Saving Private Ryan - is this the REAL story of the beach landing?

[George-III]

I found this story on the army web site.

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/100-11/100-11.htm#initial

It sure sounds like what is shown in the movie. Im wondering if this is the story that the opening moments of the film are based on.

Watch for Capt. Ralph E. Goranson - 2nd Rangers - Dog Green Beach (first mention is in paragraph 4):

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Small-arms fire, mortars, and artillery concentrated on the landing area, but the worst hazard was produced by converging fires from automatic weapons. Survivors from some craft report hearing the fire beat on the ramps before they were lowered, and then seeing the hail of bullets whip the surf just in front of the lowered ramps. Some men dove under water or went over the sides to escape the beaten one of the machine guns. Stiff, weakened from seasickness, and often heavily loaded, the debarking troops had little chance of moving fast in water that was knee deep or higher, and their progress was made more difficult by uneven footing in the runnels crossing the tidal flat. Many men were exhausted before they reached shore, where they faced 200 yards or more of open sand to cross before teaching cover at the sea wall or shingle bank. Most men who reached that cover made it by walking, and under increasing enemy fire. Troop who stopped to organize, rest, or take shelter behind obstacles or tanks merely prolonged their difficulties and suffered heavier losses.

Perhaps the worst area on the beach was Dog Green, directly in front of strongpoints guarding the Vierville draw and under heavy flanking fire from emplacements to the west, near Pointe de la Percee. Company A of the 116th was due to land on this sector with Company C of the 2d Rangers on its right flank, and both units came in on their targets. One of the six LCA's carrying Company A foundered about a thousand yards o shore, and passing Rangers saw men jumping overboard and being dragged down by their loads. At H+6 minutes the remaining craft grounded in water 4 to 6 feet deep, about 30 yards short of the outward band of obstacles. Starting off the craft in three files, center file first and the flank files peeling right and left, the men were enveloped in accurate and intense fire from automatic weapons. Order was quickly lost as the troops attempted to dive under water or dropped over the sides into surf over their heads. Mortar fire scored four direct hits on one LCA, which "disintegrated." Casualties were suffered all the way to the sand, but when the survivors got there, some found they could not hold and came back into the water for cover, while others took refuge behind the nearest obstacles.

Remnants of one boat team on the right flank organized a small firing line on the first yards of sand, in full exposure to the enemy. In short order every officer of the company, including Capt. Taylor N. Fellers, was a casualty, and most of the sergeants were killed or wounded. The leaderless men gave up any attempt to move forward and confined their efforts to saving the wounded, many of whom drowned in the rising tide. Some troops were later able to make the sea wall by staying in the edge of the water and going up the beach with the tide. Fifteen minutes after landing, Company A was out of action for the day. Estimates of its casualties range as high as twothirds.

The smaller Ranger company (64 men), carried in two LCA's, came in at H+15 minutes to the right of Vierville draw. Shells from an antitank gun bracketed Capt. Ralph E. Goranson's craft, killing a dozen men and shaking up others. An enemy machine gun ranged in on the ramps of the second LCA and hit 15 Rangers as they debarked. Without waiting to organize, survivors of the boat sections set out immediately across 250 yards of sand toward the base of the cliff. Too tired to run, the men took three or four minutes to get there, and more casualties resulted from machine guns and mortars. Wounded men crawled behind them, and a few made it. When the Rangers got to shelter at the base of the cliff, they had lost 35 men.

Company C, 2d Ranger Battalion, was probably the first assault unit to reach the high ground (beach sector Charlie) and did so in an area where cliffs begin to border the western beach (Map No. VII). Landing in the opening assault wave, about 30 men survived the ordeal of crossing the sands and found shelter at the base of a 90-foot cliff, impossible to climb except at a few points. Three men went off immediately to the west, looking for a spot to go up. Three hundred yards away they tried a crevice in the slope and made it by using bayonets for successive hand holds, pulling each other along. 1st Lt. William D. Moody, in charge of the party, brought along 4 toggle ropes and attached them to stakes in a minefield 15 feet below the crest. Enemy small-arms fire opened up from the left, near a supposedly fortified house. Moody and one Ranger went along the cliff edge toward the house, reached a point above Company C, and shouted down directions. The unit displaced to the ropes and monkey-walked them to the top; all men were up by 0730. While the movement was in progress, Capt. Ralph E. Goranson saw an LCVP landing troops (a section of Company B, 116th RCT) just below on the beach and sent a man back to guide them to the ropes.

Captain Goranson decided to go left toward the fortified house and knock out any enemy positions there which would cause trouble on Dog Beach; then, to proceed on his mission toward Pointe de la Percee. When the house was reached, the Rangers found that just beyond it lay a German strongpoint consisting of a maze of dugouts and trenches, including machine-gun emplacements and a mortar position. Captain Goranson put men in an abandoned trench just west of the house and started to feel out the enemy positions on the other side. This began a series of small attacks which continued for hours without any decisive result. The boat section of Company B, 116th RCT, came up early and joined in, but even with this reinforcement Captain Goranson s party was too small to knock out the enemy position. Three of four times, attacking parties got around the house and into the German positions, destroying the mortar post and inflicting heavy losses. Enemy reinforcements kept coming up along communication trenches from the Vierville draw, and the Ranger parties were not quite able to clean out the system of trenches and dugouts. Finally, toward the end of the afternoon, the Rangers and the Company B section succeeded in occupying the strongpoint and ending resistance. They had suffered only 2 casualties; a Quartermaster burial party later reported 69 enemy dead in the position. This action had tied up one of the main German firing positions protecting the Vierville draw.

(this ends the story of Capt Goranson - what follows is more about the 2nd Ranger Battalion)

Small elements of the 2d Ranger Battalion also fought their own way off Dog White, just west of the main penetration area. Less than half of Companies A and B had reached the shelter of the sea wall, about 0740. Some tanks, firing at enemy emplacements, were scattered along the beach, but the Rangers saw no other troops and had the impression of being alone on the beach; less than a quarter mile to their left, the 5th Ranger Battalion was touching down on a beach already crowded with assault infantry. Within a few minutes of reaching the wall, the survivors of Companies A and B dashed over the promenade road beyond the sea wall and got into the cover of shrubbery surrounding the wrecked villas that line this stretch of the beach flat. Eighteen Rangers of Company B turned right and, hugging the foot of the slope, went several hundred yards toward the Vierville draw, intending to go up that exit in accordance with original plans. Nearing the draw and facing heavy fire on an open stretch of the flat, the group retraced its steps. Meantime, Company A's men and a few from B, after crossing the road in several scattered groups led by noncommissioned officers, had worked through the villas and were trying the bluff at different points. They were joined by a machinegun section of Company D, 116th RCT, and three DD tanks helped by silencing enemy positions on the flanks which had been giving trouble. Two Rangers of Company A reached the top above and found enemy trenches, containing two or three machinegun emplacements, in plain sight just beyond the military crest. In a few minutes another group of six Rangers joined up, and they started out to investigate the apparently empty trenches. Machine-gun fire opened from two points as Germans came out of dugouts and manned their positions. They had waited too long. The leading Rangers were within 20 yards, and more small parties were coming up behind them. Working in twos and threes, they mopped up the enemy emplacements, taking six prisoners and killing as many more. Only three of the attacking force were casualties. Company B now came up, having got back from its try toward the Vierville exit, and the 5th Ranger Battalion was in sight on the bluff top to the left. The 2d Battalion men joined them for the move inland. This action took place between 0800 and 0830, widened the area of penetration on Dog White, and probably aided in the success of the larger advance to the east by covering its right flank.

[ 08-26-2001: Message edited by: George-III ]

[Slapdragon]

The real story behind Saving Private Ryan came from an account from Band of Brothers (with a number of significant errors), except that the protagonist was an Army Chaplain. Rangers did indeed land with US Forces at the toughest points of the beach.

[ 08-26-2001: Message edited by: Slapdragon ]

[Slapdragon]

Here is an example of a war office condolences for multiple family losses. Niland's family received one like this.

[JasonC]

A number of men made it to the sea wall relatively unscathed because they happened to come in opposite a part of the beach obscured by smoke. This wasn't planned, it was just that some of the rockets from the prep barrage had ignited the grass on the bluff in that area, and the smoke from the fires drifted along that section of the bluff.

For me this little fact raises the single greatest military question about the day. Why on earth didn't the prep bombardment conclude with a thick smoke barrage, on purpose? Hindsight is 20-20. Lack of foresight in military matters sometimes borders on the criminal.

[CMplayer]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

For me this little fact raises the single greatest military question about the day. Why on earth didn't the prep bombardment conclude with a thick smoke barrage, on purpose? Hindsight is 20-20. Lack of foresight in military matters sometimes borders on the criminal.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Wasn't there a pretty stiff wind that day?

How long would a smokescreen have lasted

in those conditions?

[JasonC]

The Germans didn't run out of machinegun bullets or mortar rounds. Why should the combined allied fleet have run out of smoke? They only need it long enough to get to the sea wall, or at most up the bluff. The fact that a random brush fire saved most on an entire infantry battalion proves it would have helped, and seriously. It was just a major screw up not to think of something like it beforehand.

[Schrullenhaft]

Did ships, even those slated for ground support of the assault waves, carry smoke-generating (WP ?) rounds during WW II. They would obviously be useless in an actual sea-engagement (where engines or large smoke generators actually lay down smoke screens from exhaust stacks). What kind of coverage would they have to achieve on the beach to actually have an effect ? If there was only so much available (if any) wouldn't its use telegraph to the defending divisions where the most important effort(s) would be assaulting (though some of this would be ovbious geographically speaking) ?

I'm under the impression that CM slightly overmodels the effectiveness of artillery/mortar delivered smoke in concealing units from fire (or accurately aimed fire). Thus CM players probably use smoke far more often than was the actual case in combat (at least this is my impression). The fire (which is probably one of the more common smoke generators on a battlefield anyway) was a constantly regenerating smoke screen that probably couldn't have been reproduced otherwise.

I assume that White Phosphorus would have been the most common smoke generating round. If the naval units delivered enough of it to actually screen the assaulting units the beaches themselves would be a burning hell for the troops once they got ashore. Making the actual beach itself a dangerous place for the assaulting infantry and severely complicating matters for the landing/beach masters (those that control the flow of materials on a beach), which would have been a definite issue.

[gunnergoz]

One reason I'd read why smoke wasn't used on the beach barrage was that it would have obscured targets for the destroyers and cruisers that were close enough in to execute direct fire missions. Indeed, some DD's came in so close that they risked beaching themselves. A bigger question is why the pre-invasion aerial bombardment was planned so far back from the headlands over the beaches. As it was, the preponderance of the bombers struck miles inland, tearing up orchards and killing livestock but precious few Germanans.

[Guest PondScum]

One reason I've heard for why the bombers didn't hit the beachfront is that they didn't want to leave craters there that incoming troops might drown in. They feared that troops would step off their landing craft into the surf, disappear into craters that been hidden by the incoming tide, get dragged down by 80lbs of kit, and drown. The bomber crews were specifically warned off the beaches, and so erred even further inland.

Of course, on the day, many allied troops would have LOVED to have had craters to hide in.

[Enoch]

Another odd decision by the Allies was to ignore the lessons learned by the Marines and Army in their Pacific operations. By 1944, they had been conducting amphibious landings for at least a year and a half.

I believe that Gen. Norman Cota, assistant division commander of the 29th Infantry (Blue and Grey) division, had been reassigned to the divison from the Pacific before D-Day. when he offered advice about how things worked in the Pacific the planners just laughed at him.

[PeterNZer]

Most of you will already know this, but I found "Beyond the beachhead" very enlightening on the topic.

[Guest Mad Gunman]

One name sums up all of the major blunders of WWII 'Dieppe'.

[Pak40]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

The real story behind Saving Private Ryan came from an account from Band of Brothers (with a number of significant errors), except that the protagonist was an Army Chaplain. Rangers did indeed land with US Forces at the toughest points of the beach.

[ 08-26-2001: Message edited by: Slapdragon ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Band of Brothers had nothing to do with the Omaha Beach landings. I think the SPR beach landing sceenes were more inspired by Ambrose's other book, D-Day.

[ 08-27-2001: Message edited by: Pak40 ]

[killa in manilla]

in response to gunnergozs' question

_____________________________________________

"A bigger question is why the pre-invasion aerial bombardment was planned so far back from the headlands over the

beaches. As it was, the preponderance of the bombers struck miles inland,tearing up orchards and killing livestock but precious few Germanans." -gunnergoz

--------------------------------------------

The reason the bombardments happened inland was so that the airborne paratroop divisions would be able to sucessfully land.

[Pak40]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

For me this little fact raises the single greatest military question about the day. Why on earth didn't the prep bombardment conclude with a thick smoke barrage, on purpose? Hindsight is 20-20. Lack of foresight in military matters sometimes borders on the criminal.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I often wondered about this myself. But some of the reading I've done lead me to the answers.

Their resoning was that they needed to be able to view the land in order to have any Naval artillery support, which they viewed as more important than providing a smoke screen. In retrospect it's easy to say what they should have done.

[Guest Babra]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

Why on earth didn't the prep bombardment conclude with a thick smoke barrage, on purpose? Hindsight is 20-20. Lack of foresight in military matters sometimes borders on the criminal.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Do naval guns carry smoke?

Anyway, as Pak40 says, it becomes impossible to direct supporting fire through a smoke screen. The big ships were well back, but many of the destroyers were firing direct. My fraction of a buck.

[JasonC]

The obvious way to lay the smoke screen was from the rocket fire support ships. For that matter, there were also Priests firing direct from landing craft. I am aware the navy wanted to see everything, but it is still a lousy argument. The screen would not have been there for 4 hours anyway, so the DDs would have had plenty of opportunities to support with direct fire - *after* the men were under the seawall.

As for effectiveness, a random brush fire saved a battalion of infantry, so we know by now, perfectly well, it would have made a huge difference. It was just plain stupid not to smoke the beach; no modern commander would think twice about it. Yes hindsight is 20-20, as I said before. But military commanders are expected to show some foresight as well, since the lives of their men depend on it.

[gunnergoz]

The bottom line is that the Allies got ashore and stayed there. The issue of smoke and bombing effectiveness probably would have saved a good many lives had they been executed differently, but in the end the outcome would have been much the same.

I'm glad someone mentioned the "not invented here" mentality of planners who overlooked the Pacific assault experiences. This was partly the fault of the military dynamics of the day...European and Pacific theaters may have well been on different planets. The JCS in Washington did little to coordinate and disseminate information between the two war fronts. Also aggravating matters was the fact that the Navy was overwhelmingly involved in the Pacific and the Army held sway in the ETO. Of course, we all know that Admirals and Generals speak in different tongues...

An interesting aside is that US Marines almost made it to Normandy...The ship's company of one of the assault command ships were ready to reinforce the hard-pressed Rangers at Pte du Hoe (sp?, sorry!) but the Army nixed their volunteered support for fear of bad P.R. in what was supposed to be an Army show. Individual Marines were present in several Army commands and units, however, in both the Normandy and Med assaults.

[Spook]

Well, setting aside the issue of heavy or medium bomber direct support for Omaha, what I am curious about is what extent were Allied fighter-bombers utilized for beach support at Normandy, if at all.

Granted, a fighter-bomber's armanent wasn't going to be very effective against the most heavily fortified positions, and flying near naval shell trajectories was probably too significant a hazard. But given the preponderance of Allied FB support available on D-Day, with minimal interference from the Luftwaffe, I wonder if added sorties against the Omaha bluffs might have helped in "suppressing" the defenses to an added degree.

[Guest Babra]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

The screen would not have been there for 4 hours anyway, so the DDs would have had plenty of opportunities to support with direct fire - *after* the men were under the seawall. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh, I see what you're saying. You mean smoke BEFORE they land. Was that ever done anywhere? If it wasn't, I'm sure there's a reason for it.

[Gyrene]

The biggest reason that smoke was not used in the beaches in WWII is the same reason why there were no massive night beach landings:

Amphibious landings in WWII relied almost entirely on visual signals, and smoke would make an already difficult job even more so.

The timing required for a massive landing is very difficult to appreciate, as is the amount of intelligence that had to be gathered visually by the ships off-shore.

The Marines were consulted by the Army, especially in areas such as Combat Loading of the landing ships and the Marines even provided training for early Army amphibious instructors.

The smoke that saved soldiers at Normandy was most likely a very fortuitous event that would be imbossible to be caused on purpose if required.

Incidently, I've heard that there were more Germans in the area than there were expected by the Americans, such as an entire division that happened to be on training maneuvers nearby, is this true?

Gyrene

[offtaskagain]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Gyrene:

Incidently, I've heard that there were more Germans in the area than there were expected by the Americans, such as an entire division that happened to be on training maneuvers nearby, is this true?

Gyrene<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yep, Army Intel somehow missed the presence of the entire 352nd infantry division. They thought the area was only held by some conscript, understrength division. In reality the 352nd was refitting after heavy combat on the EF. The situation was somewhat like the rude little suprise of the 9th and 10th SS in Arnehm. The 352nd proved to be a pretty capable defender with a good number of combat vets.

[Pak40]

Jason,

Another major reason that they didn't smoke the beaches is that the landings were planned by unit, time, and location. Every unit, once on the beach, had their specific orders of where to go and what to do. Therefore, every landing craft had to arrive at a specific section of beach at a specific time. The ONLY way to effectively get the correct units in their specific places at their specific times was to use landmarks as their guides. Even without the smoke barrage this proved to be a hard task, many units landed in the wrong place.

And we can all say once again that in hindsight, it would have been better to smoke the beaches and let every unit land wherever they land. Then again, all units could land within a small strip of beach and the Germans could easily cause massive casualties with their pre-sighted artillery.