Film of Stuka 87G in action

[JonS]

Originally posted by Mike:

And yet when the Axis virtually ahnihilated Force K at Malta the resulting increase in supplies to Rommel enabled him to surprise the British at Gazala in 1942.

Erm. Gazala was preceeded by months of mutual inactivity. It's also relativly close to Tripoli and especially Benghazi. I think you'll find that those two factors were fairly significant in terms of Rommels ability to build up supplies.

Sure, sinking ships helped, but the Axis in Africa were strangled by their own infrastructure.

Regards

JonS

P.S.: Interestingly, a broadly similar thing happened during Op STRANGLE in Italy during the first half of 1944.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by stoat:

Malta Convoys: a misunderstanding. There were a good number of convoys from Gibraltar and Alexandria that reached Malta. (some intact, some torn up) However, none went completly from Alexandria to Gibraltar. It was not completly closed to convoys, just to through convoys.

There were a couple from the west, plus a handful of missions where a taskforce steamed part the way there in order to launch fighter reinforcements. There were a few more convoys from Alex, mostly in 1940 and early 1941. After that, it became very sporadic until at least late winter of 1943, when the Allies could provide adequate air cover from NA.

Michael

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Mike:

And yet when the Axis virtually ahnihilated Force K at Malta the resulting increase in supplies to Rommel enabled him to surprise the British at Gazala in 1942.

Erm. Gazala was preceeded by months of mutual inactivity. It's also relativly close to Tripoli and especially Benghazi. I think you'll find that those two factors were fairly significant in terms of Rommels ability to build up supplies.

</font>

[stoat]

I'll see what I can do but I have school tommorrow morning and probably will not post my findings until early afternoon.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JonS:

...the Axis in Africa were strangled by their own infrastructure.

Yeah, mostly. They could run supplies as far east as Benghazi reasonably well, and as far as the Egyptian border less well. But with their means at hand, to go beyond that point was flirting with disaster.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by stoat:

I'll see what I can do but I have school tommorrow morning and probably will not post my findings until early afternoon.

That's cool. :cool: I might not be around to read them before that anyway. And it's not exactly as if the fate of the world hinges on this happening instantly.

...At least, I hope it doesn't!

:eek:

Michael

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by stoat:

Malta Convoys: a misunderstanding. There were a good number of convoys from Gibraltar and Alexandria that reached Malta. (some intact, some torn up) However, none went completly from Alexandria to Gibraltar. It was not completly closed to convoys, just to through convoys.

There were a couple from the west, plus a handful of missions where a taskforce steamed part the way there in order to launch fighter reinforcements. There were a few more convoys from Alex, mostly in 1940 and early 1941. After that, it became very sporadic until at least late winter of 1943, when the Allies could provide adequate air cover from NA.</font>

[JonS]

Originally posted by Mike:

You can only build up supplies if you're receiving them in the first place!

Yes, quite, and my point is that despite the best efforts of Malta supplies were received into North Africa.

Gah, don't take my word for it - take a look at van Creveld, or ... mmm, what's it called? It'll come to me. Anyway, there are a couple of fairly well known graphs about showing, month by month, what was despatched, and what was received, into North Africa. In Maltas best months, it was only skimming the cream off the top.

[Guest Mike]

Yes supplies were received - that much is self evident - for the 60% and 1/3rd and 50% figures I quoted the difference between them and 100% made it through.

I dont' have to take yuor word for it otr look up anything - I know that bbecause it is the corollory of what I posted!

I maintain that 30-60% losses are a little more serious than simply skimming the cream off the top tho! Rommel thought so too.

[JonS]

Mmm. I don't really care what Rommel thought.

from here:

While the critical role of Malta as a base for British interdiction of the Axis strategic lines of communication is undeniable, the limited intratheater distribution system was the more important problem facing the Afrika Korps. The most significant weaknesses in this system were the limited capacity of the available ports and the inadequate capabilities of German and Italian overland transportation assets. These two factors alone contributed more to Rommel's final defeat at Alam El Halfa than did all other factors combined, including enemy action for much of the campaign. Van Creveld states—

Despite everything, the Italians succeeded in putting an average of 72,000 tons—or just above Rommel's current consumption—across the Mediterranean in each one of the four months from July to October [1941]. Rommel's difficulties, therefore, stemmed less from a dearth of supplies from Europe than from the impossible length of his line of communications inside Africa.

Particularly crippling for the Afrika Korps was the severe shortage of trucks needed to move supplies over the vast distances of the area of operations. In his work, Panzer Battles, German Major General F. W. von Mellenthin pointed to this problem—

Even when our supplies did reach Africa, it was no easy matter to move them to the front, because of the great distances involved. It was 700 miles from Tripoli to Benghazi, 300 from Benghazi to Tobruk, yet another 350 from Tobruk to Alamein. When we were at Alamein, many of our supplies had to be hauled 1,400 miles from Tripoli [emphasis added].

[A.E.B]

Actually Malta did play a vital role in hampering Rommel's and the Italians' supply lines.

Before Italy joined the war, much of the Italian Army's supplies were delivered via small coastal craft, far smaller that the vessels used for the runs from Italy to Tripoli or Benghazi. Caboting supplies is far more efficient than using trucks (the British railway in Egypt didn't reach the border).

What Malta allowed was for the British to eliminate the coastal fleet in short order. The British themselves also found out the hard way how impossible small boat delivery was during the seige of tobruk. Planes during the day, and fast attack craft - British MBTs and German E-Boats at night - based in Malta or Tripoli/Benghazi could easily reach these small supply convoys.

So instead the DAK supply chain was trucks driving the inadequate coastal highway.

A.E.B

[Baneman]

Originally posted by stoat:

... one of a JgdpzIV destroyed by, you guessed it, 50cal fire. ... Will try to post some shots from here as well.

If you can post this pic somehow, I would be very interested to see it.

Cheers

[stukapalooka]

http://www.panzerworld.net/jagdtiger.html

This site claims that 5 Jagtiger were destroyed by air attack. I am sure many were also damaged. Carius claims that rockets got one right through the rear doors.

5 out of 88 ain't bad.

And Baneman, anyone with the cognitive abilities to read blueprints and correlate that information with photos and drawings can clearly see that there is a clear path for projectiles into the T34's rear. Many AFV are also vulnerable to this sort of attack. Including the German Tiger.

[Wicky]

I claim you're a clever & witty umpa lumpa

[pamak1970]

But let's apply the missing principle of charity in argument the other side mislaid, and assume as naively as possible that low kills per Russian tank were simply a byproduct of their overwhelming numerical superiority in Lancesterian fashion. Its just math, let's do it.

20,000 tanks to start plus 8,000 lend lease plus 102,000 produced equals 130,000 Russian tanks. Germans around 50,000. Let's take 10000 tanks are our unit and call it 13 to 5. The squares are to remain equal under Lancestrian attrition. Russian power 169, German power 25, net outcome Russians left with 144, Germans with zero. Square root again to get back to numbers, we have 12. In our units, that is 120,000 tanks, that Russia was supposed to end the war with. The actual figure is 30,000 or less, their losses were 100,000 not 10,000. So our fine Lancestrian estimate gets Russian losses wrong by a factor of ten.

First point.

I thought it was clear since it was mentioned earlier that Lanchester equations are used to value principles and examine simple scenarios.

They do not predict numbers in complex situations,although there are some projects that use advanced and extensive modifications of Lanchester equations trying to predict results (without big success).

Therefore the whole post is totally irrelevant.

The issue is that we know and accept some rules like that the ratio of forces - affect outcomes-kills favoring the big site (with all else equal) ,which is something that numerators and denominators do not consider at all,(better to say they distort it ,but i will talk about that later)

The problem is that although we are aware of the limitations of Lanchester theories, you do not seem to be aware of the limitations of your theory and you are very bold in using it to describe battlefield effects.

So, even if you could use the proper method to evaluate Lanchester applicability in a historical example and prove that results do not match data, you would not point anything new .

So now we come to point two.

That is the way you try to prove that Lanchester equations do not give accurate numerical results.

It is totally wrong from start to the end.

First mistake is that you use the overall production numbers.

Lanchester equations apply when neither side receives additional reinforcements or replacements during the resolution of the fight.

Since neither germany or Soviet Union had the total number of tanks you use from start ,but they actually "build it" during the fight , there is no logic in using these numbers in Lanchester equations.

Second,

let's ignore the above mistake and assume that it is not so important.

You continue by using the wrong type of equation!!

Search your papers and see the GENERAL equation used to find the number of units that will survive after the end of the fight using the theory of square law.

This general equation in our example is the following

If we name

Y1 the number of soviet tanks surviving the engagement

yo the initial number of Soviet tanks at the start of the engagement (accepting in spite the previous point your number - 130000)

x0 the initial number of German tanks (accepting again your number of 50.000)

then

y1^2 = y0^2 -(A/B)x0^2

where y1^2 means y1 squared (same with y0^2 , x0^2)

A and B are factors i will explain later.

Now your equation is a specific form of the above.

In your equation A=B.

Now what is this A and B?

According to the square law theory A and B are the LETHALITY COEFFICIENT of Germans and Soviets.

Now i have to explain to you the meaning of this coefficient cause by reading your post i noticed that the main problem is that you confuse different concepts.

I will give my best shot to explain it clearly cause this is the main sourse of your misunderstanding.

The equation we use in this case is a bi- product of the following equations.

Dx/dt= -By and

Dy/dt=-A.x

This is where we find for the first time A and B.

Let's focus on the first equation.

The first equation points that

the rate of attrittion of germans at any time during the engagement (Dx/dt) is proposional to the number of participating Soviets at that time (y) and the factor B.

Notice that since we have attrition (x becomes lower as the time passes) and since Dx is defined as x at a subsequent time - x at a previous time therefore Dx= negative.

That is why you see the (minus) at the other portion of the equation.

returning to my effort to explain the meaning of the term "lethality coefficient",i will say the following.

The first equation points that at ANY TIME during the engagement , the Russian "lethality coefficient" B is always the same.

This factor is not affected by the quantity x or y or ratios of forces .It is independant of all that.

So what does this mean in real world experience?

We can define it in different ways.

One might use the phrase that it is the kill probability of the weapons participating in an engagement if ALL ELSE factors that affect perfomance (like morale,leadership ,terrain and so on) are considered the same for bothe sides.

Another one might put it differently.

Try to imagine yourself inside a single tank ,trying to engage a single enemy tank with your gun.

Before you pull the trigger to send the shell away ,you realize that you have a certain percentage of probability to kill the target.

Your equipment, skill,training, relative position and so on and so on combined all together in this specific situation,give you a certain percentage to kill the target.

This is what "lethality coefficient" stands for.

It is the percentage of killing generated by all the above factors.It expresses your ability to kill and it is a "quality" indicator.

Notice nomatter how we describe it , it is true that this percentage has no relation with x or y or force ratios.

So consider that you are part of a company of 16 tanks ready to fire simultaneously a volley of 16 shells towards the same single target.

Again all other factors of training,skill,equipment and so on is the same as in the previous case.

In this situation and inspite the fact that the ratio of forces has changed, you should be able to realize just before you fire the shell as part of the team , that you have the SAME percentage of probability to kill the target.

The presence of your fellow tankers do not affect your training,relative position, quality of gun and so on that shape your "lethal coefficient"-meaning ability to destroy the target.

Now here is where there is the main confusion.

Using statistics and numerators denominators.

You claim that when you are alone and ready to engage a single enemy tanks, you realize that your "average effectiveness" after you destroy it, will be one tank. (one shooter -one loss)

On the other hand, when you are part of a company ready to engage the same single tank during the same conditions you are aware that your "average effectiveness" after the german tank is destroyed will be 1/16 of the tank ,(16 shooters causing one loss).

This is what you do not realize from the beginning.

This type of "average effectiveness" you consider ,which is a bi product of your numerator and denominator, has nothing to do with the "lethality coefficient" which is the real factor indicating your ability to engage and kill a target.

This "lethality coefficient" is independent from force ratios as i said.

The “average effectiveness” is certainly affected by force ratios and might have a very different value .

So someone might claim in the previous second scenario that the “lethal coefficient “ of a tank at that specific engagement is 20% and you argue that this can not be true cause according to your “average effectiveness” you expect to see a percentage of 1/16 or about 6% .

The above was the main issue I had to address in detail first.

Let’s return to your initial equation.

Now it will be much clear the problem of your study.

As I said earlier you used a specific form of the general equation.

If you compare the equation you used with the general one i provided, you will realize that you inserted an assumsion which destroys completely the value of the study .

Without realizing it , you insert the assumsion that A/B=1

That means that indirectly without knowing it, you imply that the "lethality coefficient" of germans and Soviets is the same.

So you treat all factors that influence "lethality coefficient" like training, leadership, equipment quality and so on , as equal for both sides.

So you say for example later

their losses (Soviets) were 100,000 not 10,000. So our fine Lancestrian estimate gets Russian losses wrong by a factor of ten.

Although as i said from the beginning noone claims that lanchester estimations of numbers are accurate, your wrong approach makes it easy for someone to contradict you.

Of course there is going to be a totally different estimation from historical results , since

you imply that Soviets had the same quality of germans ( A= ,you are going to find totally different results.

In fact someone can claim that if Soviets had the same historical quantity superiority combined with the same quality as Germans ,then it would not be surprising to see their losses much more lower than what they had historically.

A 10.000 Soviet losses in this scenario is certainly a possibility.

Later

Let's still pursue it anyway, to see what it predicts about average achievements, relative performance of the winning and losing sides, etc. Total kills are 10,000 + 50,000 = 60,000, total shooters are 130,000 + 50,000 = 180,000. Average kills per shooter are 0.33. Necessarily less than unity by the already mentioned identity. Here, vastly less, because the Lancester equations predict run-away wins ("snowballing") for the more numerous side.

Russian kills are 50,000, spread over 130,000 shooters, average kills 0.385, above the 0.33 average. Despite their larger numbers, Lancestrian odds effects raise their average effectiveness, compared to the overall average of both sides. The Germans on the other hand have 10,000 kills spread over 50,000 shooters, average kills 0.2, far below the average for both sides and barely better than half the Russian figure. The relatively performance and the initial odds multiply out to the predicted 5 to 1 loss ratio, favor the more numerous side.

Now we know the war was not such a lopsided win, and the kill ratio was 2 to 1 favor the Germans, not 5 to 1 favor the Russians.

A clear example of how much you are confused by inserting "average effectiveness" in the Lanchester theory.

.

You have already inserted the equation that the German "lethality" coefficient" is the same as the Soviet one.

We do not know the actual value but we DO know that whatever is this value ,is going to be the same for the whole duration of the scenario regardless of numbers or force ratios and is equal for both sides .

In other words, if you are in a single tank ready to exchange your first volley against an enemy tank,regardless if the target is alone or part of a bloody division , you will still have decent chances to take out of action ,even if hundreds of tanks of a bloody division in the second case are going to "evapotare" you during this exchange of volley.

When you try to use the "average effectiveness" as you define it through numerators and denominators, you miss something important.

If 1000 tanks engage a single tank in a single volley, they will inflict MULTIPLE KILLS according to lanchester theory.

The single tank might receive 20 30 40 different rounds.

In Lanchester theory these rounds are considered as KILLS cause the attrition as described in the theory is calculated through the use of "lethality coeficient" probability.

In Lanchester law we assume a SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE OF VOLLEYS until one side is completely eliminated.

The answers of a question regarding the statistical results of x shooters with A "lethality effectiveness" " acording to lanchester requires a totally different procedure

than a simple division of numerators and denominators..

We do not care so much about the shooters, we basically care about the shells and if we do indeed take force ratio measurements ,is because our final objective is to determine number of volleys and effective shells.

By using your "average effectiveness" you fail to address the shells.

The "average effectiveness" sees just a single casualty and divides it to all members which participated in the engagement.

How was this casualty produced is an issue it does not address at all.

Lanchest does point the fact that big ratios affect casualties in favor of the big guy, but this is not a result of less "lethality coefficient".It is a result of shorter duration of the battle until the small guy is destroyed and this is what affects the actual outcome of losses.

That is not so strange if you think of terms of "lethality coeficcient" and get over with "average effectiveness".

The more enemy shooter trying to kill you ,each one having a certain Lethality probability, the less chances for you to survive long enough to try your lack using your "lethality' ability in subsequent volleys.

That is the whole story.

That applies even in the extreme case of 1000 tanks firing at you.

At first you might think that no matter if they are 1000 or 1000000, they are going to get you anyway during the first volley.

So you would not expect to see different large numbers giving different chances to you to score a hit during an engagement since the duration will be basically the same in any case-meaning one exchange of volleys before you are destroyed.

But since the theory "sees" multiple shells-kills against you and since the more the numbers ,the more these multiple shells destroying you, it should not be surprised that even in such extreme cases, the "losses" you inflict in theory are getting lower.

Maybe the best example i can use is that the theory "in the absense" of other targets besides you engaging 100 or 1000 tanks, "treat" you as a single vehicle with 100 "life points".

The same with anyone of your targets.

So 1000 tanks destroy your "points" while you might destroy " a single point" from an enemy vehicle.

That is because the theory "needs" to focus on the effectiveness of SHOTS ,not shooters and the definition of attrition in this theory (Lethality probability multiplied by number of shooters) ,is such as that it does not "accept" that a round landing together with many others in your vehicle is "worthless".

In order to be able to "reward" these rounds that "passed" the "lethality coefficient probability check" as effective in killing you, it needs to see your single target as a sum of "life points".

For the "average efectiveness" all these things about shells are irrelevant.

It just sees a single loss and 1000 shooters and since you confuse this "average effectiveness" with the "lethality probability" when you shoot trying to kill a target, you come to totally different conclusions.

you fail to distinguish the two following cases

The first one is the case when the "lethality coeficient" is very small ,say 1% and therefore as a result 100 tanks will have poor perfomance inflcting maybe one kill if they all fire together.

And the second is the case where 100 tanks with a much better "lethality coeficient" say 20%

will land successfully 20 rounds on a single target, but since you focus only on denominators and numeratos, you treat this as 1 kill per 100 tanks again like in the previous case.

And when someonr points you that it IS possible to have good "lethality coeficient" inspite what numeratots and denominators point, you disagree

My post is too long so i will stop here.

I think all your points are relevant with what i described until now.

The funny thing is that i do agree with you that Lanchester theory has limitations and can not predict accurate results.

Still i chose to address the way you think cause

i noticed at some point that the whole thing leads you to very strange results.

So although i could accept your claims about gross inflations of pilots and i could agree with at least some things regarding CAS, i started to have big issues with other conclusions that do not match battlefield experience as i gather it though AAR, combat diaries,stuff studies and so on , about the great difficulty to score kills during a typical armor engagement.

P.s I am sorry if at some points i am very direct saying clearly that you are wrong.

This is nothing personal.

It is obvious that i think you are wrong and you think the same about me.

nevertheless i consider this as a good discussion even though it seems that it is just the two of us.

[ August 18, 2005, 12:40 PM: Message edited by: pamak1970 ]

[stoat]

Emrys: I owe you some info.

Form what I gathered, and it wasn't easy (lots about defensers, barely anything about attackers), the operation to take Malta in mid to late '41 (July-October: maybe later, winter's no factor) was to have been much like the assualt on Crete but scaled down a little.

The Germans would have utilized a Fallschirmjaeger division and this unit would go in alongside three Italian parachute battalions (one of them the Carabinieri battalion). Follow up units were not mentioned.

The operation was to have been supported by X Fleigerkorps and various Regina Aeronautica and Italian naval units.

British Defense was centered around what RAF units could still fly, and 231 Infatntry Brigade consisting of 2nd Battalion the Devonshire Regiment, 1st Battalion the Hampshire Regiment, and 1st Battalion of The Dorsetshire Regiment. These units later served in Sicily and Northwest Europe as 231 "Malta" Independent Brigade. Other support units like engineers, AA men, QMs, etc. would surely have been used in the defense of an invasion.

An interesting side note: Pz.Abt. 66, which was equuipped with captured KV-2 tanks, was slated for the invasion of Malta though this is obviously Herkules.

Anyone with further information please post it.

I will now try to post some pictures of tanks deystroyed from the air, as that is the true topic of this thread.

[JonS]

Originally posted by stoat:

British Defense was centered around ... 231 Infatntry Brigade consisting of 2nd Battalion the Devonshire Regiment, 1st Battalion the Hampshire Regiment, and 1st Battalion of The Dorsetshire Regiment. These units later served in Sicily and Northwest Europe as 231 "Malta" Independent Brigade.

Minor point: 231 was an indep bde in Malta, but later became part of 50th Div, and served as an integral part of that div in NWE (and poss Sicily).

[stoat]

Point conceded.

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by JonS:

Mmm. I don't really care what Rommel thought.

And interesting concept.

And regardless of your quote, more suplies landed would have allowed for a supply line that was more capable of delivering more supplies!

I note that the tonnage given is quoted as "more than Rommel's current usage" - which of course he thought was not nearly enough........but which the supply line apparently managed to deliver OK.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by pamak1970:

[snips]

The issue is that we know and accept some rules like that the ratio of forces - affect outcomes-kills favoring the big site (with all else equal)

All else is, of course, never equal.

An article in the latest BAR (just arrived today) by Rowland, Rooney and Storr based on historical analysis from DOAC in the 1980s shows that correlation of forces is one of the less impirtant influences on battle outcomes. No surprise there, really; Biddle's "Military Power" arrived at the same conclusion, and dear old Trevor Dupuy suggested, only partly in jest, that "the smaller side always wins" would be a good rule of thumb in military history.

Originally posted by pamak1970:

The problem is that although we are aware of the limitations of Lanchester theories, you do not seem to be aware of the limitations of your theory and you are very bold in using it to describe battlefield effects.

What "theory"? As far as I can tell, Jason has merely been doing a comprehensive demolition job of both the simple-minded application of Lanchester's square law in places where it's wildly inappropriate, and guying the "romantic" view of combatants spending their entire time slaying each other in vast and Valhalloid numbers. In this, he is simply right.

Originally posted by pamak1970:

Lanchester equations apply when neither side receives additional reinforcements or replacements during the resolution of the fight.

Extensions to the Lanchester equations to cover reinforcement have been around for a while.

Originally posted by pamak1970:

Search your papers and see the GENERAL equation used to find the number of units that will survive after the end of the fight using the theory of square law.

So what's the expectation of the number of survivors in a square-law fight with an equal number of participants of equal effectiveness on each side?

Originally posted by pamak1970:

If 1000 tanks engage a single tank in a single volley, they will inflict MULTIPLE KILLS according to lanchester theory.

Maybe in theory, but who cares? This never happens in real life. The number of tanks engaging other tanks seldom rises above being a succession of duels and truels, even on those rare occasions when tanks fight tanks. The SSKPs attainable by WW2 weapons are so low that over-hitting never becomes a concern.

Originally posted by pamak1970:

In Lanchester law we assume a SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE OF VOLLEYS until one side is completely eliminated.

Nope, I don't believe Fred ever said anything about volleys. His equations plainly indicate a continuous-time treatment.

Originally posted by pamak1970:

It is obvious that i think you are wrong and you think the same about me.

nevertheless i consider this as a good discussion even though it seems that it is just the two of us.

Take heart, it's not just you and Jason.

I think you're wrong, too.

All the best,

John.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by stoat:

Emrys: I owe you some info.

Thanks, stoat, that is useful.

One thing I am wondering about. Not long ago, I read somewhere that in the spring of 1941, the choice had to be made between taking Malta and taking Crete. I wonder if that was the case and if an attack on Malta at that time (April-May) ever got as far as even a prospective plan. I am just trying to figure out what its chances of success and at what cost might have been at that early stage.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by stoat:

British Defense was centered around ... 231 Infatntry Brigade consisting of 2nd Battalion the Devonshire Regiment, 1st Battalion the Hampshire Regiment, and 1st Battalion of The Dorsetshire Regiment. These units later served in Sicily and Northwest Europe as 231 "Malta" Independent Brigade.

Minor point: 231 was an indep bde in Malta, but later became part of 50th Div, and served as an integral part of that div in NWE (and poss Sicily). </font>

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

I have my doubts about Sicily.

Your doubts are well founded. After a trivial amount of research I found that 50th Div in Sicily consisted of 69, 151, and 168 Bdes. 168 Bde was ditched for NWE, and replaced by 231. I don't know what happened to 168 ... broken up for scrap maybe.

[JasonC]

Mike - For the short English moral, see John Salt's executive summary. Il m'a compris...

[JonS]

Originally posted by Mike:

regardless of your quote, more suplies landed would have allowed for a supply line that was more capable of delivering more supplies!

I note that the tonnage given is quoted as "more than Rommel's current usage" - which of course he thought was not nearly enough........but which the supply line apparently managed to deliver OK.

No, you still aren't getting it. The Italians managed to get to African ports more than Rommel required, despite the best efforts of Malta. The problem was getting it from there, off the ships, and then to the front where there continued to be shortages, despite there being sufficient in theatre.

Simply getting getting more to Africa wouldn't have helped much - it would only have led to larger dumps in Tripoli, some 1,000 to 1,400 miles behind the front. That's 2-to-4 times the distance between Wellington and Whangarei. Travelling at about 10-20 miles an hour.

A.E.B.s point about coastal shipping is valid, but more-or-less the same result could have been acheived from bases in Egypt. Tripoli may have been out of reach, but the destinations of the coastal traffic weren't. Besides, Malta had done the damage to coastal shipping well before any serious consideration was given to capturing the it by the Axis