Something Odd I've Noticed About Artillery and Rarity

[Vanir Ausf B]

Go into the scenario editor and pick a date. June '44 works well. Then go to the unit purchase screen for artillery. Switch back and forth between Axis and Allied and look at the rarity for both. There is a HUGE difference in rarity between the two sides. Germans get artillery at much lower rarity across the board, large calibers in particular. Isn't this the exact opposite of what it should be?

[Silvio Manuel]

Is it like that at a lot of different months? I would think that maybe in (Jan43?) at the start of the Stalingrad counterattack (Uranus?) that the Sovs would have lots of heavy arty available, or at least more than in the month you picked.

Usually the Sovs have maybe 1 decent med/heavy module at a discount, like 122/152, or 132 rockets, or maybe something huge like 203. Otherwise they pretty much always just have the Regimental/Battalion stuff at normal rarity.

The Germans typically had a much better arty system, as the Russian used direct fire (i.e. 76mm reg. cannon) a lot. Maybe on other late-war months it's better.

[WWB]

Went through a debate on this a while ago. CM Rarity figures are designed for what was likely to be seen by the average unit anywhere on the front. Since the bulk of soviet guns were concentrated at higher levels and used on specific occasions (eg opening day of bagration) whereas the german guns tended to be concentrated at lower levels and used more frequently.

Another often-overlooked fact is that in terms of placement in an infantry division TO&E, soviet 76mm guns equate to german 105mm guns, as do 122s and 150s. Very, very few soviet IDs ever got organic 152mm howitzers.

So, the rarity is not off, it is just unclear what is measured.

WWB

[Silvio Manuel]

Given what WWB said, I guess you just have to hope that you get one med/heavy module at a discount due to variable rarity, and then assume that it's the guns that Corps dispatched to support your little Battalion-sized attack.

[Vanir Ausf B]

I think what you're saying is that the Soviets used their arty more at an operational level, and the Germans more at a tactical level and CMBB is a tactical game.

Well, as long as there is some rational behind it, I suppose I can accept that. It just feels backwards to see the Germans have so much more big arty available.

[ April 22, 2003, 01:32 PM: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[JasonC]

The rarity system is screwy, tied to echelon level regardless of differences in national doctrines. That winds up benefiting the Germans. It also is calculated on a relative basis not an absolute one (portion of similar forces instead of absolute number).

For instance, the Germans had all of 1050 combined 170mm and 210mm guns for all fronts for the whole war. They get rarity of +80 for the 170s and +65 for the 210s. Those are the same order as the Russian numbers for 152mm gun howitzers and 132mm rockets, which they had thousands of.

Why? Because both are considered the "standard" calibers for "corps level" support. The fact that corps level heavies rarely supplimented German div arty (which had its own 150s) but were an ordinary part of the Russian structure, which just used the corps level differently, is not really taken into account.

Meanwhile the rarer Russian 203s and 210s, and gun versions of the smaller 122 and 152 calibers, get rarity numbers of +150 to +200. Because they are considered "less common" (than the *Russian* 152s and 132s, not than the *German* 170s and 210s) corps and army level calibers.

German 158mm rockets are +40 rarity at the time of Kursk and +30 at the time of Bagration. Russian ones are +65 and +50. The Russians had more launchers than the Germans did. The Germans seem to be getting a "rarity break" for having a smaller overall artillery park. About the same number of launchers are a higher portion of a smaller overall force.

Russian 122s are +40 to +50 rarity. Higher than German 158mm rockets. They were an ordinary part of div arty and common in higher echelon howitzer units as well. But since their deployment straddles two echelons, they appear "rare" compared to 76s, instead of common compared to 158 rockets.

The Russian 120mm mortar is +10 at the time of Stalingrad and +20 at the time of Kursk and Bagration. Seems fair enough. The German 120 is +30 at Kursk and +20 at Bagration, only 10 worse. In fact, the Germans produced 8500 120mm mortars while the Russians produced 46500 of them, over 5 times as many.

Meanwhile the German radios cost +10 rarity over the phones at the time of Kursk and Bagration, +20 at the time of Stalingrad. Do Russian radios that might be 5 times as scarce pay 10 higher rarity, like German 120 mortars? No, they cost 65 higher rarity at Bagration, 80 higher at Kursk, and are only available for the light calibers.

If the high cost of the radios is right, which it may well be, then the low cost of the German 120s seems off.

With variable rarity on, there are some partial compensations for all of the above. The Russians have many types for their higher echelon guns, because there are guns and howitzers for many calibers, or similar calibers. Some of them will happen to "roll" lower rarity than others. You get more "dice", in effect.

Also, the higher echelon types have somewhat lower prices due to extremely long delay times - but those aren't important if you use planned fire on turn 1. If you also take lower quality (greens or conscripts), the lowest rarity large caliber FO can be affordable, despite the high base rarity.

Germans needn't care, because the divisional 150s are powerful enough for anything and low base rarity. If they also happen to get cheap 210s they just have an additional option.

The scewiest part is when you compare rarity factors for different countries and different categories of weapons simultaneously. A long 75 StuG is treated as common, for instance, even before their production actually took off in the second half of 43 and in 44 when PzIII production halted. Meanwhile a Russian 122mm howitzer pays 40-50 rarity.

There were an order of magnitude more of the latter than of the former at that point in the war. But the absolute scarcity of tanks compared to arty is not handled by the rarity system. Setting the force type (armor, combined arms, infantry) is supposed to cover that, with point budgets.

But for all its warts, it is better than nothing. It encourages use of vanilla items. If some of those are overmodeled, that is a modeling problem not a rarity problem. High Russian arty rarity is a pain in "assaults", and you should consider playing those with rarity off. Or you can just count on all the "dice" to offer you 1-2 of the larger calibers at a moderate premium.

[Andreas]

The Germans and the Soviets used special units for the heavy stuff. In the German case independent Artillerieabteilungen, in the Soviet case the RGVK regiments. The former were attached at Korps level as a matter of course. They may or may not have come with a special Arko (Artilleriekommandeur), a staff specifically tasked to centrally control artillery in a specific area. The latter were attached in critical sectors - they were High Command reserve. That is an important difference. Dispersion vs. concentration has huge effects. I do not think it is unlikely at all that in a minor skirmish along large sectors of the front the Germans would have the upper hand in artillery tubes and control systems available, although they may not have a lot of rounds to feed them with. Where it really mattered though, the Soviets would make absolutely sure that German artillery was not going to interfere with their best-laid plans later in the war.

Realistically, the German heavies would not really work a lot on the tactical battle level, IMO. They were firing deep interdiction, counter-battery, and those sort of tasks where you really need to reach out and touch someone in the deep rear. The German guns in particular were very good at that, with their very long range.

The Germans also quite simply had outgunned the Soviets on the tactical level (meaning division). The 105 equalled the 76 as mainstay, and the 150 was quite prevalent in German infantry and Panzer divisons, while the 122 on the Soviet side was not quite as well supplied to divisions as people seem to think, almost certainly not on the level of the 150 in German service, at the tactical level. For quite a while after the invasion there were really few to go round. The Germans used captured 76, 122 and 152mm guns in significant numbers, manufacturing ammunition for the 122 themselves. They were not that impressed with them as artillery pieces though, except for the good range of the 152.

There is also the issue with the Soviet love affair with direct fire employment of their 76mm (and higher) guns. This would reduce the likelyhood to be bombarded by 76mm indirectly if you are German (and why bother if you are Soviet, the HE load of the round is pathetic).

In general you will only see realistic levels of employment of these various pieces in scenarios, or if you happen to agree with your opponent to play realistically. The rarity system is a good help at thinking about what is realistic, but it is not perfect.

[BlackVoid]

Don't forget that the russians had about 5 times as much of everything, not just arty.

They could have put in a +500% rarity for almost everything german. Now how much fun would that be?

[Silvio Manuel]

Nice post Jason, thanks for the info.

[JasonC]

"the German heavies would not really work a lot on the tactical battle level, IMO. They were firing deep interdiction, counter-battery"

That is true of the 170s, which specialized in range CB and interdiction, and of the small number of 150 Kannon (as opposed to howitzers). But not for the 210s. Those were howitzers meant to pulverize front line positions. They were also twice as numerous as the 170s. But still numbered only 3 digits over the whole war. 150mm howitzers fired 16 times as much ammo as the 210s.

But as for the statement that the Germans "had the Russian outshot at the tactical level" and the "i.e. division", it repeats the missed point about national doctrine differences.

The Russians had 80% of their tube arty at division level or below in 1941, like the Germans did. But they changed that over the course of the war. They simply found pooling their arty at higher echelons, then reassigning it to areas of the front, worked better for them than leaving nearly everything down at manuever divisions.

The Germans used the corps level of command mostly for administrative and staff functions, with little in the way of weapons organic at the corps level. That simply wasn't the case for the Russians.

With the Germans, the fact that 170s and 210s are corps level assets is practically synonymous with saying they were scarce. But that is simply not true of the 132s rockets and 122 and 152 howitzers on the Russian side. They were not scarce.

An army with 9 maneuver divisions often had 3 regiments of guns *per division* above the division level - 1 of AT, 1 of heavy mortars or rockets, 1 of howitzers or guns 122mm or larger. It was perfectly normal for only 1/4th of the indirect fire guns along a given portion of the front to be at division level or below.

"Corps" just does not equal "scarce", to the Russians. It was the *ordinary* place to put guns meant primarily for massed indirect fire. The Germans used organic artillery regiment commands or regiment sized arkos to direct their guns, firing indirect. The Russians did not use their division level artillery staffs for that.

Most division level guns fired on targets they could see. Indirect fire, observation assets, fire plan staffs, etc, were at corps and army, not at division. The Russians had several times as many divisions as the Germans, with younger and less experienced commanders and staffs.

If you read late 41 and early 42 Russian staff reports on artillery, it is quite clear the average division level artillery officer did not know trigonometry and could barely read a map. (Some could not read, period). It is not surprising they were not put in charge of indirect fire support. Trained personnel were concentrated at higher echelons because they were scarcer, and their skills had to be spread over a wider area of responsibility.

The US was intermediate, with artillery in brigade sized groups about equaling the number of guns in the divisions, with heavier calibers. Div arty directed 105s and small numbers of 155s. Corps arty directed hordes of 155s, including some gun rather than howitzer, and 8 inches. There were about as many 155 and up guns as 105 and below, and in CM module terms they fired as many missions.

The unit directing the fire was just different. US 155s were not at all scarce, but if you put a CMBB style rarity system on them they would appear so, because they'd split between small numbers at infantry divisions and larger numbers at corps - like Russian 122s.

It remains kinda crazy that Russian guns have rarity numbers the same as German ones that were 5 to 10 times less common. And the reason is just that the rarity system overly fixates on echelon level, and views those through a lense of German doctrine.

As though everyone else was trying to use their guns the same way organizationally, and just didn't have big enough ones to equip divisions with heavier calibers. It is not remotely true.

[ April 22, 2003, 07:32 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Prinz Eugen]

The amount of knowledge on issues WW II that some of the members have in this forum just continues to amaze me over and over again ! :eek:

Great post, JasonC. Wonder if BFC ever takes heed of such well laid arguments such as yours ? :confused:

[Edited to correct some typos. Hey, it's 3 AM, I'm allowed to have hose]

[ April 22, 2003, 08:08 PM: Message edited by: Prinz Eugen ]

[JasonC]

I've certainly seen them responsive in the past, so I tend to trust them. But it may not be worth their time to revisit all of this. I for one want North Africa. Some things it is better if the player community can find workarounds to handle realism or balance issues without touching the actual code, using agreed optional rules, designing scenarios this or that way, etc.

I was interested enough in this subject of the rival artillery parks, though, that I tracked down the numbers to make the following comparison. Basically I wanted to match off comparable elements of the two sides' guns available to see what, if any mismatches there were, not as a result of doctrine and use but straight out of the factories, as it were.

The upshot is that the mix was remarkably close, with a few categories giving an edge to the Russians, and the Germans better in only one (important) area. That area is not heavier tube arty, though.

At the top end, both sides had small numbers of seige caliber artillery, under 100. Not enough numerically to really matter.

The Germans had a meaningful number of 210s, around 750 made over the course of the war. The Russians did not make their counterpart during the war, but they had just as many 203s at the start of Barbarossa, organized in 32 reserve heavy artillery regiments with 24 guns apiece. The German piece was more modern, but in simple weight of metal, a draw.

The Germans next had about 340 excellent 170mm long pieces they used for corp level counterbattery. And a smaller number, around 160, of earlier 150mm longs with the same role. But the numbers for these are small. Their most common counterbattery piece was the little 105mm K18, with 1500 fielded and still being put out in quantity in 1944. Overall, 2000 long range pieces, the heavy ones quite good but the bulk weak on the shell weight side.

The Russian counterpart was the 122mm gun, as opposed to howitzer (the A-19). They made 1400 of those during the war, and started with a number of them, 1000 or more, in the corps level arty pre-invasion. These typically formed 1/3 to 1/2 of larger arty groups with 152 howitzers. They aren't as good as the 170s, but they are better than the 105 K18. Again pretty much a draw.

Next the Germans had 5400 150mm howitzers, the heavy portion of their div arty. Certainly an excellent piece, and in CMBB their artillery "ace" since it comes with low rarity and high blast. Well, the Russians made 5000 of their own comparable 152mm gun howitzer (or the similar howitzer) during the war - and started with around 2000 to boot. The Germans did not have numbers in this caliber.

Then the bulk of the German field artillery was 17250 105mm howitzers making up the bulk of their div arty. Russian div arty was certainly lower in weight. But not because they did not have as many guns of comparable weight - they just weren't organizationally at division level. The Russians produced 13600 122mm howitzers during the war. They had a thousand or two at the start. Combined with their slight edge in 152s mentioned above, there is no German numerical advantage in medium caliber tube arty. And the Russian 122 is heavier than the German 105.

Next I should consider rockets. The Germans fielded 2200 launcher systems in the heavy calibers, 210mm to 300mm. The Russians fielded 1800 300mm rocket systems. The Germans also have 6000 150mm rocket launchers. The Russians had 6800 132mm ones. Plus a modest number of smaller and less useful 82mms. A draw.

Next there are heavy mortars. The Germans made 8500 120mm mortars, copied from the Russian version. But the Russians made 46600, 5 times as many. In 81mm caliber, the Germans made 75000 and the Russians 150000, twice as many. The extra 38000 120s are particularly noteworthy, since that number is slightly larger than all of the other tube systems combined, from the 210s down to the 105s, including the rockets.

So to a first approximation, the Russians had an equal gun for every German one, with half of theirs larger 122mm caliber compared to 105mm, and in addition had a bonus 120mm mortar for every medium or heavy caliber gun the Germans did, and then in addition had twice the light mortars.

All of that without even mentioning the 76mm, the backbone of Russian div arty. The Russians match and exceed the entire German park, caliber for caliber, before you even count the contribution of their standard field gun.

But that is not too surprising, actually. Because they were using their 76s for lots of roles, roles the Germans also performed with 75mm guns, without making them "div arty". The Russians had different guns for massed indirect fire. So did the Germans.

The Russians fielded 69K 76mm guns. The Germans had 32K 75mm PAK of various types, plus 11K 75mm infantry guns and around 10K 50mm PAK. The German guns were better at AT. But there are comparable numbers of them. The Germans also had 3.5K heavier 88 PAK, while the Russians had 5.1K of their 57mm. The Germans had a small number, around 7K, of lighter PAK 47mm and below, early in the war. While the Russians fielded a massive 49K of their light 45mm, clear to the end.

The basic story is the German mix is much better at penetrating armor, while the Russian one is twice as numerous, lighter in mix, and more focused on tossing HE. The one place the Germans really do stand out is in the quality (rather than quantity) of their dedicated ATGs. They phased out the lighter portion of the mix, and their standard PAK 40 was significantly better than a Russian ZIS-3 in AP terms.

It would be fair to say what was distinctive is that the Germans focused their *direct fire* gun program on high end anti tank ability. While the Russians did not, and instead used a mix of light AT and duel purpose field guns.

It is easy enough to see why. During the period when the Russians were on the defensive, their 76mm field guns had adequate AT ability against the common, early war Panzers the Germans were using. By the time the German tanks had improved and made their 76s inadequate as ATGs, the Germans had lost the initiative.

It was then critical for the Germans to have good AT ability, because they faced attack by hordes of T-34s. It was not so critical for the Russians, because German armor was scarce and on the defensive. Undoubtedly the Russians would have been far better off if they had a common field gun that also killed Tigers and Panthers. But it was possible to win without one.

Now, what does all of the above mean for rarity numbers? First, it is strange that 120mm mortars, fielded in enourmous numbers, aren't +0 rarity. They were certainly more common than German 105s, in absolute terms. Their production was, moreover, front loaded, with so many made in 1942 and 1943 that the Russians practically halted production after that, because they had more than they needed.

Second, it is awkward that Russian 152s and 122s that were numerically as common as German 150s and 105s, are 40-65 rarity while the German guns are 0 to 10. These seems to reflect echelon confusion more than anything else - the idea that anything divisional must be more common than anything higher, which is only strictly true under German artillery organization schemes, not under Russian ones.

Higher echelon arty deserves longer delay. Centralization decreased responsiveness. It is proper than higher echelon Russian stuff should practically require preplanned fire. But there is no a priori reason for it to be higher rarity, just because it was higher echelon. German 150s should be faster to land and easier to adjust than Russian 152s - not "cheaper".

The best way around all of this at present is probably to play Russian assaults (only) with rarity off. That way the occasions when their higher echelon stuff would indeed by firing in support of the maneuver units, however small, can be simulated without unwarranted "untermenschen math" premiums.

Leave rarity variable in other cases. Then it becomes random whether one or another higher echelon Russian caliber happens to be around. The only occasion when fixed rarity should be on is when you want to simulate breakthrough period fighting, with the Russians supposedly far ahead of the bulk of their tube arty (or retreating on defense, with none of it around or alive), and only lower echelon mobile types anywhere near the front.

I hope this interests somebody still...

[ April 23, 2003, 03:43 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Andreas]

Jason, you are understating German gun numbers by considerable amounts (~20% for the 105; ~10% for the 15cm pieces). I'll ignore captured pieces, we just say they all served in the west (estimate about 3-5,000 captured 10-12.2cm pieces; probably 2-4,000 15cm types). Your statement that 'the Germans did not have numbers in this [15cm] calibre', compared to the Soviets, is puzzling, since the numbers are almost identical. You count 7,000 Soviet 152s, I count >6,000 150s produced, plus >900 152s captured and used from the Soviets, plus numerous other guns captured. Sorry, but your math does not stack up on this one, check it on the calculator if you don't trust me.

When you are saying that Korps Arkos were just admin because there were so few >15cm pieces to go around, you are of course completely ignoring the not exactly insignificant number of independent Artillerieabteilungen with 10cm K18, 15cm sFH and other pieces. These were also attached to the Korps level.

You are still completely ignoring the difference in use. The Soviets on a division by division comparison level are outgunned. Easy as that. You match 76 against 105, and if you are lucky you have some 122s (most likely not), which the Germans will match with their 150s. The real difference for the Soviets starts when Comrade Stalin starts dishing out RGVK regiments to a specific sector. That is when you get the horror-stories of hour long bombardments chopping everything to bits. If you are however not blessed by this largesse, you'll have to make do with what you got - 76mm guns and mortars. While the Germans shooting at you have heavy guns.

If one does the simplistic math you do in your preceding post, one would think that something is broken. If one looks at concentration ratios in real use though, the story looks much different. The Soviets managed to achieve artillery superiority by concentrating on a tiny sector of the frontline. I suggest Niepold 'Mittlere Ostfront 1944' for an analysis of densities in Bagration.

Your adding up guns and proclaiming that something is amiss based on total production numbers is just meaningless.

[JasonC]

By "did not have numbers", I meant they did not have a large advantage in numbers over the Russians. The German divisional 150 FO has a default rarity of +10. The Russian 152 has a default rarity of +65. Paying 50% more than the other guy, over the effectiveness cost of the item, I call significant. There should be a large advantage in how common an item is for the side with the +10 compared to the side with the +65, to justify a 50% increase in the typical price of the item. And there isn't any gap in number of 150-2 caliber pieces available to justify such a huge price difference.

As for captured gun types, I'd love to see them. They'd be rare compared to the standard types, but available. The Germans would have more "rolls" that might randomly get low rarity for an otherwise scarce type. Meanwhile, since not every German unit had the default German equipment, perhaps their rarity numbers could be slightly higher. Perhaps the best portion of their arty (the divisional 150 FO) might have a rarity of 20 or 30, instead of 10.

And I did not say Arkos were administrative, I said corps were. The Germans did not attach lots of organic units at corps level; the Russians habitually did. In fact, mid to late war Russian divisions tended to be understrength, and used much like Germans and western allies used regimental commands. Assets that in German or US forces would be divisional "extras" (AT, engineers, medium arty) were corps level troops in the Russian organizational system. The Germans had far less in the way of higher echelon artillery in the first place. In 1942, the Russians typically had an additional artillery regiment per division at army or corps, and in breakthrough fights or later on, they often had several (1 AT, 1 heavier tube, 1 mortar or rocket e.g.).

Saying "at the division level" blah blah, is willfully missing the point again. Division meant different things to German artillery organization and Russian artillery organization. For the Germans, it was where 4/5ths of indirect fire assets lived. For the Russians, it was a pool of direct fire guns often parcelled out to the regiments, with a little left over for a divisional commander to intervene with, like his reserve maneuver element. While the main indirect fire assets lived at corps and army.

You can't tell me "if I'm lucky 122s, most likely not", when there are 15000 of the things running around. They weren't paperweights. They did not magically disappear from the earth because they weren't part of the division. Division as the be all and end all of a tactically relevant divide is a "German eyes only" view of the world. It isn't even accurate for American artillery practice, let alone for Russian.

And no, it is not Comrade Stalin who dishes out arty reserve assets in a particular sector. Every corps had an artillery group at the start of the war. Later every army had one. Artillery brigades and divisions served armies and fronts on a regular basis. Individual artillery regiments often worked with specific maneuver elements (e.g. a tank corps or Rifle division) for the length of a given operation. If they were retasked during one operaiton it was by the army commander not Stavka.

The guns aren't paperweights off in the Moscow suburbs. The general staff assigned regiments to specific armies and left them with that army for its use for the length of a given operation. They had hundreds of the things to assign, so it is not like most had to do without. There are more independent mortar regiments, tube arty regiments independent or in artillery brigades and divisions, likewise for AT regiments, than there are army corps to assign them among. The only ones that went without were units assigned purely defensive missions during at attack, and the like.

The Russians achieved artillery superiority by making more guns, keeping them alive longer after 1942, destroying German ones, and concentrating them in offensive sectors. The Germans did not have more guns or heavier ones, they had fewer and (though only marginally) lighter. They may have gotten more use out of them via more flexible doctrine, they may have had more radios until late in the war. They did not have 150s vs. 76s for years on end, which is what the CMBB rarity numbers suggest. Russian heavy artillery was not scarce.

By the way, I've read all the staff studies and concentration ratios and operational narratives. I don't need to be advised to do so. If anything, they make it even more clear than the production numbers alone that Russian artillery intervened in a big way, and was not at all limited to pecking with 76s and 82s at direct fire targets. Particularly on the occasions CM calls "assaults"...

[ April 23, 2003, 06:16 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Andreas]

Let's just take your example - a Soviet army with 9 field divisions and a RVGK howitzer regiment attached, sometime mid-war. Say it is opposed by a weak Korps with two divisions, and two independent Artillerieabteilungen (one heavy, one medium). Assume all are at 100% strength (not likely, but whatever).

The Soviets field a total of 24 152mm guns, and 9x24 76mm guns, plus 9x12 122s. Most of the 76, if not all, are in DF positions. The Germans field a total of 24 150mm in the divisions, plus 12 10cm K18, and another 12 150mm in the two independent Abteilungen. They also field 48 105mm. In terms of indirect medium and heavy artillery, this makes for 132 Soviet against 96 German. Not a huge advantage on any given day, and in this setup the Germans actually have 50% more 150mm than the Soviets. If the Soviets are really unlucky, the RVGK regiment has been brought up to numbers with 122mm howitzers - in that case the Germans have a lot more 150s.

Then they field their regimental guns - 12x150mm and 24x75mm for the Germans. The Soviets field 9x3x4 76mm guns, again in DF mainly (the Germans could do indirect quite easily with theirs). That is 36 to 108 tubes, with the Germans being able to throw heavier weight and further. Much better advantage in terms of guns available for the Soviets, assuming they have not lost most of them in battle already.

So, even in a situation where the Soviets significantly outnumber the Germans in terms of units fielded, the artillery advantage is not that significant for them, and in the upper calibre range can be against them, unless they have been reinforced by central assets. Which would only happen if they were hanging around on an important axis.

Edited because I can not count to three.

[ April 23, 2003, 06:41 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[X-00]

Originally posted by Andreas:

The Germans also quite simply had outgunned the Soviets on the tactical level (meaning division).

The above qoute exposes a total misunderstanding of how war is waged in general, and artillery especially Soviet artillery was used specifically. German divisions in the defense did not go one on one with Soviet divisions. In other words warfare is not Stratego.

A German division in the defense would be taking on a Soviet Army or yes two! The German division would have to cover an impossibly large sector and have great difficulting achieving regimental artillery concentrations.

Conversely, The Soviet Army would be reinforced significantly (an Arty division or more). The artillery was centralized to achieve tactical effects and great pains were made to synchronize the fire with maneuver. In fact, Soviet maneuver elements would manuever with great skill through the bombardments as they were falling.

You cannot seperate the levels (tactical-operational-strategic) of war. From 1942 on, Soviet artillery was operationally massed in order to achieve decisive tactical advantage at the point of attack. Similarily, the germans operationally massed their armor in order to achieve decisive tactical advantage. Obviously german armor is modelled, sadly Soviet artillery is not.

In Attack and Assault games Soviet artillery should be given massive "rarity cuts" and correspondingly German artillery should be given massive "rarity spikes". Especially from 1943 on. This would relect how war is waged not as is the case now how Stratego is played.

[ April 23, 2003, 11:58 AM: Message edited by: X-00 ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by X-00:

The above qoute exposes a total misunderstanding of how war is waged in general, and artillery especially Soviet artillery was used specifically. German divisions in the defense did not go one on one with Soviet divisions. In other words warfare is not Stratego.

The above quote is a complete misunderstanding of what I was saying. The whole point I am making is that simple numbers don't tell you anything, you need to look at how the numbers were used. What I tried to point out by saying this was that the two nations had fundamentally different approaches, and that these are to some extent reflected in the rarity figures. To just count weapons systems and then say 'well the Soviets had more of X, so how come they are very rare?' is just beside the point.

I am obviously not making myself very clear.

Edit: if you actually bothered to read my posts completely, you would already have noticed that I agree that modelling a full-scale late-war Soviet assault in a QB is just not feasible. Why should it? We have discussed this before, but so far I have to see someone wanting to be the Germans in that scenario. If it is single-player anyway, you can use the scenario editor to knock yourself out.

[ April 23, 2003, 09:51 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[X-00]

[Andreas]

X - you don't understand what I am saying. Even after telling you again what I am saying, you still want me to say something else, so you just ignore my clarification.

I leave you to it.

[Triumvir]

Well... far be it from me to plug my own test scenario, but -- can I plug my own test scenario? I have attempted to simulate a Soviet assault on a secondary defensive line -- in other words, out of the range of most of the heavy artillery, but with sufficient left over to make ears ring on the German side.

I don't do many scenarios, but I'd be very interested in getting feedback on how realistic or accurate my force compositions are, as well as how I should restructure my defensive positions.

You can either get it at the Scenario Depot or by emailing me at triumvir@yahoo.com.

Cheers,

Triumvir

[X-00]

Originally posted by JasonC:

You can't tell me "if I'm lucky 122s, most likely not", when there are 15000 of the things running around. They weren't paperweights. They did not magically disappear from the earth because they weren't part of the division. Division as the be all and end all of a tactically relevant divide is a "German eyes only" view of the world. It isn't even accurate for American artillery practice, let alone for Russian.

And no, it is not Comrade Stalin who dishes out arty reserve assets in a particular sector. Every corps had an artillery group at the start of the war. Later every army had one. Artillery brigades and divisions served armies and fronts on a regular basis. Individual artillery regiments often worked with specific maneuver elements (e.g. a tank corps or Rifle division) for the length of a given operation. If they were retasked during one operaiton it was by the army commander not Stavka.

The guns aren't paperweights off in the Moscow suburbs. The general staff assigned regiments to specific armies and left them with that army for its use for the length of a given operation. They had hundreds of the things to assign, so it is not like most had to do without. There are more independent mortar regiments, tube arty regiments independent or in artillery brigades and divisions, likewise for AT regiments, than there are army corps to assign them among. The only ones that went without were units assigned purely defensive missions during at attack, and the like.... ...Russian heavy artillery was not scarce.

Actually Andreas, you do not understand and as Jason argues wilfully misunderstand the very different employment techniques.

Bottom-line:

1. Soviet Heavy Artillery was not rare. Certainly if an army was assigned to a quiet sector in the defense it may have its "habitually related" arty regiments and divisions pulled. Conversely, if an army/corps was in the attack/assualt it could count on ridiculously amount of heavy metal. This is not reflected in the game

2. Arty Regiments and Divisions were habitually associated with Armys and Corps for long periods of time. Not reflected in the game

3. On the strategic offensive (43-45), the Russians had the operational freedom to mass their artillery and ammo for tactical effect. Not reflected in the game

4. Conversely, on the strategic defensive (43-45), the Germans did not possess the operational freedom to mass their artillery and ammo for tactical effect. Not reflected in the game

Again your understanding of where the line between tactical combat and operational art begin and end is amatuerish at best.

[JasonC]

"a Soviet army with 9 field divisions and a RVGK howitzer regiment attached, sometime mid-war."

No Andreas, not one regiment in the army. They were averaging one RVGK regiment *per division* in attacking armies as early as 1942. For instance, 5th Tank in the Stalingrad attack had 6 RDs, 2 Tank Corps, 1 cavalry corps, for 9 division sized formations. Its higher echelon artillery park was 1 battalion of 300mm rockets, 4 regiments of 132mm rockets, 4 regiments of 120mm mortars, 5 regiments of 122mm howitzers, and 4 regiments of 122mm or 152mm guns. Plus 8 AT regiments with motorized 76mm. Thus, 1 tube arty regiment, 1 mortar or rocket regiment, *and* one AT regiment - *per division*.

That is an attacking army in late 1942. In early 1942 at the Kharkov counterattack, RVGK artillery regiments were 1 regiment per division in the attacking armies. For instance, the 6th army had 8 RDs, 2 Tanks corps, plus 1 independent tank brigade. It had 1 rocket regiment, 4 gun regiments, 5 howitzer regiments, and 2 motorized AT regiments (which were attached to the Tank Corps for the duration of the operation, one each).

When the war began, the Russians had 61 corps in the field. They had 53 brigade sized corps artillery groups, with 2-3 regiments of mixed 122s and 152s. The artillery park was significantly weakened by the fall of 1941, and formations went into Stavka reserve for rebuilding. That is the origin of most of them having the RVGK designation from that point on. 79 new non divisional artillery regiments formed in calendar 1942.

By the end of the war there were 26 artillery divisions, 63 brigades, and 57 independent regiments. That is a heck of a lot more than 1 higher echelon regiment per army.

For comparison, here are some of the German higher echelon artillery formations at Kursk, their most prepared assault of the war. Most of it was assign to corps level in support of the armor formations.

AG South level - 1x105 battalion, rest assigned

Army level 1st Pz Army (which was mostly in reserve) - 1x105 battalion, others all assigned

Within 1st Panzer army, at corps level - 2x105.

Within 4th Panzer army, 2 SS Corps had 2xrocket regiment and 2x105 battalion. 48 Panzer corps had 1 210 tube battalion, 1 heavy rocket battalion, 1 120mm mortar battalion, 2 105 battalions, and one battery of long 150s.

6th Army had 1 105 battalion in 29 corps.

Within AD Kempf, 3 Pz Corps (3 Panzer and 1 infantry divisions) had 1 210 battalion, 1 rocket regiment, 1 150 and 1 105 battalion. Also, the ID had 1 extra 105 battalion and a rocket battalion assigned. 42 Corps had just 1 battery of long 150s. Raus Corps had 1 heavy rocket battalion, a rocket regiment, and 3 105 battalions.

That was the higher echelon German artillery supporting their largest assault of the war. The divisions organic to that level of support were 13 panzer (and PzGdr) divisions and 29 infantry divisions, not counting 4 rear area security and Rumanian IDs.

If you total it all up, it comes to the equivalent of 0.7 battalions of higher echelon stuff per division. Also, the infantry divisions in less critical sectors were light a total of 13 battalions from their organic TOE, or 0.3 per division in the whole force. So the net excess above division TOE was 0.4 battalions per division in the force. Most arty lived at division, in the German army.

The level of higher echelon support was about 2 battalions per division at the points of main effort - 2 SS and 48 Panzer Corps, 3 Panzer Corps. About half of that was rockets - 1 battalion per "assault division". A quarter was just extra light 105s, which tells you where much of the stuff stripped out of the lightened infantry divisions elsewhere went.

So in practice, assault level arty support for the Germans meant a division with 4 organic arty battalions got a rocket battalion in addition, and at the heavy spots support from one other tube battalion, as likely to be ordinary 105s as something larger.

Ordinary higher echelon support on defensive sectors meant a battery of long range CB guns here or there, and an occasional extra battalion of 105s acting as a corps level reserve. What they were actually doing in defensive sectors was retasking guns organic to div arty through Arkos, to fire support missions for other units in the corps when necessary.

[ April 23, 2003, 03:59 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by X-00:

Again your understanding of where the line between tactical combat and operational art begin and end is amatuerish at best.

Funny, I would have thought it is your understanding of written English that is amateurish. Alternatively, you are busy building up a strawman, and we all know Andrew Hedges' sig-line about that. But far be it from me to keep you from cheerleading Jason. Since you obviously have no original thoughts to bring to the debate, how about you just stop wasting bandwidth? Your continued failure to understand my point is really embarassing to watch.

With that said. Regarding densities in assault settings, quoting from one of the studies Jason so loves to refer to, but conspiciously fails to mention as sources whenever asked for them.

During Bagration (figures from Niepold, op cit), 6,754 artillery pieces and mortars (including rocket launchers) were not employed in the breakthrough sector. These had to cover 591km of frontage, for an average density of 11.4 guns/mortars per km of frontage. In the breakthrough sector, the density was 178 tubes, ~16 times as many. The Germans have about 5 guns/mortars per km of frontage. So outside the breakthrough area, the superiority was just higher than 2:1. As I showed above, the Germans on the tactical level had higher numbers of heavy guns than the Soviets. While according to some I have no understanding of how the Soviets used their artillery, I guess it is a fair bet that the independent regiments and artillery divisions would be the ones concentrated in the breakthrough sectors, while the organic artillery would be with the divisions covering the rest of the front.

The July 1943 TO&E according to Zaloga gives the full-strength Soviet infantry division 12 122mm guns, and 36 76mm (unsure whether this includes the infantry guns - presume it does not). As everybody knows, forces outside the breakthrough sector were not up to strength. Neither were the Germans, but had they been, they would have 12 150mm (vs. 0) and 24 105mm (vs.36 76mm). So let's assume they are equally strong.

But of course, the Germans had to cover more ground for each division. But how much more, outside the breakthrough sector - well let's look in Niepold again. In Bagration, this works out at 41 divisions covering 588km, for a frontage of 14.3km. The Germans had 24km on average per infantry division. That is roughly 1.7 Soviet rifle divisions against one German infantry division. In terms of guns that means that 20.4 122mm and 61.2 76mm stood against the complement of a German division outlined above. Edit: just checked something else, and the number of organic mortars (not 50mm) and guns (not ATG) in a 1944 infantry division is 148 - quite close to 11.4/km if the frontage is 14km/division (giving 160).

Still, no 150mm, unless Jason wants me to believe that the Soviets, so famous for concentrating their breakthrough assets, left their 150mm and 122mm RVGK and Guards Mortar regiments hanging about in secondary areas of the front. Frankly, I would find that hard to believe, but if he can show me a source saying so, I am all ears.

Now, this is all I have been saying all along: There are situations in which CMBB's rarity numbers will make the Soviets look very good for artillery. It is not just a case of some pro-German slant. Blathering on about production numbers (even overlooking the fact that Jason got them badly wrong for the Germans, underestimating by a considerable margin) is not getting you anywhere. You need to look at how the guns were actually employed. Once you do that, I find it perfectly imaginable that there are quite a few times along the front where a German unit will have support from 150mm howitzers, while the Soviets don't even have 122mm howitzers, let alone anything more punchy, available.

The data, instead of unsupported musings, is there for anyone to look at. You make of it what you will, but at least some data has been presented here.

For the purpose of the argument, I will ignore that all those heavy guns in the breakthrough sectors will not actually be used until the beginning of the barrage, in order to not give the game away.

Edit to insert the point about frontages and gun numbers, and to correct the typo - the Soviet TO&E dates 07/43, not 07/44.

[ April 23, 2003, 03:22 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

No Andreas, not one regiment in the army. They were averaging one RVGK regiment *per division* in attacking armies as early as 1942.

(Italics by me)

Yes, and all the Soviet armies were attacking, all the time. Thank you. I suggest reading what I wrote, otherwise you can engage in a straw-man building contest with Mr.X.

[ April 23, 2003, 02:37 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Andreas]

I leave the faithless with this:

As for Mr. X claims that his four points are "not reflected in the game" - rubbish, tosh, nonsense, inane blatherings of a madman, call it what you will, sense it does not make.

He has obviously never looked at the scenario editor.