Air power is much too strong....

[Jollyguy]

I don't agree that air power is too powerful. If you want to blunt its effectiveness, invest in anti-air radar research.

[husky65]

Originally posted by Brian Rock:

For example Operation Cobra, the heaviest concentrated application of airpower in WWII I can think of, produced perhaps 50% casualties.

I am not aware of any units that were destroyed (by which I mean made combat incapable, as opposed to annihilated) by air power alone.

To Quote General Fritz Bayerlein, on Operation Cobra '70% of my troops were out of action - dead, wounded, crazed or numbed. All my forward tanks were knocked out, and the roads were practically impassable'.

70% casualties in one day.

The shortest turn in SC is one week, the longest one month - project those casualties forward for 1 week of operation Cobra style air attacks and you are looking at combat ineffective in one turn.

To Quote Von Kluge, re air attacks on 22 July:

'Whole armoured formations, allotted to the counter attack, were caught in bomb-carpets of the greatest intensity, so that they could be extricated from the torn up ground only by prolonged effort and in some cases only by dragging them out. The result was that they arrived too late. It is immaterial whether such a bomb carpet catches good troops or bad, they are more or less annihalated.'

[Scorpion_22]

Husky, whatever useful things you might want to say are ignored because you have proven yourself to be a complete dolt by adopting a hostile posture from the word go.

Here I am trying to create a sensible discussion out of it, and out of the blue comes some "historically learned person" to attack the initial poster with insults.

You, sir, must be a very sad individual.

Because I do not spend my time doing things that I don´t like ie. talking to people like you, this is my final post on the subject. All because it is a fruitless discussion anyway as nothing will ever be done about it.

Some of your arguments do make good sense, some of them don´t.

The way I envisioned the airfleets :

1.Their "hard attack" value could stay at about the same while soft attack should drop a bit.

(If you think that armies are just as vulnerable to troop loss than tanks....well.....oh and demolishing a unit´s supply, organic transports and some command sections would make that same, formerly veteran unit a green unit when reorganised?)

Sure, massive casualties to infantry (tens of thousands of combat troops) are possible in the time frame you described but the conditions it requires are a bit special, don´t you think?

However, like I originally said, and like you confirmed multiple times, tanks are vulnerable to air units.

2. Readiness should be affected for the ongoing and the following turn.

Currently air attacks cause no damage to readiness & supply. This is probably because they cause so great casualties that if they caused readiness damage they´d be even more powerful!

This is why I think it´d be best to tone down the casualties and implement readiness damage.

I just think this´d be the best method of representing losses to supply, organic transport and command units. A low-readiness and supply unit would be crippled in combat effectiveness and would not be nearly as mobile.

Just causing strength losses does nothing to mobility....

3.

Casualties caused to (especially "soft" units) rise too sharply with airfleet experience.

This is one of the major gripes for me....if the casualties stayed at the "inexperienced" level, all would seem to be fine.

Of course some improvement would be expected (especially against armor)....it just seems too dramatic.

4. There should be a way to research anti-aircraft technology (beyond for those units who are on top of strategic objectives)

One poster said that airpower can be countered by investing in AA radar.....well...that is unfortunately untrue.

Air effectiveness would be more tolerable IF There was a way for ground troops to concentrate an attack on one spot ie. to stack units.

Husky, you calling me a poor strategist is again the mark of a small mind.

I did not come here to gripe at this because of having lost all of my games to opponents using these tactics!

Quite the contrary, 4 times out of 5 I have been the one winning the air war and demolishing the opponent after that, regardless of his industrial capacity or ground troops, and found that this kind of conclusion to the games became boring.

Inexperienced air units of similar tech level simply cannot and will not compete with airfleets of superior experience.

You can rant all you want here, but I won´t be here to read ´em, Husky.

I would similarly suggest that you do some reading on social interaction before you engage in "civilized" conversation again.

[Desert Dave]

As originally posted by arby:

One of the things I'd like to do if I wasn't math-challenged is figure out the break-even point. I'm relatively sure that a unit at 9 with 1 experience is better than a unit at 10 with none. How about 8? 7? Am I better off reinforcing a unit with experience once it gets to a certain point, even if I lose that experience? And what is that point?

Once upon a time I used to try and figure a break point, only it was on a clumsy surfboard out near Pacific Palisades -- you had to crouch down and do a little dance (... presumably to appease the Great Kahuna) and somehow FIT IN with the flow of the ocean universe... and not incidentally, show off for the California lasses strolling ashore... )

As for this one, it is uncertain, and probably should be, how best to maximize each unit.

Mostly I go by hunch or intuition (after all, your subconcious is FULLY aware of your game situation, even if your mind is aghast at what perilous position you now find yourself in... again!) and try to keep each unit strong enough to withstand potential counter-attacks without being decimated to the extent that another reinforcement will reduce the hard-gained experience even further. :eek:

I'm sure you recognize this casual ploy, and maybe even do the same, but as to precision -- I am fairly sure that this will never be attained (in any endeavor) but also confident that we as a species will never stop trying to reach... further and farther, even if the direction is toward the interior (as magic-inclined Carl Jung) rather than -- outward, to some distant but much becoming Star.

[Panzer Cmdr]

As stated in a previous reply, I think the concept of airfleets/bombers operating from airbases only would help equalize war. Planes should not just be allowed to land just anywhere (swamps, mountains or woods for example) but even in these places it may be possible to build airfields since it could be argued that the whole 50 mile hex is not complete forest, swamp etc... just make it cost more MPP's to build in these areas. Again this change would be more of a major change for SC2 and probally not just a patch. It may be also allowable to operate air units from cities to with a general note to say it assumes each major city has an airfield. A country would thus only be allowed to build a maximum of airfleets/bombers equal to sum of available cities/airfields (only new aircraft can be placed at a city or airfield - so if America put an aircraft at a British Airfield it really would not limit America's limit)

This would be especially good for a proposed SC Pacif, where it would be silly to just keep landing planes on islands and instantly operating from there. This would allow strategic placement of airfields, capturing of key islands (perhaps those with enemy airfields) and in turn it will make air power planning more strategic and less of an option to just buy as many airfleets as possible).

[husky65]

Originally posted by Scorpion_22:

Husky, whatever useful things you might want to say are ignored because you have proven yourself to be a complete dolt by adopting a hostile posture from the word go.

ie you have posted on a subject you don't understand, this has been pointed out to you in detail and now you are peeved.

Like I care about your opinion.

Here I am trying to create a sensible discussion out of it, and out of the blue comes some "historically learned person" to attack the initial poster with insults.

No here is a case of someone who admits ignorance of the subject matter asking 'who are you to say I've forgotten the scale' - remember?

I then go on to provide historical examples of why your contention is absurd, you get miffed.

You, sir, must be a very sad individual.

Because I do not spend my time doing things that I don´t like ie. talking to people like you, this is my final post on the subject. All because it is a fruitless discussion anyway as nothing will ever be done about it.

So lets just get this straight, you post crap that you don't understand, get miffed when it is pointed out you don't understand it, take the facts presented personally, then after being unable to support ANY of the points you raised as problems, decide to take a 'I'm too good for this sort of argument' approach (whilst simultaneously trying to get the last kick in and run away).

Whilst your last statement 'All because it is a fruitless discussion anyway as nothing will ever be done about it.' actually shows that you didn't understand the issues you raised, but now realise that they were not broken - they work fine, you just didn't understand how it worked.

I respect that level of intellectual integrity when displayed by a 12 year old.

The way I envisioned the airfleets :

1.Their "hard attack" value could stay at about the same while soft attack should drop a bit.

(If you think that armies are just as vulnerable to troop loss than tanks....well.....oh

it would be interesting to know if this is english - do you have a point?

and demolishing a unit´s supply, organic transports and some command sections would make that same, formerly veteran unit a green unit when reorganised?)

So you think that just because a unit has an experienced Jager in the foxhole it doesn't matter that his HQ, supply and Comms troops have never been in combat or worked together before?

You really need to read up BEFORE you comment.

Sure, massive casualties to infantry (tens of thousands of combat troops) are possible in the time frame you described but the conditions it requires are a bit special, don´t you think?

However, like I originally said, and like you confirmed multiple times, tanks are vulnerable to air units.

I would recommend that you have a good read and find out how many actual infantry there are in an infantry unit, you might also want to consider how effective they will be with no comms, little supply, disprupted leadership etc.

As I suggested before, tanks are not the only units vulnerable to air attack, Infantry units are too, all units are - there are plenty of historical references available, read some.

2. Readiness should be affected for the ongoing and the following turn.

Currently air attacks cause no damage to readiness & supply. This is probably because they cause so great casualties that if they caused readiness damage they´d be even more powerful!

This is why I think it´d be best to tone down the casualties and implement readiness damage.

I just think this´d be the best method of representing losses to supply, organic transport and command units. A low-readiness and supply unit would be crippled in combat effectiveness and would not be nearly as mobile.

Just causing strength losses does nothing to mobility....

So you want to ignore well documented historical reality in favor of a more complex and less intuitive system?

The point isn't how to do it? the point is why?

3.

Casualties caused to (especially "soft" units) rise too sharply with airfleet experience.

This is one of the major gripes for me....if the casualties stayed at the "inexperienced" level, all would seem to be fine.

Of course some improvement would be expected (especially against armor)....it just seems too dramatic.

Remember all those historical accounts I've suggested you peruse?

Go read them, you are making a fool of yourself.

The damage massed allied airpower did WAS extremely 'dramatic'.

4. There should be a way to research anti-aircraft technology (beyond for those units who are on top of strategic objectives)

The Germans thought so IRL too, their flak panzers and Halftracks were usually the first vehicles killed, because they attracted attention.

Until the advent of the light/medium weight SAM, there was no real counter to CAS and the game does not run long enough to credibly develop the SA-7/Redeye class weapons.

Air effectiveness would be more tolerable IF There was a way for ground troops to concentrate an attack on one spot ie. to stack units.

Oh good, the answer to you disliking well documented historical fact is to fundamentally change the game system?

Husky, you calling me a poor strategist is again the mark of a small mind.

So when you post things that show your lack of strategic ability and pretend they are fundamental flaws with the game I should simply giggle quietly and say nothing?

Feel free to prove your contention - how does this mark me as small minded?

I did not come here to gripe at this because of having lost all of my games to opponents using these tactics!

Inexperienced air units of similar tech level simply cannot and will not compete with airfleets of superior experience.

Are you actually setting out to prove that you are utterly clueless? - ask the Japanese about how dramatic the difference is between experienced pilots and inexperienced pilots, or take a look at the kill rates achieved by experienced Luftwaffe pilots such as Hartmann V that of a guy just out of training.

You can rant all you want here, but I won´t be here to read ´em, Husky.

I would similarly suggest that you do some reading on social interaction before you engage in "civilized" conversation again.

Thats the way, if you can't argue the points, label them as a 'rant' and then pretend that your ongoing total display of ignorance of the subject matter puts you on some higher level than people who have read up on the subject extensively.

BTW, when did a public display of ignorance become "civilized" behaviour?

[Scorpion_sk]

Ah yes, in my opinion, operational movement should be the one way to "re-base" the aircraft....

[Brian Rock]

Originally posted by Scorpion_22:

70% casualties in one day.

Hey, 50%, 70% - what's 20% between friends?

It's not clear that the 70% was caused entirely by airpower. Let's presume that it was. To put this into context they were hit with 4,000 ton of bombs on that one day (July 25).

http://www.forces70.freeserve.co.uk/Panzer%20Lehr/Panzer%20Lehr.htm

The shortest turn in SC is one week, the longest one month - project those casualties forward for 1 week of operation Cobra style air attacks and you are looking at combat ineffective in one turn.

[Bruce70]

Just because it wasn't the norm IRL doesn't mean that a player shouldn't be able to make it the norm in the game. I don't know if the damage model is right, but the point in question (as I understand it) is "is it possible?". Cobra proves that it is.

[Bruce70]

Just thought I would add that, in the games I have played, air power is only used against one or two units per turn. So it isn't really the "norm" in any case - most combat is undertaken without air support. Most of us prefer to concentrate our airsupport but if we spread it around it wouldn't have a large impact at all.

[Brian Rock]

Originally posted by Bruce70:

Just because it wasn't the norm IRL doesn't mean that a player shouldn't be able to make it the norm in the game.

True, to a point, although I it's fair to ask how feasible that outcome is.

(Of course, since it's his game Hubert might decide to put in level 9 flying laser tanks, at which point historical considerations become moot.)

I don't know if the damage model is right, but the point in question (as I understand it) is "is it possible?". Cobra proves that it is.

Not necessarily. It proved that a single already damaged division - not an entire corp or army - was capable of losing 50-70% of casualties to air in unique circumstances.

It doesn't necessarily follow that what can be done to a division can be done to an entire corp or army, nor does it follow something happened that happened once in exceptional circumstances can be repeated regularly.

By analogy, suppose I buy a new car this week. That proves it is possible for me to buy a new car, but it wouldn't be reasonable to conclude that I this proves I can buy a new car every week.

[ September 16, 2002, 04:29 AM: Message edited by: Brian Rock ]

[husky65]

Originally posted by Brian Rock:

It's not clear that the 70% was caused entirely by airpower. Let's presume that it was. To put this into context they were hit with 4,000 ton of bombs on that one day (July 25).

It is clear from the context of the quote that he is referring to the Air attack prior to the ground assault.

But is it reasonable to use Cobra level attacks as a benchmark? The bombing of the Panzer Lehr is possibly the largest single concentration during the entire war (if there is another case I'm happy to be corrected). I don't think you can use a statistical outlier and then project it as a norm.

Possibly the largest tactical concentration bombing, but hardly the largest concentration bombing of the war, particularly when you consider the ability to do it day and night onto the same target for a week to a month.

[Ancient One]

I have to agree that air power is too powerful in SC, I like how it worked in CoS better.

[iolo]

Air power is mofo deadly in SC but I think it has to be because of the 'no-stacking' rule.

Without the air strikes you would have a really hard time even breaking through a single line of corps, much less a double.

[Canuck_para]

Originally posted by iolo:

Air power is mofo deadly in SC but I think it has to be because of the 'no-stacking' rule.

Without the air strikes you would have a really hard time even breaking through a single line of corps, much less a double.

I agree iolo. Without stacking or combined unit assaults it is fairly hard to breakthrough without airpower. I did like airpower in COS, which softened up units. However SC works beacause of the lack of those things. Strong airpower allows Blitzkreigs within the confines of the game structure.

And Husky66, you should relax a bit. You seem to be rather hostile.

[Madison]

I think air is all to powerful. It basicly dominates the AI and seems to me to be the deciding factor in hot seat games. I could not have taken France from my human opponent without no less than 4-5 air fleets.

One time playing AI which I have whipped except for expert, I had the Italians with level 5 long range aircraft and level 5 bombers and I was shelling the U.S. from Spain/Portugal!!!! It was grand!! Each hit did like 5 damage and 2 bombers was all it took to Dresden each American city to 0. At that point I just quit buying units it was ridiculous, I had like 10,000 MP's accrued and didn't need to spend any more. I was even disbanding most of the units out of bordom of moving them.

Its odd, I have been able to beat the AI on intermediate but one game I am in the allies landed in 42 in France and have blasted my corps there to dust with like 5-7 air units, 2 carriers and a Jutland sized surface fleet. I could not keep a unit in Brest more than 1 turn. It would get shelled to death. I must of lost 1/2 of all my casualties in the game to Air alone. I was trying to keep up page on the meat grind in the east with only 350ish money per turn. Depressing but I am almost through 1944 and still on Soviet soil by a few hexes. I have pushed the allies back to brest but I spend everything down to 0 dollars trying to keep units alive.

That kinda turned into a book, sorry for the length of post but again, AIR is very powerful, and I like the idea of dropping readiness or even reducing movement or making operational movement restricted some how?

John

[Brian Rock]

Originally posted by husky65:

It is clear from the context of the quote that he is referring to the Air attack prior to the ground assault.

I don't agree. The full paragraph from the website I found with the quote reads as follows:

During "Operation Cobra" on July 25th the USAAF dropped 4,000 tons of bombs on the Panzer Lehr division and it was during this raid that American troops were bombed by there own planes. Among those killed was Leutnant-General Leslie McNair who was commander of the American ground forces. He was buried in great secrecy. During the American attack with no possibility of retreat the Panzer Lehr fought virtually to the last man among the shell holes and craters of their division. General Bayerlin described the landscape as "looking like the surface of the moon. After an hour I had no communication and all my forward tanks were knocked out. At least 70 percent of my troops are dead, wounded, crazed or numbed".

Note the time sequence: </font>[*]The USAAF drops 4,000 tons of bombs</font>[*]The Americans attack, and the Panzer Lehr "fought virtually to the last man"</font>[*]Then the Baylerlein quote that "After an hour I had no communication and all my forward tanks were knocked out. At least 70 percent of my troops are dead, wounded, crazed or numbed".

http://www.aero-web.org/history/wwii/d-day/13.htm

Possibly the largest tactical concentration bombing...

Let me clarify I don't have a problem with the strategic bombing model. My question is about the ability of air power to destroy entire corps and armies.

...but hardly the largest concentration bombing of the war, particularly when you consider the ability to do it day and night onto the same target for a week to a month.

I'd be interested in any specific examples.

In the meantime, for your reading pleasure, two links to papers about the effectiveness of battlefield airpower. The first, "Attacks on German ground combat units in Normandy" is rather skeptical, the second "Battlefield Air Support

A Retrospective Assessment" presents a more complex picture of strengths and weaknesses:

http://w1.183.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/articles/airpower.html

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/2spr90.html

[Bruce70]

We are talking about what would happen if practically every tactical bomber of either side attacked a single 50sqkm area for two weeks and more or less without opposition. I think the results of that would be pretty devestating.

But perhaps we are concentrating on the damage rather than the policy. Why weren't air fleets used in this way week in, week out? and do these reasons exist in the game?

[husky65]

Originally posted by Bruce70:

But perhaps we are concentrating on the damage rather than the policy. Why weren't air fleets used in this way week in, week out? and do these reasons exist in the game?

Look at D-Day, Day one, over 10,000 allied sorties plus the availability of more if it were needed.

The reason strategic bombers were not routinely used for tactical bombing was that they tore up the ground to an extent that it made advancing difficult.

They also belonged to different commands, that did not like being subordinated.

[husky65]

Originally posted by Brian Rock:

General Bayerlin described the landscape as "looking like the surface of the moon. After an hour I had no communication and all my forward tanks were knocked out. At least 70 percent of my troops are dead, wounded, crazed or numbed".

Having read the article you suggests supports your contention, I'm simply amazed that you arrived at that conclusion.

"The first line has [sic] been annihilated by the bombing.... The three-hour bombardment on 25.7-after the smaller one a day before-had extermi- nating morale effect on the troops physically and morally weakened by continual hard fighting for 45 days. The long duration of the bombing, without any possibility for opposition, created depressions and a feeling of helplessness, weakness and inferiority. Therefore the morale attitude of a great number of men grew so bad that they, feeling the uselessness of fighting, surrendered, deserted to the enemy or escaped to the rear, as far as they survived the bombing. Only particularly strong nerved and brave men could endure this strain. "

You will note that the original quote says "after 1 hour, 70% cas etc" - the bombing lasted 3 hours.

I'd be interested in any specific examples.

Saturday 24th July beginning of Operation 'Gomorrah' when 746 RAF bombers drop 2,300 tons of bombs on Hamburg in 48 minutes,

Sunday 25th The USAAF bomb the city again in daylight,

Wednesday 28th The second mass raid on Hamburg by 722 RAF bombers results in nine square miles of city being set alight.

Thursday 29th The mass evacuation of a million civilians from Hamburg is ordered after the seventh British (Night) or American (Day) air-raid in six days.

Monday 2 Aug 43, The ninth attack on Hamburg in eight days. More bombs have now been dropped on Hamburg than on London during the whole of the Blitz.

- this was in 1943, later the allies ability to deliver bombs (and do so accurately) would go up sharply.

All up Bomber Command flew 3,095 sorties and dropped over 8,600 tons of bombs on Hamburg.

In the meantime, for your reading pleasure, two links to papers about the effectiveness of battlefield airpower. The first, "Attacks on German ground combat units in Normandy" is rather skeptical, the second "Battlefield Air Support

A Retrospective Assessment" presents a more complex picture of strengths and weaknesses:

I've read accounts by those on the receiving end of that airpower - they were utterly convinced that it was decisive.

[Doomsday1]

Without doubt air power is strong, and it should be. Too strong in SC...maybe. I just read an article titled "Thunderbolt Strike on the Road to Montelimar" by William Cogan Jr. which graphically descripes how P-47 fighter bombers from the US 79th fighter group shot up and destroyed over 2,000 enemy vehichles on a 30 mile stretch of highway as they (Germans)retreated through the Southern France , July '44. "[A]s we travelled up the Rhone valley, wrote one flier, the destructive powers of the fighter-bombers became apparent with grim clarity that none of us had ever fully realized". This carnage was exacted in a mater of hours. Of course this was not an everyday event, or even a weekly occurence. Part of what is lacking in the game, IMHO, is artillery, namely AA. The Germans effectively employed the dreaded '88' as an effective AA weapon, and flakpanzers to protect not only vital material resources, but men as well. The AI in SC simply does not punish airpower enough for attacking men or armored units unless they are covered by friendly interceptors.

The question is, is it realisitic to have say 5 air fleets pound one army group while ignoring numerous other threats and remain unscathed? If these aggressors were damaged, (fighter bomber losses were common occurence among the P-47s and Typhoons, and I am sure the Soviets lost their fair share), then said aggressor would have to repair those fighters before taking to the skies to rain destruction from the skies. a bit of a reprieve.

For game play, without the benefit of strong air units being able to cripple opposing units, and as my dear friend/PBEM enemy Iolo pointed out, (you owe me a turn!) the war just degrades into trench warfare without eiher side gaining a clear advantage.

Solution: Some type of overall limit on how many fleets can attack a single unit, or some kind of reciprocal damage? I am not sure. As someone pointed out earlier, lack of trained, skilled pilots was very much part of the undoing of the Luftwaffe, and very much so for the Japanese. What makes sense for SC?

[Brian Rock]

Operation Gomorrah isn't an example of a combat unit being wiped out by bombing. It's an example of a city being strategically bombed.

I'm not questioning whether the Allies could drop bombs - they did - I'm questioning whether they ever destroyed an entire army or corps.

Having read the article you suggests supports your contention, I'm simply amazed that you arrived at that conclusion.

And I'm simply amazed that having read the article you think that "the Panzer Lehr fought virtually to the last man among the shell holes and craters of their division" doesn't imply action against ground forces.

Nor is this the only article that relates to ground combat:

The 2nd SS and 17th SS panzer divisions on the front were fully committed to defence of the line and had no reserves left. Panzer Lehr had been pretty much destroyed by the bombing and the fighting that followed it.

http://www.valourandhorror.com/DB/BACK/Cobra.htm

Now Bayerlein's original quote may have been solely in reference to the bombing. I don't have the original quote so I don't know, but based on the quoted article it is not clear.

I've read accounts by those on the receiving end of that airpower - they were utterly convinced that it was decisive.

Perhaps, but belief in decisiveness!= proof of destruction. Let me say it again, show me evidence of an army or corp being destroyed by airpower.

[Brian Rock]

Originally posted by Doomsday1:

I just read an article titled "Thunderbolt Strike on the Road to Montelimar" by William Cogan Jr. which graphically descripes how P-47 fighter bombers from the US 79th fighter group shot up and destroyed over 2,000 enemy vehichles...

I'm having trouble believing this.

The German 19th Army lost 2,100 vehicles in total over eight days at Montelimar, and at least one source attributes most of this to the 75,000 artillery rounds fired by the Allies.

http://www.kwanah.com/txmilmus/36division/archives/montelim/montelim.htm

http://members.aol.com/cog143in/Narrative.html

Pilots are notoriously bad at accurately estimating kills.

Often the German attack at Mortain is used as an example to show the effectiveness of the fighter-bombers as tank killers. But in fact this engagement is rather an example of vastly exaggerated claims. The British 2nd TAF claimed to have destroyed or damaged 140 German tanks in the Mortain area 7 - 10 August, while 9th US Air Force claimed 112.1 This actually exceeded the number of German tanks employed in the operation. In fact no more than 46 tanks were lost in the operation and of these only nine had been hit by air weapons.

http://w1.183.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/articles/airpower.html

[ September 17, 2002, 04:35 AM: Message edited by: Brian Rock ]

[Bruce70]

Originally posted by Doomsday1:

Solution: Some type of overall limit on how many fleets can attack a single unit, or some kind of reciprocal damage? I am not sure. As someone pointed out earlier, lack of trained, skilled pilots was very much part of the undoing of the Luftwaffe, and very much so for the Japanese. What makes sense for SC?

I do not believe that is the answer even *if* there needs to be one. Unless it was physically impossible IRL then it should be possible in the game.

*If* there were good reasons why this was not a regular occurence IRL then those same reasons (or some abstraction thereof) need to be modelled in the game. For example a limit on the number of total airfleets (representing shortage of pilots as you point out) could be a possible solution. But even then you have to ask "could more pilots have been trained IRL?".

Increasing the amount of reciprocal damage, as you put it, would be a better solution IMO, which brings us back to the question of AA research for ground units not on a strategic target. The more I think about it the more I am convinced that this should be included in AA research. I haven't heard an argument against it (but I could easily have missed it) while several people have suggested it in various threads. Are there any nay-sayers to this proposed change?

[SirReal]

Bruce, it's so nice to see someone take up a fight against a troll! =)

Especially since the troll, while profusely declaring it's historical knowledge, never actually provides the nice references you do.

/SirReal