Battlefront.com Posted December 16, 2001 Share Posted December 16, 2001 Kallimakhos, <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>People are not sheep and in the battlefield the side that believes more in the justification of their cause have better moral and in the end they will win. When in continuation war the Finnish army crossed the old borders and started occupying enemy territory, a lot of troops mutinied and some were even shot for treason.<hr></blockquote> It is interesting to note that the same was true for the Romanian Army and so to for the Hungarians to a greater (lack of morale) and lesser degree (resistance of homeland). Germany itself also followed this, but the losses and disillusionment with their government and leaders worked against this. And of course the forces arrayed against them, just like in Romania and Hungary, were too big and too determined to win at any cost for such late boosts in fighting spirit to make a critical difference. I suspect that if Finland had been located between Hungary and Romania it would have been defeted, occupied, and run as a puppet state of the Soviet Union until the late 1980s. The fact that it was clearly not in the Soviet Union's main sphere of interest saved it from this fate, much the way Yugoslavia was spared. If the Soviet Union really wanted to take either Finland or Yugoslavia at any cost... I am sure they could have. This is not a sight on either country, but rather a neutral observation of military reality and the Soviet's track record. Steve Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kallimakhos Posted December 16, 2001 Share Posted December 16, 2001 <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Big Time Software: Mind you that Finland was a minor blip on the Soviet strategic radar both during the Winter War and during the War of Continuation. This meant that all Finland had to do was put up a good enough fight and make victory "not worth the effort" for the Soviets. In 1944 they had far bigger fish to fry in Central and Eastern Europe. Finland was very much a "let's see if we can take them out, otherwise we'll just quit and forget about it" situation for the Soviets. This was not the case on either the Western, Southern, or Eastern Fronts. The entire energy was focused on taking Germany out and occupying every inch of its soil. So one should expect to see differences in how the nations on these fronts fought. While I very much admire and take great interest in Finland's military experiences, they simply can not be compared with the Western forces fighting the Germans in the way you have attempted to do. Might as well bring in examples from the Pacific Theater for all the similarities they shared. Steve<hr></blockquote> You may call the Finnish experience a minor blip, and righly so from the Soviet standpoint, to some extent. Our point of view is of course different . But considering the issues we are talking here, from tactical point of view there are real and interesting tactical and strategic questions why Finns did better than their German allies in similar conditions. These questions shouldn't be brushed aside by calling one front just a blip. Mind you, from the Russian point of view, it was the Leningrad front! So as I have said, many battles in Finland and especially summer 44 are interesting on their theoretical side, why the things happened the way they happened, there are some real lessons to learn there. And as Tero has said many times, in history books this is a story pretty much untold. There is a language barrier, a barrier between historical traditions. I am no great expert on western front or eastern front, my meager knowledge comes from the northern front. I read your comments in awe and admire your knowledge, but yet at the same time I feel the Finnish contribution to these issues is worth acknoledging. Not because of nationalist pride, but beacause I sincerely believe Finnish experience can contribute to these theoretical discussions, and they are not easily available for the non finnish speaking majority . My ulterior motivaton is to play CMBB as Finnns the way I understand it should be done, with historical winning chances, which leads me queston: will the moral, fitness and other variables be totally totally varied or will they be rigged to produce a as plausible random game you can imagine? What ever the answer, I know it is going to be the best game ever... but excelllence is still a neverending process. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kallimakhos Posted December 16, 2001 Share Posted December 16, 2001 <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Big Time Software: Kallimakhos, And here is where things were VERY different in Finland compared to Western Europe. The Allies had not only superior numbers of artillery and munitions (very important!), but they also had a system of delivering artillery that had both the strategic applications similar to Soviet methods as well as the tactical flexibility similar to Finnish and German. One has to wonder how well the Finns would have done against the same number of guns but with far more tactical and counter battery flexibility than the Soviets actually had. Steve<hr></blockquote> Just one thing: let's not underestimate Russian artillery in 44. Russians had the at least the same ability to gather info as Finns, so when Finns were trying to counterattack, they often got really badly beaten by the Russian fast responce artillery. In 44 Russians were able to do that also! The real issue seems to be that the attacking force is allways more vulnerable to accurate artillery with good recon. And TRP's. A basic lesson in defend/attack or even in atritionist/manouverist approaches, I think. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kallimakhos Posted December 16, 2001 Share Posted December 16, 2001 <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Big Time Software: Kallimakhos, I suspect that if Finland had been located between Hungary and Romania it would have been defeted, occupied, and run as a puppet state of the Soviet Union until the late 1980s. The fact that it was clearly not in the Soviet Union's main sphere of interest saved it from this fate, much the way Yugoslavia was spared. If the Soviet Union really wanted to take either Finland or Yugoslavia at any cost... I am sure they could have. This is not a sight on either country, but rather a neutral observation of military reality and the Soviet's track record. Steve<hr></blockquote> He he, Im glad we were situated elsewhere. What was the name of the other country that didn't get occupied during WWII? But I must say that relations between Russia and Finland differ profoundly from central Europe. We were once a part of the Russian empire, once they liberated us from Sweden and granted us autonomy. Not going to the details more deeply, have you ever heard what the Polish think about Russia? And they speak allmost the same language! No, it's a very complicated love/hate affair betweens Russians and Finns, and you have to remember that our beloved Mannerheim was a Czars's general. And that Lenin wouldn't have been able to get to the town that was to be his namesake, if he didn't have so many Finnish friends. [ 12-16-2001: Message edited by: Kallimakhos ]</p> Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Lincoln Posted December 16, 2001 Share Posted December 16, 2001 Steve, <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Big Time Software: [QB]Lincoln, Yes, "shock" at the scale the Soviets practiced it is something that no other WWII force could match. Their doctrine, from top to bottom, was based on smashing the enemy's immediate zone as hard as possible, then push forward with a might lunge regardless of tactical losses. This did not work very well at first at the strategic sense, but often did at the operational sense (Yelnia and Moscow jump to mind right away). The aborted 1942 summer offensive in and around Kharkov was another example of failure. Failure in the sense that they had not quite got the "shock" thing down to a science and the Germans didn't fold up, but instead recoiled and struck back very hard. But at a tactical level they achieved success many times. German troops were still getting used to being hit hard in this way. Steve<hr></blockquote> I think it is important to separate intention from outcome, and from means. Through much of the Great Patriotic War the Soviets did not formulate their intention according to their own pre-war doctrine. My point was that Uranus/Saturn was the first operation explicitly formulated more or less in accordance with this doctrine, but this intention was modified within the first week. Kursk and the Dnepr battles reverted back to Zhukov's earlier type. Bagration remained more true to the concept, for most of the operation. It is also true that the Soviet's used mass and lives to effect their tactical ends, but this is not an essential part of the doctrine, simply the methods they chose at that time - you could argue due to little trust in their lower echelons. Someone on the list also pointed out that warfare is competitive. Consequently, the ultimate outcome of any operation - its success or failure - cannot be laid solely, or even substantially, at the feet of doctrine. To my mind doctrine impacts primarily on the character of success or failure, not its occurrence. Hence the modified Uranus/Saturn was a success, but it was an attritional success when it was conceived as an attempt at operational success. Bagration was also an attritional success, but it was also an operational success as well in the pre-war Soviet sense. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Big Time Software: Honestly, I think the specific nature of Soviet doctrine is rooted in cultural and institutional differences that make such a "shock" strategy not unpalatable to Western nations. But is such a doctrine either necessary or even best? I would counter that the examples of Desert Shield/Storm, Kosovo, and now Afganahstan perhaps demonstrate that there is no need for such a doctrine. The use of overwhelming and technologically advanced force, without offering the defending forces a chance to retaliate, is perhaps even more "shock" than what was practiced by the Soviets in WWII. The effects of infrastructure collapse, material losses, and death render the nation state as a whole (or at least a large part of it) from being capable of reacting to conventional military action when, and if, it ever comes. The demoralizing effect of being bled white by an attacker that can not be harmed or exhausted can even be seen as decisive. <hr></blockquote> Again, I would separate the means from the intention. In no way are heavy losses from frontal attacks part of the doctrine. They were just the methods employed by the Soviet command at that time. The term "shock" is problematic in English since it reminds one of the physical effect of a hard blow. Better to think in terms of "shock" in a medical sense: a systemic reaction to some trauma which in and of itself need not be physically massive or major. I agree that the Soviet doctrine is culturally informed. But really it is the willingness to articulate it which is cultural, not the doctrine itself. Soviet "historo-scientific-determinism" meant that they had no compunction in objectifying and talking about something (the system) which was distinct from the sum of its parts and worked according to a logic of its own, rather than the reductionist logic of its components. In the west such notions have long been discounted by a generally rationalist philosophy. Late 20th century western thinking is beginning to rengage with such notions. Re: Desert Storm/Kosovo/Afghanistan. In the western sense of the term "operation", Desert Storm was surely successful as it seems the current action in Afghanistan is likely to be. This is essentially my point. In the pre-WWII Soviet sense whether such battles have any significance depends on their ability to register at the operational level. In this sense Desert Storm failed. We (in the West) would say that the military were restricted by political strictures. This division is Western. The goals of the "operation" were set so as to ensure that a successful battle could be fought, but this had limited significance on the operational level. Depending on who the current conflict is considered to be against, there is a similar danger in Afghanistan. Focussing on complete physical destruction of the perceived enemy may appear to be a step forward over Desert Storm, but only in the attritional sense. The inability of the anti-Saddam coalition to execute subsequent strikes against Saddam illustrates the potential failure the anti-terrorist coalition may face. Likewise, the operational significance of the current battle is determined by the conditions it brings about for subsequent action, since single blows are not generally amplifiable to strategic success. Summary: look to the intentions of a so-called operation to discern its intended operational significance, not its outcomes. If those intentions are aimed at the enemy system rather than his body you will see the operational logic laid out in a series of strikes aimed at this system. These strikes may be carried out by many means including attritional battles or by individuals, but their significance lies in their place within the operational aim. Systems cannot be defeated by attrition only, distintegration from within is necessary. Shock is needed to bring on this disintegration. Application of this school of thought to lower echelons (armies, corps, divisions, etc.) can lead to elements of manouevre theory. The main problem is that at that level little of the enemy system bar the infrastructure and logistics are visible (i.e., as a boxer you could hit your opponents trainer I suppose rather than the man in the ring), and the means at your disposal limited to destructive elements. Hence the tendency to focus on bringing about attritional ends through manouevre means. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Battlefront.com Posted December 16, 2001 Share Posted December 16, 2001 Kallimakhos, <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>You may call the Finnish experience a minor blip, and rightly so from the Soviet standpoint, to some extent. Our point of view is of course different .<hr></blockquote> I'm sure you understood what I meant by my comments about Finland being a "sideshow", but just to make sure everybody understands why that is relevant: When comparing success/failure at the operational or strategic level one does not have to look any further than the specific area in question. There is absolutely no doubt that the Finns defeated the Soviets once and then stalemated them to such an extent in 1944 that the term "victory" could be applied once again. Especially because no other nation in Europe managed to withstand Soviet military action and retained its total independence. Yes, some concessions were made... but when one looks at what happened under Soviet rule in Eastern and Central Europe... these concessions were like giving up on desert after having a 5 star chef prepare your dinner However, one has to be VERY careful when comparing one theater, with a unique set of situations and combatants, DIRECTLY to another, with a different set of situations and combatants. Tero's previous posts were not as mindful of the importance of this as I think should have been. Therefore, some of his arguments which were only supported by such erroneous comparisons are therefore not relevant as stated. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>But considering the issues we are talking here, from tactical point of view there are real and interesting tactical and strategic questions why Finns did better than their German allies in similar conditions. These questions shouldn't be brushed aside by calling one front just a blip.<hr></blockquote> Oh, I totally agree. As I said above, one just has to be very cautious when drawing larger conclusions from these examples when compared to others. It is much easier to draw direct examination between how Finns fared vs. the Soviets in a specific set of circumstances compared to the Germans vs. the Soviets in a similar set of circumstances. Trying to compare US vs Germans in an entirely different situation is where things don't work so well. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>So as I have said, many battles in Finland and especially summer 44 are interesting on their theoretical side, why the things happened the way they happened, there are some real lessons to learn there. <hr></blockquote> Very true. And as you have stated already, the feeling of fighting for one's homeland under a government that was still thought of as worth fighting for played a major role in how the Finns fought later on in 1944. They also, of course, had only one thing to focus on while other Axis nations had far more things distracting them. A determined, resourceful, unified, politically stable, and intelligent enemy on the defensive in its own homeland is probably the worst of all military forces to fight against. In this regard, Finland is unique. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>And as Tero has said many times, in history books this is a story pretty much untold. There is a language barrier, a barrier between historical traditions.<hr></blockquote> Sadly, this is very true. I find the war in Finland to be one of the most interesting of all "chapters" in WWII. I only wish there were tons of books in English on the subject. Alas, while I can find 2000 or so books on Waffen SS formations, I have but a couple dedicated books in English which cover this interesting theater. And since I don't expect to learn Finish any time soon, I think I will just have to hope for more books to be translated into English <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>What was the name of the other country that didn't get occupied during WWII?<hr></blockquote> Forgetting about Switzerland and Sweden for various reasons... technically only Bulgaria was not occupied during the war. Bulgaria remained neutral until it actively joined the war against the Axis when it was clear that they had little choice but to do so. After the war they were absorbed into the Soviet's sphere of influence. Albania, Yugoslavia, and Greece were the only three nations to escape becoming direct vassal states of the Soviet Union that were, in theory, within its reach. Greece was spared because the Germans withdrew first and then war ended. Also, it was clearly going to upset the Western Allies if the Soviets did anything overt there. Greece was also blocked by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, neither of which the Soviets had under their control when the war ended. Since they weren't occupying the country, and had little reason to desire this in the first place, they did not DIRECTLY interfere there (they did indirectly for decades after though). Albania became its own Communist state after the Germans withdrew and managed to retain a large degree of autonomy after the war. Partly because of what Yugoslavia did (see below), partly because they weren't strategically important enough to make a big fuss over. Since the country went to Communism, that was pretty much "good enough" for Soviet strategic planning. Albania also holds the distinction of being the last hardcore Communist government in Europe. Then there is Yugoslavia... the only nation in all of Europe to liberate itself from total occupation without the direct intervention of a foreign army or an unrelated surrender of the German Armed Forces. Not only did they liberate themselves, but they managed to repulse Soviet attempts to make Yugoslavia another Romania or Bulgaria. I am also pretty sure the Soviets actually feared applying force to Yugoslavia because of the butcher job they did on the Germans for 4 long years. Again, the Soviets had bigger fish to fry and since Yugoslavia was Communist, that was "good enough" for the Soviets at the time. Lincoln, <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>I think it is important to separate intention from outcome, and from means. Through much of the Great Patriotic War the Soviets did not formulate their intention according to their own pre-war doctrine. My point was that Uranus/Saturn was the first operation explicitly formulated more or less in accordance with this doctrine, but this intention was modified within the first week. Kursk and the Dnepr battles reverted back to Zhukov's earlier type. Bagration remained more true to the concept, for most of the operation.<hr></blockquote> I not really sure I totally agree with this. I see the earlier operational/strategic counter attacks not necessarily being all that different in terms of intention than later ones. However, the means changed as they learned from their mistakes and took actions to correct their organizational shortcomings. The means also changed dramatically, but not so much in terms of the theory behind their employment but rather a refining of the forces/weapons and doctrine. But the major point I am making here is that Bagration was strategically similar to German type offensives in terms of intention and outcome. The means are what I see as being different. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>It is also true that the Soviet's used mass and lives to effect their tactical ends, but this is not an essential part of the doctrine, simply the methods they chose at that time - you could argue due to little trust in their lower echelons.<hr></blockquote> Actually, I would not argue this. The earlier shortcomings of Soviet operational and strategic operations were more to do with endemic problems of planning, communications, command & control, and force competency. The latter was in part of a lack of trust (i.e. not allowing low level initiative), but also due to horribly abbreviated training and low percentage of experienced soldiers of all ranks. If one looks at major Soviet operations over time one can clearly see the improvements in both planning and execution. Unfortunately for millions of Soviet citizens, this was only brought about after their lives were wasted in a grand learning experiment to discover what didn't work and how to fix it. However, at the tactical level the reckless (by Western standards) employment of small units lasted until the very end of the war (Berlin being a huge example of this). This can partly be seen as a cultural aspect of the peoples of the Soviet Union, but it can also be shown to be ingrained in their doctrine. The Soviets used "shock" tactics which inherently necessitated the serious risk of high loss of life and equipment. For example, an initial Soviet breakthrough was supposed to be pursued without any thought to flanks or rear. They were taught to assume these things would be taken care of by other units. This allowed for deep and highly disruptive thrusts, which achieved a very high level of "shock". However, if the defending units managed to stabilize the situation, the spearheads were generally left to be destroyed instead of withdrawn since this was more disruptive and costly for the defender. It was, also, very costly for the attacker. It is a type of doctrinal approach that no Western nation adopted during or after WWII. The menace of Soviet marauding units in the German rear was so acute that strong AT assets were organically assigned to German artillery battalions starting in late 1943. The reasoning was two fold... first because the Soviets broke through at the tactical level quite frequently, and second because the units which broke through were more interested in causing destruction of German forces rather than preserving their own safety or (as was often the case) holding key terrain features. Therefore, rear units could not count on simply blunting a Soviet incursion to the rear, they had to be assured the means to destroy it. Such was not the case against Western forces, at least in terms of degree and scale. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Re: Desert Storm/Kosovo/Afghanistan. In the western sense of the term "operation", Desert Storm was surely successful as it seems the current action in Afghanistan is likely to be. This is essentially my point. In the pre-WWII Soviet sense whether such battles have any significance depends on their ability to register at the operational level. In this sense Desert Storm failed. We (in the West) would say that the military were restricted by political strictures. This division is Western. The goals of the "operation" were set so as to ensure that a successful battle could be fought, but this had limited significance on the operational level.<hr></blockquote> I disagree with this only because I disagree with how you are defining operational success. One could easily argue that pursing a full conquest of any of these countries would have lead to more problems than it solved. And therefore, on balance, the more narrow definitions for the war against that country were, in effect, operationally the best which could be obtained. While the aftermath of the war might not be without some leftover issues, I can imagine things being only worse if the operational objectives were set too high. So the Coalition chose a set of operational parameters which had a high chance of victory for its immediate and main goals (liberating Kuwait and nullifying Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors as it was) and a very low chance of unintended, negative ramifications of widening/lengthening the conflict. Western, Soviet, or whatever... I call it smart This is something that the Germans failed to realize when they attacked the Soviet Union. They could have formed a tighter set of operational goals for Barbarossa than they did, and followed them more closely than than what actually happened. However, I am very much of the opinion that in the strategic sense this would not have made much of a difference. The plan was doomed to failure from the beginning because it did not offer a significant assurance of victory strategically. Only a multi part, multi year, fundamentally different approach from the bottom up *might* have led to success. Even then, I am not sure it was possible given the reality of Nazi Germany, its leadership, is forces, and its military situation of 1941. Getting back to Desert Storm... the problem after the war was that the Iraqi leadership remained intact. This was due to a flaw in assumptions of what military victory would indirectly acheive internally within Iraq and/or limitations on action imposed for political reasons. It would appear the lession was learned and applied to Afghanistan, since the main goal (taking out specific terrorists and targets) was not seen as meaning anything unless the shielding goverment was utterly destroyed with an accountable and stable government installed in its place. Followed up, of course, with a huge diplomatic, economic, and potentially military effort to get other nations of questionable character to clean up their act. Unlike Desert Storm, at least the US understands that a single operation is not going to achieve the desired end results. This is the lession the Germans did not understand prior to their invasion of the Soviet Union. And they paid heavily for that mistake. Steve Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Tero Posted December 17, 2001 Share Posted December 17, 2001 Originally posted by Big Time Software: Well, if you play with the numbers like you did... sure Official US figures. The party line is "firepower to conserve troops" but the US infantry divisions which were in the initial landing contingent had a huge turnover rate (between 95,1% and 252,3%). Those which arrived at the front after October had a markedly lower turnover rates. But they do not cancel each other out. All these casualties were in the group that represented 14% of the overseas manpower. The actual fighting men represented 68% of the infantry divisions manpower but took 95% of the casualties. These figures do raise my eyebrows a fraction, when the firepower axiom is taken into account. How much worse would the infantry casualties have been when the "reduced" casualties were this severe ? How was it calculated the firepower saved lives ? But look at other operations other than the first, and least favorable from the attacker's standpoint, and I think the record is clear that the US/UK strategy of applying firepower to reduce casualties did in fact work. For example, the 12th SS Panzer Division during the Bulge practically ceased to exist as a fighting formation when it ran up against a tiny US blocking force. US casualties were tiny, yet the attacker's were crippling. How did this happen? Massive and overwhelming use of artillery, good use of defending terrain, and carefull coordination between the various friendly forces involved. ÜberFinns were able to pull that off with (or without) decent arty cover in numerous engagements. Does your example prove the US doctrine worked when they were the attackers and the Germans were entrenched in good defensive terrain like the bogace ? Apples to oranges. The US did not face the Soviets, nor did the Finns face the Germans. You are therefore comparing one Doctrine A vs. Doctrine B to Doctrine C vs. Doctrine D. Direct comparisions are therefore utterly impossible to draw. Actually more like a comparison between Granny Smiths and Red Delicious. The problems the respective forces faced were essentially the same. The approach the Soviets and the Western Allies took pretty much the same with emphasis on slightly different aspects but still within the parameters. The only real difference could be said to be the fact the Soviets were not as timid in their use of infantry as the Western Allies were. The Germans and the Finnish approaches were distinctly different but not incomparable IMO since the differences were brough on by different strategic and doctrinal outlooks and goals. while you are the one who is saying that the Germans basically always had things go just the way they wanted them to (at least in the West). If they had had things go their way Eisenhower would have had to send the other message he drafted. This is actually a misunderstanding brought on by the common misconception that I lean towards the überGerman school of thought when in fact I refuse to buy the teachings of the überAllied school of thought line, hook and sinker. I see now initiative was a very poor choise of terms. When I picked it I was thinking about the way the Germans were able to counter the Allied moves by holding on to the defensive positions and slowing down their advance. Or by disrupting the attacks. I do readily admit is my axiom is works only as far as D+55 when the Germans ran out of means to counter the Allied firepower superiority in terms the they had chosen to take and which they could implement. And since I was only talking about the battles in the West, your examples are totally irrelevant. I take it you would not object to me citing Sun Tsu or Clausewits and their principles and deem them irrelevant. The fact is that German counter attacks in the West did very little to influence Operational conditions in their favor. In fact, they more often than not resulted in the exact opposite. And from the Strategic point of view, they failed miserably. Not just in France and Belgium, but also in North Africa and Italy as well. Against the Americans ? True, but they also couldn't afford to stand up to a battle of attrition. At that point in time, no. So I say once again, how can you possibly argue that the Germans had a viable choice to make and that they in fact held the initiative? The only real choice they had (a fighting retreat across France to shorter frontlines and supply routes) was not a choice at all in their opinion. And as long as they had the Allies bottled up they had options (limited number of them but still) open for them. As long as they had strenght to counter attack they could interfere with the Allied plans. BTW: please take a look at the Soviet Petsamo-Kirkenes operation and how the Germans acted against a force over 3 times their size. They most certainly did not have a viable solution, nor did they have the ability to decide which of the poor choices they would have to live with. They had to try and beat the Allies in a short battle of attrition, even though the odds were long. They failed to do this and so ended their only chance for even a stalemate in the West. Agreed. Mind you that Finland was a minor blip on the Soviet strategic radar both during the Winter War and during the War of Continuation. Not really. The defence of Leningrad was a prime concern for them and since the Finnish border ran so close to the city limits they did not have space to trade for time in the NW. Finland may have been a minor blip but it was right smack in the middle of their screen. This meant that all Finland had to do was put up a good enough fight and make victory "not worth the effort" for the Soviets. True. The army was tasked to hold out as long as possible so that a diplomatic settlement could be reached. But that does not mean that the Finnish experiences and dotrinal choises were any less irrelevant than those made by the other, bigger, armies. In 1944 they had far bigger fish to fry in Central and Eastern Europe. Finland was very much a "let's see if we can take them out, otherwise we'll just quit and forget about it" situation for the Soviets. This was not the case on either the Western, Southern, or Eastern Fronts. The entire energy was focused on taking Germany out and occupying every inch of its soil. So one should expect to see differences in how the nations on these fronts fought. What !?! You admit openly there WERE differences in the performance of the different armies which are based on force specific approaches (tactics, doctrines and underlying political considerations) ? I'll be damned. While I very much admire and take great interest in Finland's military experiences, they simply can not be compared with the Western forces fighting the Germans in the way you have attempted to do. Might as well bring in examples from the Pacific Theater for all the similarities they shared. E=MC² is a constant. The problems different armies are basically the same: how to attack a fortified position, how to implement defensive positions, an invasion must be beaten at the beach and not to allowed to expand etc. Therefore the image of German tactical units doing as they pleased to the frustration of Allied forces, as a rule, is something I find unsuportable. Doing as they please does not equal being able to retain initiative. Even such a desperate choice as where to direct the counter attack is a way to show you are responding to the enemy moves but not according to the enemy plan. Even such a doctrine as keeping the MLR at all costs is an act of showing you have initiative, as long as you can hold on to the MLR and make the enemy attack over the same terrain (and over his own fallen) over and over again. Holding the MLR at the end of the battle whenever possible by immediate counterattacks, turning a retreat in the face of a superior enemy into an encirclement and preferring fading away when encirceled and making for the friendly lines instead of surrendering enmasse were all überFinnish practises in the face of overwhelming odds in every department you care to mention. [ 12-17-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p> Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Battlefront.com Posted December 17, 2001 Share Posted December 17, 2001 Tero, <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Official US figures. The party line is "firepower to conserve troops" but the US infantry divisions which were in the initial landing contingent had a huge turnover rate (between 95,1% and 252,3%). Those which arrived at the front after October had a markedly lower turnover rates. But they do not cancel each other out. <hr></blockquote> I do not question the figures, rather I question how you are interpreting them. You looked at a very narrow set of figures and made some very huge conclusions. I look at the same figures and my conclusion is totally different: The US losses in Normandy would have been much larger, perhaps by a factor of 2 or 3, without the heavy use of firepower. This is because the troops were largely green, had to storm beaches under heavy fire, and then were subjected to heavy defensive fire by (in many case) very experienced troops in terrain which was familiar to them using superior equipment. Tactical reports of German counter attacks being totally broken up, with heavy losses, when the ground troops failed to stop them are abundant. This was not some standard attack/defend situation, but a very intense, large scale, assault of the most difficult nature. In short, I am surprised the US figures weren't higher even WITH the extra firepower. If the US forces had assaulted Normandy without the overwhelming firepower I am 10000% sure they would have been pushed back into the sea. Therefore, the use of firepower there did not only save US lives but it also was most likely the decisive factor. The other disagreement with your broad, sweeping conclusions is that you only picked one small slice of the entire war in the West. Why not look at the figures in other operations and see what they tell? Basing conclusions on just this one sample is in and of itself flawed. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>ÜberFinns were able to pull that off with (or without) decent arty cover in numerous engagements.<hr></blockquote> Correct me if I am wrong here... but the Finns only got such successes against the Soviets, correct? And also correct me if I am wrong that the US forces in Normandy were fighting against Germans. And finally, also correct me if I am wrong that there are no examples of US forces fighting Soviet forces in WWII that can be used as direct comparison. Again, you seek to compare Apples to Oranges. Therefore, your arguments are flawed from the very ground up. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Does your example prove the US doctrine worked when they were the attackers and the Germans were entrenched in good defensive terrain like the bogace ?<hr></blockquote> No, because I did not attempt to show that at all with the example I gave. You made a very large and sweeping conclusion that massed firepower to save lives was a failed doctrine. I am simply showing that you don't have not made any basis for such a theory on the scale you claim. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The problems the respective forces faced were essentially the same. <hr></blockquote> Wrong. They were night and day different from the core outward. You can look at superficial similarities, such as you outlined, but they do not amount to anything substantive. You can not, repeat CAN NOT, compare Finn vs. Soviet to US vs. German in the way you did and expect me to take your arguments seriously. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>This is actually a misunderstanding brought on by the common misconception that I lean towards the überGerman school of thought when in fact I refuse to buy the teachings of the überAllied school of thought line, hook and sinker. I see now initiative was a very poor choice of terms. When I picked it I was thinking about the way the Germans were able to counter the Allied moves by holding on to the defensive positions and slowing down their advance. Or by disrupting the attacks. I do readily admit is my axiom is works only as far as D+55 when the Germans ran out of means to counter the Allied firepower superiority in terms the they had chosen to take and which they could implement. <hr></blockquote> Good, we finally now have a clarification to your earlier thoughts. I still disagree with the degree you feel the Germans had control of the situation, but I do totally agree with you that belief in either überschool is not helpful. I do not feel the Germans were inferior or the Allies superior, in any way shape or form (doctrine, fighting qualities, etc.). However, it is clear that for the given circumstances the Allies won the war. Therefore, at some level (or various levels) the Allies outfought the Germans. And because the casualty ratios in the West were not very favorable to the Germans (overall) as they were in the East, it is probable that US/UK doctrine of emphasizing firepower over human assaults did in fact minimize friendly casualties while obtaining better end results. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>I take it you would not object to me citing Sun Tsu or Clausewits and their principles and deem them irrelevant.<hr></blockquote> Not at all. But taking a battle which Sun Tzu or Clausewitz cited in their works and directly comparing it to any WWII battle would be irrelevant. And that is what you continue to attempt to do. And that is to take statistical and superficial examinations of inherently and fundamentally different situations and draw direct comparisons from them without digging beneath even the crust of the surface. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Against the Americans ?<hr></blockquote> Yes. Name me one major German counter attack against the Americans which had an operational level of success. The closest two that come to mind are Kasserine and the Ardennes. Both of which shared quite a lot of similarities, including the eventual destruction of the German attacking force and a higher loss of life and equipment for them vs. the US forces they sought to destroy. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>And as long as they had the Allies bottled up they had options (limited number of them but still) open for them. As long as they had strength to counter attack they could interfere with the Allied plans.<hr></blockquote> But since they lacked this strength, it was inevitable that they would lose. Which means you still have failed to show how the Germans had even a hope of winning against the Western Allies after failing to throw them back into the ocean within the first couple of days of fighting. In other words, your larger conclusions about German abilities to direct the outcome of the larger scale battle are based on nothing. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>What !?! You admit openly there WERE differences in the performance of the different armies which are based on force specific approaches (tactics, doctrines and underlying political considerations) ? I'll be damned. <hr></blockquote> Show me one quote where I said anything to the contrary. A whole host of factors made the Romanians different fighters from the Hungarians, the Hungarians different from the Finns, the Finns different from the Germans, etc. These factors are available in CM to utilize in order to see such differences (excepting the human's ability to override national tactical doctrine). However, to argue that national and sub national forces all fought the same is ludicrous. Just as ludicrous as it is to assign Finn troops a +2 modifier for fighting ability just because in your mind they were über. I have always argued, and will always argue, against your notion of inherent differences in the ability of a soldier from one nation vs. another. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr> The problems different armies are basically the same: how to attack a fortified position, how to implement defensive positions, an invasion must be beaten at the beach and not to allowed to expand etc.<hr></blockquote> True to a large extent. However, the kind of superficial and flawed examination and comparisons you have made are not as simple as what you have just stated. You are attempting to use numbers, without any thought about what produced them, to form some sort of opinion about "best" and "superior". This is so flawed that it is actually quite difficult to argue against rationally. For example, it is very hard to argue against someone who things ghosts and monsters are real, yet continue to show faked pictures, stories which can't be proven, and generally poor scientific approaches to examination of evidence. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Even such a doctrine as keeping the MLR at all costs is an act of showing you have initiative, as long as you can hold on to the MLR and make the enemy attack over the same terrain (and over his own fallen) over and over again.<hr></blockquote> Totally disagree. Someone who is tied up against a barn wall and gets shot at, without being hit, is not in a position to influence the ultimate outcome. The guy might be lucky, have fast reflexes, and good dodging instincts, but he does not have the initiative to influence the situation beyond that. So on balance, the guy with the gun has the initiative. Whether he has the ability, or even means (for example, ample ammo), to be victorious is a totally seperate issue. Initiative, in the military sense, is having a superior ability to influence the eventual outcome to a desirable conclusion. If one side can constantly win small scale battles, but always winds up losing the operations and eventually the whole war... on balance who had the greater degree of initiative? Having Tactical initiative makes for great über stories after the war. However, if those stories are told while the "losers" are running the country under occupation or simply that the local cemetaries are filled with those who died for a lost cause, what does it matter if some platoon constantly racked up impressive tank kills? Put another way... if you had a choice to have Tactical, Operational, or Strategic initiative... which would you choose? Steve [ 12-17-2001: Message edited by: Big Time Software ]</p> Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Tero Posted December 18, 2001 Share Posted December 18, 2001 I do not question the figures, rather I question how you are interpreting them. You looked at a very narrow set of figures and made some very huge conclusions. The cut off is not the same as presented in the US history books. But there is a clear transition in the combat activities at that point in time. The set of figures is not narrow, it is a set that does not compliment the American (and Commonwealth) tactics and doctrine as much as the wide figure which counts in the casualty German figures up to the Falaise Gap. And my conclusions are not that huge: 1) Despite all their firepower suppremacy the Allied infantry still had to go in and occupy the terrain (which favoured the defender) and took proprotionally the same kind of casualties the Soviet infantry took in similar attacks (the Soviet divisions having minimal rear echelon contingent whereas the American divison had close to 40% non-combat personel in the roster.) Both the Soviet and the American divisions up to D+55 could sustain something like 90 % casualties in the combat element when conducting assault against static defensive positions in close terrain. 2) The Germans were able to get a 1:1 kill ratio during the Normandy battles when defending in static positions in close terrain which curtailed enemy movement. The ratio was better if the German figure includes POW's as the American are almost 100% KIA/WIA. 3) The situation got volatile when the Germans had expended all their assets in trying to prevent the situation from becoming volatile. The Allied free ranging CAS made daylight movement hazardous and tactical redepoyment to block the American forces streaming out of the bridgehead became virtually impossible. Apparently the Germans had not planned ahead for this contigency and that was the undoing of their forces in the area. The US losses in Normandy would have been much larger, perhaps by a factor of 2 or 3, without the heavy use of firepower. This is because the troops were largely green, had to storm beaches under heavy fire, and then were subjected to heavy defensive fire by (in many case) very experienced troops in terrain which was familiar to them using superior equipment. And superior small unit tactics ? Tactical reports of German counter attacks being totally broken up, with heavy losses, when the ground troops failed to stop them are abundant. So are tactical reports of Soviet attacks during the summer of 1944 against the Finnish defences being broken up by precision heavy arty barrages when they were being formed up so that the Finnish infantry did not have to fire a shot to stop them. I am not taking a piss. By this I want simply to convey I am not particularly impressed by these reports, nor am I not totally unaware of the importance of the correct timing and application of firepower in a tactically critical moment. I do admit I am reflecting much of the Normandy dynamics against the dynamics of the Soviet summer assault that was taking place against the Finns simultaneously. All the incredients are the same in both cases: heavy firepower advantage for the attacker, limited resources for the defender, defender having assets in other places than the actual point of assault and to be able to bring them up they would have to relocate, terrain favouring the defender but if the attacker got past a certain point the tactical situation would swing in favour of the attacker. IMO the differences are not fundamental enough for the examples to be too dissimilar to make them incompareable, when the events are examined from the tactical and doctrinal POV. This was not some standard attack/defend situation, but a very intense, large scale, assault of the most difficult nature. I agree, a seaborn invasion is the one form of attack in which there is absolutely no tolerance for errors. In short, I am surprised the US figures weren't higher even WITH the extra firepower. If the US forces had assaulted Normandy without the overwhelming firepower I am 10000% sure they would have been pushed back into the sea. Therefore, the use of firepower there did not only save US lives but it also was most likely the decisive factor. Agreed. But you are mixing the scales. In the startegic level the firepower was decisive and it did save US lives (mostly rear echelon). But, despite this firepower advantage, in the tactical level the combat echelon of the US divisions sustained as heavy casualties as any other army would have sustained , when they were engaged in a static front attrition combat. Once they could excert their inherently better mobility in mobile warfare friendly environment did the firepower/mobility advantage mix start paying dividents. The other disagreement with your broad, sweeping conclusions is that you only picked one small slice of the entire war in the West. These "sweeping conclusion" apply only to that small slice (static phase in Normandy). Perhaps even in isolated places like the Hürtgen forest and to a degree in the Ardennes. Why not look at the figures in other operations and see what they tell? Basing conclusions on just this one sample is in and of itself flawed. How can you draw conclusion about the validity of a tactical approach or a doctrine if you do not disseminate the operations aspects into different parts according to the differences in the circumstances ? The Normandy campaign had distinct phases of which the period up to D+55 was basically attack in close terrain and defence in static linear defences. After that the situation became volatile and the tactical situation altered. If we are to compare the phase up to D+55 to different Allied vs German operations then the correct operations would be other landings (in MTO), or similar operations involving attacking static linear defences, like in the Hürtgen Forest or the West Wall, not other operations in the ETO which are inherently dissimilar (the Allied forces are able to move freely to bypass the German defences). The reason why I compare the early phase of Normandy to the Soviet summer assault is because of the similarities in the tactial, doctrinal and strategic outlooks of the forces involved. Correct me if I am wrong here... but the Finns only got such successes against the Soviets, correct? And also correct me if I am wrong that the US forces in Normandy were fighting against Germans. And finally, also correct me if I am wrong that there are no examples of US forces fighting Soviet forces in WWII that can be used as direct comparison. You are correct. But the criteria you present does not apply when you compare the performance of different forces and their tactical and doctrinal approaches in similar/comparable tactical situations. If you feel more comfortable we can start comparing the actions in the US-German Hürtgen Forest actions againts assorted Fenno-Soviet winter actions. One of the reasons the early Normandy actions are IMO compareable to the Soviet summer assault is the scale in terms of the number of troops and other assets involved. Not to mention the implications and consequences if/when the defenders failed in their mission of stopping the enemy. Again, you seek to compare Apples to Oranges. Therefore, your arguments are flawed from the very ground up. You have to convince me comparing different armies facing similar tactical problems in comparable situations is comparing apples to oranges. As long as there is quantifiable data available on all the actions I see no reason why the actions could not be compared. Other than the criteria I use does not favour the US Army and present it in the best possible light. I cut off the data unorthodoxically against the conventions of the Anglo-American history writing. Does that make my conclusions wrong ? No, because I did not attempt to show that at all with the example I gave. You made a very large and sweeping conclusion that massed firepower to save lives was a failed doctrine. I am simply showing that you don't have not made any basis for such a theory on the scale you claim. How do you explain the turnover rates of the infantry divisions then ? Home leave rotation ? The data I have read over the years almost invariably show higher loss rates in the attacking units. The average US Army in ETO platoon had a 90% turnover rate. That is actually pretty bad. I would consider that normal for a Finnish platoon under attack by the Red Army having 10 guns per frontline kilometer. Or a Red Army platoon in attack. But for a platoon in an army which has bledged to trade firepower for casualties it is a tad much, even when that 90% is bound to include non-combat related medical cases (trench foot etc). Wrong. They were night and day different from the core outward. You can look at superficial similarities, such as you outlined, but they do not amount to anything substantive. You can not, repeat CAN NOT, compare Finn vs. Soviet to US vs. German in the way you did and expect me to take your arguments seriously. You have to be more specific that that. Which criteria make the comparison so impossible ? What would have to be substantive enough ? Good, we finally now have a clarification to your earlier thoughts. I still disagree with the degree you feel the Germans had control of the situation, but I do totally agree with you that belief in either überschool is not helpful. I do not feel the Germans were inferior or the Allies superior, in any way shape or form (doctrine, fighting qualities, etc.). However, it is clear that for the given circumstances the Allies won the war. Therefore, at some level (or various levels) the Allies outfought the Germans. And because the casualty ratios in the West were not very favorable to the Germans (overall) as they were in the East, it is probable that US/UK doctrine of emphasizing firepower over human assaults did in fact minimize friendly casualties while obtaining better end results. Actually I think the terminology of the Allied firepower doctrine (firepower for lives) was deviced to give the right impression to the troops and the folks back home much like the daylight bombing rethorics. Not at all. But taking a battle which Sun Tzu or Clausewitz cited in their works and directly comparing it to any WWII battle would be irrelevant. And that is what you continue to attempt to do. And that is to take statistical and superficial examinations of inherently and fundamentally different situations and draw direct comparisons from them without digging beneath even the crust of the surface. It seems you focus on the differences and I focus on the similarities. You deem the differences rule out the similarities while I think there are enough similarities to even out the differences sufficiently so a valid comparison can be made. Yes. Name me one major German counter attack against the Americans which had an operational level of success. The closest two that come to mind are Kasserine and the Ardennes. Both of which shared quite a lot of similarities, including the eventual destruction of the German attacking force and a higher loss of life and equipment for them vs. the US forces they sought to destroy. Anzio springs to mind. But since they lacked this strength, it was inevitable that they would lose. Which means you still have failed to show how the Germans had even a hope of winning against the Western Allies after failing to throw them back into the ocean within the first couple of days of fighting. In other words, your larger conclusions about German abilities to direct the outcome of the larger scale battle are based on nothing. Was their failure more to the strategic desicions and outlines made before the invasion (which affected the eventual disposition of the assets and curtailed their deployment when the attack came) or due to their inability to conduct operations against such odds with the assets they had available ? Show me one quote where I said anything to the contrary. Before you have implied these differences were alledged and unquantifiable. A whole host of factors made the Romanians different fighters from the Hungarians, the Hungarians different from the Finns, the Finns different from the Germans, etc. These factors are available in CM to utilize in order to see such differences (excepting the human's ability to override national tactical doctrine). The Western Allied preferred walking fire but due to running units not being able to fire on the move (even with SMG's in an effort to suppress the enemy) in CM the German bounding overwatch (using RUN/HIDE and UNHIDE for the overwatch element) will fail in the face of a similar force advancing towards it using Move command (simulating walking fire). Word has it the SMG will get emasculated in CMBB. However, to argue that national and sub national forces all fought the same is ludicrous. Just as ludicrous as it is to assign Finn troops a +2 modifier for fighting ability just because in your mind they were über. I have always argued, and will always argue, against your notion of inherent differences in the ability of a soldier from one nation vs. another. And I still find it curious a man of your level of knowledge still thinks any "inherent" non-mechanical and intangible (NOT unquantifiable mind you) superity has to do with the nationality more than the tactics and doctrine employed by the its army. Were the conquistadores inherently superior to the South American indians ? Or did they luck out because the indians had not seen a rider on a horse or a muzzle loading rifle or a cannon ? Were the blacks inferior to the Europeans ? Or were they beaten with superior technology and tactics ? Only once, at Isandwhana, did they prevail. Right after that one victory at Rourkes Drift they were beaten back because they failed to utilize their overwhelming superiority and attack from all sides at the same time. I would be called a racist if I was to imply that the failure at Rourkes Drift was due to inherently better quality of the Europeans as warriors. True to a large extent. However, the kind of superficial and flawed examination and comparisons you have made are not as simple as what you have just stated. You are attempting to use numbers, without any thought about what produced them, to form some sort of opinion about "best" and "superior". This is so flawed that it is actually quite difficult to argue against rationally. For example, it is very hard to argue against someone who things ghosts and monsters are real, yet continue to show faked pictures, stories which can't be proven, and generally poor scientific approaches to examination of evidence. I am trying to determine what produced the approx. 100 000 US and the 100 000 German casualties by a certain point in time just before the tactical situation changed and the nature of the combat operations altered and reconcile that with the US "firepower instead of casualties" mantra. What happened to the US and the German casualties after that date ? I'll hazard a guess: the US casualty rates started dropping and the German casualty rates started increasing. I am not denying the total casualty figures for the entire operation or what caused them. But when the operation is being examined from the tactical/doctrinal POV there is no reason to assume the daily casulties were constant for the duration of the operation. If there was fluctuation then there must have been periods when the casualties ran high and periods when they ran low. If the Allied casualties ran high when the Allies were bottled up in Normandy and they eased up after the break out then there must be a reason for this. If the German casualties ran high when the Allies were bottled up in Normandy and they eased up (or started increasing) after the break out then there must be a reason for this too. It is quite intriquing to find that only recently has there surfaced any concrete numbers about the Allied casualties at various stages of the combat actions and operations. Up to that it was always total numbers with the emphasis on the severity of the German losses. Which BTW I am not denying. But you are suggesting that the figures I mentioned are faked, unproven or poorly researched and it was the ghosts of the dead Germans soldiers and a few unfortunate incidents of firendly fire that caused the US casualties then I suggest you contact the US sources and request these faked bits of data and all traces of them be stricken from the annals of WWII and the total figures of the operation in guestion be enforced forthwith. Totally disagree. Someone who is tied up against a barn wall and gets shot at, without being hit, is not in a position to influence the ultimate outcome. The guy might be lucky, have fast reflexes, and good dodging instincts, but he does not have the initiative to influence the situation beyond that. So on balance, the guy with the gun has the initiative. Whether he has the ability, or even means (for example, ample ammo), to be victorious is a totally seperate issue. Are you assuming the guy was tied up against a barn involuntarily ? If he actively chose to be tied up there then I think he had it coming. Initiative, in the military sense, is having a superior ability to influence the eventual outcome to a desirable conclusion. No. Superior ability is a bonus but not a prequisite. If one side can constantly win small scale battles, but always winds up losing the operations and eventually the whole war... on balance who had the greater degree of initiative? I'd say the losing side took a bite they could not swallow. They retained the initiative but the enemy could take the casualties and did not mind losing the insignificant ones. I think Pyrrhos did not lose initiative at any point, he just lost his army and with it the war. Having Tactical initiative makes for great über stories after the war. However, if those stories are told while the "losers" are running the country under occupation or simply that the local cemetaries are filled with those who died for a lost cause, what does it matter if some platoon constantly racked up impressive tank kills? Dunno. Depends what was being fought over. Winter War was a Finnish victory no matter what the Soviets claim. The diplomatic end result was what the Finns were after: Finland remained independent. The enemy was stopped with massive casualties. Vietnam war was US loss because the diplomatic end result was what the Vietnamese wanted even when the US units racked up impressive kill tallies and inflicted massive casualties to the enemy. Put another way... if you had a choice to have Tactical, Operational, or Strategic initiative... which would you choose? Depends what I am going after. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CMplayer Posted December 18, 2001 Share Posted December 18, 2001 <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: Does your example prove the US doctrine worked when they were the attackers and the Germans were entrenched in good defensive terrain like the bogace ? <hr></blockquote> Wait a sec here, according to what you were arguing earlier, the bocage ought to be good terrain to _attack_ in. Just sneak around behind the enemy and surround them, or something like that? You've got me all :confused: Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Simon Fox Posted December 18, 2001 Share Posted December 18, 2001 <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Amongst everything else tero wrote: Actually I think the terminology of the Allied firepower doctrine(firepower for lives) was deviced to give the right impression to the troops and the folks back home much like the daylight bombing rethorics.<hr></blockquote> The facts are that the Allies developed vastly superior, more efficient and flexible systems for the application of firepower than the Germans did. I am not familiar with the "Allied" "firepower for lives" doctrine. Perhaps you could enlighten me as to the military manuals of the time which lay it out. I am sure that German doctrine too emphasised the benefits to attacking of a combination of all arms. Unfortunately they were just never able to get it right. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Vanir Ausf B Posted December 18, 2001 Share Posted December 18, 2001 Tero, I really have no idea what your over-all point is (if there is one) but here are a few random comments for what they're worth: <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: The cut off is not the same as presented in the US history books.<hr></blockquote> I am not aware of any "cut off" for the consideration of casualties in US history books. Perhaps you are refering to some I have not read? Could you be more specific? That is a very broad statement. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>2) The Germans were able to get a 1:1 kill ratio during the Normandy battles when defending in static positions in close terrain which curtailed enemy movement. The ratio was better if the German figure includes POW's as the American are almost 100% KIA/WIA.<hr></blockquote> All else being equal, it is generally expected that the attacker will suffer more losses than the defender, especially in "close terrain". I don't see what that proves. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The reason why I compare the early phase of Normandy to the Soviet summer assault is because of the similarities in the tactial, doctrinal and strategic outlooks of the forces involved.<hr></blockquote> ?! <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Other than the criteria I use does not favour the US Army and present it in the best possible light. I cut off the data unorthodoxically against the conventions of the Anglo-American history writing. Does that make my conclusions wrong ?<hr></blockquote> Here you go again with another "Anglo-Saxon biased historian" tangent. Could you be more specific, or do you believe there is not a historian west of the Rhine worth his salt? <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The data I have read over the years almost invariably show higher loss rates in the attacking units. The average US Army in ETO platoon had a 90% turnover rate. That is actually pretty bad. I would consider that normal for a Finnish platoon under attack by the Red Army having 10 guns per frontline kilometer. Or a Red Army platoon in attack.<hr></blockquote> You're comparing turnover rates for US units attacking Germans in Normandy to Finnish units fighting a defensive war against Soviets!? What are you trying to prove here? This whole thing started several pages back when you asked the following question: <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>But pray tell where did the Allies actively dislodge the Germans from their positions with a single deliberate ground attack with infantry, armour, artillery and other assets before the Germans were willing to give up the positions.<hr></blockquote> People provided multiple examples of this, and now you are making claims of "uberAlliedness" or whatever. I have seen nothing of the sort here. Your current ramblings seem to have little to do with your earlier assertions. BTW, I have a small revelation for you: All armies attempt to trade firepower for casualties when they can. You're swimming upstream on that one. [ 12-18-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]</p> Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Battlefront.com Posted December 18, 2001 Share Posted December 18, 2001 Tero, With all due respect, I am terminating my involvement in this thread. I thought I would give it one last try before doing so, but unfortunately your response was as I epxceted based on similar previous discussions with you: 1. Your arguments are muddled. 2. Your counter arguments are muddled. 3. Showing clear and direct bias against Anglo American forces simply because they were not Germans or Finns. 4. Confusing facts and figures to support your increasingly muddled line of argument. 5. Ignoring, dodging, or (at best) not understanding direct and fundamental challenges to your core "evidence" supporting your muddled claims. 6. Arguing for the sake of arguing. If your argument is that the Anglo American forces sucked compared to everybody else, you have not proved it. If your argument is that the Germans somehow maintained freedom of action (initiative) while at the same time being clobbered and quite quickly conquered (how many months did the Finns hold out against the Soviets compared to the Germans against the Anglo American forces in Western Europe?) you have also utterly failed to prove this. On the contrary, I and others have done a pretty neat job debunking your weak arguments, even if you wish to undersand this. You were given ample opportunity to make your case and have utterly failed to do so. Therefore, I am fully satisfied that I can leave knowning there are no lingering issues which need to be addressed. Steve Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
TSword Posted December 18, 2001 Share Posted December 18, 2001 In my opinion based on some study of very detailed battle analysis (NTIS has some really good ones) i came to the conclusion that the contrary is true. In a real battle an attacking force was annihilated very quicly by some machineguns and small arms fire when not being supressed. In the Ardennes battles for Butgenbach for instance a single US-company could easily defeat a whole battaillon of german attackers, they were butchered by the MG's, mortars and small arms fire in no time. (German had not supressed the defenders and were not able to bring their tanks to bear with the first attacks..). Also the US used vast quantities of Artillery whenever possible to stall attacks. There were many instances were around 6 artillery battaillons fired on a pile of wood or the like, crunching the attacker completely. And they didn't fire for 3 or 4 minutes but hours instead !!! (The same for german artillery fire after the first attacks failed..The Werfers were really devastating. On the other hand houses built with concrete walls couldn't be perforated by 75 mm HE shells (A US platoon and a Bat. HQ stood in a house for hours while some Mark IV's shot their 75 mm HE's in the walls without taking a single casualty...) CM is a game and many, many things are quite wrong... Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Tero Posted December 19, 2001 Share Posted December 19, 2001 <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by CMplayer: Wait a sec here, according to what you were arguing earlier, the bocage ought to be good terrain to _attack_ in. Just sneak around behind the enemy and surround them, or something like that? You've got me all :confused: <hr></blockquote> Loud and clear. The method the US army deviced to bust the the bocage defences did not involve field artillery support in the tactical sense as such, only massive field artillery preparations. Sure, these artillery fire missions were directed at the proper target points but due to safety regulations there was a gap between the lifting of the barrage and the actual attack. The defences had to be taken out by infantry using direct fire weapons and supported by direct fire support assets. Which was inherently costly to the infantry before they got it right. And even then it was an infantry intensive affair, not an artillery intensive affair. Get me ? [ 12-19-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p> Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Tero Posted December 21, 2001 Share Posted December 21, 2001 Originally posted by Simon Fox: The facts are that the Allies developed vastly superior, more efficient and flexible systems for the application of firepower than the Germans did. Are you talking just about artillery ? "Application of firepower" covers much more than just artillery. I am not familiar with the "Allied" "firepower for lives" doctrine. Perhaps you could enlighten me as to the military manuals of the time which lay it out. I could propably dig up the proper FM number but since they are not readily available I have to direct you to such books as "Closing with the Enemy". I am sure that German doctrine too emphasised the benefits to attacking of a combination of all arms. Unfortunately they were just never able to get it right. JasonC in the "What happened to the Lorraine panzer brigades" sums it up pretty well. The Germans were way too aggressive when comparing their available assets and their tactics and doctrine to the prevailing tactical and strategic disposition. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Tero Posted December 21, 2001 Share Posted December 21, 2001 Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B: I am not aware of any "cut off" for the consideration of casualties in US history books. Perhaps you are refering to some I have not read? Could you be more specific? That is a very broad statement. Are the Allied casualties or are they not almost invariably listed per complete operations, not per phases of the operations ? The "unusual cut off" I refer to is not the temporal cut off for the usual historical for the entire Normandy operation. All else being equal, it is generally expected that the attacker will suffer more losses than the defender, especially in "close terrain". I don't see what that proves. Disregarding such questions like does the German figure up to that date include German casualties inflicted by the British the historical cut off evens out the American total casualty figures over a longer period of time. After the Germans lost Avrances and the Allies burst out into the open I would think the Allied casualties would shift from foot infantry to mechanized troops and armour. And that the casualty figures per engagement for the Allies would decrease. If the different nature of these two phases is disregarded then the total American casualty figure can not be distributed correctly to depict the combat during the different phases. Here you go again with another "Anglo-Saxon biased historian" tangent. Could you be more specific, or do you believe there is not a historian west of the Rhine worth his salt? They are not necessarily biased. They are just not doing their leg work properly. When was the last time a major Anglo-American WWII myth was busted ? Daylight bombing got busted, CAS is being debunked. Are there really no other myths still in the foundation ? Churchills memoires are still being considered a prime source and the views presented in it still prevail for crying out loud. You're comparing turnover rates for US units attacking Germans in Normandy to Finnish units fighting a defensive war against Soviets!? What are you trying to prove here? If the mantra "firepower for lives" was true then one would expect the average turnover rate during the entire NWE campaing (June 6th 1944 to May 1945) to be different. But pray tell where did the Allies actively dislodge the Germans from their positions with a single deliberate ground attack with infantry, armour, artillery and other assets before the Germans were willing to give up the positions. People provided multiple examples of this, and now you are making claims of "uberAlliedness" or whatever. I have seen nothing of the sort here. Your current ramblings seem to have little to do with your earlier assertions. Please read my "claim" again. All the examples thrown at my face do not fit the bill exactly. Not one instance was provided where a single deliberate ground attack with infantry, armour, artillery and other assets before the Germans were willing to give up the positions. All of them mention artillery busting up a German counter attack or two. Ie: the American force is either bogged down or forced into a defensive posture. And all of the examples involve a series of actions. Not one have given an example when a single Allied attack before the break out decisively busts the German defence open at the outset and the Germans are forced to retreat. BTW, I have a small revelation for you: All armies attempt to trade firepower for casualties when they can. Not a revelation. Why get your own killed if you can make the enemy get killed. The überFinns actively avoided frontal assaults if at all possible because they would inherently involve heavier casualties. If there was any way to use a single pointed thrust in covered terrain and then roll the enemy defences from the flanks or go around the defences and take the defences from the back the additional time would be spent instead of the casualties taken. The Soviets deviced a system where they made a decoy break in and then direct heavy arty barrages where the projected counterattack would fall. This is why I am trying to ascertain why these kind of infatry casualties are given and still the mantra prevails. And this is why I strive to segregate the POW figures from the other losses as they distort the Allied casualty rates because the totals are being compared, not the different classes of casualties. You're swimming upstream on that one. So what else is new ? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Redwolf Posted December 21, 2001 Share Posted December 21, 2001 <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: Originally posted by Simon Fox: The facts are that the Allies developed vastly superior, more efficient and flexible systems for the application of firepower than the Germans did. Are you talking just about artillery ? "Application of firepower" covers much more than just artillery. I am not familiar with the "Allied" "firepower for lives" doctrine. Perhaps you could enlighten me as to the military manuals of the time which lay it out. <hr></blockquote> I think one has to seperate Americans and British here. The British inherited the systems I would regard as high-firepower from the Americans. The M3 and M4 medium tanks (M3 Grant, not Stuart) were the cheapest design possible to deliver the high blast of the US 75mm. Cost is defined as including shipping cost, which makes the high design while preserving footprint desireable. When evaluating the gun these tanks carried, you have to compare that with British designs of the same time, which was for a large part AP only, with a very small HE round and/or mainly intended to shoot smoke. Compaing with German designs of the same time, a armoured unit of similar cost would carry much more HE capacity than an Axis unit. 75mm guns on light vehicles like Chaffee and M8 HMC also indicate a high preference for HE firepower even in situations that require swiftness (The Germans had a vehicle for the heavy part of recon units in the 250/8 and 234/3, but these were not fully tracked and had no turret). The American divisions had the highest percentage of men in support roles, which effectivly makes artillery ammunition in the frontline cheaper. Also they had the required motorization to move big artillery pieces. They were willing to turn many M10 into temporary artillery pieces by producing masses of HE shells for them, after discovering that at least in Italy there were not enough tanks to shoot at. Other nations would have found a different use for them, the Americans wanted more indirect firepower and they didn't want to wait for a mechanical modification of the vehicle. The .50cal is IMHO a very successful attempt to turn many light vehicles into high-firewpoer weapons while preserving their original purpose. More so than the Axis 20mm, which as a weapon was more powerful, but could only be applied to vehicles designated for it and could not be removed to be fired from the ground. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Tero Posted December 21, 2001 Share Posted December 21, 2001 Originally posted by Big Time Software: 3. Showing clear and direct bias against Anglo American forces simply because they were not Germans or Finns. Nope. It is not bias against them because they are not German or Finns. I just do not show proper respect for them. That is mainly because for all the nice little captions of Allied heroics in the "bloody" combat in the bogace I have never ever seen any actual figures on the Allied infantry losses. For example in "Closing with the Enemy" there is an entire section on bocage fighting. The usual rethorics is observed (heavy casualties, how heavy is not stated). There is nothing about the actual casualty figures except a off hand remark about 1st Army requesting 25 000 replacements. 5. Ignoring, dodging, or (at best) not understanding direct and fundamental challenges to your core "evidence" supporting your muddled claims. Well, I ask for some evidence for the validity of the mantra when the Western Allies are in the offensive and you and others grace me with a nice and impressive bunch of stories mainly about the use of massive arty fire to beat back counter attacks against hard pressed defenders, not how the Allies could excert it from the move or after some preparations and bust the German defences into a pulp forcing them into a headlong retreat. Sorry, but I can dig those up from the überFinnish archives if I wanted that kind of evidence. If your argument is that the Anglo American forces sucked compared to everybody else, you have not proved it. Does it really mean I think they sucked when I refuse to take the composite Allied casualty figures at face value when discussing combat of different nature inside a single operation ? If your argument is that the Germans somehow maintained freedom of action (initiative) while at the same time being clobbered and quite quickly conquered In Closing with the Enemy there is a phrase "regain initiative for the attacker" or something to that effect. How can that be if the attacker has the initiative already ? (how many months did the Finns hold out against the Soviets compared to the Germans against the Anglo American forces in Western Europe?) 4 months against 11 months. But our army was demobilized in the end, not disarmed and marched into captivity. And the casualties sustained were close to 1000% lower than those sustained by the Germans. On the contrary, I and others have done a pretty neat job debunking your weak arguments, even if you wish to undersand this. You guys still haven't been able to explain the extent of the Allied infantry casualties away. The Western Allied arty excelled in breaking up counter attacks. I knew this. But when it comes to breaking up prepared defensive lines it falls far behind the power of the Red Army artillery practises. I am fully satisfied that I can leave knowning there are no lingering issues which need to be addressed. To be able to gain moral high ground you need to prove the US war experience was more relevant that that of the rest of the armies. The debate is over tactical and doctrinal principles and you seem to think anybody elses data except that of the US Army is irrelevant in the theoretical level. Your sources are mainly US, mine mainly Finnish. I hold both source to be of equal value. You think that the weight of evidence you have can inundate the weight of evidence I can present simply because you have more bits of data to pour in. When I postulate things from the casualties for a certain timeperiod not normally observed in your sources as relevant you accuse me of manipulating them and taking them out of context. You can not prove the data is actually wrong so there must be something wrong in my approach because I can show there is something amiss in the formula as presented by your sources. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Vanir Ausf B Posted December 22, 2001 Share Posted December 22, 2001 <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: Disregarding such questions like does the German figure up to that date include German casualties inflicted by the British the historical cut off evens out the American total casualty figures over a longer period of time. After the Germans lost Avrances and the Allies burst out into the open I would think the Allied casualties would shift from foot infantry to mechanized troops and armour. And that the casualty figures per engagement for the Allies would decrease. If the different nature of these two phases is disregarded then the total American casualty figure can not be distributed correctly to depict the combat during the different phases.<hr></blockquote> That's a very wordy dodge. In no way does it address my point that your 1:1 loss ratio figure you were holding up does nothing to prove your point. All else being equal, the Allied casualties would be expected to be worse than 1:1, not better. So the fact that they acheived 1:1 losses while attacking would suggest whatever they were doing worked well enough. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>They are not necessarily biased. They are just not doing their leg work properly. When was the last time a major Anglo-American WWII myth was busted ? Daylight bombing got busted, CAS is being debunked. Are there really no other myths still in the foundation ? Churchills memoires are still being considered a prime source and the views presented in it still prevail for crying out loud.<hr></blockquote> You did not provide the specific examples I asked for, so I assume you do mean to include all western historians in your claim. I'm glad to see you're doing your legwork unlike those infamous slackers Jentz and Dupey. I look forward to reading your book. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>If the mantra "firepower for lives" was true then one would expect the average turnover rate during the entire NWE campaing (June 6th 1944 to May 1945) to be different.<hr></blockquote> Wrong. See 1:1 ratio comments above. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Please read my "claim" again. All the examples thrown at my face do not fit the bill exactly. Not one instance was provided where a single deliberate ground attack with infantry, armour, artillery and other assets before the Germans were willing to give up the positions. All of them mention artillery busting up a German counter attack or two. Ie: the American force is either bogged down or forced into a defensive posture. And all of the examples involve a series of actions. Not one have given an example when a single Allied attack before the break out decisively busts the German defence open at the outset and the Germans are forced to retreat.<hr></blockquote> Who are you trying to fool here? You are now adding conditions and qualifiers to your original question after the fact. It is not true that all the examples given involve Allies breaking up German counter attacks with artillery. That is a totally false statement. How can you expect people to take your points seriously when you deliberately misrepresent the facts? <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>This is why I am trying to ascertain why these kind of infatry casualties are given and still the mantra prevails. And this is why I strive to segregate the POW figures from the other losses as they distort the Allied casualty rates because the totals are being compared, not the different classes of casualties.<hr></blockquote> Let us know when you have all your numbers added up and your arguements sorted out. I look forward to seeing you debunk western "mythology" and telling us how it really was. I have a hunch its going to be some variation on the "Germans would have won if Hitler had just kept out of it and the Allies had fought fair" threory, but we'll see. Until then there is little point in going further as nothing anyone says is going to change your mind and I'm having a hard time keeping track of all your different arguements as they seem to change from post to post. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
The_Capt Posted December 22, 2001 Share Posted December 22, 2001 Hey Lincon, Drop me a line, someone wants to talk to you but you have no e-mail address. I think you may be interested. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CMplayer Posted December 22, 2001 Share Posted December 22, 2001 <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: The method the US army deviced to bust the the bocage defences did not involve field artillery support in the tactical sense as such, only massive field artillery preparations.<hr></blockquote> This misses an important part of the technique. Artillery supported attacks not only with prep fire, but also by firing directly behind the area being contested, to prevent the Germans from easily reinforcing. (or withdrawing for that matter) I would definitely call this 'tactical' use of artillery. The defences had to be taken out by infantry using direct fire weapons and supported by direct fire support assets. Or further, in the successful bocage-fighting the infantry squads and the sherman tanks were effectively merged into inf/armor/engineer fighting teams. This is more than just infantry with direct fire support, it is a sort of hyper-squad with not just a BAR-man, but a machine gun toting, cannon equipped tank or two as well, and a demolitions element as integral parts of the team. Which was inherently costly to the infantry before they got it right. Which further supports the truism that difficult terrain with short LOS disrupts the coordination between various arms, and thereby favours the defender. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Andreas Posted December 22, 2001 Share Posted December 22, 2001 <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero: Not one instance was provided where a single deliberate ground attack with infantry, armour, artillery and other assets before the Germans were willing to give up the positions<hr></blockquote> I provided you with a list a while back - please repost your analysis as to why this was wrong, if indeed you have posted a reply here, since I don't feel inclined to wade through this thread to find it (alternatively, just tell me which page it was on). Here is another one BTW - Nijmegen Bridge. The Germans did not intend to blow the bridge, but were forced back when the paras crossed. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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