Average Life Span

[tenfive2]

We've all heard about the average life span for a machine-gunner in WW2. What was it, something like 15 minutes? But how long did a tank and crew really last? Or one of the AT guns? In the game at least, it's something like 5 minutes.

Any info on real ALS in WW2?

[Admiral Keth]

My dad served in the 90th ID as a member of a front-line .30-caliber MG squad from D-Day to just north of Metz, where he got severely wounded. Don't recall the total length of time, but slightly longer than 15 minutes.

[offtaskagain]

My grandpa's cousin served in the 101st AB from Market Garden through the end. That's a little more than 15 minutes too.

[Snake Eyes]

A WWII veteran friend of mine served in the 82nd Airborne Division and was one of six original members of his company that survived the war without being killed or wounded.

[Maastrictian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tenfive2:

We've all heard about the average life span for a machine-gunner in WW2. What was it, something like 15 minutes? But how long did a tank and crew really last? Or one of the AT guns? In the game at least, it's something like 5 minutes.

Any info on real ALS in WW2?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Obviously real life soldiers lasted a heck of a lot longer than their CM counter parts. But don't forget that:

1. Most soldiers only fought in one or two battles as intense as a CM battle.

2. A CM casualty might be back fighting in a week, or even an hour.

--Chris

[tenfive2]

Ok, forget about the machine-gunner story.

And yes, many soldiers did survive and did come home to raise families... Still, the cemeteries are filled with something.

And, you don't have to be in a major battle to get killed...

[lcm1947]

Well, tenfive2 I was also under the impression that machinegunners in WWII had an extremely short life span and still tend to believe it but really don't know. I do know that in CM the machinegunners are really a prime target from infantry up to and including tanks and would think the same applied in real life also.

[Warren Peace]

My step-father lasted from July 25 to November 25 in the 5th Armored Division as a medic.

My impression is that on Average US Infantry divisions suffered around 200% casualties from D-Day to VE day. Since 75% of the casualties were suffered in the 7200 individuals that made up the infantry companies. They would be turned over faster. If we do the math:

Assume 14,000 men per Division, therefore 200% casualties would be 28,000 casualties. 75% would fall in the combat battalians this would mean 291% causualty rate for these units (which would include the Machine gunner).

291% casualties/11months=317% casualties/year

or 6.1% Casualties per week. Your probabilites of being a non-casualty:

1 week= 93.9%

2 weeks=88.2%

3 weeks=82 %

4 weeks=76.7%

8 weeks=58.9%

12 weeks= 47%

16 weeks = 36.5%

11 months = 5.4%

Not quite 15 minutes, but still not great odds. Also, it should be noted that by far most of the casualties were clustered in June, July, November, December, and January, so for those months the casualty rates would be higher.

[JasonC]

The "half life" for a tank battalion could be as low as 1 week in heavy fighting, and as long as a year without. In typical cases, large battles (Normandy, Bulge, Kursk, etc) would see 50% per month "wastage" rates for tanks. This would include intense episodes in which a whole company might be KOed in less than an hour, and many "ordinary" weeks when only 1-2 tanks were lost. While overall, a typical US tank battalion turned over its vehicles once or sometimes twice in the whole war - including replacements for mechanical breakdowns, etc.

As for infantry units, their loss rates were around three times higher than the tankers, at least in the US case. The previous fellow's calculations are misleading though, because roughly half of the casualties involved in the "200% turnover" figure for infantry divisions, were non-battle losses (frostbite, trenchfoot, dysentery, pneumonia and traffic accidents mostly). Those were somewhat more likely to hit the infantry at the front (fewer opportunities to get warm, etc), but were much more evenly distributed than battle casualties.

Most of the battle casualties were WIA - around 3/4. Also, typically 1/3rd of WIA plus non-battle were returned to duty. The 200% figure is for divisions engaged for the whole campaign. Many units arrived after the Normandy fighting, and some late in 45, and had half that level of losses (still less for the latest, etc). The average battle losses per infantry division per day in combat was 48. About 500 men per battalion could be considered front line troops.

So a realistic estimate of the chances faced by front line infantry would be about 1% per day of wounds and half that of sickness (the rest of the non-battle hitting the rest of the men in the division). Or per day -

0.25% KIA

0.5% WIA out of war

0.25% WIA but later returned to unit

0.30% non-battle out of war

0.2% non-battle but later returned to unit.

A guess for the returned would be about two months later. Sometimes it would be less time, sometimes more. Most with cases serious enough to only be back in more than 3 months probably were sent home.

What would those chances mean on a cumulative basis for someone in the divisions that fought the longest, which was around 300 days in action? For a unit in action so long, the chance of going through completely unscathed would be very low. The ways of exit were the permanent categories above. So someone ashore on D-Day was realistically facing around a 1/4 chance of being killed, and most of them would go home wounded (or ill). Thus the phrase "million dollar wound" among the infantry, especially the old timers.

Among units that entered the battle later the odds were not so steep. Many divisions were in battle only 2-5 months of the campaign; half to a quarter of the infantrymen in their initial forces could expect to "go the distance". And replacements entered at many points, with similar chances. They took higher losses than the old timers did in their first few days, but faced a shorter haul time-wise.

Overall, including the less engaged units in the total, the chances might have been around 1/5 KIA, 1/5 go the distance unscathed, 2/5 home with wounds, 1/5 home from non-battle sickness. Bomber crews faced similarly steep chances, though with capture taking the place of most "non-battle sickness". Fighter pilots and tankers were distinctly safer than either of those, but still faced fairly high chances of death or wounds. Gunners and engineers took moderate losses compared to those (some units similar to the tankers, most less), and everybody else (supply, AA, HQ, ground crews, etc) lost little.

The experience of other countries or in other theaters would of course be different. In particular, the eastern front was bloodier and the fighting sustained for a much longer time. Higher portions of Germans in the west were captured, fewer killed. Most Japanese that fought the Allies head on (as opposed to bypassed, and not counting China) - were killed. US KIA in that theater were comparatively low, but disease was a more serious drain (malaria, yellow fever, etc).

It is a fine question, and I hope this helps.

[Charlie Rock]

Here are some quick figures for ya:

In eight weeks, from 6 June 1944 on:

4th ID

Unit Initial Strength Battle Cas. Nonbattle

8th reg. 1923 1429 203

12th 1955 1311 156

22nd 1954 1345 165

29th ID

115 regt 1825 1360 195

116 1853 1527 146

175 1854 1256 278

1st ID

16 regt 1973 703 234

18 regt 1890 584 256

26 regt 1770 558 407

9th ID

39 regt 1555 784 264

47 1482 909 294

60 1523 1080 330

In some rifle companies near 100% turnover in 3 months would be realistic.

Shot over,

CR

[Darwin]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tenfive2:

We've all heard about the average life span for a machine-gunner in WW2. What was it, something like 15 minutes? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I had heard a number like that before also but assumed it was meant for mg gunners on bombers. Now I am curious, was the life expectancy of flyboys better or worse compared to infantry?

[PJungnitsch]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I had heard a number like that before also but assumed it was meant for mg gunners on bombers. Now I am curious, was the life expectancy of flyboys better or worse compared to infantry?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That would depend so much on who they were flying for, at what time, and with what aircraft.

Allied bomber losses were very high mid war during daylight bombing before the Mustang escort fighters entered service, while after that point it was very dangerous to be a German fighter pilot in the west, with turnover per MONTH hitting 30 to 40%, AFAIK. Another factor is that German pilots flew until they were dead or disabled, while Allied pilots (at least in the West), were rotated out after a certain time. Some of the top German aces, with hundreds of victories, were themselves shot down 10 or more times and just happened to get lucky and survive.

And then of course there is the so-called 'Ace Factor' in that most pilots in a tough environment die relatively quickly, while those that survive can become almost unbeatable. The top ace of the war ended it with 352 victories.

[Brian Rock]

I suspect when figures like this are quoted they are referring to 15 minutes of combat.

For planes I believe it was total flying time, which was logged. For ground-puonders I'm not quite sure how you'd actually calculate this. Is if from the start of the battle? When the unit first takes fire or fires at the enemy? I suspect it's one of those numbers that doesn't really mean much of anything.

[ 08-24-2001: Message edited by: Brian Rock ]

[Warren Peace]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> The previous

fellow's calculations are misleading though, because roughly half of the casualties involved in the "200% turnover" figure for

infantry divisions, were non-battle losses (frostbite, trenchfoot, dysentery, pneumonia and traffic accidents mostly). <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actual my calculations appear to be an underestimate. Last night I looked at Omar Bradley's book and he claims that 83% of ALL casualties (battle and non-battle) occured in the 80 rifle platoons that make up a division. Thus my math actually underestimates the loss rates for Infantryman by a factor of two. Interestingly, it would also suggest that the prototypical Machine gunner in question (if he was a .30 or .50 man, would have a longer "life" expectancy since he was not actually part of the Rifle Platoon that General Bradley refers to. Of course if he were a BAR man, then he'd be toast. This kinda makes sense because in US doctrine heavy machine guns were basically support weapons and would be supporting from a distance.

[Wilhammer]

It is said that the 29th ID before the St. Lo operation was actually three divisions, one buried, one in the hospital and one in the field. This after about 6 weeks of combat, IIRC.

Michael Doubler's Closing With The Enemy has a chart in the back of all US divisions deployed to NW Europe, and IIRC correctly, the average ID suffered about 85% casualties, and some around 200% or more.

In an action as intense as the ones we fight in CM, 50-70% casualties is likely, and I feel that is about right.

[ 08-24-2001: Message edited by: Wilhammer ]

[Commissar]

According to one Red Army vet, average life span of a tank might be only a month or two. Thanks for the ride guys, but I think I'll walk. :eek:

[tenfive2]

Well, how about anti-tank guns? Like machine guns, as soon as they are spotted, everyone's focus is to knock them out. I think this is where the limited life span comes in play. These units are magnets for fire.

[Skipper]

> According to one Red Army vet, average

> life span of a tank might be only a month

> or two.

Well, it was hardly any better for a number of other military professions. Such as AT gunners, combat pilots and normal infantry.

There were times in Stalingrad, when a batallion of 30 men was considered a combat-capable unit.

[JasonC]

"In an action as intense as the ones we fight in CM, 50-70% casualties is likely, and I feel that is about right"

It is not even close to right, for average losses. The average US infantry division lost 48 men per day in combat. In period of intense fighting, like the push to St. Lo, they could run 100-200 per day. The British did a study of infantry rates of advance and losses, cited previously on this board, and the average for those that were resisted seriously was in the range 15-30 men lost in an hour to three hours for one attacking company or regiment. In an advance of 600-800 yards per hour.

Also, the weapons platoons of infantry companies suffered along with the infantry, and the MG and recon platoons at the battalion level weren't much better off. The forward exposed troops were around 500 per battalion, before reduction for losses. (Were the 400 in the rifle and recon platoons at greater risk? Sure). One does occasionally hear of losses that high to particular attacking *platoons* on a whole corps front in a single incident. Not battalions, for more than a few outlier occasions in the whole war.

What causes the large turnover is the sustained nature of such losses. If you lose 150 men in a division with 4500 forward troops, that is only ~5% losses for the "up" regiments. But keep that up for two weeks, and even with rotation of units you will lose half the division. If you take replacements continually you can keep it up for a month, and will turn over the personnel in the front line units in that period of time.

But not through 50-70% casualties in half an hour, over and over again. Nothing would be left inside a week if such loss rates were typical. The truth is, players in CM can and do shove their electronic markers at each other much more recklessly than the historical participants did in real life. And in an all-fired hurry because of a clock. The historical units were more likely to seek a more roundabout way that did not involve loss, to take their time, to let artillery do the work, to withdraw before being overrun, etc.

It was also much harder to see things with heads in the dirt that CM and its general sighting would have you believe. Control is much easier, as CM squads all stick together and get orders quickly and react to them reliably. When in reality, an hour into a general attack men could be lost, disoriented, units intermixed, "all about the shop". Regular and long periods of reorganization followed almost every significant tactical advance.

You can say CM fights represent the 3 toughest fights some unit gets into if you like. The overall losses are still high, and the obvious reasons are superior morale, control, and sighting - and above all the fact that it is a game with no real lives on the line. All of which enable the players to shove their forces together harder than in the real deal.

[JasonC]

In intense combat, yes the half life of an AFV was on the order of one month. The German armor in Normandy was halved at that rate. But this does not mean whole tank fleets fell away at that rate. Portions are always unengaged. Vehicles are under repair but get back into service. Hit tanks are often recovered. And whole armies do not sustain combat as intense as the Normandy attrition fighting over their whole lengths for long periods. Some sectors are always relatively quite, etc.

Also, AFV strength is a stock between two flows, in as well as out. New production in continually "topping off" the force. At any given time, a fair portion of the AFVs in the fleet are the most recent additions, as they have had the least time to "decay". If the replacement rate is above the loss rate, the force size obviously rises. But rising results in more use and higher loss, stabilizing the force. Otherwise put, a given loss rate r will allow a stream of AFVs at rate x to maintain a force of a size that goes as x / r. E.g. 10% per month losses and 100 vehicles per month production will tend to mean a 1000 vehicle fleet in existence.

If you look at overall reductions in AFV strength, you do not find half lives of only a month or two. They run more like 6 months to a year. It is also interesting that on the Russian front, the rate almost equalized for Russian or German tanks as early as 1943 - it was about 6:5 then. In 1944 and after, it was the same. Meaning, the Russians were losing more tanks, but only in the same ratio as the strength of the two tank fleets, or because they had more to lose from.

The very low initial German loss rates progressively rose as the war went on. Home front production rose strongly as well, and kept the AFV fleet roughly the same size despite the higher losses. Because of this empirical relationship for the Germans (roughly constant fleet size), you can track overall losses from the production statistics! Works through late '44.

[Commissar]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

> According to one Red Army vet, average

> life span of a tank might be only a month

> or two.

Well, it was hardly any better for a number of other military professions. Such as AT gunners, combat pilots and normal infantry.

There were times in Stalingrad, when a batallion of 30 men was considered a combat-capable unit.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well that's true but the idea of being burned alive in a tank just isn't too appealing.