Patton vs Zhukov, USA vs USSR after 1945, who would have won?

[Tripps]

Originally posted by Marlow:

Where was that said in this thread? I certainly don't think the analysis so far has shown anything of the sort. Numbers are between 2 to one and 6 to one in combat aircraft, depending on scenario. Over time this would only get worse for Soviets given huge disparity in aircraft production. Add in lack of range for Soviet fighters, and control of the air is not at issue. [/QB]

I didnt say it had been said, i said "I thought".

[dalem]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by dalem:

Allies vs. Sovs in 1945? Before anyone demobilizes?

It's over in two weeks.

Week one - shoot down the Red Air Force.

Week two - bomb the bejeezus out of the Red Army.

I'm too cranky to argue details this time - check past threads.

-dale

Sorry dalem, I must have missed out on the history books that tell how the war ended on the 20th of June 1944. Can you give me the links on Amazon to buy them?

Cheers! </font>

[Geier]

It was unable to annihilate the much smaller German air and ground forces in two weeks. Why would they succeed against the Sovs?

That was the point I believe.

[Grisha]

People need to stop drinking the Soviet deception Kool-Aid. Useful, yes, but come on. Ninja supply trains sneaking across the steppes through the night?

In the Vistula-Oder operation, roughly 2 million Soviets troops were deployed or regrouped. Of that 2 million about half were not spotted or identified by German intelligence. How do we know this? By comparing Soviet maps with German intelligence maps of the same period. Glantz wrote a book on this back in 1989 called "Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War," covering over 40 Soviet military operations throughout the war. It is almost 600 pages long with a lot of data on Soviet deception measures and how those developments facilitated Soviet operations. Vistula-Oder (and the Manchurian operation) were the refined results of many developments of Soviet military art in WWII, not just in operational theory, but tactical theory (forward detachments, for one), intelligence-reconnaissance, and, yes, deception.

Marlow, are you just talking to talk? You seem to be having a problem with the idea of an effective Soviet force, one that might actually have given the western allies a "modicum" of trouble, had the west decided to attack. But, it's not all that difficult to see the Red Army at the end of WWII was a very effective army, honed from years of warfare with one of the best armies in history, and guided by an operational theory that was quite probably the finest at that time - and still is today. All it takes is reading books, albeit expensive and sometimes dry books, but then the idea of an effective WWII Red Army still doesn't sit quite well with many in the west so as to make it to popular military historical literature. But, that doesn't mean the information doesn't exist. It most assuredly does. Present US military art is largely based on it.

I think part of the problem with western acceptance of Red Army effectiveness has to do with the fact that in terms of overall tactical versatility and initiative, the Soviets were likely below average when compared with the west, and it's this focus on tactical abilities that seems to hold so much concern or value. What many don't realize is that 1) tactical success alone stopped winning war sometime in the late 19th century, and 2) the Soviets developed aspects of their tactical and operational theory to compensate for this weakness.

[Geier]

Originally posted by Marlow:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Grisha:

[ See Christer Bergström's link on this.

Speaking of highly subjective:

"Without doubt, the Soviet fliers in general were the toughest and most determined opponents ever to be faced by German airmen. Any other air force probably would have disintegrated morally following the immense losses that were dealt the Soviets by the Luftwaffe on June 22, 1941 - at least this was what the Germans had anticipated would happen to the Soviet armed forces. In spite of this, Soviet bomber crews kept launching one mission after another against the advancing German ground troops during the first weeks of the war, and the Soviet fighter pilots never ceased challenging the Luftwaffe of air superiority."

He needs to look at other air forces during tough times in the war before this statement passes the test. </font>

[dalem]

Originally posted by Geier:

It was unable to annihilate the much smaller German air and ground forces in two weeks. Why would they succeed against the Sovs?

That was the point I believe.

Ah. Well, the Germans didn't have all the guys and all the tanks and all the planes that people are crediting to the Sovs in a possible Sov push past Berlin. My point is that anything the Sovs could mass for such a push would get the crap knocked out of it. IS-2s and IS3s don't run without gas, etc.

I think the far more important factor is that the Western armies would have been hard-pressed to convince their soldiers to fight yet again, and this time against their former Allies. The U.S. troops were already itching to get home. I think the Sov forces woul also have been hard-pressed in the elan area, but I know less about them except that they had more than a court martial waiting for them if the disobeyed.

So I see riots and mutinies in the U.S. Army before I see massive reactions to Sov pushes. That being said, assuming the hypothetical I think the Allied air power at close range and against concentrated forces would have been absolutely devastating. The Sovs would have had no answer.

-dale

[ October 17, 2003, 11:57 AM: Message edited by: dalem ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by dalem:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by dalem:

Allies vs. Sovs in 1945? Before anyone demobilizes?

It's over in two weeks.

Week one - shoot down the Red Air Force.

Week two - bomb the bejeezus out of the Red Army.

I'm too cranky to argue details this time - check past threads.

-dale

Sorry dalem, I must have missed out on the history books that tell how the war ended on the 20th of June 1944. Can you give me the links on Amazon to buy them?

Cheers! </font>

[Andreas]

As for comparing the German and the Soviet supply situation. The Red Army had a much much better grasp on their supply lines than the Germans ever had. They very speedily relayed the (completely destroyed) railway lines, and after the Vistula-Oder operation started creating pipeline battalions capable of laying 30km of fuel pipes per day, IIRC.

The crappy roads are a complete non-issue. All important transport went via rail. The allied airpower had struggled knocking out the few rail lines in Italy in 1944, so I am a bit hesitant to ascribe to them the absolute power to do just that in central Europe in 1945/6.

And just to hammer it in - air power does not win wars. Did not then, does not now. If all one can come up with is that air power would have saved the day for the W.A., I suggest further study of the impact of airpower in WW2.

[argie]

Originally posted by Andreas:

If all one can come up with is that air power would have saved the day for the W.A., I suggest further study of the impact of airpower in WW2.

Better yet, study post-conflict BDA from Kosovo and how Serbians fooled today's aquisition systems with (Soviet) WWII methodology...

[Steiner14]

Originally posted by Ariel:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

If all one can come up with is that air power would have saved the day for the W.A., I suggest further study of the impact of airpower in WW2.

Better yet, study post-conflict BDA from Kosovo and how Serbians fooled today's aquisition systems with (Soviet) WWII methodology... </font>

[flamingknives]

Just a thought, but weren't the Chinese and N. Koreans trained by the Soviets?

[argie]

Not sure about the North Koreans, but Chinese warfare way had nothing to do with Soviet's ways, from what I've read on Korea war.

[Grisha]

Just a thought, but weren't the Chinese and N. Koreans trained by the Soviets?

There were many German advisors in China before WWII, but that didn't seem to have helped the Chinese much against the IJA. Does that mean the Germans were poor troops in WWII?

[stikkypixie]

This is just a question, but if the soviets noticed that their fighter planes were inadequate wouldn't they just develop new ones, in a relatively short time? Like the Germans did, MORE OR LESS based the panther on the T-34? Everything i've read until now is that any advantage one side had will remain on their side. WA could have developed better tanks for example and Soviets better planes. I don't know so you guys tell me.

[flamingknives]

The assumption so far has been that any action will be in a very short space of time; 6-8 months, tops.

Even the germans didn't develop the Panther that quickly - they'd been bumping into T34s for 2 years before they finally fielded the first, unreliable, units.

Development of aircraft on both sides was largely independant of the opposition - each side tried to make the best they could.

There were many German advisors in China before WWII, but that didn't seem to have helped the Chinese much against the IJA. Does that mean the Germans were poor troops in WWII?

I was under the impression that the Soviets had a large part in equipping and training the N.K.s at least.

In such a case, one might have expected some of the operational skills to have rubbed off.

[argie]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

I was under the impression that the Soviets had a large part in equipping and training the N.K.s at least.

In such a case, one might have expected some of the operational skills to have rubbed off.

Not so easy. The Soviet Army already had the main aspects of the Operational Theory fairly well developed by 1941, and look what happened.

[Ruthless]

Ok, I'll pitch in my two cents from a non-grog perspective, but from I think I know a little about warfare and about WWII.

For starters, there's not a clear situation defined here, so there are too many variables to comprehend. When would this engagement take place? Have the Japanese capitulated yet? What is the political will of the president? Of Stalin? Of the fighting men of the countries involved? Who is attacking whom and what are their goals? How much of a factor is partisan activity going to be? Etc.

For the sake of argument, let's say that there are two situations:

(1) Russians try to take Western Europe, Western Allies defend.

(2) Western Allies try to force Russians out of Eastern Europe, Russians defend.

(It is unlikely Western Allies would have had the political will nor the military strength to conquer Russia, so I'll forget about that possibility for now.)

Now, there seem to be a lot of people that are just about to wet themselves over how great the Russians were on the battlefield (and some doing the same for the Americans, too), but let's face it: Russia didn't and couldn't just "roll over" the Germans even when they were horribly undersupplied, understrength, and vastly outnumbered by the Russians, not to mention being attacked on both fronts. So I don't think the Russians could easily push the Americans out of Europe. Similarly, I don't think the Americans and their allies could easily push the Russians out of Eastern Europe. Thus, I don't think that a short war by the Russians would be possible (probably not for the WA, either.) Neither side showed itself to be spectacular on the tactical nor the operation levels, though both had their share of successes (and failures.)

I think it is very unclear which side was superior on the tactical and operational levels, but I think on the strategic levels it is clear (or at least it is to me): The Americans and her allies controlled most of the world, the Russians controlled Russia and Eastern Europe.

Russia had--as far as I know--very little naval capacity and this would make them quite vulnerable, as the WA's navies were quite powerful, including aircraft carriers. This would also allow the WA to invade Russian territory from many different places, making Russia have a similar problem to what the Germans had with the Atlantic Wall--too much border to defend. Additionally, Russia was highly reliant on supplies from the USA (everything from jeeps and aircraft to copper and traincars). Further, the Russian economy and industry was not in good shape. I don't really think the Russians--with no assistance from the US--could keep up with the US' production. I also think that Russia's supply lines would be more vulnerable than the WA because they would be vulnerable to attack from multiple directions.

And the force levels on each side are, I think, misleading. According to what I've read, the Russian army was large, but they lost a LOT of men in the years of fighting and were down to a lot of old men and children (according to von Mellenthin.) Also, the US had not fully exploited its resources in manpower, which could be brought to bear pretty well within a couple months, probably. So, if the Russians could not get a clean victory in a couple of months, they would be hit with a lot of fresh reinforcements.

And in response to someone's comment about the Chinese fighting the Americans in Korea, they should bear in mind that the Chinese lost about a million men just fighting the US to a stalemate in a limited war. We didn't even attempt to attack their homeland, which would have brought a lot more casualties and lost supplies to the Chinese. I do not think the Russians could afford to lose a million men in such a situation, but then I don't think they were as mismatched as the Chinese were, either in terms of technology.

Finally, I think the A-bomb, if ready by the time this hypothetical war broke out, would have been pretty much a deal-breaker for the Russians. I think some here are thinking of strategic bombing of cities like Hitler did with Stalingrad. Only those were regular bombs, which left the city broken, but standing. The A-bomb would pretty well wipe it off the face of the map and make the area hazardous wasteland to humans. I don't think the Russians would continue fighting after one of those was dropped on, say, Leningrad.

Anyway, that's my assessment. The Russians were in no position to get the WA out of Europe and the WA would have had a bloody time getting the Russians out of Eastern Europe, but the WA had most if not all the strategic advantages and this would mean--IMO--victory over the Russians if the WA had the political will to fight a long, bloody battle.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by stikkypixie:

This is just a question, but if the soviets noticed that their fighter planes were inadequate wouldn't they just develop new ones, in a relatively short time? Like the Germans did, MORE OR LESS based the panther on the T-34? Everything i've read until now is that any advantage one side had will remain on their side. WA could have developed better tanks for example and Soviets better planes. I don't know so you guys tell me.

The Soviets actually had several successful high altitude variants of their fighters during the war, including the La-7. But none were ever put into production, because the VVS had enough Spitfire IXs to deal with any possible threat from German heavy bombing.

[Grisha]

I think I'll step out of this one now. I've said all I wish to say. The publications exist to support my points.

[Marlow]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Marlow, are you just talking to talk? You seem to be having a problem with the idea of an effective Soviet force, one that might actually have given the western allies a "modicum" of trouble, had the west decided to attack. But, it's not all that difficult to see the Red Army at the end of WWII was a very effective army,

Exactly which of my posts are you reading? Please point to a spot where I said anything negative about the Soviet Army. I've a great deal of respect for what the Soviets acomplished with their Army in WWII. My points have been focussed on three areas.

1. Several people here are stating over and over "OPERATIONAL ART! OPERATIONAL ART! DECEPTION! DECEPTION!" Fine, but words don't do squat. From what I've read (and I've read a fair number of Glantz' books/articles, and am working my way through Erickson), Soviets were pretty good, but you need to consider the state of their opposition in 44 and 45. My "ninga trains" comment was directed to the posters who place an almost mythic quality over Soviet "operational art" and such. Not much different than those who assume that the German soldiers always kicked ass tactically.

2. That the Soviet air force was ill equiped to deal with the airforce of the WAs, both quantitativly and qualitatively. I've backed up both with numbers.

3. That the manpower difference wasn't 3 to 1 as some suggest.

Now where did I say that the Red Army sucked?

[ October 17, 2003, 10:23 PM: Message edited by: Marlow ]

[Marlow]

Originally posted by Steiner14:

it costs me laugh to imagine, how the US-army would have done in Stalingrad, if i only look into Iraq...

Maybe the Brits would have been capable to deal with the russian soldier, but definately not the Yankees. And the Brits were a bit too few...

Just my 2 cent.

God spare us from morons.

[Marlow]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Marlow, what is really relevant in strength comparisons are frontline troops, not the chaps getting VD in Paris. So while the US had 2.2 million men in Europe in 1945, how many of them were in combat units? Proportionally far less than there were in the Red Army.

It is 3 million, and if you read the posts in this thread, I did address this. However, we can look a little closer.

We’ll start with the numbers provided for the Soviets in this thread(not total manpower, since you say it is irrelevant) . I have no idea if they are correct, but nobody has seen fit to challenge the original poster. 230 divisions and 18000+ tanks.

How do the Western Allies stack up? As I already posted in this thread, the Americans, Commonwealth, and Free French bring 90 divisions (I may be underestimating by 10 or so). Note that this does not include divisions from the Pacific theater, those from Continental US, rearmed Germans, Newly raised French division, or Polish. These divisions are often twice the size of the Soviet divisions, so we’ll call this 150 Soviet Division equivalents. (I’m going with 150 rather than 180 just to allow some error in favor of the Soviets).

Also, as I already posted in this thread, the Americans had a very significant amount of combat power outside of their divisional structure. 45% vs. 20% for the Soviets is the figure I’ve seen. These separate units (only counting the ones in Europe) consisted of 32 separate tank batts. 52 separate TD batts (more than 90% SP by mid 1945). About 5 divisions worth of separate cav units and about 10 divisions worth of separate infantry. Broken down this works out to about 30 divisions (mostly armored divisions) worth of troops. Add another 60 Soviet division equivalents to the equation for a total of 210. The soviets (with 20% extra divisional strength) get another 46 divisions for a total of 276.

210 vs 276 is a lot different from the 3 to 1 odds proposed by some.

Some other factors to consider. You must examine the state of the opposition before you can assume that the Soviets would have the same kind of success against the WAs as against the Germans in 44/45. An average US Infantry division had twice the infantry troops as a late war German division (even one with a full complement of troops), and attached an independent tank and/or TD battalion. This would provide an armored force of between 40 and 90 tanks or TDs. What was the typical establishment of armor for an average German division in late 44 or 45? Bet the average American infantry division could call on as much or more armor than the average late war Panzer division.

Almost forgot to compare the total number of tanks available. Lets see, 15 US armored divisions at about 200 tanks each for 3000. 32 separate batts with about 50 each, for another 1500, about 50 SP TD batts with about 40 TDs each (anti-armor of a tank), for 2000. US total in theater is about 7500. Now we add in a couple of French units – avout 500. Add in the Brits, I’m only guessing now, but I’ll say 3500 (half the number of divisions, so half the armor?). Out total is 11,500.

18000 to 11500 is a lot better than 3 to 1

[ October 17, 2003, 10:56 PM: Message edited by: Marlow ]

[Marlow]

[ October 17, 2003, 10:55 PM: Message edited by: Marlow ]

[Grisha]

Marlow,

I've sent you email from here.

[Andreas]

Marlow, the tank/SP number does not make sens I think. In May 45 there were about ~10,000 tanks with the frontline troops of the Red Army, but another 25,000 or so in the depots.

As for divisional numbers, I think it is around 450, which are usually half the size of those of the W.A. (remember that by this time especially Brit/Canadian units may well be much understrength though). Also, you don't address the teeth vs. tail issue. US/UK divisions were very tail heavy, and did not really bring that much more infantry to the party than a Soviet division of half the size. They had a lot more artillery to be sure, but that is just a question of where this was located (the W.A. did not have artillery divisions). The logistical tail of W.A. divisions was a lot bigger than that of either the Germans or the Red Army. The figures for the share of the tail I have read in a study on Cassino claim the relation was 10% for the Germans late in the war (although that seems very low), 20% for the Soviets and 35% for the W.A.

@Ruthless

late in the war the Soviets tended to just push the Germans around. You can not judge the Red Army of 1945 based on its performance in 1943 anymore than you can judge the US Army in Europe in 1945 based on its performance at Kasserine Pass.