Patton vs Zhukov, USA vs USSR after 1945, who would have won?

[flamingknives]

Originally posted by Marlow:

Almost forgot to compare the total number of tanks available. Lets see, 15 US armored divisions at about 200 tanks each for 3000. 32 separate batts with about 50 each, for another 1500, about 50 SP TD batts with about 40 TDs each (anti-armor of a tank), for 2000. US total in theater is about 7500. Now we add in a couple of French units – avout 500. Add in the Brits, I’m only guessing now, but I’ll say 3500 (half the number of divisions, so half the armor?). Out total is 11,500.

18000 to 11500 is a lot better than 3 to 1

The figures for British units at the end of the war are something in the region of 18347 men in an infantry division, and 332 tanks in an armoured division, plus about 2000 trucks and 4-500 other vehicles.

Total tanks strength at war's end is ~2750 cruiser and infantry types*, with ~4800 in reserve.

* The web page that gives this info refers to these numbers as MBTs. Being as there were no MBTs at this time, I've assumed that this means the more powerful types. (Cromwells, Comets, Shermans and Churchills)

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Steiner14:

Maybe the Brits would have been capable to deal with the russian soldier, but definately not the Yankees. And the Brits were a bit too few...

Just my 2 cent.

I doubt it is worth that much. Is it something the Brits put into their tea that makes them such fearsome fighters, compared to the US soldiers?

All this nationalistic analysis is just so much rubbish. The numerically superior, fearsome and fanatical Zulus at Rorke's Drift were not victorious despite all three of these attributes. Yet there are still people around who think that if e.g. the Waffen-SS had fought in Africa in 1941, their fanatical fighting ability would have defeated the Commonwealth there and then. Bollocks.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

The figures for British units at the end of the war are something in the region of 18347 men in an infantry division, and 332 tanks in an armoured division, plus about 2000 trucks and 4-500 other vehicles.

That is TO&E or real average?

[Steiner14]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Steiner14:

Maybe the Brits would have been capable to deal with the russian soldier, but definately not the Yankees. And the Brits were a bit too few...

Just my 2 cent.

All this nationalistic analysis is just so much rubbish. </font>

[flamingknives]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by flamingknives:

The figures for British units at the end of the war are something in the region of 18347 men in an infantry division, and 332 tanks in an armoured division, plus about 2000 trucks and 4-500 other vehicles.

That is TO&E or real average? </font>

[Ruthless]

Originally posted by Steiner14:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Steiner14:

Maybe the Brits would have been capable to deal with the russian soldier, but definately not the Yankees. And the Brits were a bit too few...

Just my 2 cent.

All this nationalistic analysis is just so much rubbish. </font>

[Ruthless]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Marlow, the tank/SP number does not make sens I think. In May 45 there were about ~10,000 tanks with the frontline troops of the Red Army, but another 25,000 or so in the depots.

As for divisional numbers, I think it is around 450, which are usually half the size of those of the W.A. (remember that by this time especially Brit/Canadian units may well be much understrength though). Also, you don't address the teeth vs. tail issue. US/UK divisions were very tail heavy, and did not really bring that much more infantry to the party than a Soviet division of half the size. They had a lot more artillery to be sure, but that is just a question of where this was located (the W.A. did not have artillery divisions). The logistical tail of W.A. divisions was a lot bigger than that of either the Germans or the Red Army. The figures for the share of the tail I have read in a study on Cassino claim the relation was 10% for the Germans late in the war (although that seems very low), 20% for the Soviets and 35% for the W.A.

@Ruthless

late in the war the Soviets tended to just push the Germans around. You can not judge the Red Army of 1945 based on its performance in 1943 anymore than you can judge the US Army in Europe in 1945 based on its performance at Kasserine Pass.

Yes, but even in 1945, how many months did it take the Russians to advance, say, 100 miles? How long to take Berlin? And that is against the very badly battered (and by this point small) German army. My point being that there is, as far as I can tell, no reason to believe the Red Army could quickly push the Western Allies out of Europe. My point is also that the Russians, despite being numerically superior, did not show themselves capable of advance any better than the Western Allies.

And most analyses thus far have ignored the strategic level, which IMO is where the Russians are very inferior in this case.

[White Phosphorus]

Originally posted by Steiner14:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Steiner14:

Maybe the Brits would have been capable to deal with the russian soldier, but definately not the Yankees. And the Brits were a bit too few...

Just my 2 cent.

All this nationalistic analysis is just so much rubbish. </font>

[Spook]

Originally posted by Steiner14:

All soldiers, all equal?

At present, all soldiers are human, are they not? Thus all susceptible to the same potential strengths and weaknesses that can surface in any humany being?

No, all soldiers are "not" equal; their ultimate combat effectiveness is defined by a host of external factors, such as doctrine, overall training & discipline, tactics, weapons, leadership, motivation, and so on and so forth, discussed priorhand in these BF forums so MANY times before.

But national borders alone certainly do not convey a special advantage or disadvantage.

There are enough studies, showing what everyone else with eyes for history can see:

there are even huge differences between the characteristics of the armies like there are differences between cultures.

For those with historical eyes, they can also see as that the allowance and application of ADAPTATIONS to the lessons of war -- along with the "external factors" I noted above -- played a lot bigger role to a soldier's combat effectiveness than did borders or cultural upbringings.

Pick up and read a copy of Michael Doubler's "Closing with the Enemy" as a compelling case study on this, among others.

How powerful the US-army is, becomes clear from Vietnam to Iraq, when material doesn't count, but the single soldier.

There are huge differences.

Material is a factor to a given point. Soldiers' motivation is a factor to a given point. But if you studied the US Vietnam War in earnest, it might surprise you as to how many small unit actions the US soldier accorded himself well in, allowing for the less distinguished moments too. The same for both cases in Iraq too.

Jessica Lynch may have become the far bigger household word in the USA afterwards, but Patrick Miller certainly showed from the same ambush what one such US soldier was capable of accomplishing in a heartbeat-FUBAR situation.

Just comparing the Vietnam and Iraq wars by name alone is meaningless for assessing soldiers' effectiveness.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Ruthless:

Yes, but even in 1945, how many months did it take the Russians to advance, say, 100 miles? How long to take Berlin?

100 miles were done in ~3 days on a regular basis during advance operations in late war. 2 weeks in the Vistula Oder operation in January to advance 500km. Roughly the same rate during Iassy-Kishinyev in August 1944. About 3 weeks to move 5-600km during Bagration. I can think of one time the W.A. achieved these advance rates against an unbeaten foe, and that was for a few days in late August/early September 1944 in France.

So, the answer to 'how many months did it take the Red Army to advance 100 miles?' is 0.1.

2 weeks to take Berlin - an advance of 70 km, including an encirclement of half of 9th Army (~100k men give or take inside the cauldron I would guess) followed by a wide encirclement and then reduction of a city of 3-4 million inhabitants that was fiercely defended. There simply is no comparison for this for the W.A. because they never had to deal with this sort of military challenge.

I very strongly recommend Christopher Duffy's 'Red Storm on the Reich' and Paul Adair's 'Hitler's greatest defeat' as reading matter. The former deals with the various operations in January to March 1945 in what was then east Germany and Poland, the latter deals with Bagration.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Ruthless:

And most analyses thus far have ignored the strategic level, which IMO is where the Russians are very inferior in this case.

Can you explain please?

As an add-on to my previous post. Bagration, Iassy-Kishinyev and the Vistula Oder operation did emphatically not happen against a 'badly battered German army'. The same German army that was given a vicious kicking by the Red Army in the east was giving the W.A. a very hard time in Italy and France in June (and indeed defeated them at Monte Cassino two times earlier in the year, while hemming them into the Anzio bridgehead for four months), beat Market-Garden in September, and launched the Ardennes offensive in December. So by that token, all the W.A. successes in 1944 were also achieved against a badly battered and by that time small German army.

[Ruthless]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Ruthless:

And most analyses thus far have ignored the strategic level, which IMO is where the Russians are very inferior in this case.

Can you explain please?

As an add-on to my previous post. Bagration, Iassy-Kishinyev and the Vistula Oder operation did emphatically not happen against a 'badly battered German army'. The same German army that was given a vicious kicking by the Red Army in the east was giving the W.A. a very hard time in Italy and France in June (and indeed defeated them at Monte Cassino two times earlier in the year, while hemming them into the Anzio bridgehead for four months), beat Market-Garden in September, and launched the Ardennes offensive in December. So by that token, all the W.A. successes in 1944 were also achieved against a badly battered and by that time small German army. </font>

[Ruthless]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Ruthless:

Yes, but even in 1945, how many months did it take the Russians to advance, say, 100 miles? How long to take Berlin?

100 miles were done in ~3 days on a regular basis during advance operations in late war. 2 weeks in the Vistula Oder operation in January to advance 500km. Roughly the same rate during Iassy-Kishinyev in August 1944. About 3 weeks to move 5-600km during Bagration. I can think of one time the W.A. achieved these advance rates against an unbeaten foe, and that was for a few days in late August/early September 1944 in France.

So, the answer to 'how many months did it take the Red Army to advance 100 miles?' is 0.1.

2 weeks to take Berlin - an advance of 70 km, including an encirclement of half of 9th Army (~100k men give or take inside the cauldron I would guess) followed by a wide encirclement and then reduction of a city of 3-4 million inhabitants that was fiercely defended. There simply is no comparison for this for the W.A. because they never had to deal with this sort of military challenge.

I very strongly recommend Christopher Duffy's 'Red Storm on the Reich' and Paul Adair's 'Hitler's greatest defeat' as reading matter. The former deals with the various operations in January to March 1945 in what was then east Germany and Poland, the latter deals with Bagration. </font>

[Grisha]

Ruthless,

Your comments on the Soviets are highly inaccurate, and I must respond to your posts for some peace of mind.

Russia didn't and couldn't just "roll over" the Germans even when they were horribly undersupplied, understrength, and vastly outnumbered by the Russians, not to mention being attacked on both fronts. So I don't think the Russians could easily push the Americans out of Europe.

Your response indicates a lack of knowledge wrt Soviet operations from 1944, on. I strongly suggest you make efforts to rectify this weakness.

I think it is very unclear which side was superior on the tactical and operational levels, but I think on the strategic levels it is clear (or at least it is to me): The Americans and her allies controlled most of the world, the Russians controlled Russia and Eastern Europe.

I can't speak for the Americans tactically, but it would be safe to say that in general the Soviets were pretty average in innate tactical ability. However, operationally the Soviets rated right up there with the Germans by 1944. Why? Based on in-depth studies done by the US Army during their development of US operational art in the 1980s.

Russia had--as far as I know--very little naval capacity and this would make them quite vulnerable, as the WA's navies were quite powerful, including aircraft carriers. This would also allow the WA to invade Russian territory from many different places, making Russia have a similar problem to what the Germans had with the Atlantic Wall--too much border to defend. Additionally, Russia was highly reliant on supplies from the USA (everything from jeeps and aircraft to copper and traincars). Further, the Russian economy and industry was not in good shape. I don't really think the Russians--with no assistance from the US--could keep up with the US' production. I also think that Russia's supply lines would be more vulnerable than the WA because they would be vulnerable to attack from multiple directions.

Any naval/amphibious action by the US against the USSR would've had to deal with the vastness of the Soviet interior. It would've been a logistical nightmare. The Soviets were not "highly reliant" upon lend lease. It certainly facilitated the Soviet war effort, greatly so in some cases, but it would not have changed the outcome of the Soviet-German War.

And the force levels on each side are, I think, misleading. According to what I've read, the Russian army was large, but they lost a LOT of men in the years of fighting and were down to a lot of old men and children (according to von Mellenthin.) Also, the US had not fully exploited its resources in manpower, which could be brought to bear pretty well within a couple months, probably. So, if the Russians could not get a clean victory in a couple of months, they would be hit with a lot of fresh reinforcements.

The Soviets did lose a lot of men in the war, but "old men and children"? And using v.Mellenthin of all people as an expert on the Red Army???

And in response to someone's comment about the Chinese fighting the Americans in Korea, they should bear in mind that the Chinese lost about a million men just fighting the US to a stalemate in a limited war. We didn't even attempt to attack their homeland, which would have brought a lot more casualties and lost supplies to the Chinese. I do not think the Russians could afford to lose a million men in such a situation, but then I don't think they were as mismatched as the Chinese were, either in terms of technology.

And as I pointed out, the Chinese had been trained by the Germans before their conflict with Japan, but I don't recall any Chinese blitzkrieg campaign in WWII ...

Anyway, that's my assessment. The Russians were in no position to get the WA out of Europe and the WA would have had a bloody time getting the Russians out of Eastern Europe, but the WA had most if not all the strategic advantages and this would mean--IMO--victory over the Russians if the WA had the political will to fight a long, bloody battle.

Your assessment is flawed, based on incomplete knowledge of Soviet military and economic abilities. I agree that any long conflict between the two would've favored the US, but as far as an immediate flash-war in Europe, the Red Army would've been wetting their toes in the waters off Bourdeau in 3-4 months.

----------------------------------------

Well, the fearsome Russians soldiers were pushed back, despite being very numerically superior, by the Germans, almost to the point of being conquered.

Too generalized as a statement. Do you mean summer 1941? If so, the Soviets were actually outnumbered until about November 1941. If not, please be specific.

I'd be interested in what makes you think the Russians were more adept at warfare or more fierce than than the Americans. Or what made the British more fierce than the Americans for that matter. IIRC--and this is a little-known fact --American forces had to cross this one barrier code-named Omaha Beach which supposedly was pretty tough.

I don't know about fierceness (though fighting against extermination in your homeland probably would make a case for ferocity), but as far as operational expertise that's pretty much a given. Soviet operational excellence did not exist all throughout the war, but its foundation was theoretically complete before WWII. It took the Red Army until 1943 before they were able to actualize their prewar operational theory, but when it was put to practice there was nothing comparable at that time. If you doubt this, spend some time looking through a lot of the research done by the US Army's School of Advanced Military Studies. You will likely be surprised by what you find there.

This conversation reminds me of one I had with a Russian on the LOMAC forums who was sure that everything Russian was highly superior to everything made by the West. He boasted of how, in WWII, if a Russian pilot ran out of ammo, he would almost always try to ram himself into a German aircraft carrier. IIRC, he also told me that I was raised on propaganda. Irony can be pretty ironice sometimes...

Yes, I see the irony in it as well.

------------------------------------------

Yes, but even in 1945, how many months did it take the Russians to advance, say, 100 miles? How long to take Berlin? And that is against the very badly battered (and by this point small) German army. My point being that there is, as far as I can tell, no reason to believe the Red Army could quickly push the Western Allies out of Europe. My point is also that the Russians, despite being numerically superior, did not show themselves capable of advance any better than the Western Allies.

- The advance rate of the Belorussian operation during the intial first stage was about 240-300km in 12 days. This across marshy, forested terrain along a front 1,100km wide.

- The advance rate of the Lvov-Sandomierz operation was 350km over 48 days along a front 440km wide. Concentration of German panzer units was high here.

- The advance rate of the Yassy-Kishinev operation was 300-320km in 10 days across a 500km front.

- The Vistula-Oder operation of January 1945 was 500km in 23 days across a 500km front.

- Manchurian operation of August 1945 was 200-800km in 25 days across a front 2,700km wide.

And most analyses thus far have ignored the strategic level, which IMO is where the Russians are very inferior in this case.

This is grossly incorrect. As stated at the beginning I strongly suggest you study Soviet military art and their WWII operations.

[ October 18, 2003, 06:45 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Ruthless:

However, if you'd like to cherry-pick facts, we could just as easily say that the Germans could easily wipe the Russians out of Russia if you look at how fast they advanced at the beginning of Barbarossa.

Ruthless, I know you as a bit more clued up than that. Which Red Army would the W.A. be fighting in 1945, that of 1945, or that of 1941?

Answers on a postcard, but please stop being ridiculous.

[Ruthless]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Ruthless:

However, if you'd like to cherry-pick facts, we could just as easily say that the Germans could easily wipe the Russians out of Russia if you look at how fast they advanced at the beginning of Barbarossa.

Ruthless, I know you as a bit more clued up than that. Which Red Army would the W.A. be fighting in 1945, that of 1945, or that of 1941?

Answers on a postcard, but please stop being ridiculous. </font>

[Ruthless]

Grisha--your post is too long for me to quote and I am tiring of this debate (as I don't believe either side has any really useful way of determining which side would win) so I'll say that I HAVE studied (though perhaps less than most here) Russian operations in WWII and I am not as impressed as you and Andreas. As I just told him, there is a reason that the Russians didn't try to take all of Europe and it wasn't out of the goodness.

On paper, you could argue the Chinese in Korea could easily beat back the US and UN forces as they vastly outnumbered them. However, US airpower, artillery, and long supply lines (and poor logistics in general) led to the Chinese taking 2/3 losses before even reaching the front. It is true the Soviets fought admirably and their operational art was good, but you guys make it sound like they would easily roll over the western allies and I see no reason to believe that. Unless you have some magic box of facts to present to me, I'm going to say you will be unable to sway me.

And, I maintain that strategically, the western allies were far superior. Russian industry and supplies (oil for one) would be vulnerable to air power, especially from aircraft carriers (if we assume Japan is out or at least contained to the point of no longer being a threat.) All Russian ports would be closed up by western allies (and that is not a trivial issue for Russia.) Eastern Russia would be vulnerable (think the Chinese wouldn't want a piece of Russia to have as their very own?)

I really think that although there is little chance the western allies could have conquered Russia, for Russia to try to take Europe would be an extremely foolish and costly mistake for them.

But really, we are all talking out of our arses, aren't we? No one really knows and no book in existance is going to prove one side or the other.

---Edited to add:

Lend-lease to Russia

Excerpt:

"n addition to the aircraft deliveries American Lend-lease deliveries to Russia included also more than 400.000 trucks, over 12.000 tanks and other combat vehicles, 32.000 motorcycles, 13.000 locomotives and railway cars, 8.000 anti-aircraft cannons and machine-guns, 135.000 submachine guns, 300.000 tons of explosives, 40.000 field radios, some 400 radar systems, 400.000 metal cutting machi­ne tools, several million tons of foodstuff, steel, other metals, oil and gasoline, chemicals etc. A price tag was naturally attached to all deliveries, with following typical fighter prices:

P-40 Kittyhawk - 44.900 dollars, P-39 Airacobra - 50.700 dollars and P-47 Thunderbolt - 83.000 dollars.

Regardless of Soviet cold-war attempts to forget (or at least diminish) the importance of Lend-lease, the total impact of the Lend-Lease shipment for the Soviet war effort and entire national economy can only be characterized as both dramatic and of decisive importance. The outcome of the war on the East front might well have taken another path without Lend-lease. There were undoubtedly big difficulties in the early period: aircraft modified for tropical conditions were delivered to Arctic ports, Russian-language instructions were lacking, a big number of aircraft were grounded because of lack of spa­res, ammunition, bombs or high-octane fuel. Soon many technical problems 'were overcome, Soviet guns and bomb racks were installed, and numerous other technical improvisa­tions were made in Soviet AF frontal units. Soviet specialists developed also ingenious technical improvements and modifi­cations of the original aircraft versions. In parallel the new American technology was systematically investigated in research and design institutes, and the total impact for the modernization of the Soviet aviation industry was certainly immense. The ultimate peak of this learning process was the post-war copying of the Boeing B-29 in only two years time, resulting in the Soviet nuclear-bomb carrier Tu-4.

Lend-lease aircraft amounted to 18% of all aircraft in the Soviet air forces, 20% of all bombers, and 16-23% of all fighters (numbers vary depending on calculation methods), and 29% of all naval aircraft. In some AF commands and fronts the proportion of Lend-Lease aircraft was even higher: of the 9.888 fighters delivered to the air defense (PVO) fighter units in 1941-45 6.953 (or over 70%!) were British or American. In the AF of the Karelian front lend-lease aircraft amounted to about two-thirds of all combat aircraft in 1942-43, practically all torpedo bombers of the naval air forces were A-20G Bostons in 1944-45 etc."

[ October 18, 2003, 08:44 PM: Message edited by: Ruthless ]

[White Phosphorus]

Originally posted by Ruthless:

I HAVE studied (though perhaps less than most here) Russian operations in WWII and I am not as impressed as you and Andreas.

The U.S. army was impressed enough to name operation Desert Storm in honor of Soviet operation August Storm, because it was so heavily studied.

The Majority of lend lease arrived after the Germans were stopped. The Red army had more german trucks in 45 then western trucks in 41-42.

[Grisha]

Grisha--your post is too long for me to quote and I am tiring of this debate (as I don't believe either side has any really useful way of determining which side would win) so I'll say that I HAVE studied (though perhaps less than most here) Russian operations in WWII and I am not as impressed as you and Andreas. As I just told him, there is a reason that the Russians didn't try to take all of Europe and it wasn't out of the goodness.

Yes, I'm more than a little tired as well, since it annoys me when people presume to hold as truthful statements they cannot confirm or corroborate. And it wouldn't just be Andreas or myself who are impressed, but many in the western military community including much of the US military leadership. And the reason the Soviets didn't try for Europe is quite simple really. They secured the buffer zone they wanted to prevent another occurance like Barbarossa. The CP gave up on world revolution during Stalin's regime.

On paper, you could argue the Chinese in Korea could easily beat back the US and UN forces as they vastly outnumbered them. However, US airpower, artillery, and long supply lines (and poor logistics in general) led to the Chinese taking 2/3 losses before even reaching the front. It is true the Soviets fought admirably and their operational art was good, but you guys make it sound like they would easily roll over the western allies and I see no reason to believe that. Unless you have some magic box of facts to present to me, I'm going to say you will be unable to sway me.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but weren't the Chinese Communists basically fighting with infantry via infiltration? Sort of the Korean War version of Stosstrupps? Trying to establish a connection between the Chinese Communist methods in the Korean War with Soviet operational art is like comparing Stosstrupps to von Seeck's combined arms concept. And, no, they would not have easily rolled over the western allies. They certainly didn't easily roll over the Germans, but the Soviets did learn how to effectively beat them at their own game. A hypothetical clash between west and east in summer of 1945 would've been short, but bloody for both sides.

During the period when the Soviets were beginning to impose their will in military operations against the Germans (Nov.'42 - Jul. '43), theater-wide Soviet numerical superiority hovered around 1.8:1. This was at a period when the Soviets were still in the process of developing an effective practice to their operational art. By summer of 1945 Soviet practice of operational art was very refined. Simply, the western allies in northern Europe wouldn't have had the numerical odds to defeat the Red Army that was deployed opposite them.

And, I maintain that strategically, the western allies were far superior. Russian industry and supplies (oil for one) would be vulnerable to air power, especially from aircraft carriers (if we assume Japan is out or at least contained to the point of no longer being a threat.) All Russian ports would be closed up by western allies (and that is not a trivial issue for Russia.) Eastern Russia would be vulnerable (think the Chinese wouldn't want a piece of Russia to have as their very own?).

The USSR was a huge landmass with little need for outside resources (much like the USA). Naval airpower would've been of negligible value in this instance. A heavy bomber campaign would've also been unfeasible until Belorussia was under western allied control. The USA would've probably got the upper hand in the long run with a working atom bomb, but before that Europe would've been Soviet.

I really think that although there is little chance the western allies could have conquered Russia, for Russia to try to take Europe would be an extremely foolish and costly mistake for them.

There was greater probability of the west hitting the Soviets than the reverse in 1945. For one, Stalin had been thinking ahead during the war, and took political (and military) steps to secure a buffer zone for the USSR along its western border. The west was slow to pick up on this, and was quite incensed when it realized what had occurred. So, at the end of WWII Stalin felt he had achieved his prewar political objectives, whereas the western allies felt duped.

Lend lease began to make an effective contribution to the Soviet war effort from 1943 on. Before that time it was simply too small to have much of an effect strategically. While it would be wrong to say that lend lease had no major impact upon the Soviet war effort, it would be incorrect to assume that lend lease was vital to Soviet victory. Now, if you think Soviet operational art just made commanders think a little better, made soldiers fight a little better, and made supplies run a little better, then I could see why lend lease might seem so important. But put in the time to figure out what Soviet operational art was about, and you might not. The US military did, and look how they performed in the last two Gulf wars.

[Spook]

This is perhaps a bit presumptuous of me, but checking on Grisha's RAS site link in his sig, this one disclaimer statement is what I regard as useful to requote in this topic thread for reference:

Having stated that, it should also be said the staff at RAS do not believe Soviet operational art to be a sort of military "super-concept" that utterly shatters our traditional understanding of the Soviet-German War. Rather, it was for the Soviets a means of developing more efficient and effective methods for conducting a war against Germany. Soviet operational art allowed the USSR to maximize its advantages while minimizing its disadvantages. It allowed the Soviets the ability to gain a sense of proportion and perspective for the war, adjusting their military art as needed, and thereby improving their chances for victory. But, it was not a perfect formula, having its share of tragic events and costly errors, sometimes more than average given the nature of totalitarian regimes. But, it did make a difference, and a far larger one than generally understood.

At the least, a noteworthy comment of perspective IMO.

[Ruthless]

Originally posted by Grisha:

And, no, they would not have easily rolled over the western allies. They certainly didn't easily roll over the Germans, but the Soviets did learn how to effectively beat them at their own game.

Ok, so we agree that they could not have easily rolled over the Western Allies. Which means what? Stalemate? IMO, probably. In either case (WA attacks or Russia attacks), the defender would likely be pushed back a bit then the line would pretty well stabilize after much death on both sides.

I agree Russian operation art developed substantially during the war. However, even at the end, the Russians were clumsy on the tactical level and I see no reason to believe they were superior on the operational level, at least not to the point where they would be victorious by that advantage.

Originally posted by Grisha:

{Ruthless quote}

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />And, I maintain that strategically, the western allies were far superior. Russian industry and supplies (oil for one) would be vulnerable to air power, especially from aircraft carriers (if we assume Japan is out or at least contained to the point of no longer being a threat.) All Russian ports would be closed up by western allies (and that is not a trivial issue for Russia.) Eastern Russia would be vulnerable (think the Chinese wouldn't want a piece of Russia to have as their very own?).

The USSR was a huge landmass with little need for outside resources (much like the USA). Naval airpower would've been of negligible value in this instance. A heavy bomber campaign would've also been unfeasible until Belorussia was under western allied control. The USA would've probably got the upper hand in the long run with a working atom bomb, but before that Europe would've been Soviet.

</font>

[s3333cr333tz]

I think some people are forgetting a few very basic things.

The state of the German military in 44 and 45 was a result of fighting the Soviets. The German military in 44 and 45 was a shadow of its former self.

Strategic bombing, for all intents and purposes was little more than a terror tactics, and a way to exact some revenge. It is well documented that Germany production went up each year during the war, despite the exponential increase in sorties flown against her industry. Yes, for the critical thinker there are some other reasons for this increase, but the fact remains, it was largely spay and pray.

Lend-Lease. Did it help the Ruskies? Sure it did, but I don't think it helped to the extent some people here would like to think. In the end it still came down to the heroic efforts of the Soviet soldier. Regardless if his belly was full of spam, or if it was full of goolash.

Many parts of the western front were used as R&R for units devasted in the eastern front.

The west faced the Germans in their prime only a few times. I don't know if you could consider the "one hand tied behind my back" routine in North Africa, German prime. Im hard pressed to think of any point that the WA's were able to handle an equal german force before the eastern meat grinder started grinding up brautwurst ;p

[Grisha]

Ruthless,

A few short points.

The USSR in 1945 was not an agrarian society, it was an industrialized nation.How else does it produce what it did in WWII? In fact, the Soviet Union quit being an agrarian nation in the mid-1930s. It was a highly centralized industrialized nation from an economic viewpoint. There was no Soviet version of the Sears catalog back then, but then they weren't into a market economy anyway.

Neither North Korea or Communist China practiced operational art in the Korean War, as far as I know, any more than Germany did in WWII.

Regarding Soviet operational art, it would be very difficult to practice it without a clear strategic vision. So, it confuses me that you say you know something about Soviet operational art, yet seem to think that it was somehow divorced from a strategic direction. The very essence of Soviet operational art gave unity to their military art. Strategy gave purpose to operations that gave purpose to tactics. Anyway, I'm not going to write a monograph here on SovOpArt, but it is a difficult subject that addresses a fairly recent problem (since the 20th century): how does one defeat and destroy armies as complex systems? There's a lot of history in this development that begins during the French Revolution, continues through the Prussian reforms of the 19th century, then finalizes within the emerging formation of the Red Army in the 1920s and 1930s.

Many hail the tactical brilliance and operational expertise of the Germans in WWII, yet many seem able to distance the total lack of consistent strategic direction from the German army. But, when the Red Army is scrutinized, its average tactical performance seems to overshadow what became an amazing operational excellence that was directed by astute strategic planning. The impression left is that it's better to aimlessly fight excellent battles than to effectively conduct a mediocre, if able, force such that it wins the battles needed to secure operational and eventually strategic success. But, how those battles were won, how operations influenced those battles, and how strategy determined the number and scope of operations was largely the realm of Soviet operational art.

[Andreas]

Okay Ruthless, so I am cherrypicking. The four operations I mentioned caused the Germans at least 1-1.5 million irrecoverable losses (i.e. wounded are extra) so >10% of their military losses in the war, but hey, guess they can't have been that important. They happened concurrently with the Falaise pocket, where the W.A. managed to ensnare a wooping 40,000 Germans, while letting the bulk escape over the Seine to fight another day.

So, since my argument is not good enough for you, how about we use yours?

Let's see. US Army performance. Well, I think the Louisiana maneuvers were a bit of a shambles, right? And the Rapido crossings - phew, better not mention those. Kasserine - oh dear, that was an embarassment, eh? Oh well, clearly that indicates that in 1945 they would struggle to beat the Albanian army.

So, let's move on to the Pommies. Did rather get their rear end kicked in Belgium 1940, n'est-ce pas? And the early desert war against the Germans is at best a draw, being extremely generous. Then we have Cassino (actually, there is enough idiocy to go round at Cassino to have a big share reserved for the US Army too). Oh dear oh dear. Clearly based on this, in 1945 the British would not be able to hold a candle to the South Uppsala anti-Nazi league when it comes to beating the Wehrmacht.

Well, there are always the French. Woops, 1940 again. Best leave it at that.

Ah, but air-power will handle the Red Army. Err no it won't. I mean, just look at the losses the RAF took in the Nuremberg raid, or the USAAF in attacking Schweinfurt? Everybody knows anyway that in 1940 the bombers had trouble hitting a target the size of Berlin. Clearly air power will not rescue the W.A.

So, but at least strategically it is clear that the US will get lots of kit across the ocean. Well, no. Operation DRUMBEAT showed the US to be incapable of protecting their shipping outside Miami, let alone anywhere else. Shipping losses in 1942 were so bad, it just defies believe that the US got their invasion force across by mid-1944.

Cor blimey guv, doesn't look good for the W.A. at all, now does it? I mean, looking at all this, it rather surprising they managed to get to the Reich, now isn't it?

If that all strikes you as ridiculous, that's because it is. Just as your continued insistence to evaluate the Red Army of 1945 by analysing their performance in 1941/2. You say you have studied the Red Army performance in the war. It appears to me that you stopped doing so when 1943 came around. You asked a clear question about advance rates, and you got a clear answer, but it is equally clear to me that you don't like it, otherwise you would not come back to this ridiculous comparison with 1941, and the repeat comment that I am cherrypicking.

As for me exaggerating the Red Army performance - I am not making this stuff up. There are history books in which you can read up on it if you feel inclined to do so. I quoted two of them, but here are a few more for German speakers:

Kissel, Hans 'Die Katastrophe in Rumänien 1944'

Magenheimer, Heinz 'Die Abwehrschlacht an der Weichsel 1945'

Some interesting single actions:

Kissel, Hans 'Vom Dnjepr zum Dnjestr - Rückzugskämpfe des Grenadierregiments 683 9.3. - 12.4. 1944'

Fricke, Gerd 'Fester Platz Tarnopol 1944'

Hoffmann, Dieter 'Die Magedburger Division' about the 13.PD which was destroyed in Romania 1944.

Then of course there are the works by Glantz, of which I recommend to the sceptics the Art of War symposium transcripts which involved a lot of former German officers.

As for Korea, yeah that performance of the US trained Korean forces and the US forces stationed there really inspired confidence when the North Koreans jumped across the border. Holding on to the Pusan perimeter was a masterful success of a military operation. Also the foresight of the US Army, to stick to the old Bazooka model really tells you how seriously the US Army took to learning lessons from the war.

[Andreas]

BTW - those gormless Russians helped the invasion of Normandy in another way, not usually widely known. I was only made aware of it recently.

In Spring 1944 1st Ukrainian Front hammered at 4.Panzerarmee, and encircled Tarnopol (which had been named a Fester Platz) and three German armoured divisions at Kamenets-Podolsk.

This led to 9th and 10th SS to be sent from France to deal with the developing desaster. Had the Soviets not continued to attack throughout the Rasputitsa, these two divisions would likely have been in northern France, ready to immediately launch into an allied landing. Also, Kamenets-Podolsk significantly damaged 1. SS - LSSAH, which was still rebuilding when the invasion happened and therefore was not available until July.

Two extra, full strength SS Panzerdivisions early on in Normandy would not have stopped the invasion either, but would have made it a lot more costly and difficult. As it was, only one of the tank regiments was in France at the time of the invasion, and the two divisions did not arrive in the frontline before the end of June, three weeks after the invasion.

By the way, the speed at which these divisions could be shuttled across the continent (9.SS left west Ukraine on 12th June and was in the line in Normandy on 26th June; 10th SS left from the 16th June and was in position on 29th; a division like this would take about 60-70 trains to move), should give some pause for thought to those who talk about the massive impact that the strategic air campaign had on transport. The Germans also did not have stealth trains, but they managed to use their railway system for shunting armies back and forth until it was physically occupied by allied forces in 1945. Strategic bombing certainly made it more difficult, but did not stop it.