Tank gun test, extreme ranges. (Warning: large pics inside)

[Bad Monkey!]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by WineCape:

The more I read this excellent thread, the brighter this idea!<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree, I'm rather fond of it also. I'm afraid it's destined to die a cold and lonely death (err, mebbe not cold, not in here ) of neglect in this thread. Maybe I'll see about working my idea out a little more and giving it it's own thread.

[ 10-08-2001: Message edited by: Bad Monkey! ]

[M Hofbauer]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Bad Monkey!:

Maybe I'll see about working my idea out a little more and giving it it's own thread.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

you go ahead and do that. I'm with you on thisone, it's a great idea.

[Sig]

Hello,

Just read the complete thread. Very interesting despite a significant increase in temperature lately.

Just to refocus a few seconds on the game:

The problem: long distance fire and accuracy, crew quality, is CMBO solving this equation realistically?

A way to solve the problem without too many "to hit" bonus given to too many different weapons and crews (major pain to define) would be to do it in the same line as the "fanatism percentage" given to infantry.

Simply give a new variable to AFV/Gun crews and call it, I don't know, something like: "Uebercrew", "Cool-headed", "Ace"...whatever you like. This would simply be a percentage giving the (secret) chance that this *CREW* receives a special "accuracy bonus". Exactely the same idea behind the "fanatism" bonus!

With such a system you could simulate "the few tanks in a group doing most of the killing" thing, simulate the "Wittman effect", *avoid* the future gamey "all elite-100% accurate ueberpanzers for only 1200pts". AND it shouldn't delay (glps, deep water here, Sir) CMBB because it shouldn't ask for too much coding (OK, OK, major disclaimer for this part, I'm not Charles, obviously).

What do you think?

(waiting anxiously)

Sig

[Pascal DI FOLCO]

Sig,

Pretty good idea you have had ! I support this one

[Triumvir]

Why not just have the same leader bonuses applied to HQs apply to individual armoured/vehicular units?

[Sig]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Triumvir:

Why not just have the same leader bonuses applied to HQs apply to individual armoured/vehicular units?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hello Triumvir,

Well, because personally I prefer to keep the level of god-like control low. And because it will keep your observation skills sharp as you try to discover if your lone PzKpfw Ausf.IVf facing hordes of T34/75 is manned by the Uebercrew from Hell .

Also this could give more flexibility: the *possible* accuracy bonus could probably be more finely tuned than simply with a +1 or +2. Furthermore uncertainty is a *great* feature of CMBO, and a probability to have an Uebercrew is far more exciting than the certainty to have one. At least that's my opinion.

Sig

[Eric Young]

Man,

What a read!

I've learned a lot about this stuff and I can say that from my experience Mr. Hofbauer knows his beans here.

The way it should be modeled is to establish a to hit algorithm that works off of max range for the weapon type and ammo load and then modify it up or down for crew experience/morale. With that as a base you can realistically add modifiers for LOS hindrance, movement of both target and firing platform, suppression of firing platform crew, etc.

E

[Triumvir]

Sig,

as a platoon commander, shouldn't you already know if tank 312 has an uebercrew?

Furthermore, it more accurately lets us use the crews the way they were used in real life; with the best getting proportionately more strain on them than the worst.

[Diceman]

I almost hate to push this thread back to the top, as it seems to have run its course but I'm dieing to know one thing. How is the remodeling of gunnery coming along in CMII? Can BTS or one of the beta testers give us a clue? Just a taste. Pretty please with sugar on top? I know you're afraid of adding fuel to fires but can you give us a hint?

[ 10-08-2001: Message edited by: Diceman ]

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Jason Said If Jeff would have it that in the offensive phase, the average Tiger got 1-2 kills while their losses were small, and in the defensive phase they got another 2-3 kills to total my 4 for the whole period through August - with additional presumably minor losses incurred, and with breakdowns probably running ahead of battlefield losses, and many more in short term repair than total write offs - I have no objection to any of that, and consider it perfectly realistic.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I’d be interested if you could briefly elaborate on your point here, and what basis you have for these averages?

Of additional interest is the 17 kills figure…where is this coming from?

And finally the 20% figure for Soviet Tanks KO’d at Kursk by 88mm caliber rounds…what is the reference on this?

[Jeff Duquette]

**bump**

[JasonC]

Jeff asked "elaborate on your point here, and what basis you have for these averages?"

Well, the 1-2 is based on your estimated figures (working off of my own and estimating the attack portion) for the kills by Tigers in the offensive phase of Kursk. There were 133 of them, so 133-266 kills means 1-2 each on average (some higher, some none, yada yada; I don't have to tell you what an average means).

The 17 kills figure is from the uber Tiger anecdotes offered by others on this thread as typical. In one case, of a single tank KOing that many, in other, of a pair KOing first 18, then following up with 16 more - in both cases thus averaging 17 kills per Tiger, without loss, in a single outing. Which as outliers are believable, but as typical are not, because kills that rapid by the typical Tiger would have wiped the board at Kursk, and they didn't.

The 20% of KOs by 88mm rounds in the Kursk period is from the Russian Battlefield site. I have allowed for it being somewhat low, allowing the real figure to be up to 25% in my own calculations. The number appears to me plausible when you consider that there were around 300 88mm AFV at Kursk (133 Tiger, 90 Elephant, ~90 Nashorn) vs. more than 1250 75mm long AFV, in addition to about 1/3 smaller types (50L60, etc), towed PAK, etc.

The 4 each over the operation as a whole (offensive and defense phases) comes from 5000 total Russian AFV losses (July and August), 20-25% by 88mm, divided by 88mm AFVs present, and allowing for a better score for the armored Tigers and Elephants than the unarmored Nashorns (and towed 88 Flak, another 120 or more). Oversimplified, the Tigers aren't even half of the 88s out hunting, and 88s got 1/5-1/4 of the dead Russian AFVs, ergo the Tigers got at best ~1/10 of the dead Russian AFVs, which comes to not more than 4 each on average.

So the general picture would be several kills per Tiger, but a single digit, with only a portion of them lost in turn. And many of those broken down, damaged or combined damage and mechical issues, etc.

Thus the relative kills over the whole life of each Tiger might be quite good, especially looking at only their battlefield total losses, rather than breakdowns and under repair categories. But the KOs per tank in 2 months would still be within reasonable limits set by destroyed Russian AFV, leaving room for other German weapons to KO things.

The differences between the two - kills per Tiger in 2 months, modest; vs. kills per KOed Tiger, high - are (1) many of the Tigers are still running after 2 months and (2) many of those that aren't, broke down rather than being KOed. The KOed Tiger "denominator" is smaller. The KOed Russian AFV "numerator" remains within plausible limits, a few per tank.

That picture is consistent with the reported high relative performance of the Tiger and the reported limited Russian losses, not all of them killed by 88mm. Each Tiger got only a handful in the period, but they mostly survived to do it again in the subsequent period.

Which incidentally fits perfectly the picture of a couple of Tigers KOing 2 each at range, and living to do it again when another target presented itself. It does not fit the 17 per outing anecdotal reports, which if average performances would have run through the whole Russian armor fleet at Kursk, easily and without loss. Those will still fit as outliers, as among the best "runs" among the sample size present, but not as average performances.

I hope this clarifies the picture I have presented on the uber-Tiger question.

[rexford]

I thought the point was that a few Tigers did an extraordinarily high percentage of the killing, and the others rode the gravy train without pulling their weight. The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding posts is that a few tanks should get the very highest hit probability that can be ballistically justified, and the rest get the regular CM treatment.

And that 2000m plus accuracy for the very gifted and experienced should be high enough at long range to regularly tear apart the enemy masses.

By the way, at Rowno one Michael Wittmann, in a StuG III (short barrel 75mm), was able to knock out a bunch of T34 with single shots aimed at the turret ring, which was accomplished in a few cases against the front of a T34! So "aces" appear to justify remarkably high hit percentages at long and short range (my thanks to Jeff Duquette for bringing the Wittmann StuG anecdotes up some time ago).

This "average kills per Tiger" thing just supports the overall line of thought that was presupposed early on, a few kill like crazy and the rest fire a few shots wildly or sit around and do sentry duty.

Guys like Wittmann will be terrors at all ranges and in just about anything.

POSTSCRIPT

How about that Canadian guy who made an art of killing Panthers frontally by bouncing a round off the mantlet bottom so it would hit and kill one of the hull crew? If we look at the number of Panthers that were killed on frontal shots by Shermans, what percentage does that Canadian get with his 18 or so knock-outs?

Or what about the Russians, in two 75mm armed Shermans, where the first tank would target and break a Tiger track so the moving vehicle would rotate and offer a flank shot to the second Sherman? How many Russians had the nerve to try that technique even after it became famous? How many crews could face a Tiger and hit the tracks for a break while the panzer headed towards them?

The few, the proud, the effective.

[ 10-09-2001: Message edited by: rexford ]

[PJungnitsch]

This was the original 17 kill quote, that I posted a while back:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>And AFAIK most of that reputation was built when they could outrange their enemy:

"...two Tigers acting as an armoured point...Normally the Russians would stand in ambush at the safe distance of 1235 meters...the Tigers...made use of their longer range...within a short time they had knocked out 16 T-34's which were sitting in open terrain, and when the others turned about, the Tigers pursued the fleeing Russians and destroyed 18 more tanks."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It was meant to illustrate that Tigers WERE capable of living up to their reputation if conditions were favorable, ie outranging their opponent in OPEN terrain, which is what I thought the whole thread was about.

In case this is not clear enough, it was not meant to be an average (cough)JasonC(cough).

There was no close terrain that enabled the T-34's a flanking shot from close in, the T--34's were not dug in, there was no airforce or artillery or mines interferance etc, and they were T-34/76's AFAIK, not Stalins. This was also one of the first uses of Tigers and the long range accuracy of the 88 came as a surprise to the Soviet force.

I sort of assumed the debate is not about the effectiveness of Tigers in the whole war, it is about their accuracy at long ranges in favorable conditions, which didn't happen all the time, Kursk probably being a good example.

Certainly there would be factors other than muzzle velocity such as optics, accuracy of tube manufacture, accuracy of traversal and gun-laying manufacture, etc to consider, but I still think it may be as simple as giving the crews that used rangefinders an accuracy bonus at ranges over 1000 meters or so, especially when firing from defense. For the Tigers it would be occasional crews, while for Nashorns, JadgPanthers, JagdTigers and A/tk 88's it would be more general from what I remember. Stugs also should benefit somewhat. Jeff correct me if I am wrong on the rangefinder use.

[ 10-11-2001: Message edited by: machineman ]

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Jason SaidThe 20% of KOs by 88mm rounds in the Kursk period is from the Russian Battlefield site. I have allowed for it being somewhat low, allowing the real figure to be up to 25% in my own calculations. The number appears to me plausible when you consider that there were around 300 88mm AFV at Kursk (133 Tiger, 90 Elephant, ~90 Nashorn) vs. more than 1250 75mm long AFV, in addition to about 1/3 smaller types (50L60, etc), towed PAK, etc.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Your initial figure of 20% is low. The actual statistic is 26%. The statistic is based upon examinations of T34’s destroyed by 88mm rounds. This information was apparently originally obtained from Red Army archival research by Steven Zaloga and is laid out in a more elaborate form within “Red Army Handbook” (Pg 179).

Of additional interest is that this 26% figure does not in fact represent Red Army T-34 losses relative to causation for Kursk/Operation Zitadelle, but represents Soviet operational studies conducted after the Central Fronts Counteroffensive to retake Orel Jul 14 – Aug 18, 1943. The exact figures are:

German Weapon____% of Soviet T-34’s lost to gun caliber

50mmL42 (50mm short)____________10.5%

50mmL60 (50mm Lang)_____________23.0%

75mm____________________________40.5%

88mm____________________________26.0%

====================================

Average Number of Kills Per Vehicle

The assessment of combat effectiveness as a function of "average number of kills per vehicle" obviously ignores some very basic realities of Armored warfare. Tanks are fickle beasts of burden that require a huge amount of upkeep in order to continue running. Some part is always in need of attention, even if it is only a loose nut or bolt that needs tightening. A “back of the envelope” calculation on Tiger kill averages of 1 to 2 tanks in the offensive and average kills 2 to 4 in the defensive based on initial Tiger strength at Kursk appears to ignore actual operational Tiger strengths at any given moment in time.

The German Armys starting Tiger strength for Operation Zitadelle was 133 (evening of July 4th strength). This figure had dropped to 60 Tigers by July 6th. The vast majority of these vehicles were damaged while traversing Soviet minefields or were down from mechanical problems (blown engines, cracked idler wheels, etc). A prime example of Tiger operational strength decay from Kursk is the 505th Schwere Panzer Abteilung.

505th Schwere Panzer Abteilung: This Battalions operational strength at the start of Kursk was 31 Tiger I’s. As with other Tiger units at Kursk the 505th suffered heavily from mines and mechanical breakdowns during the first two days of the offensive. Close to a quarter of the battalions Tiger strength was in the hands of mechanics after only the first day of action. At the start of July 6 (2nd day of the attack) the battalion strength was down to 24 operational machines. Operational strength was down to 14 machines by the end of July 7th. Now bear in mind that the 505th lost only 5 irrecoverable losses (i.e. Tiger KO’d from gunfire that also burned) between Jul 4 and Jul 14. So the vast majority of these vehicles are falling out as a result of mechanical problems, or minor to moderate repairable battle damage.

So what was happening with the 505th during some of its combat engagements around the Kursk Salient? During the opening days of the offensive, the 505th Tiger Battalion bore the brunt of several Red Army counterattacks spearheaded by the 16th and 19th Tank Corps. From David Glantz’s “The Battle of Kursk” (pg 93):

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Attacking toward Butyrid at the deepest point of German penetration, Lieutenant Colonel N. M. Teliakov's 107th Tank Brigade, leading the 16th Tank Corps, fell into an ambush of the Tiger-equipped 505th Panzer Detachment. In a matter of minutes, the Germans knocked out 46 of Teliakov's 50 tanks, and Lieutenant Colonel N. V, Kopylov's supporting 164th Tank Brigade, attacking on the 107th's left, was also heavily damaged, losing 23 tanks.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The brief but bloody counterattack by the 16th Tank Corps on the 6th Jul is also elaborated upon in “The Battle for Kursk, The Soviet General Staff Study”:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Operations on 6 July

The second day of the operation began with combat involving the 16th Tank Corps which, at 0400 hours, launched a counteroffensive in the direction of Step' and Butyrki with forces of the 107th and 164th Tank Brigades. The 107th Tank Brigade attacked first, and the 164th Tank Brigade moved behind it, echeloned to the left...

During the subsequent advance the 107th Brigade's tanks encountered concentrated fire from 16 dug-in 'Tiger' tanks. In a short time, the brigade lost 46 tanks and the remaining four tanks withdrew behind the dispositions of their infantry.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Niklas Zetterling in “Kursk a Statistical Study” provides strength returns based upon staff reports for the 16th Tank Corps for its actions on the 6th Jul. Irrecoverable losses were 69 tanks. This matches well with the Glantz & Soviet General Staff accounts described above. The total tank losses suffered by the 16th Tank Corps at the hands of the 505th was apparently 88 (moreover the 16th Tank Corps suffered 69 irrecoverable losses and an additional 19 tanks were KO’d but eventually recovered and spent several weeks in repair shops). But for the purposes of the 16th Tank Corps combat power during the remainder of the Kursk operation all 88 tanks were gone. The 505th suffered three “recoverable” losses during this action.

Sixteen Tigers of the 505th in one day of fighting managed to run-up a “kill average” of approximately 5.5 Soviet tanks per Tiger involved. Now the more commonly employed kill ratio as a performance indicator indicates that the 505th was down 3 Tigers KO’d (all of which were recoverable losses) to 88 Soviet tank losses (only 19 of which were recoverable). That’s a kill ratio of approximately 30:1 in the Tigers favor.

IMHO the "average kills" per machine approach to combat effectiveness has limited value. As has already been indicated it is quite likely that in any engagement studied one Tiger may have destroyed 20 T34’s single-handedly, and another Tiger in the same battle is likely to have killed zero.

IMHO Jason’s “Kill Average” approach seems to be a very speculative method of trying to prove any sort of point regarding the combat effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the Tiger Tank. The approach obviously ignores the fact that during any given time period a large number of Tigers can be found in repair shops. Historical evidence indicates that the Tiger I probably suffered from maintenance problems more so than other tanks during the war. However, if a Tiger unit could field even a few machines their tactical and even operational impact could be profound.

A final quote from David Glantz’s “The Battle of Kursk” (pg 93):

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>For example, on 5-6 July 1943, two companies from the 505th Heavy Panzer Detachment (battalion) destroyed 111 Soviet tanks for a loss of only 3 of their own. Soviet tactics were to close with the Tigers as rapidly as possible and engage their thinner side and rear armor. These tactics were difficult to execute and the two Tiger detachments (battalions) during Citadel lost fewer than 10 tanks in combat while destroying several hundred Soviet tanks.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

More on the 505th's performance in the Orel Offensive latter.

[ 10-11-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[Panzer76]

Great, informative post Jeff. Thanks! This is an interesting topic, so you grogs just keep up the discussion!

[Vanir Ausf B]

Well, since where talking about Tigers in general, and their kill ratios, I'll post this snippet I came across in The Tiger Tank by Roger Ford.

This is speaking of the Kharkov opertion:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Between 7 and 20 March, the Grossdeutschland Panzer Division accounted for 250 T-34s, 16 T-60/T-70s and three KV-1s, at a total cost of one PzKpfw III, 12 PzKpfw IVs and one PzKpfw VI. The brunt of the fighting was borne by the PzKpfw IVs, as the losses for that tank indicate, but such a loss was understandable since in terms of numbers, those tanks made up some 70 percent of the entire force. They accounted for 188 of all the Soviet tanks destroyed, while the Tigers got 30.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's unknown how those numbers were arrived at.

Ford puts total Tiger write-offs at Kursk at 13. 133 was the number of Tigers present on July 5, but 19 more arrived during the battle.

[ 10-11-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Machineman Jeff correct me if I am wrong on the rangefinder use.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

After digging a bit I think you are correct.

Some added poop on the Sf14z:

Magnification: 10x

Field of View: 5 degrees

Eye relief: 12.5mm

Inter ocular distance: 57mm+ as stereo and 58mm+ as periscope

The graticle in the right eyepiece had 10mil squares with 2mil gaps at 5mil intervals. There was an interrupted cross at the center for the datum point. The graticle could be illuminated and it also incorporated a small clinometer graduated in mils.

The SF14z had been employed by German Artillerists as a range finder. Although various sources I have dug up indicate the instrument had excellent stereoscopic vision qualities, it appears that range finding capability may have been stadiameteric.

The instrument was intrinsic to Stug’s JagdPanzers, JagdTiger and JagdPanther. It can also be seen in use by Nashorns\Hornets. It apparently found favor with Tiger and Panther Crews. It appears to have been standard TO&E at some point in the war for at least the Tiger I as evidenced by the mounting bracket for the instrument present on the Tiger I’s cupola. Still checking on the Panther, although John Waters had indicated to me that During French Army tests of the Panther following the war it was noted that scissors periscopes were a standard feature in these vehicles. I’m still checking on the availability of this French Army report.

As we have discussed before British 8th Army folks found smaller Em.R coincidence type range finders on Tiger I’s captured in Tunisia.

[RMC]

Interesting stuff, JD.

I always wanted to see a detailed breakdown of the history of each individual Tiger tank. I have always wondered how many never made into combat due to breakdowns followed by abandonment, air attack, accidents (seen some pictures of tanks overturned after falling from bridges) etc. What was the average service life of a Tiger tank? How many were destroyed before they ever fired a shot? And then of course conversely how many took a terrible toll of enemy armor before they went down?

[Vanir Ausf B]

On Tiger tank optics, more from Ford:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The Tiger was fitted with an articulated binocular turret gunsight (Turmzielfernrohr - TZF), its twin objectives fixed parallel to the main gun tube. The TZF 9b, in use up until April 1944, had a fixed 2.5x magnification, while the TZF 9c in use thereafter offered either 2.5x or 5x magnification. Apart from that they were essentially similar. Each tube of the sight had a different illuminated rectical pattern. The left tube carried the graticules of aiming point marks - a central triangle with three subsidiary points to each side, which allowed both for leading a moving target and to assist with estimated range. The right tube had the aiming point marks but also range scales, arranged in arcs to right and left, for the main gun and the coaxial maching gun respectively, the former graduating out to 4000m, the latter to 1200m.

...

Optical coincidence range finders were issued to Tiger tanks, but could only be used externally, located in a bracket attached to the commander's cuppola in later tanks but hand-held in the earliest models. Essentially, they were low-power binoculars with a narrow field of view, arranged so that the ray path to each eyepiece was derived from objectives 1m or more apart - the TZR 1 unit ussued to Tiger tanks from quite early in 1943 had a base measurement of 1.4m. The range to the target was read off a scale, as the angle between the two objectives lenses was adjusted until the images at the eyepiece coincided.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Vanir Said Ford puts total Tiger write-offs at Kursk at 13.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is inconsistent with Glantz, and Zetterling that both put irrecoverable Tiger losses at 10 for Jul 5, 1943 to Jul 14 1943. Ford is rolling over losses incurred during the Orel Counteroffensive into Kursk Statistics. More later.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Vanir Said Between 7 and 20 March, the Grossdeutschland Panzer Division accounted for 250 T-34s, 16 T-60/T-70s and three KV-1s, at a total cost of one PzKpfw III, 12 PzKpfw IVs and one PzKpfw VI. The brunt of the fighting was borne by the PzKpfw IVs, as the losses for that tank indicate, but such a loss was understandable since in terms of numbers, those tanks made up some 70 percent of the entire force. They accounted for 188 of all the Soviet tanks destroyed, while the Tigers got 30.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Average daily Operational strength of GD’s Schwere Panzer Kompanie during this period was 4 Tiger I’s. See W. Schnieder’s “Tigers in Combat II”. Ford’s figures for Soviet tanks KO’d by the GD Tiger Company also appear low. More later…going to work.

[Jeff Duquette]

Vanir:

Obviously the Tzf9b (and later improved 9c) were the gunner's sight for the Tiger I. Although there was a range finding element to these gunsights (those little triangles you see in the gunners primary sight were employed as a ranging graticule) the Tzf9b or 9c were not range finders per say.

The TZR-1 was a fairly long, slender, periscope that tank commanders or artillery observers in tanks would employ for observation over low-lying terrain. A Tiger or Panther could in theory sit safely in a turret down position while the TC\FO observes his surroundings through the TZR-1 from the safety of his turret. I have not seen a picture of the TZR-1's redicule…it is possible that this periscope allowed indirect ranging ala the Tzf9.

There is also some evidence from German archival documents I have come across indicating the TZR-1 was employed during the later part of the war to observe "over" dust, smoke and flash generated during firing of the main gun. It helped the TC observe his own fall of shot. This was apparently somewhat a function of the decreasing quality of German "smokeless" powder in the latter (late 1944 - 45) portion of the war, and its impact on obscuration during gunnery. In addition, Guderian apparently implemented a "track mate" concept for assisting in sensing fire. This is sort of a "wingman" approach to tank combat in which one tank observes the fall of shot for his track mate.

[ 10-11-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]