantry guns), 160 heavy Pak (including at least 51 8.8cm Pak 43/41), 56 8.8cm Flak (note that the generally accepted "144" 88's on Bourgebuis Ridge may include both the Pak 43/41 and an exaggeration), and about 230 Nebelwerfer. Our primary source for German casualties for the battle actually covers the period 11-20 July. However, it is likely that few of the casualties in that report were actually incurred prior to start of GOODWOOD on 18 July and none of them appear to be inconsistent with the minimums that would be expected. The exception is the losses of 16th LW FD (51 WIA and 8 MIA). Zetterling estimated that it lost a total of 2,500 men in Normandy, of which about 500 were lost in operations around Caen in early July. The casualties reported by the division for the month of July (in a 5 PzAOK report) were 368 KIA, 759 WIA, and 2,496 MIA, which is probably closer to the actual total casualties of the division in Normandy. Also, it is well documented that the division was broken up and used as replacements after GOODWOOD, being formally disbanded on 4 August 1944. Furthermore, all of the regimental commanders, most of their staff, and 36 company commanders were counted as losses in GOODWOOD, implying that 50+ officers alone were casualties in GOODWOOD. The report for 11-20 July gives the number of officer casualties as one, while the July report gives officer casualties of 92. Finally, the British PW reports indicate that the German MIA are undercounted by at least 1,495 (8 Corps alone reported 1,628 EPW while all 2 Army units involved reported 2,827 EPW for the battle) and it appears likely that most of these were incurred by 16th LW. From this, I conclude that the casualties of the 16th LW FD during GOODWOOD totaled about 3,100 men, over 1,500 of those being prisoner. Total German losses were about 6,500 men (8.15%), 86 tanks, assault guns, and SP AT (26.5%), and at least 72 Nebelwerfer, Pak, and artillery pieces (9.77%). Unlike the British losses, it appears that almost none of the German personnel losses were replaced before the Germans began their withdrawal from Normandy. And, it appears that the German AFV losses were more or less permanent as well, the majority of those recovered and repairable were abandoned when the German retreat began. The artillery losses were also irrecoverable (9th Werfer Brigade lost 47 Nebelwerfer during GOODWOOD, nearly one-half its operational strength).

Armor losses to AT mines cannot be definitely excluded, however, it is interesting to note that no vehicles losses were recorded for the two specialized mine clearing units that participated in the battle (22nd Dragoons and 1st Lothians). Furthermore, the total personnel losses in the two were 2 KIA and 10 WIA, or 0.79 percent (0.26 percent per day) of the 1,513 man strength of the units. Engineer troops totaled 4,457, losses were 6 KIA and 48 WIA, or 1.21 percent (0.40 percent per day).

And now to dig further into the British (or in this case, Commonwealth) casualties. The heaviest hit - in terms of whole percentages - was 2 Canadian Infantry Division. On 18 July 2 Canadian Division had a succesful day, partly clearing Louvigny, west of the Orne, and successfully bridging the Orne at two locations at Caen by 1200 on 19 July. The division suffered moderate losses of 21 KIA, 43 WIA, 3 MIA - mostly in 4 and 5 Brigade. There were an additional 43 KIA and 75 WIA suffered by the Royal Regiment of Canada in the two-day battle for Louvigny, which was not cleared until late in the morning of 19 July. Operations to cross the Orne at Caen and clear the western edge of Vaucelles cost the division an additional 39 KIA, 136 WIA, and 3 MIA on 19 July. In the first two days of the battle the inexperienced division, with minimal armor support, had achieved most of it's objectives for a loss of 363 casualties. Based on a divisional strength of roughly 17,000, that equates to about one percent per day, an unremarkable rate of attrition for a division. Even the hardest hit battalion, the Royal Regiment of Canada at Louvigny, only suffered a loss of 7.05 percent per day, less than the 9.50 percent per day norm found for battalions in World War II.

However, the picture changed on the last two days of the battle. On 20 July the reserve 6 Infantry Brigade was brought up to continue the attack south towards the tiny village of Verrieres, perched on a 88 meter height just west of the Falaise Road. The advance of 6 Brigade was up an open, gentle rise and was exposed to observation and flanking fire from Hill 112, west of the Orne, and to the German positions in Verrieres itself. To make matters worse, shortly after the attack kicked off in the afternoon, a torrential rain began. The fields were quickly reduced to quagmires, limiting vehicular movement to the hard-surfaced roads. As a result, when the Germans counterattacked from Verrieres with an estimated four tanks (which may have been Panthers since they retained some mobility off road) the leading battalion (South Saskatchewan Regiment) was unable to get AT or tank support forward and was quickly overwhelmed. The brigade reserve, the Essex Scottish was overrun in turn when it tried to recover the position. Significantly perhaps, it was only at this time that 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade was placed under command of 2 Canadian Division. The losses on 20 July were 98 KIA, 294 WIA, 50 MIA, exceeding the combined casualties of the previous two days. On the morning of 21 July, with the heavy rain still falling, the Germans continued their armored attack, inflicting heavy casualties again on the Essex Scottish and on the Camerons of Canada and the 27 Armoured Regiment at St. Andre. In the evening the division counterattacked, supported by 6 and 27 Armoured Regiments of 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade. Losses for the day were 78 KIA, 260 WIA, and 143 MIA, another very intense day of combat. These two days did tremendous damage to the infantry of the division. The Essex Scottish had only lost 11 men on 18 and 19 July. But, on 20 and 21 July, 318 men were lost or 19.09 percent per day. The South Saskatchewans, which had only lost one man earlier, lost 201 on 20 and 21 July or 12.06 percent per day. Overall, the division lost an average of 2.71 percent per day on 20 and 21 July, over two-and-one-half times the rate of 18 and 19 July.

Meanwhile, 3 Canadian Division attacked on the right flank of 8 Corps, attempting to seize the Columbelles steel factory complex on the east bank of the Orne, and then drive south towards Vaucelles. The division paid heavily for it's success, losing 60 KIA, 234 WIA, 9 MIA on 18 July, a loss of about 1.8 percent, significantly higher than the divisional norm of 1.0 percent. However, once Columbelles was captured the advance went well. Vaucelles was seized against light resistance on 19 July and only 7 KIA, 35 WIA, and 7 MIA were lost. On 20 July the division was lightly engaged in mopping up and occupying the positions seized by 11 Armoured Division, and suffered only 6 KIA and 20 WIA. It was more heavily engaged on 21 July - mostly by intense German shelling - and suffered 17 KIA, 84 WIA, and 11 MIA.

On 19 and 20 July it appears (my source, The Victory Campaign, is hazy on the actions of 10 Armoured Regiment) that 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade supported the attack of 3 Canadian Division on Columbelles with the 6 Armoured Regiment (1 Hussars), holding the 10 Armoured Regiment (Fort Garry Horse) in reserve, while the attack by 2 Canadian Division on Louvigny was supported by 27 Armoured Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusiliers). The armor units lost 7 KIA and 32 WIA, 10 tanks knocked out and 1 damaged on 18 July. After Louvigny was secured on 19 July, it appears that 27 Armoured crossed to the east side of the Orne, supporting attacks on Fleury and St. Andre. The rest of 2 Brigade supported mopping up operations in Vaucelles and Ifs. The operations on 19 July cost 1 KIA and 3 WIA, only 2 tanks were knocked out, although 10 were damaged. On 20 July, when the German counterattack so roughly handled 2 Canadian Division, 27 Armoured remained defending St. Andre, while the rest of the brigade remained in the 3 Division sector east of the Falaise Road. The brigade suffered 3 KIA and 3 WIA to German shelling, while apparently losing no tanks. On 21 July the brigade, finally attached to 2 Division, counterattacked to stabilize the division front, losing 5 KIA and 12 WIA, 17 tanks knocked out and 7 damaged.

Overall, it does not appear that the Canadian losses can be attributed to a lack of armor support or to inadequate tanks. Rather, it appears that the heavy losses on 20 and 21 July were more attributable to poor decision making. The 6 Brigade attack was executed without armor support, even though the supporting armor was close at hand, available, and unengaged. Failing to attach 2 Armoured Brigade to 2 Division on the morning of 20 July when the attack to Verrieres was ordered is inexplicable. The apparent failure of the division commander to request armored support for an advance up the open gentle slope of Verrieriers Ridge is equally inexplicable. Also, the fact that the AT guns of the South Saskatchewan's were overrun while trying to move up can only partly be attributed to bad luck. Trying to move forward the vulnerable guns and prime movers in poor visibility, in the face of the enemy was simply asking for trouble. So, would the presence of Churchills have made any difference? It's doubtful, since no tank has value in combat unless it's where it can actually particpate in the combat.

Organization

8 Corps (64,448 men: 255 KIA, 922 WIA, 59 MIA = 1,236; frm 8 Corps rpts 1,357 cas)

11 AD (14,389 men: 159 KIA, 531 WIA, 55 MIA = 745; frm 8 Corps rpts 930 cas)

29 Arm Bde (Start 214, End 132, KO 140, DMG 30) (2,826 men; 67 KIA, 189 WIA, 33 MIA)

159 Inf Bde (2,599 men; 55 KIA, 261 WIA, 6 MIA)

2 N.Yeo. Recce Rgt (Start 72, End 46, KO 32, DMG 5) (662 men; 14 KIA, 26 WIA, 10 MIA)

Other (19 KIA, 50 WIA, 1 MIA)

Inns of Court AC Rgt (782 men; 1 KIA, 5 MIA)

22 Dgns (Sherman Crab) & 26 Asslt Sqn RE (att frm 79 AD) (705 men; 3 KIA, 5 WIA)

7 AD (15,183 men: 39 KIA, 154 WIA, 2 MIA = 195; frm 8 Corps rpts 154 cas)

22 Arm Bde (Start 216, End 199, KO 15, DMG 33) (22 KIA, 89 WIA, 2 MIA)

131 Inf Bde (5 KIA, 31 WIA)

8 Huss. Recce Rgt (Start 72 )

Well here is where my disk failed and corrupted the data.

101st SS Pz Bn (~ 500 men: start 1 Tiger I? End 6 Tiger I, KO&DMG 0?)

272nd ID (~12,700 men: losses 11-20 July; 44 KIA, 131 WIA, 153 MIA, July; 242 KIA, 951 WIA, 982 MIA)

16th LW FD (Start 2? StGIII)

(~ 9,300 men: losses 11-20 July; 51 WIA, 8 MIA, July; 368 KIA, 759 WIA, 2,496 MIA)

7th Werfer Bde (110 werfer on 1 July)

(~3,700 men: losses July; 58 KIA, 204 WIA, 25 MIA)

101st SS Art Bn (~500 men: 4 21cm, 6 17cm)

LXXXVI AK (-) (~24,750 men)

346th ID (Start 8 StGIII & 6 Marder? End 8 StGIII & 6 Marder? KO&DMG 0?)

(~[1/2 7,500] = 3,750 men: losses 11-20 July; 121 KIA, 531 WIA, 219 MIA, July; 152 KIA, 627 WIA, 192 MIA)

21st PzD (Start 50 PzIV, end 22 PzIV, KO&DMG 28, 16 Pak40 SP, 24 10.5cmStG)

(~12,900 men: losses 11-20 July; 162 KIA, 394 WIA, 832 MIA, July; 239 KIA, 714 WIA, 996 MIA)

503rd Pz Bn (~500 men: start 39 Tiger, End 20 Tiger, KO&DMG 17)

9th Werfer Bde (~120 werfer, 47 lost 18-21 July)

(~3,700 men: losses July; 46 KIA, 153 WIA, 163 MIA)

1039th PzJg Bn (~400 men: 27 Pak 43/41 8.8cm, 12 lost 18-21 July)

1053rd PzJg Bn (~300 men: 16 Pak 40, 13 lost 18-21 July)

Art Rgt Staff Autun (ARKO 118?) (Losses July: 39 KIA, 96 WIA)

555th Art Bn (~400 men: 12 12.2cm how)

763rd Art Bn (~400 men: 9 17cm)

1151st Art Bn (-) (~300 men: 8 12.2cm how)

1193rd Art Bn (~400 men: 12 14.9cm how)

625th Art Bty (~200 men: 3 17cm)

III Flak Korps (~1,500 men)

11700th FlakKG (8-12 8.8cm)

12400th FlakKG (8-12 8.8cm)

13399th FlakKG (8-12 8.8cm)

Strength ~79,750 men

~325 tanks, assault guns, SP AT

Losses (personnel losses for 11-20 July)

~6,500 men (8.15%)

(Note: 8 Brit Corps rpt 1,628 EPW, all PW rpt 2,827 for period)

~86 tanks, assault guns, SP AT (26.5%)

GOODWOOD planning:

1000 hrs 13 July Dempsey meets with O'Connor (8 Corps), Crocker (1 Corps), and Simonds (2 Cdn. Corps). At that time 59 ID withdrawn from 8 Corps and 7 AD substituted. Reason was Monty's instruction of 10 July to Dempsey and Bradley:

"Second Army will retain the ability to operate with a strong armoured force east of the River Orne in the general area between Caen and Falaise,

For this purpose a corps of three armoured divisions will be held in reserve, ready to be employed when ordered by me.

The opportunity for the employment of this corps may be sudden and fleeting. Therefore the study of the problems arising will begin at once."

Following was a second conference on the morning of 14 July at Creully. Then on the morning of 15 July Dempsey visited O'Connor and delivered to him a copy of Monty's:

"Notes on Second Army Operations

16th July-18th July

1. Object of this operation.

To engage the German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle.

To gain a good bridgehead over the River Orne through Caen, and thus improve our positions on the eastern flank.

Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel.

2. Affect of this operation on Allied policy.

We require the whole of the Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas.

A victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank.

But the eastern flank is a bastion on which the whole future of the campaign in North West Europe depends; it must remain a firm bastion; if it became unsatble the operations on the western flank would cease.

Therefore, while taking advantage of every opportunity to destroy the enemy, we must be very careful to maintain our own balance and ensure a firm base.

3. The enemy.

There are a lot of enemy divisions in the area south-east of Caen:

21 Panzer Division 16 GAF Field Division

1 SS Panzer Division 272 Infantry Division

12 SS Panzer Division

Another one [116 Panzer Division] is coming and will be here this week-end.

4. Operations of 12 Corps and Canadian Corps - 16th and 17th July.

Advantage must be taken of these to make the Germans think we are going to break out across the Orne between Caen and Amaye.

5. Initial Operations 8 Corps.

The three armoured divisions will be required to dominate the area Bourgebus-Vimont-Bretteville, and to fight and destroy the enemy.

But armoured cars should push far to the south towards Falaise, and spread alarm and dsepondency, and discover 'the form.'

6. 2 Canadian Corps.

While para 5 is going on, the Canadians must capture Vaucelles, get through communications and establish themselves in a very firm bridgehead on the general line Fleury-Cormelles-Mondeville.

7. Later Operations 8 Corps.

When 6 is done, then 8 Corps can 'crack about' as the situation demands.

But not before 6 is done.

8. To sum up for 8 Corps.

Para 5.

Para 7.

Finally.

Para 6 is vital.

B.L. Montgomery

15-7-44

At 0300 hours 16 July the 8 Corps Operations instruction was issued. The intention laid down in the instruction was:

"On 18th July, 8 Corps will debouch from the existing bridgehead east of the River Orne with a view to:

(a) Dominating the area Bourgebus-Vimont-Bretteville-sur-Laize.

( Destroying any enemy armour or other forces encountered en route to this area.

© If conditions are favourable, subsequently exploiting to the south."

On 17 July Dempsey issued the following summary to all of his corps commanders:

"Second Army Operations

Commencing on 18th July

West of the Orne.

1. 12 Corps will hold the whole of the commanding ground on the general line Evrecy-Esquay-Eterville. They will establish a force on the spur south-east of Evrecy and develop a strong threat on the axis Evrecy-Amaye.

They will do all they can to lead the enemy to believe that Second Army intends to cross the River Orne on their front.

2. 30 Corps will improve their positions on the front Vendes-Noyers-Missy, and operate with light forces in the direction of Villers Bocage. Their operations will be designed to draw enemy reserves into the thick country on their front and to contain them there.

East of the Orne.

3. 1 Corps will establish 3 Division in the area Bivres-Traorn-St.Pair-Emieville-Touuffreville, and will hold this area against enemy attack from east and south-east.

1 Corps will also occupy and hold the villages of Cuverville and Demouville.

Patrolling and exploitation will be carried out to the east and north-east of 3 Division area, but main bodies will not be moved from this area without reference to me.

4. 8 Corps will establish armoured divisions in the areas:

(a) Vimont

( Garcelles-Secqueville

© Hubert-Folie-Verrieres.

The task of these three divisions will be to get their main bodies so establsihed that there can be no enemy penetration through the ring, to destroy all enemy troop concentrations and installations in the area; to defeat enemy armour which may be brought against them.

Vigorous patrolling and exploitation will be carried out to the east and south-east to the line of the Dives-to the south in the direction of Falaise-to the south-west as far as the River Orne at Thury Harcourt.

Main bodies of the three divisions will not be moved from areas (a), ( and © without reference to me.

5. 2 Canadian Corps will capture and hold Vaucelles and Gibreville with one division and build bridges over River Orne at Caen. This is a vital part of the whole Army operations.

They will be prepared, on instructions from me, to advance their front to the line Fleury-Cormelles and may start to employ another division for this task.

Their operation of expanding the Caen bridgehead will include a junction of their forces east and west of the River Orne on the line Eterville-Fleury.

M.C. Dempsey,

Lieutenant-General,

Commander, Second Army

17th July, 44"

Andreas did you link your AHF thread earlier? If not:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=81359&highlight=tank+losses+normandy

[JasonC]

michael k - a useful Sherman accounting job, thanks for it. I cannot however agree with the remark that it "cannot be claimed that the US Army had ‘more than they needed’".

They lost 4300 over the whole war while they made 11 times that number. Losses and full strength for all units in the field combined come to only 11000, including the steady expansion of fielded ADs throughout (one wave Med era 1-3rd ADs I mean, another breakout era, another in the fall before the bulge, a few more in 1945). They gave away 5 times what they lost to allies, with the British portion enough to cover all US losses and still re-man all US ADs and independent battalions twice over. Even backing out all LL up front, built covered losses 7 times over. No this is not the result of mere victory - the Russians e.g. cannot say anything remotely like it.

Transport was the allied bottleneck, from shipping space. Not produced items. Everything competed with everything else for shipping space across the Atlantic and over to the continent. The reason the rear portion of the channel is still stuffed with as many tanks as the pointy end, is their priority never had to be pushed to absolute to keep the armor force in the field up near TOE.

Of course when a unit loses half its strength in a month of the most intense fighting, it is short tanks until it can restock. But they did, as soon as they could be pulled off the line to take replacements, and if they could find crews. Under normal conditions of active combat use, US ADs still ran 90% of TOE in armor and the independent battalion working with IDs ran 80%. Any student of the German strength returns will tell you that is about as full as combat allows armor formations to get.

As for Goodwood, yes it was a fiasco. No infantry losses to attacking IDs is not the reason it counts as a fiasco. Losing nearly 500 tanks in a matter of days while failing to break through and inflicting only about 1/6th that scale of armored loss on the enemy, counts as a fiasco - in any war, any side. When you have 4 to 1 armor odds you are supposed to get something out of it.

It simply needs to be acknowledged that British armor doctrine and use in practice was inferior to US or German as late as mid 1944. All arms coordination with the tanks was particularly lacking. Your narrative mentioned a case of "inexplicable" failure of the tanks to help the infantry - one may just as easily call the inability of massive artillery and air power to suppress a PAK front in front of attacking armor inexplicable, and the willingness to drive into it anyway and lose nearly 500 tanks more like criminal.

There is in fact a simple explanation for these inexplicables - coordination of other arms with armor in the British army left a lot to be desired.

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

[qb] michael k - a useful Sherman accounting job, thanks for it.

I cannot take any credit. I merely reposted Rich's work.

As for Goodwood, yes it was a fiasco. No infantry losses to attacking IDs is not the reason it counts as a fiasco. Losing nearly 500 tanks in a matter of days while failing to break through and inflicting only about 1/6th that scale of armored loss on the enemy, counts as a fiasco - in any war, any side. When you have 4 to 1 armor odds you are supposed to get something out of it.

The reason I reposted Rich's Goodwood post was because it showed that the myth about 'Losing nearly 500 tanks' is groundless. Rich clearly pointed out that the losses were around 361 and of these 160 were a total loss. This is far below '500'. Christopher Dunphie, in his book 'The Pendulum Of Battle' points out that the ground gained during the 2 days of Goodwood was the same as it took the US Forces 4 days to take during the start of Cobra. This is remarkable when the US faced 100+ Panzers and the British 600!

The tank loss ratio for Goodwood would be about 2;1 in the German favour.

[JasonC]

"Losses were ...493 tanks (35%)." From your own post.

That is nearly 500 in anyone's book, and it is the delta operational as a result of Goodwood.

"Only 361 of the tanks were knocked out - that is, they were either written off or were so damaged as to require long-term repair, 132 were damaged"

Delta operational is battlefield losses and they are 500, not 160. German "losses" of 83 are also battlefield aka reduction in runners, only a portion of them TWO. The Brits cannot be credited for the Germans inability to evac tanks during Cobra, when they did not make the breakout etc. Allied TWOs soar in August for similar reasons of inability to move previous field KOs, a portion of them the Goodwood stuff no doubt.

And the German tanks facing Goodwood are not 600. That is more like total AFVs left in theater on the day it starts. Your own post says the right figure is 325. The Brits have over 1300 tanks so they had 4 to 1 armor odds. They lost 497 field KO to inflict 83 field KO, which is 1 to 6. 4 to 1 armor odds attacks that generate 1 to 6 delta operational outcomes are fiascos.

As for the armor the US faced, the US faced about as much armor in Normandy as the Brits did, they just faced it at different times, more piecemeal. From small amounts with 17SS, Lehr's initial counterattack in early July, the StuGs working with the FJ corps, 2SS, 2nd Panzer in the 1st ID sector, then in the breakout period the remnants of Lehr, 2 fresh StuG brigades, all of 116th Panzer, and the force gathered for Mortain - which reached the level facing Goodwood incidentally.

But was employed offensively in a dumb way, seen ahead of time by strategic intel, etc. Also, easily half the Goodwood losses came from the PAK front not the tanks, and the Germans managed nothing similar opposite the Americans during Cobra. Not that it would have worked very well against US artillery and firepower arms practices - any more than Mortain did.

The US outscored the Germans in Normandy in tanks lost, despite being on the attack and largely equipped with inferior Shermans with short 75. The Brits had higher armor odds longer, used their armor more in multiple breakout attempts, had superior Fireflies the US lacked - and were dramatically outscored by the Germans throughout the Normandy fighting, including in Goodwood.

Terrain and less piecemeal employment had something to do with that. Quality had a bit to do with that, as the Tigers in theater were used opposite the Brits and more than their share of the inferior StuGs got the US part of the front.

But a huge portion of it was simply doctrinal weakness on the part of the Brits. Their "armour" (as opposed to "tank") force in particular, had a recklessly tank-centric approach that the whole war showed was fundamentally unsound, and which led to excessive armor loss rates every time it was tried, by any side. Goodwood was the last time it happened on that kind of scale, but hardly the first. (Remember Knightbridge? etc).

As for the ground taken, Cobra took all of France, Goodwood was stuffed within arty range of the start line. The guns didn't even have to displace. The comparison is absurd.