Charge of the Light Brigade

[Bannon DC]

Came across some source material for this older scenario when researching another battle near Sevastopol. These are quick reads... there are many detailed sites. I located the area on Google Earth, but as of this writting it is one of the few low-resolution shots of the Crimea. I'm throwing this up for no other reason other than to share the links. You may want to play the scenario too.

Basic map and desciption of the "Charge" action.

BBC "Infamous Anniversary"

Article from local Nottingham news about "Battlefield Detectives' " Richard Rutherford-Moore. Some pictures of the area.

Interview with Richard Rutherford-Moore

The National Archives -- summary of the action and period map.

National Archives

The full 6 verses of Tennyson's "The Charge of the Light Bridgade."

Tennyson's "The Charge of the Light Brigade"

Many are familiar with the Battlefield Detectives series. Episode was partial inspiration for scenario. This link describes series: book seller

"Charge of the Light Brigade" CMBB Scenario at

The Scenario Depot

[Bannon DC]

Here is Google picture. The Causeway Hills (IIRC) are on the right in the low res part of picture. Can you see the yellow dot in the distance? That is about the middle of the Valley of Death. Funny thing about this picture is the field on fire in the foreground. Doesn't seem like anyone is around putting it out.

Also, this is a good view from one of the strongly defended anchors of the Russian defensive belts in WWII. One of the photos attached on Google Earth shows a concrete anti-tank position with some scattered guns.

]Valley of Death looking west from Mt. Sapun

[Bannon DC]

Here is closer view of the ground where the Charge of the Light Brigade occured. The hills on either side do not seem that step. The end of the valley opens up on the left. What appears to be mist in the background is actually clouds from the ajoining tile.

]Closer view of the valley

[JasonC]

The brigade commander stuffed a perfectly sensible order.

The Russian cavalry was retiring, because the Brit infantry had held them and the heavies had driven in their right flank. The Brit commander wanted to recover the Turkish position to follow up this success, and regain LOS over the north valley, restoring the full position the Turks held in the morning. He had no ambition beyond that.

As the Russian force was retiring this was perfectly sensible, was doctrinally correct, as was the role assigned to the lights - envelop the right of an already beaten cavalry force trying to retire. They were to bring along their horse guns precisely to reoccupy the Turkish position, as the overall commander's previous order had set as the objective.

The guns mentioned in the flubbed order were the Turkish ones taken by the Russians earlier in the day, hence the notion of preventing them from carrying them off, which should have made it obvious which ones were meant. The idea was to restore the consequences of the Turk's defeat and prevent the Russians having made any lasting gain from it.

In Tennyson terms, it was the "cannon to right of them" that were the intended target.

What the overall commander did not count on is the light brigade commander having no real idea what was happening or had happened up to that point. Without which, he found it hard to decode the clues (prevent carrying off etc). He was not the sharpest tack it must be said. He failed to tie in the new order with the objective stated in the previous.

One wonders quite what he thought he was doing - probably he thought he was screening the open left of the Brit position and little else, attention riveted front, and the reorientation to his right (where all the action was taking place, but apparently news to him) disoriented him.

That he then went the whole length of the valley to the Russian battery at the far end of it, was probably more than a mental mistake, however. It is quite likely the horses shied away from the fire on both left and right and stampeded down the open center of the valley. They should have just turned right and taken that one ridge line close at hand, and then ridden along it, clearing it of Russians. Who would have been facing two ways at that point. They had to turn 180 degrees away from the Brit infantry to fire on the light brigade as it ran behind them.

And they cannot of done so very much. The Brits lost only 120 men, not a sign of serious musketry directed at them. The guns to the right, mostly captured plus a few Russian horse guns, the former largely unmanned and the latter facing the wrong way, can't have offered much fire. The guns at the far end were out of range for most of the ride, but doubtless effective at the end of it.

Anyway. What was intended was sensible, what was done was not, and the reason was the lower commander did not have a good mental picture of the unfolding battle, his superior's intentions, or what was expected of him because of them.