Bring out your dead!

[Sergei]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

Look past the Soviet period tactics and you will find that no way no how can any force come across such "uncovered" terrain and not sustain casualties if going against a determined defender.[/QB]<hr></blockquote>

On the other hand, Red Army really couldn't have done better if the terrain was something different, except if it was summer (snow hindered mobility, thus not making it truly open). And in that case all the lakes and swamps would have posed a problem. If it was a closed terrain, Finns surely could have intercepted attacks swiftly compared to how quickly Soviets would have noticed the counter-attack, and that way gained a local superiority, destroying Soviets piece-meal.

Of course it is true that the Soviet tactic wasn't effective. But what would you have done if you were the commander, considering training of the forces?

[Slapdragon]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by manchildstein II:

i always figure "KIA" are really 'dead or incapacitated' and other "casualties" are often the result of cowering and not any actual wound. that way the casualty figures at the end of the game usually seem more reasonable.

andy<hr></blockquote>

Andy --

This is so. A casualty is someone taken out of the game, a KIA taken out of the campaign, so sometimes casualties look a little but bigger in CM than they are.

CMPlayer, I did not know you were still upset about some game now far in the past. I play about 10 a month and never really remember them after a few weeks. If I had known that this was your point and not the issue of open ground attacks, I would never have started this up with you.

I found the e-mail from the game, and note that I said the lanes of attack were not good since they were too open, and that you got upset because you thought my discussion of tactics was some aspersion of your playing ability. Well, I am sorry, it is a game, and in my games with Andreas and Dorosh right now going very heavy (unfortunately I owe both turns) we both talk about tactics and startegy without getting upset, and I had figured a game with you was the same. I was unaware about your sensitivity in this area and started a banter which you took all wrong.

So this is basically all my fault. I am very sorry that I misunderstood the tenor of your conversation here and in that game.

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

no way no how can any force come across such "uncovered" terrain and not sustain casualties if going against a determined defender.<hr></blockquote>

Who said anything about not sustaining any casualties?

I'm just trying to suggest what I thought was an axiom of WWII theory, that ideal terrain is open enough to allow full combined-arms coordination: infantry, armor, artillery and air support. That's the ideal for attacking. That's all I'm really suggesting, and I'm looking at that only from the point of view of the Allies in the period and theatre covered by CMBO.

Because of your personality you might prefer, if you had to fight yourself, to fight in dense forest as a sneaky and resourceful patroller. If that's the kind of soldier you are then I bow to you. Seriously. But if you've got a simulated WWII force comprised of normal, physically timid pixellated infantrymen, then you're best off in terrain where they can work in a combined arms manner. Dense forests inhibit that and lead to much more casualty intensive battles, against a determined defender. Of course there are exceptions, such as in very uneven situations like a beach landing. I'm not sure we actually disagree so much, it just seems we are misreading each others' intentions.

BTW I haven't seen the movie you mentioned though I'd like to. The only Finnish war movie I can think of right off that I've seen is the one about the long range bicycle patrol, which I really enjoyed. I have a question about it though. When they broke through the Russian line from behind, were they really supposed to do that? Or did the commander just make it up, as some kind of suicidal wish. They didn't seem to be expected on the other side. Maybe I went to the toilet right when they explained that bit.

[CMplayer]

Slappy, I disagree with some points in your characterization of that e-mail exchange. I will not, however, argue the issue here.

[JasonC]

Slapdragon is wrong and CMplayer is right, but the confusion stems mostly from the particular way slapdragon understands the military terms he is slinging about. He does so according to a maneuverist orthodoxy, and the failings of his analysis are the shortcomings of that whole school of doctrine, which he has reproduced faithfully and accurately.

He thinks "attack" and "charge" are synonyms. He knows only one way for attackers to proceed, and that is by local odds differentials created by concentrated spearheads, then moved about vigorously inside the enemy positions. And he thinks that charges over completely open ground in concentrated groups, especially with infantry, will get lots of people killed to little result, which is entirely true.

He just doesn't know there are other ways of attacking. He doesn't really understand combined arms at the pointy end at all. He understanding it only at the operational level, about brigade I'd say, where the combined arms idea is limited to making sure the concentrated spearhead being shoved around has all arms present. For some unknown tactical multiplier reason, that seems to help, but how and why he doesn't bother his head about.

You see Slapdragon, walking infantry across the open, or charging, is not the only way to "attack". Charges that "don't get anyone within 50 meters" of the defender's positions can be as pointless as you please, but so is getting to the enemy position. The point is not in the least to get anywhere. It is to *kill* the defenders. Ground gained is quite irrelevant. Maneuverists often fail to grok this.

What does a combined arms attack over open ground actually involve? Supporting artillery brought into range and well supplied. AFVs standing by. Infantry in echelon, with organic heavy weapons (mortars, HMGs, usually light direct-fire artillery too). Then what? A bum's rush? Pickett's charge? Not at all.

The infantry creeps - not runs, creeps - toward the enemy positions. Usually in a wedge, which then crawls forward by alternating bounds, 50-100 yards at a time. The enemy can open fire on them at long range, or not. If he does, then does everybody stand up, shout "Banzai!", and charge "home" with l'arme blanche? Um, no, only in the dreams of the school of St. Cyr, that ancestor of all maneuverists.

The infantry goes to ground, the forwardmost my withdraw somewhat, everybody goes as still as possible. The HMGs and mortars plaster the firing defensive positions. 12 heavy guns at a time fire at lone defensive heavy weapons, indirect. Whole platoons of tanks direct their fire at single identified defending positions for 5 to 15 minutes. There is absolutely no rush. If an enemy gun is firing at the tanks, it is spotted and innudated with HE (it is, remember, in open ground). Defending MGs are fired at by attacking mortars, defending riflemen by HMGs - both from beyond range of effective reply.

The attackers do not "spend" soldier's lives to "close" in some mystical belief in the shattering moral effect of the terror of closing with the enemy. They spend ammo, and time, in the entirely rational belief that defenders rendered into small pieces, by high explosive, will not continue to oppose the assault. When no defenders are still firing, then and only then, the caterpillar creeping of the infantry resumes.

To avoid having each shooter annihilated piecemeal, one after the other, by the attacker's superior heavy firepower, the defender must employ the tactic of fire discipline. Meaning, they do not open up at long range with every available weapon, but instead hold their fire until there are many attackers in the defender's lethal zones.

If the attackers came on is a single mass, all up and walking, this would work like a charm. At 250 yards or whatever, every defender would open up simultaneously and kill or wound so many attackers than the attack would be reduced to a shambles in minutes. But that is why the attackers are caterpillaring along, in echelon, in wedges, by bounds, etc.

Only this platoon is going to be that close at first. Everybody else will still be farther out - outside the lethal zone of the ordinary side arms of the defending infantry, and prone. The defenders can wipe out that platoon, or wait. If they wait, then they will often be spotted by the nearest approaching attackers, now stationary and prone again, before many other attackers get too close. Those lead attackers will then call down fire, and direct their own side arms to suppressing the defenders.

When any given section of the defender's front is effectively suppressed by fire, heavy weapons are moved in closer opposite them. While they are heads-down, infantry maneuvers closer and swells the volume of fire on that area. Fire ascendency, not local odds, is the name of the game. The winner will be the side with heads up, firing, instead of down and ducking.

When the fire ascendency is heavy enough over one area, and the nearest creeping infantry is already very close - then and only then, will a last rush carry the forward infantry to grenade range. Not bayonet range, but grenade range yes. The grenades will then force the defenders out of their holes or kill them there.

The attackers don't care a lick about gaining ground, or about getting across this or that area, or even about getting close to the defenders. They don't care if the defenders are killed by artillery barrages while the nearest attackers are 1.5 km away, or by tanks and mortars and HMGs from 500m, or by riflemen from 200m, or by grenades from 25m. Just so long as they kill the defenders.

All the rest is just creating multiple threats so that each defender's tactic - to fire or hold fire, to stand or to run, etc - has its counter. The grenades are only there to meet the counter "stay in the bottom of the hole where it is safe, no matter what happens". They are not "the purpose" of the rest. The infantry advance is not "being supported" by all the other arms. It is just a subordinate to the whole design of killing the enemy as the HMGs are. Its role is merely to create the threat "if you don't reveal your positions, you will still die, once these guys get close and see you".

The entire logic of a combine arms attack in the open is based on firepower, not on maneuver ideas. Its goal is not ground but killing the enemy - an attritionist objective. If the enemy stands and shoots at range, they may never even need to advance, as they may be able to kill the defenders in wholesale lots, all day, with attacking artillery. This is not a "failure", it is merely one horn the defender can choose to be impaled on. If he holds fire or denudes his front to avoid this, the other measures will kill his outposts, and the whole thing can be done again tomorrow a mile further on.

Some of these tactics were developed by the Boers in the Boer war. Some were developed by the rival infantries of WW I, with the Germans having a distinct lead. Rommel's book on infantry is largely about getting it to work at the company command level in WW I conditions. He found that even a section of 2 HMGs could perform the fire support role, in the absence of the doctrinally mandated heavy artillery support. He found that it was largely a question of heads going down and of sighting differentials created by it, which allowed fire and movement principles to be applied. We would say "fire ascendency".

[Slapdragon]

If frontal attack is your bag, then I say go for it. Everyone has their own tactical style, and if you find frontal attacks through open terrain are good, then you should do so.

[ 12-12-2001: Message edited by: Slapdragon ]</p>

[Battlefront.com]

I think everybody here is missing a critical point. And that is about scale.

Open or dense terrain are, in my opinion, neutral in terms of being good/bad for the attacker. What swings the benefits and negatives one way or the other are the exact circumstances of the attack in question. In other words, each has its + and - attributes, which are magnified or reduced depending on the actual battlefield situation at the time.

Scale is important because any one individidual battle, regardless of terrain, can be easily won by either side. There are plenty of cases of battles in very dense terrain where the attacker won easily, and plenty in open terrain where they lost. Again, it all depends on the specific context of the battle in question.

Where the terrain issue becomes VERY different is at the operational and strategic level. Miles and miles of long, deep "open" terrain is generally much harder to defend than dense terrain when the attacker is deploys a mechanized combined arms force with a complimentary doctrine. The reason is that the attacker can rapidly advance deep into the flanks and rear of the defender and prevent a cohesive regrouping of its forces. This is very difficult to do in dense terrain against a well prepared or resourcefull enemy.

Two examples:

1. The Allies in Normandy. Initially they had great difficulty advancing because taking one hedgerow or defended town only meant being faced by another. Once the Germans, basically, ran out of such terrain features (and the means to defend them to some degree), the front colapsed and the Allies made an advance rarely seen in military history.

2. The German attack on France in 1940. They breeched moderate/poor defenses in dense terrain and advanced at a fantastic pace until they reached the open terrain beyond. There they made one of the most rapid and conclusive advances of all time.

Both started out in dense terrain, but eventually led the attacker to victory in France. Yet the nature of the fighting in the dense terrain was very different. The Allies drove right into the teeth of tough German defenders in the 1st example, while the Germans sidestepped such defenses. Yet both resulted in victory.

Contrast this with some of the forest battles in 1944/45 along the Western Front. The US forces tried to repeat #1 instead of doing #2 as the Germans did (i.e. avoid a long, costly strategic battle). Since the depth of the dense terrain was great, and the German resolve to defend it intense, the US forces were bloodied up very badly. Horrible weather, poor planning, and an unclear vision for success made it much worse.

But do keep in mind that the US never had huge force advantages in terms of numbers, and yet inflicted very large numbers of casualties on the defending forces. That shows at the tactical (CM) level, it is not necessarily better to be the defender in such situations.

Anyhoo... a pretty silly discussion in general, as it would seem that nobody is really doing much to convice the other side of their point of view.

Steve

[Slapdragon]

Another thing, if you are an allied tanker in WW2, you don't want to be in the open, trying to do the JasonC gunfight at long range. The Germans are far better at long range, so you need to find a way to close distance without becoming suddenly dead.

Now in WW2, the Americans and British relied on swamping German tanks, but in CM you cannot do that, the Sherman costs close to what the Panther does and cannot kill the Panther toe to toe. Even the Firefly is costly for its power. Tank for tank at long range the Germans clean up.

So the way to fight German tanks is to get closer, and attack from their flank, which requires stealth. This is hardly the answer if you are stuck in an open ground frontal attack mentality.

[Battlefront.com]

As for which terrain I like to attack over the most...

In CMBO it would be mixed terrain. Open areas with nice dense patches for me to start out in. The enemy would likely have these too, so I try and flank and attack from favorable positions. I then take these positions for my own and use them to launch another attack or defend against a counter attack.

In CMBB things are a little different. I now loath, hate, fear, dread, etc. attacking over even moderately open terrain. Say a field 100m wide by 60m deep. If I have good troops, good support weapons, and the oportunity to launch a coordinated attack, I generally do OK. But if the defender is dug in, my troops aren't the greatest, and my support weapons aren't adequate... well... I am not ashamed to say I have had my ass handed to me

The main reasons why are largely the ones brought up earlier in connection with the original question of this thread. There are some things that CMBO did not model as well as CMBB does, and those things tended to favor frontal attacks over open terrain. Now that we have fixed some of the shortcomings of CMBO, people who love to attack over open ground will find it much tougher to do in CMBB.

Steve

[Slapdragon]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Open or dense terrain are, in my opinion, neutral in terms of being good/bad for the attacker. What swings the benefits and negatives one way or the other are the exact circumstances of the attack in question. In other words, each has its + and - attributes, which are magnified or reduced depending on the actual battlefield situation at the time.

<hr></blockquote>

I think this is very important, since terrain can play a huge part in the battle at CM level depending on your force mix. In my discussion previously, I was referring to a realistic US force mix with a heavy percentage of 75 armed tanks and no more than a 1.5 to 1 attack strength. Conserving my forces in any battle of this sort becomes of extreme importance, even more important than taking random objective flags, since it is very easy for the defender to blow out a fifth of my force in one minute just by catching the Shermans advancing.

But maybe I have all Churchhills, and he has all 50mm guns. And maybe I have gotten some heavy arty, and even some MGs. Then the open ground becomes more appealing since my Churches are safe as, well Churches, and he is going to face their rath until they run out of ammo, nothing he had will dent them.

[Spook]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Contrast this with some of the forest battles in 1944/45 along the Western Front. The US forces tried to repeat #1 instead of doing #2 as the Germans did (i.e. avoid a long, costly strategic battle). Since the depth of the dense terrain was great, and the German resolve to defend it intense, the US forces were bloodied up very badly. Horrible weather, poor planning, and an unclear vision for success made it much worse.

<hr></blockquote>

On an off-tangent note, regarding that last statement, it's a bit of intrigue to me in that there is still usually very little discussion/debate in historian or wargamer circles as to who was most responsible for the Hurtgen fiasco. Hodges? Bradley? Or even Ike?

[Battlefront.com]

Slapdragon wrote"

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>So the way to fight German tanks is to get closer, and attack from their flank, which requires stealth. This is hardly the answer if you are stuck in an open ground frontal attack mentality.<hr></blockquote>

Although I haven't had much of a chance to play CMBB extensively (sigh...), I did have a battle a couple of weeks ago that proved this.

I was attacking a Soviet position in the winter of 1941/42. I had a superior infantry force backed up by artillery, 3 armored cars, 3 StuGs, and 4 PzIIIs. I had to advance over largely open ground against what turned out to be a MG battalion with no armored support, no AT guns, and little artillery. They were in prepared defensive positions, including trenches, mines, and wire. Inbetween my start line and their MLR I had only a few croppings of trees, a couple of houses, and some LOS deadspots (terrain was quite hilly).

Initially I got my ass kicked very hard. I divided my force up into two groups, roughly 1/3rd on the left for flanking and 2/3rds on the right with armor for a direct assault on the town. They pounded me with artillery on the first turn and I effectively lost roughly 1/2 of my infantry force, one FO, and one AC directly assaulting the town. The remainder of this force was pinned down, routed, or just barely able to advance. The deep snow made moving very difficult and tiring. It took me about 20 turns to advance about 80m and form a new jump off position.

In the mean time I worked my flanking force up and around the side and supported it with some of the armor previously in the center (StuGs). The PzIIIs flanked right and this bought my clobbered infantry force time to reorganize and rest up. I then attacked in one motion and wiped out the defender with almost no additional losses.

Attacking over open terrain nearly killed my assault. The only force that did any advancing for the first 20 turns was my flanking force which had better cover and met with less resistance. But once I got on both flanks and had my center reorganized, I crushed the entire defending force to a pulp. I won the battle, but the cost was initially very high.

Had I to do it over again I would have put 2/3rds on the flank and not attempted to move the remaining force up the middle until I was better sure of the defender's abilities.

Just more food for thought

Steve

[Pak40]

To get back to the original topic:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> I usually get between 50-70% wounded or dead as an average and most guns ant vehicles are dead (well at least when I lose) the forces are certainly not fit for any more duty that day (week, month)

In WW2 did the kind of fight modelled in CM occur regularly and did they amount to the same destruction and carnage or am I just playing gamy and with total disregard regard to human life?

<hr></blockquote>

If you compare the entire fight for Arnhem Bridge (about 3 days) to a single scenario in CM (less than 1 hour) you will see that you'll get similar results for the losing side. That is, the losing side will see 80% or more casualties.

Why are the casualty percentages so close? How can a fierce 3 day battle produce the same amount of casualties as a 1 hour battle?

The answer: We, as wargamers, tend to focus on the objectives of the game rather than the lives of our men. We move our digital soldiers across a digital landscape to try and capture some flags, which seem more importanant than the lives of our men. We usually go all out to capture these flags, which means heavy casualties.

The only instance where we seem to care about our men is in a campaign. Our men must survive the first battle so that we have enough men for the subsequent battles. This comes the closest to realistic battle behavior and command decisions.

[JonS]

Slap,

I think the point Jason was making - and which you have typically mis-characterised - is that in the end all attacks come down to a frontal attack. Sooner or later you have to go in and kill the enemy, whether it be with artillery, tanks, or grenades. You can dance and maneuver all you want beforehand, but eventually you will have to attack.

Regards

JonS

[Battlefront.com]

Spook"

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>On an off-tangent note, regarding that last statement, it's a bit of intrigue to me in that there is still usually very little discussion/debate in historian or wargamer circles as to who was most responsible for the Hurtgen fiasco.<hr></blockquote>

I think this is because there was plenty of blame to go around Basically, the Allied commanders had lulled themselves into a false sense of superiority. They felt they had beaten the German Army and were therefore still in probe/attack/advance mode. What they failed to recognize for weeks was that the days of August were OVER. The Germans had rallied, and rallied in rather tough terrain. More importantly, terrain which the Allied commanders had little experience fighting in while the Germans had quite a bit. And unlike the open areas of France, the Germans were determined to dig in and take whatever came at them.

From what I have read, the commanders from Battalion to Army were at fault for not recognizing this rather significant change in the overall situation. As the battle ground on the lower levels started to figure this out, but were also the first to be rotated out while the higher commanders remained largely in place.

By the time they figured out that things had gone horribly wrong, the age old "we have come so far at such a great price, surely just a little bit more will carry us to victory!" mentality. This then dragged out the battle even longer than it should have.

In short... it was total FUBAR!

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Jon,

Let's not get into another big heated battle over what Maneuver Warfare is or is not. Your point is about actually engaging the enemy at some point is, of course, correct. The difference is HOW MUCH effort is spent on costly frontal attacks vs. actions which reduce the need for such attacks in the first place. The smart commander maximizes maneuver in order to reduce the need for costly combat. This can be done to some extent at the tactical (CM) level, but generally bears its biggest fruits at the strategic or operational level. Two examples:

1. France 1940. Germans sought to go around the major concentrations of enemy defenses. This maximized their chances for victory while reducing the need for costly battles.

2. Gulf War. The Coalition forces suffered a few hundred casualties, yet defeated an armed force numbering in the hundreds of thousands.

Clearly taking the indirect approach to victory involves risks (Market Garden, Case Blue, etc.), but it is also clear that stubborn frontal assaults without taking advantages of alternative means is not only costly but militarily criminal.

Steve

[Slapdragon]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JonS:

Slap,

I think the point Jason was making - and which you have typically mis-characterised - is that in the end all attacks come down to a frontal attack. Sooner or later you have to go in and kill the enemy, whether it be with artillery, tanks, or grenades. You can dance and maneuver all you want beforehand, but eventually you will have to attack.

Regards

JonS<hr></blockquote>

Although I wont say you are typically mischaracterizing my point since it would be rude and counterproductive, I will say that you are missing my point - that frontal attacks in the open are not good from my experience but if you like them then go for it.

You have failed to read my point, that no one should want to hang their butt out in the open if their is a covered route of the assault. It is far better to flank and attack through manuever than to charge up the middle (of course unless the middle is the covered route) until you can concentrate the whole of your force on a small portion of their force.

But again, if he likes to attack in the open through the front door, and if it works for him, then he should go for it.

For the Allies, who are the usual attacker, flanking under cover is the way to go -- you wont have the ideal situation of no enemy armor, no enemy heavy artillery, and no HMGs all that often, and when you don't your Shermans will burn.

[ 12-12-2001: Message edited by: Slapdragon ]</p>

[JonS]

I like Steve's response better

[JasonC]

No JonS, I didn't simply mean that eventually you have to "attack", let alone understanding that once again as moving onto the enemy. If there is a simply summary of my point, it is that attack and moving onto the enemy are two different things - the difference being fire as opposed to charging.

As for Normandy, no the Germans did not run out of defensible terrain. The terrain through which Cobra succeeded, as far as Avranches, was no different than that through which they fought in July. The Germans ran out of defenders, and especially out of defending tanks. Their AFV strength was down to 1/4 of the late June levels by the time of the breakout, while the Allies had been building up strength ashore, and holding several US armor divisions out of the battle. The armor ratio in the whole theater swung from around 2:1 in late June, to more like 5:1 by the begining of Cobra (at 10:1 after Mortain).

It was the logic of attrition, not any change in terrain, that led to the eventual success. Which is the same story you will find for most of the Russian successes, regardless of terrain. Only defenders with poor doctrine, in the early war, lost significant breakthrough battles without being attrited first.

Incidentally, the same logic of combined arms attack was used by the Germans in North Africa, and by both sides on the Russian steppe, successfully. Without any supposed inability to do so because the ground was open. And no, attacking dug in MGs by infantry advance in heavy snow is not equivalent to all fighting in the open.

As for the supposed inability of Shermans to fight German tanks without close terrain, several historical cases show it to be innaccurate. Notably the fighting around Celles at the tip of the Bulge, which was comparatively open ground. CM scale fights make front armor plates look more useful than they actually are in relatively open cases, because the bottomless pits on either side prevent flanking shots.

In reality, Panthers on an open field must present flanks in some direction. There are cases of their superiority in range proving decisive on the defense in open terrain, notably against T-34s in some fights on the plains of Poland, usually with the help of some minor forms of cover, dead ground, etc. But these cases were usually due to the inability of the Russians to hit them at all in reply at 2-2.5 km, rather than to frontal armor per se.

Better guns and armor help certainly, but they are by no means magic bullets. If they were, the Tigers, Elephants, and Panthers available to the Germans from Kursk to the end of 1943, fighting on the open steppe of the Ukraine, would have proved decisive. Instead, that is the precise period and location of the decisive battles of the war, which the Russians won with T-34/76s. Attacking. In the open.

The maneuverist theology is constructed around the belief that frontal anything, and especially frontal anything over open ground, is always suicidal and stupid. The fact that many historical examples defy this orthodoxy is simply not admitted at all. From numerous cases in WW II, to Ridgeway in Korea, to the success of the Marine attack up the coast in the Gulf.

The school bases this dogma on persistent and sometimes deliberate confusion, of "attack" with "charging", citing every case of a suicidal charge as evidence that intelligent frontal attacks, delivered by coordinated firepower not headstrong bludgeoning maneuver, are supposedly unsound. Which is related to the cult of the offensive, a view of ground warfare primarily in terms of ground controlled, the ascendency of the maneuver arms over artillery and "supporting" fires (even terminologically relegated to a secondary status), and similar one-side distortions.

It is relatively easier to kill defenders easily seen and without significant forms of cover, and relatively easier to coordinate all the various capabilities of combined arms, in wide open terrain (like desert or steppe), than in close forests, mountains, or cities.

Attackers always require a preponderance of firepower, whatever the maneuverists say. And if they have it - even modestly - 3:2 or 2:1 is quite sufficient, not 5 ot 10 to 1 - then an intelligent use of it can win battles by destroying the defenders, by attrition processes. 5 and 10 to 1 odds may be needed to run defenders off their feet with a single maneuver rush, but that only shows that such rushes are usually not very effective to begin with. Such odds are not needed to gradually eat through a defense by firepower and attrition methods.

This whole view is alien to maneuverist doctrine, because to adjust to it properly one has to see the enemy forces as the primary target and objective of the battle. Not as obstacles to be worked around or avoided. The advance of ones own forces has to be directed and discovering and threatening the defenders, not on getting to an objective or seizing anything. And then every firepower means must be directed at taking the defense apart, rather than the main maneuverist use of it, to clear paths for movement.

[Simon Fox]

I absolutely agree with Jason and well articulated if I might say so. The attacker does not always have the luxury of covered avenues of approach and anyway at the tactical scale any modestly competent defender would have such forming up points well covered in their defensive fire plan.

There were numerous successful attacks by both sides in the western desert at far less than 10 or 5 to 1 odds. El Alamein comes to mind.

[Brian]

Jason, don't you think you're being, shall we say, a tad chauvanistic in your attack on the doctrine of maneauvre in favour of attrition?

As a counter-example, which demonstrates above all else that the policy of attrition tends to be incredibly expensive in terms of manpower and lucre, I can only point to Vietnam.

Westmoreland persued a policy of attrition, problem was, the PAVN and NLF were prepared to take and sustain far higher casualties than his forces could. At the same time, by utilising attrition, as the prime motivator in his strategies, he essentially allowed the NLF virtually a free hand to foment revolution within the urban and rural population centres.

I'd suggest that there is in fact a place for both ideas - what you call "manaeuvrist" with its emphasis upon occupation of ground and its usage and the attritionist school of thought. The aim of course should be to attrite your enemy before you launch your manaeuvre forces to break through his forces and to then mop them up.

Attrition for attrition's sake is usually pointless. It won't gain the ground which is required, nor will it necessarily force political decisions upon the enemy which you feel are necessary to achieve the aim of victory.

[Swift]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JasonC:

Attackers always require a preponderance of firepower, whatever the maneuverists say. And if they have it - even modestly - 3:2 or 2:1 is quite sufficient, not 5 ot 10 to 1 - then an intelligent use of it can win battles by destroying the defenders, by attrition processes. <hr></blockquote>

I won't argue that this isn’t true (I believe you) but in the case of CM I find it difficult to obtain a 2-3:1 at large (attrition) range. Mostly the defender have long range AT weapons that cover possible stand off attack positions and a AT gun vs. anything but the seldom seen heavy tank is a victory for the AT gun (in my experience). Artillery can surely help, but if the defender is spread out then the attacker need a lot of (expensive) arty.

I usually favour reverse slope defence against long range open ground attacks but that is sometimes hard to achieve and the woods terrain is very easy to see through (maybe the French forests were much thinner then the ones am used to in Sweden…)

[ 12-12-2001: Message edited by: Swift ]</p>

[JasonC]

You don't have to force anything political on the enemy when they are dead. No, the US strategy is Vietnam was not to kill the enemy, it was to stay on the right side of mythical lines in the dirt, supposedly in order to avoid POing the Russians and Chinese. As in, "don't drop bombs over there, they might actually not like that". And the NVA still didn't beat even the ARVN until US airpower was withdrawn (see the breaking of the 1972 northern offensive).

What any of that has to do with successful combined arms frontal attacks in WW II, is a mystery only maneuverists can fathom. As for why I am hard on maneuverist claptrap, it is because it is claptrap and spread by thousands, with a trowel, including on this thread. If people actually believed the things they say, then Panthers and Tigers would have been unbeatable on the Russian steppe, the Russians would only have had a prayer of attacking west of Moscow in the forests, and a thousand other counterfactuals that the staters themselves know are ridiculous and false.

They just refuse to admit such things, because it would seem to tolerate the idea of attacks from the front in open ground, and ever since maneuverism replaced the school of St. Cyr as high priests of the cult of the offensive, that has been strictly verboten as savoring too much of the failed past. When the rest of the doctrine is going "ho-rah" for attacking and moving (over defending or shooting), the teachers know very well that lieus would get the wrong idea and get their men killed, unless drilled endlessly that you never attack from the front, or in the open. Even though everybody with half a brain and any awareness of history, knows that it is not literally true, especially in the era of combined arms, and especially the limited era when tanks were practically invunerable to artillery fire.

When people knowingly distort facts to fit their ideological drills, a buzzer goes off and I get in their face. Deal.

[JasonC]

To Swift - in CM QBs, the maps are typically tiny and the forces more even than in reality, arty is unrepresented, there is little time to use gradual methods - to name only a few of the largest differences from real life situations. When everybody starts set up well within the lethal envelopes of most of the enemy weapons, sure that can make it harder than it really was. So in that respect you have a point - about CM.

Many realistic attacking tactics still work, even with all of that. And in particular, all "up" defenses, with long range weapons trying to cover all of the open ground, can usually be beaten by a little scouting and a lot of prep fire on what it reveals, provided any decent starting positions exist for the attackers to sit in, in the meantime.

[Battlefront.com]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Attackers always require a preponderance of firepower, whatever the maneuverists say.<hr></blockquote>

Very true. But a maneuverist, as you would describe them, would say that the point of maneuver is to bring that firepower to bear in the most favorable way, or if possible to avoid needing to use it in the first place (eg. Maginot Line). 2:1 odds against a surrounded and confused enemy is far more favorable than 2:1 odds against a straight line of well organized defenses. And 2:1 odds against a surrounded enemy which surrenders without a fight is very difficult to beat in terms of results vs. efforts. So unless the Hand of God, or some Star Trek transporter, puts attacking forces behind the enemy, I would say that maneuver is rather important if not critical.

In my humble opinion those who seek only to defeat the enemy through frontal assaults are stupid. Those who seek to defeat the enemy through means other than frontal assaults are smart. Those who use both wisely, depending on the situation, usually wins battles and wars. Now I am off to worship my false idols

Steve

P.S. If anybody has links to the previous threads on Maneuver vs. Attrition it might be worth posting them here. It was a long and rather tedious debate that is probably best not repated in this thread.