Invade the boot, or Sardinia / Corsica?

[David I]

Guys,

You're not counting on a VIOLENT reaction from the Germans in the event that we had a successfull invasion in the Rome area! What if the II SS Panzer Korps and 5 Infantry Divisions had been thrown in on top of what they already had?

David I

[dalem]

Originally posted by David I:

Guys,

You're not counting on a VIOLENT reaction from the Germans in the event that we had a successfull invasion in the Rome area! What if the II SS Panzer Korps and 5 Infantry Divisions had been thrown in on top of what they already had?

David I

That's good! If we had actually succeeded in tying down a couple more German corps in Italy then it would have made the campaign more significant than it really was.

-dale

[Koenig]

An important point: the invasion of mainland Italy was a prerequisite of the Italian surrender, according to the armistice clauses.

After Mussolini's arrest on 25th July 1943 Germany (rightly) questioned Italy's loyalty.

From then on, it was a race with time.

The Allied wanted to put Italy out of the war.

The Germans wanted to occupy the boot before such a thing happened.

A delay would allow the German to seize the peninsula.

If I remember well, the armistice of the 8th September was just one day ahead a German ultimatum that pratically cancelled the Italian sovranity and gave the Germans units complete freedom in Italy.

The idea of invading Sardina and Corsica was not bad at all, but it should be considered that it was easy to do because the Italian troops had already surrendered.

Well, actually they did more than surrender as there were several clashes with their former ally when the Germans tried to seize Italian positions.

Invading them before the armistice would require a much more considerable effort.

As I already stated, the most effective option would be an American airdrop on Rome on 8th September.

Mutual mistrust, misunderstandings and a general incapacity to grasp the political situation by several characters on the Italian side provoked the cancellation of the operation on the eve of the armistice.

If successful it would have spared the Allied a long and bloody campaign.

But honestly I think that most of the blame for this not to have happened is on the Italian side.

Koenig

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Koenig:

The Allied wanted to put Italy out of the war.

The Germans wanted to occupy the boot before such a thing happened.

I think at that point in time Hitler was only interested in occupying Italy long enough to extract his troops safely from the southern part of the penninsula.

A delay would allow the German to seize the peninsula.

So what? Once Sardinia and Corsica are taken, the penninsula is flanked. The Germans are forced to continue their withdrawal or face the possibillity of having their armies cut off and possibly annihilated.

The idea of invading Sardina and Corsica was not bad at all, but it should be considered that it was easy to do because the Italian troops had already surrendered.

Well, actually they did more than surrender as there were several clashes with their former ally when the Germans tried to seize Italian positions.

Invading them before the armistice would require a much more considerable effort.

After Sicily was lost, the Germans began pulling out of Sardinia. Some of them went first to Corsica, but they didn't stop there. They continued on to the mainland.

As I already stated, the most effective option would be an American airdrop on Rome on 8th September.

But only if strong Italian forces determined to fight are present in the capital. There was considerable doubt as to whether this condition would be fulfilled...which doubts in the event proved justified. There's a very good chance that paratroops landed in Rome would have just been thrown away.

Michael

[Eddy]

Michael,

Good points, well made but what would you tell Uncle Joe?

He would surely see the taking of Corsica and Sardinia as further prevarication while his own troops did all the dying. This would further bolster his paranoid psyche that once the Germans were nearly beaten, the US/UK would walk into Europe all the way to his borders. It's probably what he would have done, if the roles were reversed.

However take Stalin out of the equation, if Corsica is taken, why airdrop in Rome? The allies could invade way up north near, for example, Genoa with a seaborne and airborne invasion. Looking at the map, it doesn't seem that far from Corsica so presumably air cover wouldn't be a problem. Furthermore, if near Genoa was invaded, and the allies struck east, the whole of the boot would be cut off.

Cheers

Eddy

Off topic: Err bit embarrasing this one but what does the D in D-Day stand for?

My brother asked me, I didn't know so I lied and told him it was Disembarkation Day. First thing I could think of.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Eddy:

Back on topic, what advantage could be gained by going to Sardinia/ Corsica?

I suppose it allows the allies to invade further up the Italian coast, as well as threatening southern France.

Here's the but...

IIRC part of the idea of invading Italy was to draw some troops away from the Eastern front, as well as providing strategic airbases. As such, does it matter where you invade as long as German troops are sent to Italy and your bombers can reach central Europe?

And as for France...

I don't know the terrain in central France. Is it be favourable for the kind of sweeping tank battles the allies envisaged for the liberation of Europe? Or are there areas where an invasion force could become bogged down. One thing I can say is it's an awfully long tail from southern France to the German border, and a long way for the air forces from Britain to support them. Also open to flank attacks form western, or north western France.

Eddy raises some interesting questions here. My answer would be that once the islands are seized and air forces established on them, the next step, taken sometime that autumn, is to choose an opportune location near Rome for a corps sized invasion of the mainland. From that point, such exploitation as would be economical should be pursued, but an emphasis should be on the conservation of forces. I am assuming that the 8th. Army has been following the Germans north and harassing them as much as opportunity permits.

So now at year's end we have essentially two small Allied armies at about the lattitude of Rome-Pescara or a little north of there and threatening local amphibous flanking moves on any line the Germans try to establish.

The Allies can also threaten a major landing anywhere along the western Italian and southern French coast as far as Marseille. Depending on how operations develop and on weather conditions, Operation Anvil should be put into effect sometime in early spring, 1944. The purpose of this operation is not so much to make rapid progress toward Germany in the first instance, but to draw German forces onto itself and away from the northern French coasts.

Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the major part of German forces deployed in the West would be facing north. The southern French front is just an extra drain on German resources. And when the Normandy invasion does come at the historical time, any German forces in the south would face being cut off, which was the original vision for Anvil anyway. Once the Cobra breakout occurs, these German forces in the south would have to fall back quickly, pursued by the Franco-American armies based on Marseille. So now, it seems to me that in this scenario, by the time the Allied armies arrive at the German border (which for a number of reasons might well be anything from days to weeks sooner than historically) Marseille is already a functioning port with large stockpiles of supplies. The Allied drive doesn't peter out quite as early or as badly. It makes a bit more progress against the Germans while the latter are still in a state of disorganization.

Admittedly, the gains in this scenario over the historical one are incremental. The war still most likely drags on into the next year. And unpredictable events could prevent it from proceeding as I have described. But it does seem to me that the strategy I have outlined does offer a significant possibility of greater gains at lower cost to the Allies.

Hindsight is wonderful.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Eddy:

Good points, well made but what would you tell Uncle Joe?

That would be the toughie. You'd have to first of all tell him how the seizure of the islands is only a stepping stone to larger operations, and then prove it by executing them.

He would surely see the taking of Corsica and Sardinia as further prevarication while his own troops did all the dying. This would further bolster his paranoid psyche that once the Germans were nearly beaten, the US/UK would walk into Europe all the way to his borders. It's probably what he would have done, if the roles were reversed.

On the other hand, he should realize the Allied fears that if they wait too long they will meet the Soviets on the Rhine instead of the Elbe. Or even worse, on the English Channel. The Allies have ample reasons of their own not to dawdle, and somehow that should be made understood. In diplomatic language, of course.

However take Stalin out of the equation, if Corsica is taken, why airdrop in Rome?

Because, (a) Rome is a critical political and propaganda target. It also has considerable military significance. Rome lay at the center of the logistical network of the whole penninsula and had airports too.

(b)As part of the program to reassure Joe that the Western Allies were fighting and dying for the cause too.

The allies could invade way up north near, for example, Genoa with a seaborne and airborne invasion. Looking at the map, it doesn't seem that far from Corsica so presumably air cover wouldn't be a problem. Furthermore, if near Genoa was invaded, and the allies struck east, the whole of the boot would be cut off.

That thought struck me too once upon a time. But further analysis (mostly being instructed by wiser heads) turned up evidence that the hills and mountains that would have to be crossed to get onto the northern Italian plains would present significant obstacles. It might actually be easier to enter from the east, somewhere along the coast from Rimini to Ravenna. But then that would involve sending lots of shipping into the Adriatic. Lots of arguments both pro and con about how good an idea that would be.

Off topic: Err bit embarrasing this one but what does the D in D-Day stand for?

My brother asked me, I didn't know so I lied and told him it was Disembarkation Day. First thing I could think of.

'D' stands for 'day'. So you had D-Day, H-Hour, and for all I know M-Month, though I never heard of that one.

There were many D-Days in all theaters all through the war. It usually just signified when an operation was scheduled to kick off. The Normandy D-Day got immortalized as such because the journalists seized upon it and it became a household word that way.

Michael

[Eddy]

Thanks Michael.

After reading your post ,there are some further advantages for invading southern France that I can think of.

1. The number of Free French would probably increase as more and more of their homeland was liberated.

2. Invading Southern France a year before Normandy would solve problem the shortage of landing craft which delayed the real Anvil.

3. If, after Overlord, the Allies were bogged down in the beachead in Normandy and the Germans won the battle to reinforce, the allies could shift the emphasis back from northern France to southern France.

4. It allows unblooded troops to gain experience.

So, completely changing argument (aka being a pain in the arse), why bother with Italy at all?

It was after all designed to tie up German troops, which would be achieved by invading southern France. The terrain is not very favourable for the attacker. And it ended up sucking in more allied troops than German, thus defeating the point of the whole thing.

Despite my earlier posts, this is closer to my actual position. I have always thought that the invasion of Italy was pursued for the wrong reasons; specifically by Alan Brooke and Churchill, i.e. to avoid decisive action with the Germans as they feared a blood bath, and to appear to be doing something while waiting for the Allied strength to be built up in Britain.

France is as good as Italy in these regards, with the added advantage that once Overlord is launched, the two fronts can work in tandem.

Cheers

Eddy

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Eddy:

After reading your post ,there are some further advantages for invading southern France that I can think of.

1. The number of Free French would probably increase as more and more of their homeland was liberated.

Yes. After Germany occupied Vichy, the Resistance became much more active and numerous in southern France. Most of these men would have flocked to the colors once there was an Allied force they could contact.

2. Invading Southern France a year before Normandy would solve problem the shortage of landing craft which delayed the real Anvil.

In the outline I gave above, the interval would not have been a year, but more on the order of 3-5 months. But the same principle applies. The landing craft remain in the Med until Anvil is established on shore, and then move to England for Overlord.

3. If, after Overlord, the Allies were bogged down in the beachead in Normandy and the Germans won the battle to reinforce, the allies could shift the emphasis back from northern France to southern France.

I'm not so sure about this one. It's not obvious that the Germans stood a very good chance to win the reinforcement race, especially with them already engaged in the south of France. And a really serious offensive against really serious opposition would have hard going in the south for reasons you gave earlier.

4. It allows unblooded troops to gain experience.

True. Especially any French forces raised during that period.

So, completely changing argument (aka being a pain in the arse), why bother with Italy at all?

For all the reasons I gave earlier. Removing one of the Axis partners, even the least of the major members, was a political and propaganda coup that could not be passed up. And even after securing the Italian surrender, the capture of Rome would put the seal on it.

It was after all designed to tie up German troops, which would be achieved by invading southern France. The terrain is not very favourable for the attacker. And it ended up sucking in more allied troops than German, thus defeating the point of the whole thing.

That's why I stressed pursuing objectives with economy of forces in mind.

France is as good as Italy in these regards...

But why not do both if you have the means?

Michael

[Eddy]

Yep, makes sense.

So that that then. Sardinia, Corsica, Italy, France, the BeNeLux countries, then Germany.

A bit like the Grand Tour

And as for Stalin, the allies can tell him to make his own damn boots.

Cheers

Eddy

[Kingfish]

Another advantage to invading southern France is that it would allow the allied armies to turn east and threaten German LOCs in Italy.

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by dalem:

Didn't I say all this in my first post?

-dale

Yes, but nobody seemed to get it the first time so I went on in more detail.

[CombinedArms]

BTW, I think the Allies should have invaded Italy right after Sardinia/Corsica--and not Southern France. I'm thinking of a late-September strike in the vicinity of Rome just south (e.g. Anzio) or north (wherever there's a good beach with decent exits) of the city.

Here's my thinking: Italy has a backbone of mountains, which makes it tough to attack and easy to defend. But this cuts both ways: if the Germans tried to counterattack in overwhelming force, they'd have trouble crushing the Allies if their forces were in Italy. Not so, I think, in southern France. If the Allies hit S. France before they were ready, the Germans could mobilize and push them back into the sea. If they tried this sort of counterattack in Italy, they'd be just pushing the Allies painfully down the peninsula in the same way as the Allies had to push the Germans up. But the Germans would have the disadvantage of facing the Allies' advantages in air and sea power. For the Allies, a peninsula like Italy would be very easy to defend.

In Sept 43, the Germans had many, many more divisions in Europe than the western Allies could field. Italy had the value of tying down a pretty large number of German divisions without offering much prospect of a quick, crushing defeat of the Allies should the Germans try to pour an even larger force into the area for a quick kill. There's not even the temptation of an Ardennes-like offensive for the Germans when thely look at the map of Italy.

That, plus the political necessity of knocking Italy out of the war with an actual invasion, argue for Italy as the target for Sept 43. I'm afraid if the Allies had invaded S. France instead, then Italy would remain in the war on the Axis side and the Allies would have a stranded whale on the beaches of the Riviera, with not enough force to break out and do any real damage.

I am a big fan of Dragoon--the right attack in the right place at the right time. But I think to attempt it in Sept 43 would be premature. It would work better as a threat than as a reality at that stage of Allied mobilization.

[ December 08, 2004, 09:26 AM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[ropey]

I have some questions that may have had some bearing on the decision.

1, Could the Sardinian/Corsican ports support a substantial commitment? (Naples was a substantial port - one of the largest in Europe I believe, and Taranto was also large.)

2, What capacity was possible for airfields on the islands? (The large Foggia complex was one of the Allies' key objectives.)

3, Are there any suitable landing areas north of Rome? Remember, the coast starts to get very mountainous up there so there may not have been many options.

I love this what-if. There was a S&T game series that started with the Sicilian invasion but went on to include most of Italy. (War in the Med?) The range of air support was given as the the single biggest (military) deciding factor for attacking Sicily, followed by the ease of supplying forces through ports, but I never got to test other options. I suspect that the air factor was over-rated when you look at the ineffectiveness of the Luftwaffe overall, but the real planners weren't to know this at the time.

I think that the political effect of the loss of Sardinia (& Corsica) would have hurried Mussolini's deposition as much as Sicily, but the actual surrender was tied to an invasion of the mainland so the Allies would still have been required to make a landing. I don't believe a coup-de-main at Rome would have been sustainable without a concurrent amphibious landing, and that held all the risks of the landings at Salerno which, it will be remembered, was relieved by troops driving through from the south.

Oh for a game that would play out these options!

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by ropey:

I have some questions that may have had some bearing on the decision.

1, Could the Sardinian/Corsican ports support a substantial commitment? (Naples was a substantial port - one of the largest in Europe I believe, and Taranto was also large.)

Speaking only for my own pet alternate strategy, the idea would not to be to base anything like an entire army group out of those islands. I too doubt that there was anything like enough port capacity for that. The islands are used for air bases and bases for light naval craft (PT boats, MTBs and the like). There would only be enough ground troops there to provide security.

Agreed you'd want at least one of the major mainland ports as your primary base. But remember, I have posited 8th. Army doing more or less what it did historically, so Taranto and Foggia fall to it as a matter of course, and eventually Naples does as well.

2, What capacity was possible for airfields on the islands?

Sufficient for almost any amount of TACAIR. The Allies had fighters and medium bombers based on Corsica that provided the air support for Dragoon as well as a goodly portion for the earlier Operation Strangle.

(The large Foggia complex was one of the Allies' key objectives.)

And would remain so. See above.

3, Are there any suitable landing areas north of Rome? Remember, the coast starts to get very mountainous up there so there may not have been many options.

You are right about the coast getting rugged. I frankly don't know about suitable landing sites, but the biggest problem would have been exploiting inland once you had established a beachhead. That's why I didn't encourage the idea of cutting across the penninsula from the Genoa area.

I think that the political effect of the loss of Sardinia (& Corsica) would have hurried Mussolini's deposition as much as Sicily, but the actual surrender was tied to an invasion of the mainland so the Allies would still have been required to make a landing.

Well, you definitely want to take Sicily in the first instance. I'm doubtful myself that the capture of the islands would have come early enough to have effected Mussolini's downfall. It might have given more impetus to the Italian negotiations for surrender, but I don't know about that.

I don't believe a coup-de-main at Rome would have been sustainable without a concurrent amphibious landing...

Agreed.

...and that held all the risks of the landings at Salerno which, it will be remembered, was relieved by troops driving through from the south.

Well, you'd surely want to go in swinging and loaded for bear. Half measures would not suffice. If the invasion can be scheduled early enough, the Italian army might provide some degree of support, but I wouldn't count on them for too much and neither would the Allied high command.

I'd say go in with a full corps with a second corps in reserve as a follow-on as needed.

Oh for a game that would play out these options!

Agreed.

If you are still into boardgaming, there is the GR/D game Second Front. I'd have to get it out and look at it again to see when the action starts, but I believe it does give a fairly complete OOB for both sides showing what was available sometime in mid-'43. It might be adaptable to VASSAL. It's a thought...

Michael

[Kingfish]

The port capacity on Sardinia is suitable for the support of a multi-divisional invasion force. Keep in mind that the Americans 7th army in Sicily didn't have access to a large port until the capture of Palermo, yet were still able to field 5+ divisions.

Also note that Naples wasn't captured until almost a month after the Salerno landings, and required extensive rebuilding due to German demolitions of harbor facilities.

[Koenig]

I see there is a general incredulity about the option of an Allied airdrop on Rome to cut off the German defenders in the south.

This was not an armchair general's fancy, but was a planned operation by the Allied GHQ.

As part of the Armistice signed at Cassibile on 3rd September 1943, the Americans agreed to support the Italian withdrawal from the war by dropping the 82nd Airborne Division on Rome.

100 AT guns were to be landed on the coast and ascend the river Tiber to the capital.

The Italians were to provide trucks for the entire division, alert to AA defences not to open fire during the airdrop and delimitate the landing areas with lights.

The operation was called Giant II.

It must be said the Italian were not told when the Armistice was to be divulgated and, subsequently, Giant II take place.

They were to be ready when called. It was not the case.

Why?

Rivers of ink have flowed on the subject. Each of the persons involved has his own personal truth on what happened on those dramatic days. Incredible, bizarre, distasteful, absurd...these are some of the adjectives that come to my mind when I think about it.

Explaining the events of September 1943 would take several pages. And even after that many misteries would remain, many contraddictions. Just take the words that Eisenhower had for the Armistice: 'a crooked deal'. He even refused to sign it, demanding the task to Bedell Smith...

Let's stick to facts. At 18.00 hrs of 7th September General Taylor secretly lands at Gaeta to prepare Giant II, due the day later, and is transported to Rome in an ambulance. After a series of meetings ranging from farsesque to surreal, at 11.30 hrs of 8th he communicates the signal to stop Giant II because the Italians can not assure the control of the airfields.

At 13.00 Eisenhower order to cancel Giant II: 5 hours before the planned take off of the paratroopers!!!

You may question the soundness of the plan, but certainly Ike believed in it.

You are wrong when you doubt the Italian units would fight Germans. They did it in many places, Rome included.

This is an extract from the War Diary of the German 3rd Pz. Gre. division advancing on Rome on 9th September: 'The Italian defence is very skilled, capable of surprise attacks, well camouflaged, with the employment of single tanks. Near Bracciano strong enemy resistance, the village is taken as night approaches. ... Locally we suffered considerable losses.'.

What is completely lacking is...command. Well, if only the units had orders to obey, apart from a generic resistance...

The King, the Government and all the GHQ flee Rome, leaving the soldiers alone without a guide.

So the men of the Ariete, the Granatieri di Sardegna and many other units fight and die...for nothing! It's one of Italy's darkest pages.

Eugen Dollman, commander of the SS in Rome, says about the 9th September: 'at 3 a.m. I went to Frascati...where I met General Student: pessimism in the offices was rampant...at 11 Student was very worried: a detachment of paratroopers landed at Monterotondo was in dire straits. Some (Italian) units of Grenadiers and Carabinieri were fighting gallantly.

There were rumors about the escape of the royal family and the government, but nobody believed them.... Student, after examining the charts on the table, said that everything was lost if during the night American paratroopers would land...'

A missed opportunity.

The problem is that on 8th September 1943 the political conditions for the defence of Rome did not exist.

But from a military point of view it was feasible. The best, modernly equipped and most loyal units of the Italian Army were placed around Rome. The only exception was the Centauro division, ex Divisione M (Mussolini), equipped and trained by the Germans, which had many fascist elements. In fact this unit did not take part to the fighting around Rome.

The responsibilities of the King, Badoglio and the many other major and minor Italian actors of this tragedy are enormous and unforgivable. But...there is a but.

If the Allied had trusted the Italian at least a little and had revealed them in advance the date the Armistice was to be made known, probably Giant II would have been undertaken.

But this would give the Italians too an important role. I can guess Churchill considered this unacceptable. The Armistice was not only to be an unconditional surrender, it was to be the fall of a ruling class who thought to absolve itself from all its responsibilities of the war blaming it all on Mussolini and the fascists. So it happened, and probably it was right it happened.

The Allies certainly did not need Italy's help to win the war. Had they accepted it, however, maybe the thousands of deaths of Cassino and Anzio could have been avoided. And without doubt the landing at Salerno would have been much facilitated.

It is not rare to see the reasons of politics to dictate a military campaign, even when these reasons are in contrast with its strict military aspect.

The capture of Rome in September 1943 was possible, but at a political price the Allies were not willing to pay.

The King and the Italian government made a gamble on this and they lost. And when they had to face the risk of countering the Germans, they were caught unprepared and decided to abandon the country.

Anyway the players of this tragedy had the option to try to drive the Germans south of Rome in September 1943. Ike was ready to bet the 82nd Airborne on it.

They decided otherwise.

Koenig