Panzer Group West and Ultra

[Dandelion]

Michael,

Yes he did, took it between the wars. I'm writing on a text on being an officer in the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht and was actually planning to use him as an example of how academic studies became regarded as something positive in the German army, and how officers were enabled and even encouraged to study within the frame of their service.

Of course, the "Dr.Phil." is an academic title - in his case meaning history, not philosophy as such.

Cheers

Dandelion

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

like Schneller Meyer, Rudel would have gone far in athletics. Weren't they all like that under National Socialism, though?

Athletic, yes.

It grew to be a problem real quick you know. The rate of students managing their Abitur (13th grade sort of) sank from around 300 000 a year in 1933 to some 20-30 000 in 1939, as a consequence of Nazi rule. In a nation of 60 million people - and recall that demographics looked different, it was a much younger nation than present Germany.

Even the students who made their Abitur made very sharp drops on performance at the, er, whatsthemcalled - army recruiting tests. Education hours was increasingly being filled with nonsense, such as racial theory, German soul theory, family values discussions (Nazi model) - ball crap to be brief. The German army complained bitterly, they had increasing problems finding people who actually knew anything about geography, chemistry, the sciences etc. They were appaled by the complete lack of general knowledge displayed by conscripts.

The Nazi ideal was a healthy body, and it could be seen as politically correct to perform badly in school. A sort of protest against establishment. The time of the students was increasingly filled by party duties, to the point of them not managing their schoolwork anymore - of course this was not seen as a problem.

Well, I'll tell you all about it when I get my text on the interwar years finished here. I'll put it on the web somewhere. But you're right - athletics was the ideal of the Nazis. People like Rudel and Meyer, being no intellectuals but physically prime specimens, of course thrived in a society that celebrated their virtues rather than disregarded their shortcomings.

One of my girlfriends wants me to come to her sister's wedding in Germany in late December; still considering it but too far off to really know what the future might bring. Perhaps I could visit one of those cemeteries with you sometime.

I'll be glad to bring you along.

Cheers

Dandelion

[Aco4bn187inf]

Hi Dandelion,

If I understand you correctly, that wasn't my sig in my last post, it was just a quote from Keegan for that one post. But your comment has encouraged me to take the 187th's motto as my signature line.

Cheers.

[Wisbech_lad]

LOL on German names.

Once dated a German girl with 8 names - well, if you counted the 'von' and the 'di'.

Tried to get her to donate some to charity, but no dice.

On the British side, it was a problem for the Soviet-British talks pre WW2. The British military delegate had a triple barreled name. The Russians, seeing on the delegate list "General Buftington-Tuftington-Smythe" turned up with 3 generals, and took it as a serious insult when they only had one counterpart.

Mosel? Go wine tasting.

[Aragorn2002]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

In this particular case, I fail to see the gain of treason. If it was the counter-attack as such that he wished to abort, he will in his position have had information enough to know he needed to do nothing at all. Counter-attack with what three divisions? It was just another impulse of Rommels, a spur of the moment idea that he himself discarded before the passing of eight glasses.

That's leaving aside the practical problems of contacting the enemy, leaving this kind of information, being believed and trusted and so on.

What does Speidel himself say in his book on the Normandy invasion?

I must admit it sounds unlikely. Partly because I can't imagine a German staff officier commiting such betrayel on his own comrades and partly because I think Speidel wanted peace in the West, but on German conditions, that is no unconditional surrender, to be able to stop the Soviets from reaching the eastern provinces of Germany. His reason for not wanting an offensive could have been that he, same as Rommel, did see no hope for success after realizing the overwhelming numerical superiority of the western allies and knew it would only end up in heavy casualties and little gain. On the other hand it did not stop Speidel and his fellow consipirators to prevent strong units such as the 2nd and 116th Panzer Divisions to intervene in the fighting in an earlier stage and that way no doubt causing the death of many German soldiers. Having said this I realize men like Speidel knew how to seperate emotions from ratio.

His book doesn't mention the death of Geyr von Schweppenburg (at least I could not find it in a brief examination of the book, which I almost could not find in my private library among the hundreds of books on WW 2) and is more an analysis of defeat than an account on the fighting itself.

So, after giving it some more thought I think you are right that treason in the way of giving information to the allies by Speidel is very unlikely. He and the circle he was part of, had their own agenda. Speidel clearly describes what kind of Germany he had in mind after the war and it certainly wasn't what the allies inflicted upon the defeated Germans.

[Andreas]

Geyr von Schweppenburg survived the attack and lived to old age, 92. He died in 1974.

Generals.dk

[Aragorn2002]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

[QB] Also consider that a German counterattack may have been to the allies benefit. Monty certainly planned for such an attack, and had ordered Crocker to concentrate his armor in anticipation of it. Had it gone off it may have caused grevious damage to the allies -or- to the better part of the German armor reserves in the west./QB]

Perhaps Montgomery would have welcomed it after the build-up of his armies, but most certainly not as early as the 10th of June.

[Aragorn2002]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Had they attacked with all those nice Panzers it would have been over that much quicker.

Again, perhaps or even probably...but it wouldn't have been the first time the a German offensive would beat all odds and Montgomery, Eisenhower and many others were very well aware of that. It was a risk they simply could not take in the first weeks of the fighting in Normandy. Delaying such an offensive might have been a high priority.

[Aragorn2002]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Geyr von Schweppenburg survived the attack and lived to old age, 92. He died in 1974.

Generals.dk

Ah,yes, forgive me, my mistake. I meant the destruction of his HQ. Not a good idea to cook and post at the same time...

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by aragorn2002:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Kingfish:

[QB] Also consider that a German counterattack may have been to the allies benefit. Monty certainly planned for such an attack, and had ordered Crocker to concentrate his armor in anticipation of it. Had it gone off it may have caused grevious damage to the allies -or- to the better part of the German armor reserves in the west./QB]

Perhaps Montgomery would have welcomed it after the build-up of his armies, but most certainly not as early as the 10th of June. </font>

[Aragorn2002]

The combined tank force of the 21st Panzer, the 12th SS and Panzer Lehr on the 10th of June was 462 tanks or so, according to Jentz. And allied airpower simply wasn't as effective in a tactical sense as one would expect. Naval gunfire support was effective, yes, but it doesn't change the fact that time was on the side of Montgomery and an early German counterattack wasn't what he wanted. And why would they destroy Geyr von Schweppenburgs HQ if a German counterattack was exactly what they wanted? Anticipating and planning for it is a different matter than hoping for it.

[Andreas]

Are those 426 runners? Also, while there may have been tank parity, the allies could also field hundreds of AT guns, each of which was capable of dealing with any German tank, including Tigers.

[Kingfish]

I'm not saying that the allies hoped for an early counterattack, but that they had planned for it, and had it gone off it might have worked out to their benefit in the long run.

There was certainly a possibility that an early counterattack would have gone both ways. Think the 12th SS counterattack near Buron only 5 times worse for the allies

-or-

Think the battle for Bretteville and Norrey only 5 times worse for the Germans.

If it were the latter, what would have been the result? My guess, the Germans would have pulled back behind the Orne initially, and more than likely behind the Seine within a month.

[Aragorn2002]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Are those 426 runners? Also, while there may have been tank parity, the allies could also field hundreds of AT guns, each of which was capable of dealing with any German tank, including Tigers.

No, total tank strength. No doubt perhaps two-third or so would have been runners, but the rest would have become available in the following days to replace losses. Anyway, it wouldn't have got them to the beaches, but they most certainly could have given Montgomery some sleepless nights. I don't see any possibility for a decisive German victory in Normandy, but like I said before, Montgomery simply couldn't afford to take the risk of an early German counterattack if he had the choice.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by aragorn2002:

Montgomery simply couldn't afford to take the risk of an early German counterattack if he had the choice.

But Monty's whole strategy for the campaign in Normandy was to draw in the Panzer formations onto 2nd army and hold them on the line, thus freeing up the Americans to expand and breakout. It was extremely risky, but ultimately successful.

[Aragorn2002]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

I'm not saying that the allies hoped for an early counterattack, but that they had planned for it, and had it gone off it might have worked out to their benefit in the long run.

There was certainly a possibility that an early counterattack would have gone both ways. Think the 12th SS counterattack near Buron only 5 times worse for the allies

-or-

Think the battle for Bretteville and Norrey only 5 times worse for the Germans.

If it were the latter, what would have been the result? My guess, the Germans would have pulled back behind the Orne initially, and more than likely behind the Seine within a month.

I agree. The allies could have survived a super-Buron, the Germans probably not a super-Bretteville-Norrey. But in that first week no one knew which way it would turn out. Not even Montgomery. Both sides had a large amount of relatively green troops and I think that Montgomery would have welcomed a delay in the German response as long as needed to be able to give his green troops some time to get used to battle conditions. I guess the Germans felt the same way, but they could not afford such a delay.

Whether such a German defeat would have resulted in pulling back as long as Hitler was around is something I doubt, but perhaps it would have hastened the attempt to get rid of him.

[ July 12, 2005, 11:20 AM: Message edited by: aragorn2002 ]

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by aragorn2002:

Wouldn't have mattered much with or without ol' Adolph's blessing. Had the allies shaved off 30-50% of the German armor reserves during that first week there wouldn't have been much left to withstand the likes of Operations Epsom or Charnwood.

[Aragorn2002]

Yes, but no doubt the Germans would have made them pay dearly, so it might have taken a lot longer for the Brits to get their act together again. But that isn't the point. The point is that Montgomery would benefit more from a delay of a German counterattack than the Germans. And that might have been a reason for the allies to go for Geyr von Schweppenburg and endanger the ULTRA-secret. For me this can be seen as a strong indication that they tried to postpone the German offensive as long as possible. And the best reason I can think of is that they considered themselves to be not ready yet.

[Andreas]

I do not think that view is correct, since it presumes that the Allies knew of the disagreement between German commanders. Did they?

If you get the opportunity in war to take out an enemy army HQ, I would think that anyone would jump at it, regardless of short-/long-term considerations. That it was there, and the Allies knew where 'there' was strikes me as the most likely reason for the attack.

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I do not think that view is correct, since it presumes that the Allies knew of the disagreement between German commanders. Did they?

If you get the opportunity in war to take out an enemy army HQ, I would think that anyone would jump at it, regardless of short-/long-term considerations. That it was there, and the Allies knew where 'there' was strikes me as the most likely reason for the attack.

Absolutely correct. They did it because it was there to do. No further reason required.

My understanding of the situation is that a German counterattack was simply impossible. It would have been difficult to sustain and even harder to compensate for in other areas. Remember that the Allies were exerting pressure in a few different places and that the panzer divisions in question were, for the most part, engaged. A push out of Caen would almost inevitably allow for Allied forces to advance everywhere else. Not to mention, if the counterattack failed there would have been nothing left to hold the lines.

IMO, Rommel took the only option realistically available to him. Counterattacking without a reserve would have been a bad gamble to take.

Cheers

Paul

[Aragorn2002]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I do not think that view is correct, since it presumes that the Allies knew of the disagreement between German commanders. Did they?

If you get the opportunity in war to take out an enemy army HQ, I would think that anyone would jump at it, regardless of short-/long-term considerations. That it was there, and the Allies knew where 'there' was strikes me as the most likely reason for the attack.

Yes, I must agree with that. I always try to read between the lines, but you mention the plain facts and it sounds logical and convincing.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

...the Germans would have pulled back behind the Orne initially, and more than likely behind the Seine within a month.

What, give up a short front in near-ideal defensive terrain to retreat across open ground where they would be harassed by Allied airpower and pursued by Allied armor, to get to a front almost three times as long in poorer defensive terrain? Hitler hung on to the lines in Normandy as long as there were forces there to do it. Why would he change his mind because one counterattack failed?

Michael

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Kingfish:

...the Germans would have pulled back behind the Orne initially, and more than likely behind the Seine within a month.

What, give up a short front in near-ideal defensive terrain to retreat across open ground where they would be harassed by Allied airpower and pursued by Allied armor, to get to a front almost three times as long in poorer defensive terrain? Hitler hung on to the lines in Normandy as long as there were forces there to do it. Why would he change his mind because one counterattack failed?

Michael </font>

[roqf77]

Yes, but no doubt the Germans would have made them pay dearly, so it might have taken a lot longer for the Brits to get their act together again. But that isn't the point. The point is that Montgomery would benefit more from a delay of a German counterattack than the Germans. And that might have been a reason for the allies to go for Geyr von Schweppenburg and endanger the ULTRA-secret. For me this can be seen as a strong indication that they tried to postpone the German offensive as long as possible. And the best reason I can think of is that they considered themselves to be not ready yet.

sorry to interupt a discussion so late again, but actualy it was part of their plan to advance, as caen held the key to normandy. montgomery was trying to take it as soon as possible. plus there was no delay in geman counter attacks, there was one on the sixth of june(the day of the landings) plus the counter attack on the 10th was actualy postponed because of the advances of british and candian divisions over the previous night. It was more in an attempt(succsesful!) to stop penetrations of the line. Any attempt to take hq's would of been part of ths plan more than anything else. and any attempted counter attack in the opinion of the germans at least would of lead to a penetration of the german lines at least two points of which they would not be able to recover. not atleast with the forces they had in normandy at the time. A bitter knife fight so to speak had emerged. At this point the allies and especialy the british and candians had hit the ground running. the germans were fighting for there lives.

On the British side, it was a problem for the Soviet-British talks pre WW2. The British military delegate had a triple barreled name. The Russians, seeing on the delegate list "General Buftington-Tuftington-Smythe" turned up with 3 generals, and took it as a serious insult when they only had one counterpart

well actualy no! in all the books ive read on pre ww2, the talks went very well. The russians were more irritated at the fact that the british delegates were not given authoriuty to sign any deal military or otherwise, at least thats why they and by this i mean stalin refused any further talks until after barborossa. At least according to the cambridge studies book, hitler chamberlain and appeasement.

[Aco4bn187inf]

Here's a general question- once the Allies were on the ground in Normandy, was there any conceivable strategy by which the Germans could have succeeded? What do you all think would have been the best response? (Go ahead and use the benefit of hindsight in your answers.) Of course the issue is speculative but I sometimes get the impression that the Germans were doomed no matter how they reacted.

A separate question- I once saw an interesting history book of the 2nd SS Panzer division in France. Is anyone familiar with such a book, as I can't remember the title?