Steve (BTS): ROF of ISU-152

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Jeff the data is not diferentiated the ROF is what the guns are 'capable of' per minute & thats the only explanation given other then shell weight, artillery piece weight and maximum range.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It was a joke John. There is no difference.

[Jeff Duquette]

John:

By the way nice list of data. Thanks for digging. May I ask from where you procured it?

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

John:

By the way nice list of data. Thanks for digging. May I ask from where you procured it?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Jeff the data is some page copies i have from Volz's Soviet Artillery Weapons an 3 part series from Soviet Armed Forces Review volumes. A friend sent me some copies of the pages with the data on Soviet Arty pieces.

Regards, John Waters

[ 06-10-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Jeff Duquette]

danke. Are these articles by Volz worth any in effort in obtaining?

[Stalin's Organ]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

....the IS-2 was meant to deal with German fortifications, & be frontaly immune to the standard German AT gun, the7.5 cm PAK.40

ROF realy wasnt an issue vs bunkers & fixed AT positions, except in ammunition limitations, as it would be if the task was tank vs tank fighting. Another aspect concerning the IS-2, is they only carried 5 - 7 AP-T rounds, out of the 28 main gun round's the main loadout was OF (HE) rounds for the above reasons.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yeah...but CM uses AP vs bunkers if it's available, not HE, so it could actually be a MAJOR hassle!!

anyone know if this particular "bug" is goign to be fixed??

[Stalin's Organ]

JasonC wrote that the 122 would have about the same blast as the 4.5".

My comment:

The Brit/US 4.5" was renowned for it's LOW quantity of HE filling. I'm not sure if it is modelled in CM (I haven't ever used them), but it should have a quite low blast for the size of gun - it's main role was counter-batter I believe, as it had a very good range.

So I'd expect the Russian 122's to have quite a lot higher blast than the 4.5".

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Stalin's Organ:

Yeah...but CM uses AP vs bunkers if it's available, not HE, so it could actually be a MAJOR hassle!!

anyone know if this particular "bug" is goign to be fixed??<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well that could pose a problem considering the Soviet's used HE mainly vs bunkers at least concerning the SU-152, ISU-152 & IS-2.

Regards, John Waters

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

danke. Are these articles by Volz worth any in effort in obtaining?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Jeff I think the excerpts i have are worth their weight in gold . Problem is getting them translated i think thats why Mikel only sent me the charts. Also i have no clue on page numbers etc to point you to Jeff, as the few pages are xeroxed & faded.

Regards, John Waters

[Jeff Duquette]

I tracked your lead to:

"Volz, Arthur G. "Soviet Artillery Weapons, Parts 2-3", Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, Vols. 11-12, 1987-88, Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1989, 1993.

And found it listed at:

http://www.ai-press.com/SAFRA.html

So you are saying this Publication is in Russian...oh my? :eek:

[JasonC]

To Stalin's Organ - fair enough on the realistic blast of the 4.5". But in CM it gets midway between a 105mm and a 155mm. That is, 77, 125, 200 respectively, with each of those steps 1.6 times. Arguably this overrates the Allied 4.5", but it would be about correct for the 122mm. 62% more blast than a 105 is nothing to sneeze at...

[Username]

---------------------------------------------Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

....the IS-2 was meant to deal with German fortifications, & be frontaly immune to the standard German AT gun, the7.5 cm PAK.40

ROF realy wasnt an issue vs bunkers & fixed AT positions, except in ammunition limitations, as it would be if the task was tank vs tank fighting. Another aspect concerning the IS-2, is they only carried 5 - 7 AP-T rounds, out of the 28 main gun round's the main loadout was OF (HE) rounds for the above reasons.

-----------------------------------

I have always thought that was the intent. To further clarify, it was meant to get closer to these immobile targets than the SP 122 or 152s. It had the armor and if it lost mobility could fight on with the turret. It was really a turreted SP gun.

But that was the plan and the reality is that anything goes in the front lines. Doctrine looks good on paper but gets burned to ashes in practice.

So the IS2s had run-ins with all kinds of vehicles: Tanks, TDs , assault guns, etc. It could have even been used as a clean up vehicle KOing immobilized panzers that were cut-off. Doing this at long range with HE would have been possible.

The bottom line is that just like the US TD doctrine, the russian IS2 doctrine (whatever it was) didnt last long in combat. It was an asset and it had to be a player. In face-offs with fast shooting tanks, it might have been best to pull back and reload with AP as SOP.

Lewis

[Skipper]

> The bottom line is that just like the US

> TD doctrine, the russian IS2 doctrine

> (whatever it was) didnt last long in

> combat.

Point 1. It did.

> It was an asset and it had to be a player.

> In face-offs with fast shooting tanks, it

> might have been best to pull back and

> reload with AP as SOP.

Point 2. SOP was to fire the already loaded HE at the target, then load AP.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

>

Point 1. It did.

Point 2. SOP was to fire the already loaded HE at the target, then load AP.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It did? It did what?

I am making a point that to pull back and un-ass the HEs and bomb up with a better mix of APs to HEs would have been much better than your SOP. Got a source BTW?

Thanks Skippy.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Username:

The bottom line is that just like the US TD doctrine, the russian IS2 doctrine (whatever it was) didnt last long in combat. It was an asset and it had to be a player. In face-offs with fast shooting tanks, it might have been best to pull back and reload with AP as SOP.

Lewis<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well actualy if you want to break this down to doctrinal vs feild practices. In feild practice Ie, reality IS-2's were not even deployed, until German armor had been eliminated by T-34's etc in the area the IS-2s were to operate in.

Basicly yes an IS-2 Brigade would engage an stray German tank etc, using its small AP-T ration but it was not SOP as generaly the area was already clear of German armor, as well as the Medium Brigada were deployed on the flanks of the IS-2s AOE as well.

The deployment of Heavy Tank Brigada was strictly controlled & they were only used in controled situations Ie, generaly no German armor present, this is one of the reasons that IS-2 crews gad an 20% higher survival rate then T-34 tankers etc. But this was also do to the limited number of IS-2s available in the HTB's. This is not to say IS-2's didn't engage German armor but it was a rare occurnce at best.

Regards, John Waters

[ 06-10-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Jeff Duquette]

Without diverging from the real topic too much, US Tank Destroyer philosophy\doctrine is often perceived as a failure. Tank Destroyer Doctrine however, – with a few notable exceptions (ala Mortain, Dom Butgenbach, and Krinkelt) – was never really implemented. In 20 words or less TD doctrine, in its simplest form, was ultimately a defensive role. Massed anti-tank fire was to be employed in a reactionary\counter-punching mode against armored breakthroughs (incidentally Mortain, Dom Butgenbach, and Krinkelt, were all successful defensive employments of massed SPTD’s and TD’s against armored breakthroughs).

In practice tank destroyer battalions were typically broken up and parceled out piecemeal. TD sections or platoon-sized packets were scattered about into infantry regiments and battalions to supplement these infantry units’ inadequate organic anti-tank capabilities. 1943 - 45 US organic anti-tank assets for infantry battalions\regiments consisted of the outmatched 57mm ATG. TD battalions were broken and not employed enmasse as they were doctrianally intended.

Their role as a massed reserve of mobile anti-tank pieces was never really implemented because, with perhaps the exception of trained TD officers and TD NCOs, their intended use was not understood, nor was an attempt really made to indoctrinate command and staff officers who regulated TD unit deployments. SPTD’s were often employed in a roles better suited to the capabilities of tanks or assault guns. They were also often employed in an indirect fire mode.

To imply that TD doctrine never survived first contact with the enemy is an overly broad generalization or a misrepresentation of the actual history surrounding TD units and their employment.

Just my two cents worth on US Tank Destroyers.

=========================================

Regarding Soviet Assault Guns, I would have to agree with John Water’s assessment. But again there is much more to this tale than big slow rate of fire guns mounted on tank chassises.

Soviet Indirect Artillery practices were not up to par with artillery practices and trends in most western armies. This is not to imply that Soviet Indirect artillery practices were not sophisticated. However, it is relatively well established that WWII Soviet indirect artillery was not particularly adept at executing “impromptu fire missions”. This was partly a function of limited availability of radio equipment. It was also a reflection of the vast number trained artillery observers lost in the initial years of the war. Competent FO’s were seemingly a real commodity in the Red Army of say 41 to 43. Registration fires were typically conducted days before an actual offensive. Numerous points of registration would be established within MLR areas as well as in anticipated march routes of German Counter attacks.

The unexpected often seemingly arises during attacks, and Red Army’s ability to rapidly adjust indirect artillery to deal with targets not falling into conveniently established pre-registered points chalked onto a batteries gun shields was apparently a rather drawn out process. An impromptu call for fire might take minutes for an American or British battery between the initial FO’s request for fire and the battery informing the FO “On the Way”. This same operation could take Soviet batteries hours to accomplish…if it was accomplished at all. The Soviets supplemented this “chink” in their indirect fire umbrella via employment of a great deal of direct HE fire. This supplemental direct fire role would originate from both towed artillery pieces ala the dreaded 76.2mm crash-boom, as well as self-propelled guns and assault guns, like the SU-76, SU-122 and SU-152.

Just my 20 fenigs worth…long winded…but what the heck, it ensures that it wont be read by the faint of heart Looking forward to Jason trashing my lack of artillery savie

[ 06-11-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[Skipper]

>>> the russian IS2 doctrine

>>> (whatever it was) didnt last long in

>>> combat.

>> Point 1. It did.

> It did? It did what?

Russian IS2 doctrine lasted long in combat. Ie, in essence the theory survived implementation.

[Skipper]

> I am making a point that to pull back and

> un-ass the HEs and bomb up with a better

> mix of APs to HEs would have been much

> better than your SOP.

You are wrong, because most german vehicles could be KO'd or at least seriously damaged by a 122 mm HE. While firing the HE and loading the AP, they could back out or stop and fire away or keep rolling, depending on tactical situation.

> Got a source BTW?

Yes. Article on IS-2 in http://armor.kiev.ua/. In Russian.

[Wilhammer]

The US TD doctrine was based on the kind of battle experienced in France 1940.

As said, when the TD doctrine was used, it worked.

US theater doctine in Europe was different than most others. The US essentially elected to grind down the entire front. Thus, with few exceptions, American forces were always on an offensive posture.

If the war had been fought like it had in Russia or even in the early war, the difference would of been a front with offensives focal at few points and counter thrusts against the flanks by enemy not engaged in that region. Thus, the TD would of had greater opportunity to practice it doctrine.

As it was, the only real armored counterattack by the Germans against post D-Day US forces showed that the doctrine worked.

[Jeff Duquette]

John:

The Golz articles on Red Army Artillery are all in English. I just received an email back from “Academic International Press” indicating all their publications are in English (or maybe he meant American ).

One more from W. Fleischer (pg 153) on SU-152 ROF:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>For an armored vehicle weighing 45.5 tons, the SU-152 was remarkably low (2450 mm). The armament was noteworthy: The 152.4 mm howitzer-cannon could fire shells weighing 39.94 to 43.56 kg with an initial velocity between 600 and 900 m/sec. The gun's traverse field was 12 degrees, the elevation range from -5 to +18 degrees. The shell and cartridge case were loaded separately, which kept the rate of fire comparatively low, two to three rounds per minute. For targeting a KT-5 or ST-IO telescopic sight was used. The armor was up to 75 mm thick. Thanks to the powerful W-2-K Diesel engine, a top speed of 43 kph was possible.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

John:

The Golz articles on Red Army Artillery are all in English. I just received an email back from “Academic International Press” indicating all their publications are in English (or maybe he meant American ).

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thx Jeff I had no clue as I said all i recieved was a couple zeroxed pages, with the authors name, hand written authors & title & a note about other stuff needing translation.

Regards, John Waters

[ 06-13-2001: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Jeff Duquette]

John:

Off topic, but I figure you are porbably a good person to ask. Do you have info on glacis and lower front hull slopes for JS-III (or a recomended source)? The glacis is rather inovative in its appearnce with a central crown, and a glacis that slopes away from the crown. Info from my sorces is rather scarce on this 3D sloping effect of the JS-III.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

John:

Off topic, but I figure you are porbably a good person to ask. Do you have info on glacis and lower front hull slopes for JS-III (or a recomended source)? The glacis is rather inovative in its appearnce with a central crown, and a glacis that slopes away from the crown. Info from my sorces is rather scarce on this 3D sloping effect of the JS-III.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Heh not much just a few things on the glacis weld seams letting go on bumpy roads . As to a source, I have requested a few things from friends but I have no clue if they will respond anyway, I would reccomend (as always) you contact Robert off the top of my head..

Regards, John Waters