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Commonwealth and German battalion organisation


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This is a spin-off from this thread.

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Platoons of Vickers MGs may have been attached to infantry companies of the rifle battalions, but I don't seem to recall that being the norm. Usually one MG company was attached to one battalion, and I believe much of the MG work may have been indirect?

There was nominally one pn of MMGs per inf bn. However, the MG-ers resisted this kind of penny-packeting of their guns, not always successfully. The gun crews were highly trained, and well equipped, for indirect fire. ISTM that much of their work was indirect.

JonS will be along to point us to a good first hand account soon, whose name I forget.
Fendick, R. (2001) A CANLOAN Officer. Privately published. Fabulous book. </font>
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As promised in the other thread, here is the reply, hot from the must-read book of the year, the 1941 8th print-run of Cols. Greiner & Degeners' blockbuster 'Tactics for the reinforced infantry battalion', a book without which no self-respecting Wehrmacht officer would like to be seen in Moscow this year. (woops).

Anyway, they say (translation mine):

The MG company consists of three sMG platoons, with two sections to two sMG each, the sGrW platoon, and the company HQ section. The fight as a platoon is the norm for the sMG. The smallest fire unit is the section.

The sGrW platoon consists of the platoon HQ (1 NCO, 3 runners) and 3 sGrW sections. The sGrW section consists of section leader, with distance measurement man and two phone operators, two sGrW with one sGrw leader and six mortarmen each. Each group also has two combat wagons and one ammunition wagon.

The company HQ consists of the company HQ leader, runners to the sMG platoons, signallers with signalling equipment sufficient for three phone lines and one optical link, allowing fire control within the MG company. A signal equipment carriage is attached to transport equipment.

On fighting the company:

The MG Company (4./8./12.) is the backbone of the battalions firefight. It has to be attempted to use the MG platoons together under the leadership of their CO, who will have a combat order from the battalion commander. Locally and timely co-ordinated combined fire, often jointly with other weapons is desirable. The MG Company will then execute the 'how' as it sees fit. The attachment of sMG sections to forward rifle companies can become necessary.

Examples:

- when parts of the battalion are detached on an independent task

- when the lay of the land does not allow joint co-ordination of the fire (e.g. forested country)

- before the attack and breakthrough

The Battalion OC will never distribute all his sMg to the rifle companies. He will always leave sections in the hand of the MG Company CO to be used together. Detached elements are re-attached as soon as the reason for the detachment is no longer there.

The MG Company fights in close co-ordination with the rifle companies. Parts will follow the riflemen closely without being under their orders, and other parts will provide fire support from rear-ward positions.
I think this is quite clear language regarding the sMG question, and points very clearly to a tactical mission for the 4./8./12. Kompanie. Note that it does not cover the sGrW platoon. This is directly under the command of the Battalion CO, and is "regularly" detached in sections to rifle companies on the attack.

Ps. Lt.Col. Fendick is sold out, and does not intend another print-run.

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I don't think it should be any great surprise that the Germans did things re: support weapons differently than everyone else. They were like that with everything, from soup to nuts. They didn't put names on their dogtags. They had no such thing as a Regimental Sergeant Major. They didn't insist that infantry platoons be commanded by officers, in fact, they inisisted that the vast majority of them be commanded by mere sergeants.

Their approach to support weapons was not necessarily better or worse, just different. The CW infantry battalion, as noted before, could draw on the same kinds of support as the Germans did, they just didn't wear the same shoulder flashes the way a German support weapon crew wore the same waffenfarbe as the infantry he was supporting.

The CW infantry battalion had the support of

an MG and mortar battalion from Division

a divisional AT battalion

his own 3 inch mortar platoon (carried under armour on tracks, a capability a German mortar platoon would have likely loved), his own anti-tank platoon (also on tracks), a carrier platoon (with tracked flame weapons), and his own assault pioneers

Field engineer squadrons from division

his own dedicated 24 gun Field Regiment

likely armour attached to his division from an independent tank brigade or a neighbouring armoured division

Six of one, or half a dozen of the other?

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I don't agree if you are really trying to argue that it does not make a difference. It does, if only to the BN CO. Whether the has his own sMG company, or has to rely on whether or not division is giving him some, is going to make a significant difference to the way he can handle his battalion (unless the attachment is pretty permanent, which I don't think it would be). While I believe that this sort of arrangement makes the German battalion more independent, and probably stronger in infantry operations, there is no doubt that the policy of having dedicated capable AT weapons on the battalion level made the Commonwealth battalion stronger when it came to dealing with mechanised threats.

The Commonwealth BN did not have a dedicated Field Regiment. It had a dedicated FOO team, who at any given time may or may not have had access to a number of guns ranging from very few to unbelievably many.

As the divisional AT battalion, I leave that with a UK vet's quote 'The 17-pdrs always seemed to be too far back'.

I am not arguing that one is better than the other, and certainly have not done so here. But it seems quite clear to me that they are in fact quite dissimilar in many respects of their organisation, and that will lead to differences in their handling on the battlefield.

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Originally posted by Andreas:

I don't agree if you are really trying to argue that it does not make a difference. It does, if only to the BN CO. Whether the has his own sMG company, or has to rely on whether or not division is giving him some, is going to make a significant difference to the way he can handle his battalion (unless the attachment is pretty permanent, which I don't think it would be). While I believe that this sort of arrangement makes the German battalion more independent, and probably stronger in infantry operations, there is no doubt that the policy of having dedicated capable AT weapons on the battalion level made the Commonwealth battalion stronger when it came to dealing with mechanised threats.

The Commonwealth BN did not have a dedicated Field Regiment. It had a dedicated FOO team, who at any given time may or may not have had access to a number of guns ranging from very few to unbelievably many.

As the divisional AT battalion, I leave that with a UK vet's quote 'The 17-pdrs always seemed to be too far back'.

I am not arguing that one is better than the other, and certainly have not done so here. But it seems quite clear to me that they are in fact quite dissimilar in many respects of their organisation, and that will lead to differences in their handling on the battlefield.

You're arguing that differences make a difference?

Why, really Andreas! I had no idea! :D

The "dedicated field battery" was not such on paper, but in effect, I am led to believe that the relationships between "arty reps" and infantry battalions were very good and that they were often looked upon that way. I have a photo of such an arty rep on this page that shows an artillery FOO for the Calgary Highlanders - wearing regimental kit and who later funded a memorial in Europe - not to his own regiment, but to the infantry battalion he supported. Scroll down to the stuff on Loon Plage and Major Riley.

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So the MG company has 12 MGs? I assume tripods? 6 81mm?

How did the later 120mm mortar fit into a battalion org? Directly attached to Bn HQ?

Good commo info there also.

The point of the German MG company is that it is a fighting unit. With command and control and coordination. Its probably to be used for nailing down opposition, while the infantry companies manuver for better advantage. It is not a MG supply company doling out its firepower (unless thats needed) but still retains the majority of its firepower under control even if it does penny packet a HMG or two.

[ March 13, 2005, 11:32 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

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Originally posted by Andreas:

I am not arguing that one is better than the other, and certainly have not done so here. But it seems quite clear to me that they are in fact quite dissimilar in many respects of their organisation, and that will lead to differences in their handling on the battlefield.

Well, they obviously had different assets (sMGs and mtrs vice A-Tk guns (late in the war) , mortars, carriers, pioneers, AAMGs (early in the war), etc), but it seems to me they were handled ina fairly similar manner.

In both cases the mortars were generally kept in the Bn COs hip pocket, while the other assets were parcelled out on an as-needed basis, whilst maintaining some sort of reserve, and endeavouring to concentrate when practical.

Different weapons, different techniques, but same approach. Specifically - and what I was trying to get at in the other thread - Support Coy didn't 'fight' as Spt Coy, squeezed in between A and B coys. But neither did 4./, 8./, or 12. Kompanies.

Regards

JonS

BTW, in 1944-45 there were several types of RA A-Tk Regts, all of which maintained a mix of weapons. In inf divs this was a mix of towed 6- and 17-pr. Some of the latter became SP from late-44. The 17-prs took the better part of a day to fully, and properly emplace (they are BIG guns), and as a result doctrine generally had them forming a back-stop line behind the fwd bns. The div 6-prs - smaller, handier, easier to transport and move - would be further fwd.

The other main types were so called 'assault A-Tk regts', as seen in 3, 50, and 3 Can Inf for OVERLORD. These had a SP Wolverines (3-in) in place of the 17-prs (so; no towed 17-pr). Corps and Armd Div A-Tk Regts replaced the 6-prs with SP 17-pr (so; half towed, half SP, all 17-pr).

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Originally posted by Cogust:

Wasn't the 120mm GrW a regimental asset?

Yes. I am not aware they ever became battalion assets. They replaced the gun companies at regimental level in some cases.

Total production in 43, 44 and 45 was 8,461 of the 12cm, and 61,497 of the GrW34 (there were another 1,500 or so of the para variety with short barrels). Of the latter, 51,717 were produced in 43, 44 and 45. For the 12cm GrW, add captured Red Army ones taken into service as GrW 378®.

I'd be surprised if many, (if any) of the precious 12cm variety ever found their way into battalions as regular organic assets. Possible, but not likely, and in any case an exception. As far as weapons go, that would be the heaviest item to find its way into the German infantry battalion, at 490kg in Fahrstellung (heavier than the IG18, I believe).

All info from Lexikon der Wehrmacht.

Edit: because I can not tell regiment and battalion apart and for production numbers.

[ March 13, 2005, 12:52 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

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Originally posted by JonS:

I think there is a misunderstanding. My point was relating to tactical control. I am not sure whether support coy in a Commonwealth battalion would have had tactical control of its assets in a combat environment, or whether this was undertaken by the battalion CO, or whether they were not fought as a tactical unit (this does not mean 'line unit').

4./8./12. Kompanie are referred to by Greiner & Degener as 'sMG Company', and they are supposed to have tactical control of their main asset (the HMGs), with the exception of some specific cases. The mortars are attached for admin purposes by the sounds of it, and were fought by the battalion CO, or attached to rifle companies.

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http://www.100thww2.org/100org/hwcom.html

The US followed a similar approach. But they had a bugler.

Where weapons are TOE can really be driven by the range of that weapon, the weight of the weapon and the weight of its ammunition. And to some degree, the expertise to use that weapon.

Take the US 60mm mortar. While its payload is not that much greater than many 50mm, but its range is. Its a company mortar. It covers a company area very well. Its a weapon with sights and lends itself to indirect fire.

Its also a weapon that needs some more training than the typical 50mm weapon. And it needs much in the way of ammo. Sometimes a Bn could go through 400+ rounds a day when attacking. having the weapons closer together makes this task easier.

Belt fed MGs are a company (or lower) weapon. Even the archaic water cooled weapons are Battalion level weapons.

[ March 14, 2005, 12:58 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

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Originally posted by Wartgamer:

In Korea, Vickers Guns were assigned directly to the infantry battalions, in a specialist Vickers platoon.

http://www.canuck.freehosting.net/vickers.htm

Thats so funny. Its a specialist Vickers platoon. Like having belt fed weapons at a battalion level is special?

That's my website - actually, its not, its an outdated page from my site, now on its own domain at canadiansoldiers.com

And yes, as you have been told MANY TIMES NOW, belt-fed weapons at the battalion level was special in WW II and Korea.

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On German Infantry Battalions:

"The Handbook on German Military Forces", March 1945, US Army, says:

German Inf. Battalion 1944 type had:

3 Rifle (Grenadier) Companies:

Each with 3 Rifle Platoons + 2 HMG's each

1 Hvy Weapons Company with 6 HMG, 6 81mm Mortars and 4 120mm Mortars.

For a total of 12 HMG's 6 81mm Mortars and 4 120mm Motars.

So the 120mm's are part of the Battalion.

The heavy howitzer company of the Regiment has 6 75mm Inf guns and 2 150mm Inf Guns.

This Battalion organization remains fairly true throughout Inf, Para and Mech forces (more mortars & LMGs in the Fallschirmjager, more mech. guns & LMG's in PzGr. formations)

CM shows the 81mm's being distributed amongst the Companys, while the 120's remain off board.

I personally feel that the best representation of a '44 battalion would be to have the Infantry Companies (with no motars) + 1 81mm FO and 1 120mm FO.

This varies gobs by losses, formation types, etc., but I believe that 120mm Mortars were, by 44, Battalion level assets.

DavidI

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Originally posted by Wartgamer:

Why not have a Divisional Royal Grenade Launcher Battalion?

You really think you would understand the rationale for that any better than you've been able to grasp any of the other army's concepts? You're batting .000 on pretty much everything you've tried to discuss with regards to the CW so far, and aren't doing much better with the US Army stuff.
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Originally posted by David I:

On German Infantry Battalions:

"The Handbook on German Military Forces", March 1945

IIRC, that was the book of fairy tales read to newbie coy cmdrs to scare them awake at night. Some ok-ish stuff in it, lots of nonsense.
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On 120mm mortars, if you look at gerob the German force in Normandy online database, you will find the only people who had any of them were the richest SS formations (some but only some of whom do have them at battalion), and a (very) few infantry ones where they replaced 150mm sIGs at regimental level. While everyone has 81s, scads of them. At company and battalion. As for short 81s, they weren't an echelon difference thing. Company and battalion both used the full sized 81s. The light short ones were a special item for the FJ, meant to be easier to air drop and to man-handle without ground transport.

On Brit MG organizational differences, they date from WW I and the effort of MG gunners to distinguish themselves from other branches of service. The Germans and US treat MGs as portions of the infantry arm as a matter of course. The Brits do not.

In WW I, the Brits started out with a few Vickers at battalion - like 4. Not enough to do much. Then they add Lewis guns, which are pushed down to company level and actually move with the infantry. Not as SAWs, but setting up on a new trenchline when one is taken, going into the line wherever the company does, that sort of thing. This was initially 4 Lewis guns per company as a heavy weapons platoon (along with others for mortars).

Meanwhile the Vickers are still up at battalion. They are much less mobile. Those serving them want more centralization, and this turns into a scheme whereby all the vickers are pooled into a brigade level force of (at first) 16 of them, which coordinate their fire plan across a whole brigade sector. That is the initial logic behind centralization - integrated fire plans along the line.

See, the WW I use of MGs was typically along diagonals, sometimes nearly parallel to the front. Interlocking fields of fire was the idea. Also, MG fire was thought to be much more effective from enfilade. Which is true if the other guy comes in waves. By the time the enemy infantry is moving in small sections, it is already the general practice. And other strengths have been found in it.

For example, it exploits MG range, and prevents narrow sector breakins. The enemy can't eliminate the fire hitting in front of sector B, by just winning in sector B. He must take out the MGs in sectors A and C too, or he can't get through. This requires a larger scale of attack.

And it was much harder to get a WW I attack to succeed uniformly, than to succeed somewhere. There was lots of variance. Uncut wire somewhere, a barrage at the right time, a company faster to their parapets, any of a dozen things could create a hold out sector. With tied in MGs firing along the line instead of forward, those sectors extended to their flanks and spread attack failure along the line.

So, you want an integrated MG fire plan. The way they achieved this was to have MGs in sections facing both ways at points along the line. And the scale of unit their fire was meant to help, was an echelon larger than the men they were deployed with. The MG gunners at B are responsible for the final protective fires in front of A and C. So why should they answer to the commander of B company, exclusively?

Once this system was in place, it was driven forward by additional incentives to distinguish themselves from the infantry. MG gunner was a very dangerous job already, they did not want their personnel dragooned into over the top parties to gin up trench strength. Which would dissipate specialists. Don't make them answer to the desparate local infantry commander. Keep us as separate as the arty.

The MG arm is trying to carve out a branch of service distinction for itself, more like the arty than like an organic part of the infantry. Thus fetishes like indirect fire - which had its origin in the perfectly real purpose of blind barrage fire to seal off a section of defended trench. Not against dug in defenders, but to deny passage of a piece of no man's land during an enemy attack. (It hyperextended beyond that to less sensible uses).

Meanwhile the availability of MGs increases. Lewis guns are doing the job others want infantry MGs for. The Vickers crews stay up at brigade or higher, with more weapons available as well.

Much of this was less than optimal under WW II tactical conditions. Integrated fire plans at brigade level and up weren't terribly relevant in France in 1944. Vickers were never that mobile, and the US used such heavies at battalion only and generally on defense.

Light air cooled MGs pushed down to company or coordinated tightly with attacking companies by battalion COs, made a lot more sense under WW II tactical conditions. The Brits got that kind of support from tanks, carriers, and extra Brens redeployed by supporting carriers.

The Bren - Vickers division of labor and accompanying line of division between components of the infantry proper vs. specialist MG battalion equipment, is a legacy of the Vickers - Lewis gun division of labor in WW I. Where the Lewis guns went then, Brens and infantry branch of service are found in WW II. Where the Vickers went then, Vickers and MG branch of service are found in WW II.

FWIW.

[ March 15, 2005, 05:46 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

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IIRC, that was the book of fairy tales read to newbie coy cmdrs to scare them awake at night. Some ok-ish stuff in it, lots of nonsense.
Gee Wiz you undermine my faith in the War Department. A War Department that, I might add, had every German document West of the Elbe, and a few million German POW's. I find, in general, that its is not a bad rough guide to German TOE's for '44. I did check with Nafzlinger's "German Infantry" but got little joy, he hardly mentions the 120mm. He does show the TOE for a German '45 type Division with 8 120mm's at Regimental level (still 4 tubes per battalion).

In the way back days, SPI did a couple of articles on the 1944 type German Infantry Division's creation. Due to the massive losses of '42 and '43 a reorganization of the 1939 style Division was required. Some of these renovations were codified changes that were already happening in the field (ie cannibalizing the third Regimental Battalion in order to bring

the other two battalions up to near strength).

The idea was to decrease the amount of infantry in each Regiment and battalion, without losing too much fire power. This was done by reducing the three battalion Regiments to two, and by reducing the number of Infantry squads in a platoon from 4 to 3. At the same time the number of heavy weapons in the battalion and regiment were retained (the How company in a regiment still had 6 75mm and 2 150mm Inf guns, the Hvy weapons platoon in the company still had 6 HMG's and 2 motars). Further there was an upgrade in motar types with the fazing out of the 50mm mortar as the Company mortar and replacing them with 81mm, and replacing the 6 81mm motars in the Battalion Hvy Weapons Company with 4 120mm motars.

Now, was that done uniformally across all Inf. divisions? Of course not. Was that the ideal they were striving to achieve? Yes. Was it accomplished in many divisions? I believe so.

Especially in the divisions that were withdrawn from the front and rebuilt. Did some battalions replace their 50mm motars with 81mm's and yet still have their 6 81mm motars in the Heavy Weapons Company while waiting for the promised 120mm's? You bet.

The next big change was the establishment of the VolksGrenadier Division. Again reducing the number of infantry and attempting to upgrade their firepower. In this case by reducing size of squads and increasing the amount of automatic small arms. Again with 81mm motars for the company and 120mm's at battalion.

You can see some of these changes in CMBB. Take a look at a 1941 Infantry Battalion and then at a 1944 Infantry Battalion. Note the decrease in infantry, but the relative stability of the heavy weapons, and the increase in tube size of the motars.

I am unsure if the company mortars were "batteried" together as I suggested in my previous post. So maybe the TOE as given in the game would be better (ie two motars to the company and a 81mm FO or 120mm FO).

Now I expect a German speaking Grog, with original documents at his elbow, to come along and shread what has easily been my longest post. :rolleyes:

DavidI

_______________________________________________

Insurance Companies move in mysterious ways. Like God, of course, but less generous.

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Originally posted by David I:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> IIRC, that was the book of fairy tales read to newbie coy cmdrs to scare them awake at night. Some ok-ish stuff in it, lots of nonsense.

Gee Wiz you undermine my faith in the War Department. A War Department that, I might add, had every German document West of the Elbe, and a few million German POW's. I find, in general, that its is not a bad rough guide to German TOE's for '44. I did check with Nafzlinger's "German Infantry" but got little joy, he hardly mentions the 120mm. He does show the TOE for a German '45 type Division with 8 120mm's at Regimental level (still 4 tubes per battalion). </font>
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