Attrition vs Maneuver .. secrets revealed!! (long)

[Iron Chef Sakai]

no plan survives contact. end of story :cool:

[mr_audacity]

The_Capt, wrote:

Now boxing. Fighters exercise tactics, operations and strategy. For example, a 1-2 hook, duck, upper cut is a tactical drill to be applied to an opponent when he moves into range. A round is an operation, with a specific aim, do we try and tire the opponent out, feel him out, or pound him. The entire fight has a strategy based on foreknowledge of the opponent. Should we go for the quick kill because this guys "got legs" or should be play "tag" and wear him out?

Now for Attrition and Manoeuvre. Fighters usually lean one way or the other. Attritionists tend to be big, ugly guys that will try and pound you into "meat-mash" even if they have to take a few hits themselves. The are betting that their bodies will not tire as fast as yours and that they can take more punishment. You may note, that even these fighters try and hit weak spots on their opponents and not the fists (although I've met a few). This is a Manoeuvre goal but delivered via attrition.

Manoeuvrist fighters tend to be light and fast. They hop into range, throw a few and back out. They do try and wear down an opponent but at the Operational level they seem to be practicing Manoeuvre. They can also however, look for the "decisive battle" in which they can end it once and for all.

Lastly, there exists the truly gifted fighter who can do both. Ali was a clear case in point. If you want to learn "hammer and nail" or "rubber meets the road" lessons in warfare watch Ali. This guy could move like a feather-weight even when he was a heavy. He could dance around for three rounds and then "plant and cook" an opponent just when he was getting used to doing the chasing or retreating.

Now pay attention, no matter how fast and light you are there is an opponent who will be so big and powerful that you are going to get killed unless you introduce something truly revolutionary to the process like a "stun-gun" or never get hit. The problem is, he can miss 99% of the time and still win. You have to be perfect. Much the same if you take a fighter so huge that it takes him 5 min to throw a punch, a fast guy will "beat him to death with pillows" even if it take a few days.

The_Capt - Surely a true exponent of manoeuvre warfare would think 'The Marquis of Queensbury Rules' a hindrance and simply kick his opponent in the nuts/bollocks (depending on which side of the pond you come from)? Playing by the expected 'norms' is an anathema to the true manoeuvrist.

A manoeuvrist philosophy, that drives his tactical, operational and strategic thinking would never pit strength against strength unless there was no alternative. When that occurs your point becomes valid, for this is the recon pull or surface and gaps element where one tries to achieve a schwere punkt usually via higher tempo or OODA/Boyd cycle loop.

At the minor tactical level of CM manoeuvre warfare manifests itself as:

Heavy fire-to-manoeuvre element suppression (i.e. 3-1 to 6-1 as espoused by Rommel in Infantry Attacks) in the assault phase.

Flanking moves design to induce the enemy to route/surrender rather than merely mow them down.

Covered approaches from good recon or lots of smoke where cover not possible.

Good employment of combined arms for mutual support.

What cannot be modelled easily are command methods such as mission tactics vs. control by detailed order, as you the player are in God like control of your sand table.

[The_Capt]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by mr_audacity:

The_Capt - Surely a true exponent of manoeuvre warfare would think 'The Marquis of Queensbury Rules' a hindrance and simply kick his opponent in the nuts/bollocks (depending on which side of the pond you come from)? Playing by the expected 'norms' is an anathema to the true manoeuvrist.

A manoeuvrist philosophy, that drives his tactical, operational and strategic thinking would never pit strength against strength unless there was no alternative. When that occurs your point becomes valid, for this is the recon pull or surface and gaps element where one tries to achieve a schwere punkt usually via higher tempo or OODA/Boyd cycle loop.

At the minor tactical level of CM manoeuvre warfare manifests itself as:

Heavy fire-to-manoeuvre element suppression (i.e. 3-1 to 6-1 as espoused by Rommel in Infantry Attacks) in the assault phase.

Flanking moves design to induce the enemy to route/surrender rather than merely mow them down.

Covered approaches from good recon or lots of smoke where cover not possible.

Good employment of combined arms for mutual support.

What cannot be modelled easily are command methods such as mission tactics vs. control by detailed order, as you the player are in God like control of your sand table.[/QB]<hr></blockquote>

Ahh a neophyte of New Age Manouevre I see.

Well first of all the boxing analogy is to demonstrate differences in style.

In warfare there are set rules which both sides have to live by; weather, night, time and space and each other. So you cannot simply write off "the rules" so easily.

Now as to "striking weakness", well Manouevre is actually designed to do several things, disrupt, dislocate and destroy. These can be done on both strength and weakness. Many have taken the doctrine to mean "we dance around and try and find holes, cause the enemy will be nice and leave them". It is possible to support Manouevre with Attrition and vice versa.

Now what many don't realize is that the doctrines have two important parts, aims and method. And what is revolutionary is the methods as the aims are very often the same. Many see the Attritionist as the WWI General sending his forces to die in an ill fated frontal while sipping tea. The Manouevrist is the dashing Rommel-like cavalry man swimming against the current "a rebel who makes his own rules".

Truth is neither are reality. An Attritionist aims to impose order onto the battlefield thru detailed planning and centralized command and control. A Manouevrist accepts the chaos of the battlefield and attempts to exploit it thru "mission command" and decentralized control. The empowering of subordinates to act on my intent EVEN IF it runs contrary to my orders. There isn't an Armed forces in the Western Hemishpere which even comes close to this, no matter what we spout in Staff Colleges.

In any given battle both sets of doctrine are required. Attrition will provide the coordination required to stage massive firepower required to make a breakout. Any enemy worth his salt will cover the flanks and not allow fancy footwork. Hell in this day and age our own media forces us to play by a far stricter set of rules than the enemy. Attrition makes the breakout, where we mass pound for pound more firepower and resources at a given point of our choosing. Once breakout occurs, Operational Manouevre steps in, then rather than encircling the enemy Div, you charge for Bagdad (Yeesh, Gulf War, very good example of failed Strategic Manouevre).

In CM, and at the tactical level, Manouevre really doesn't work....yet. The need to keep control of your individual assets to be able to ensure they don't kill each other and can effectively get at the enemy requires strict control. You can give the Pte on the ground the Div Comds intent but it really doesn't mean much. Our system requires that we have strict discipline because war is not nice and the human psyche is not prepared for it.

CM is very Attritionist. You have flags which have to be taken at a certain time. And the "world" is only so big. Your troops are under your supreme control. You can look for holes and try a flanking but this is not Manouevre, it is Attrition from another direction.

Almost all CM battles are the Break-In battle. Force on force, slug and shell until someone gives.

I have seen some Manouevre solutions but they are few and far between. The one game I did see it doen was classic. I played Fionn Kelly once (not trying to name drop), he conducted a classic "break-in" battle followed by a "breakthru" in which he positioned himself in an area where my defence was untenable. This is Manouevre, rolling my flank and killing me in detail is Attrition. Now if he hadn't achieved breakthru then we would have slogged thru more break-in battles.

There are other Manouevre tricks, rushing and withdrawing to force your opponent to waste arty for example. But I am afraid the true Manouevre version of CM would not be fun as the loss of control would not be much of a game in the end.

[ 12-17-2001: Message edited by: The_Capt ]</p>

[Iron Chef Sakai]

i agree

[mr_audacity]

The_Capt

Not a neophyte I am afraid, but a long term preacher of the good word…

In essence Von Clausewitz identified warfare as having three governing elements; primordial violence, political will, and coup d’oeil/genius of the commanders. Attritional warfare leans heavily on primordial violence, whereas manoeuvre warfare tries to balance the three in harmony, for to relegate any one occurs at the detriment of the others.

I may misunderstand you but it seems to me that in many ways you equate attrition to firepower, and manoeuvre warfare to physical manoeuvre on the battlefield or front/theatre. Whereas to most professional soldiers I know and have discussed these matters with they consider fire and movement as integral to both forms of warfare. The key difference is attritionalist want to kill their enemy, manoeuvrist just want to defeat them. Their manoeuvre comes from Auftragstaktik as you know and it is a manoeuvre through time (ie higher command decision tempo through the Boyd loop than their enemy).

You said: In warfare there are set rules which both sides have to live by; weather, night, time and space and each other. So you cannot simply write off "the rules" so easily.

I don’t believe this to be true. The are only equal to those that treat them as equal. For instance British Infantry soldiers are taught and trained extensively in night fighting and operations. Consequently they tend to be slightly better at it than some adversaries. Therefore to a degree they have negated through training and experience one of those ‘set rule’ you believe are levellers to all. The same goes for time via Auftragstaktik type command in which commands train again and again to up the tempo, and fight 24hour wars. By this method they dislocate the enemy who seeks the respite, and negate the ‘set rule’ of time. Space again can be redefined i.e. airborne force and air power revolutionised the military use of battlespace. Satellite and orbital platforms add extra dimensions to the battlespace that many officers have yet to come to terms with. So as we see nothing is set in stone. We keep redrawing the lines of war as we develop.

In CM, and at the tactical level, Manouevre really doesn't work… Leonhard would spot you as an attritionalist straight away. Manouevre is very much at the tactical level. The tactical level encompasses all formations up to at least divisional/corps level, so are you seriously suggesting that a US Army Divisional TOC could not undertake some form of manoeuvre warfare, and if not why does the USMC espouse it in their FM Warfighting? As a section/fireteam/squad leader/commander I could quite easily demonstrate examples of a manoeuvre warfare technique. e.g. An enemy soldier is in a slit trench 30m to your front. Your fire base lay down suppressing fire to keep his head down as you crawl forward and post a grenade. Does he jump out to be shot or stay put to be blown up? This is functional dislocation, an element of manoeuvre warfare. And you don’t get much smaller on the battlefield than minor tactics…

I suggest you read a very good book called ‘Not Mentioned in Dispatches’ by Spencer Fitzgibbon about that very subject during the Battle of Goose Green in the Falklands Conflict.

[The_Capt]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by mr_audacity:

The_Capt

Not a neophyte I am afraid, but a long term preacher of the good word…

In essence Von Clausewitz identified warfare as having three governing elements; primordial violence, political will, and coup d’oeil/genius of the commanders. Attritional warfare leans heavily on primordial violence, whereas manoeuvre warfare tries to balance the three in harmony, for to relegate any one occurs at the detriment of the others.

I may misunderstand you but it seems to me that in many ways you equate attrition to firepower, and manoeuvre warfare to physical manoeuvre on the battlefield or front/theatre. Whereas to most professional soldiers I know and have discussed these matters with they consider fire and movement as integral to both forms of warfare. The key difference is attritionalist want to kill their enemy, manoeuvrist just want to defeat them. Their manoeuvre comes from Auftragstaktik as you know and it is a manoeuvre through time (ie higher command decision tempo through the Boyd loop than their enemy).

You said: In warfare there are set rules which both sides have to live by; weather, night, time and space and each other. So you cannot simply write off "the rules" so easily.

I don’t believe this to be true. The are only equal to those that treat them as equal. For instance British Infantry soldiers are taught and trained extensively in night fighting and operations. Consequently they tend to be slightly better at it than some adversaries. Therefore to a degree they have negated through training and experience one of those ‘set rule’ you believe are levellers to all. The same goes for time via Auftragstaktik type command in which commands train again and again to up the tempo, and fight 24hour wars. By this method they dislocate the enemy who seeks the respite, and negate the ‘set rule’ of time. Space again can be redefined i.e. airborne force and air power revolutionised the military use of battlespace. Satellite and orbital platforms add extra dimensions to the battlespace that many officers have yet to come to terms with. So as we see nothing is set in stone. We keep redrawing the lines of war as we develop.

In CM, and at the tactical level, Manouevre really doesn't work… Leonhard would spot you as an attritionalist straight away. Manouevre is very much at the tactical level. The tactical level encompasses all formations up to at least divisional/corps level, so are you seriously suggesting that a US Army Divisional TOC could not undertake some form of manoeuvre warfare, and if not why does the USMC espouse it in their FM Warfighting? As a section/fireteam/squad leader/commander I could quite easily demonstrate examples of a manoeuvre warfare technique. e.g. An enemy soldier is in a slit trench 30m to your front. Your fire base lay down suppressing fire to keep his head down as you crawl forward and post a grenade. Does he jump out to be shot or stay put to be blown up? This is functional dislocation, an element of manoeuvre warfare. And you don’t get much smaller on the battlefield than minor tactics…

I suggest you read a very good book called ‘Not Mentioned in Dispatches’ by Spencer Fitzgibbon about that very subject during the Battle of Goose Green in the Falklands Conflict.<hr></blockquote>

You are a true believer aren't you!!

Well I will say that I have not been seduced by the New Order. It has workable elements but many are simply rehashing the old "read Attritionist" way of doing things but if you add enough German buzzwords you somehow are Revolutionary. You slit trench attack, for example. You are describing absolutely nothing new, firebase and assault team is not Manouevre, it is basic tactics, most of which were developed from Attritionist methods. We keep preaching Manouevre at the Tactical level but it really afford little except a "that's nice" response from the troops. At the Operational level, it is a much different story..

OK as to your points. Fire and manouevre (note small "m" here) are critical to success but you seem to have missed my point on the fact that the methods of the doctrine tell the tale. Attritionist attempt to impose order on the chaos of battle in order to better coordinate overwhelming firepower at a point. It is a philosophy and methodology. An attritionist will still drive to strike an enemies soft underbelly and turn a flank. I think you have hit on one of the biggest mis-conceptions of Attrition doctrine. It does focus on destruction of the enemy thru tightly controlles use of firepower (or projection of firepower) manouevre is a means to delivery. This is not an extinct idea and will be with us for a long time. The German buzzword is Befelstaktic (sp?).

Auftstragtak...however you spell it is mission command and empowering of subordinates which lend to a fast more fluid ability in your forces.

The key weakness in Manouevre theory is overextension. Manouevrist always run the risk of asymetrical advances and losing control to the point where you dislocate yourself. In some conditions this is an acceptable risk, after breakthru for example. In others it is sheer suicide. The trouble with the New Religion is that it too readily throws out the previous method for incorrect reasons.

It is funny you should mention Leonhard, I sat across from him in a mess dinner once, he put forward some really interesting ideas about the "Death of Manouevre". The modern battlefield is killing Manouevre doctrine before it gets out of the bag. His example is that the M1A1 MBT can travel at 80kph, yet standard speed of advance are around 5-10kph. Why because we move cautiously when under threat of contact. Well in the modern battlefield we know exactly where we are and where the enemy is (theoretically) so why can't we move in column into the enemies rear when the opening is provided. What is truly revolutionary is that the Higher commander will now see that opening before the man on the ground. SO now the OODA loop is driven by data collection and processing, the Commander doesn't need to empower subordinates when he knows more than they do.

So you have Attritionist methods driving towards Manouevrist (well really both but speed and tempo are still more important) aims. We are heading towards a highbred system.

I would be interested in a demonstration of CM Manouevre, do you have examples or perhaps a tactic which demostrates this. A game perhaps...

[The_Capt]

Oh I also forgot to mention on the rules of the game. Let's not confuse doctrine and keeping up with technology and "having no rules". You may have a night fighting ability but you will never "make day".

I would argue that there will always be rules to the game.

[mr_audacity]

The_Capt - the point about the slit trench is not that this is a tried and tested tactic, it is the fact that a manoeuvrist looks at the situation and thinks how can I present the enemy with an impossible dilemma? An attritionalist will look at the same enemy trench and think how can we take him out. A subtle difference, but as the complexity of a situation increases and other factors become involved, the manoeuvrist still will seek to present to offer an enemy an impossible dilemma to achieve defeat. You might think this is semantic but it is key to the mindset of the commander. Does one wish to destroy or defeat the enemy?

In MIC, LIC and counter-insurgency ops this becomes 'the' question upon which success will be dependent. Modern post Cold-War conflicts highlight the difference even more. Because wars are not fought outside of political will, an enemy can best be defeated by manoeuvrists who hold politics, coup d'oeil and violence in equal share. You cannot defeat an enemy by destruction alone without incurring prohibitive cost in materials and men, and usually via a long protracted war.

Just a note, Auftragstaktik and Befehlstaktik, are not merely German buzzwords. They encompass approaches and philosophies of command. Would we claim the words liberal, conservative or socialist meant nothing in the political field but were merely buzzwords. No of course not. And the same goes for these methods of command. To their exponents they mean a great deal and effect much of what they do in battle. Again read the book sited as a clear example of how both methods of command were employed at different stages of the Battle of Goose Green, and how it impacted significantly on the outcome.

[Kanonier Reichmann]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by The_Capt:

I have seen some Manouevre solutions but they are few and far between. The one game I did see it doen was classic. I played Fionn Kelly once (not trying to name drop), he conducted a classic "break-in" battle followed by a "breakthru" in which he positioned himself in an area where my defence was untenable. This is Manouevre, rolling my flank and killing me in detail is Attrition. <hr></blockquote>

So your the poor S.O.B. who was smashed by Fionn in that AAR game posted on the CMHQ site where his opponent wouldn't divulge his name. At last we know!

Regards

Jim R.

[The_Capt]

OK to answer all three of you,

Pillar,

I disagree, we cannot lay this to rest until we actually get a clear understanding of just what we are debating. I agree with your analysis and the roots of the new Manouevre Religion. But it is a fundemental shift in philosophy and doctrine which has in my opinion been taken way too far. The pendulum has swung too far right and we have lost our sense of balance. That is why I have argued from the beginning that both sets of doctrine have there place, the trick is to know when to employ them.

I also hate the labels, Attrition and Manouevre, as the do not really express what the two doctrines represent.

mr.audacity,

Well first of all I think you need to realize where I am coming from, I have spent 13 yrs in the military and been to Staff College and all that so I have a clear understanding of the two doctrines. I guess you can say "I have come out the other end" and have yet to see the light. Hence my "right" to refer to "German buzzwords" et al. Now having said that I have to say..prove it. We are switching to another doctrine and philosophy which says it is better to dance and gain victory thru "alternate means", the old school was to "sort him out" hard and fast because POWs are a pain in the ass.

So the burden of proof is on the new doctrine and I have yet to see it tested. The Gulf War was a serious battle of Attrition. 30-some days we pounded Iraqi forces to the point where their OODA loop was pretty much scrambled, then we punched thru their battered lines and ate them alive. Then when we had a chance for true Strategic Manouevre we instead went for the Attritionist method and raced after the Republican gaurd, which judging by the current situation in Iraqi was not the centre of mass of the Iraqi Empire.

WWII had it's moments but most of our doctrine preceding the New Revolution was drawn from this conflict. So I fail to see why we should switch(playing Devils Advocate here).

So the burden of proof lies squarely on the shoulder of the Manouevrist to prove their system is better. Now having and currently commanding troops in the field I can tell you that they are going to throw that grenade regardless of the Div Comds intent.

Now for the record, each doctrine has it's place and a truly gifted commander will know when to dance and when to plant. We as professionals need to give both sets of tools to our juniors and show them the strengths and weaknesses of each. But in our current state, an Attritionist is looked at as a dinosaur and should be discarded, my arguement is that the system has worked in the past and will work in the fiture so let's not throw out the baby with the bath water.

Riechmann,

LOL! Well knowing Fionn, I doubt he would fail to mention my name and he knew full well who he was pounding in my case. He still owes me another but with his schedule it will probably have to wait until CMBB.

[mr_audacity]

Well first of all I think you need to realize where I am coming from, I have spent 13 yrs in the military and been to Staff College and all that so I have a clear understanding of the two doctrines. I guess you can say "I have come out the other end" and have yet to see the light. There is always time. Carlisle does not seem to be able convert you to our evil ways so I shall not try to out do them. But…

Now having said that I have to say…prove it. If you would like to come to London and receive pedagogy from the dark side be my guest. I might even write a book!

We are switching to another doctrine and philosophy which says it is better to dance and gain victory thru "alternate means", the old school was to "sort him out" hard and fast because POWs are a pain in the ass.

POWs are very much not a pain in the arse. 1. The more you take, the more likely the next lot will be to surrender. 2. They provide vital intelligence. 3. Your forces are seen to be ‘Just’, following the Geneva Convention and international law, and help you win the political argument.

So the burden of proof is on the new doctrine and I have yet to see it tested. Firstly manoeuvre warfare is not the new kid on the block. Ask Alexander the Great, Sun Tzu, Tacitus, Caesar, Napoleon, Jomini, De Saxe or Ghengis Khan. It is merely new to US Army doctrine. You don’t believe it fine and dandy. All I can say is that I hope you never run into a true manoeuvrist enemy commander in you professional life as things might get a wee bit out of hand. The USMC seem to be slightly more forward looking in this respect and have taken massive steps to improve their commander’s coup d’oeil. During the Gulf the USMC’s doctrine allowed them to pour through Iraq gaps with far less heavy armour and support than their Army counter-parts and cause massive disruption and capitulation of the enemy.

The Gulf War was a serious battle of Attrition. 30-some days we pounded Iraqi forces to the point where their OODA loop was pretty much scrambled, then we punched thru their battered lines and ate them alive. Then when we had a chance for true Strategic Manouevre we instead went for the Attritionist method and raced after the Republican gaurd, which judging by the current situation in Iraqi was not the centre of mass of the Iraqi Empire.

General Schwarzkopf and Freddrick had very different approaches and Schwarzkopf from what I hear is still ‘pissed’ to use an Americanism with his subordinate’s lumbering attack. Powell’s halting the attack after the Basra road images started coming home on TV is the reason Sadam is still in power. As to Leonhard stating that the M1 tank advances in combat at 5-10kmh I think Lt.Col. H. R. McMasters can put him right on that!

WWII had it's moments but most of our doctrine preceding the New Revolution was drawn from this conflict. Erm was it I thought the Civil War and Great War also had a massive influence on US doctrine.

So I fail to see why we should switch(playing Devils Advocate here). No one is forcing you. You either work it out for yourself or you don’t.

they are going to throw that grenade regardless of the Div Comds intent. Just the manoeuvrist commander might have got more men alive to within grenade range of the enemy!

Now for the record, each doctrine has it's place and a truly gifted commander will know when to dance and when to plant. We as professionals need to give both sets of tools to our juniors and show them the strengths and weaknesses of each. But in our current state, an Attritionist is looked at as a dinosaur and should be discarded, my arguement is that the system has worked in the past and will work in the fiture so let's not throw out the baby with the bath water. When to dance and when to plant is not a manoeuvre vs. attritional argument. A manoeuvrist can plant just as happily as an attritionalist and vice versa. It’s how you plant or dance that matters.

[The_Capt]

Well first of all it is not just US doctrine (I am a Canadian btw and we fall somewhere between the US and Britian) which is changing.

I would suggest that the New Age Manouevre is pretty much big on style but low on substance. I for one would love to come upon a true Manouevre CO. A slave to the "dark side". I would rock his world by using both methods, hell switching to Attrition is thinking outside the "new box". You have automatically assumed that a Manouevre commander could beat me and yet have not given a reason why? A new question..why is Manouevre superior to Attrition and again a little proof?

Not to be critical but perhaps our view of Attrition is different hence the disagreement.

I think we need some hard examples (which btw I find true Manouevrist a little short on, they prefer to take old battles and claim them as their own). Do you have a scenario or a CM battle we could work off of? Perhaps to demonstrate your point. Then maybe we could come to a concensus as to just what these two schools in fact are.

I think we should get down to brass tacks, send me a problem and I'll give you what I see as an Attritionist solution, we then can compare notes.

[JasonC]

I appreciate the Captain's challenge to the latest maneuverist acolyte, and I too would like to see concrete problems rather than rhetoric. Talk is cheap, plans are better, and only execution is proof.

I also note that the much heralded revolution in US military doctrine, now verbally committed to maneuverist theories, is nowhere in evidence practically. Every recent war we've fought with attrition strategies and successfully so. The idea that the Marines frontal blast up the coast road in the gulf as "maneuverist" is laughable on its face.

They simply went straight in outshooting everything in their path, a victory by fire in methodical frontal assault if ever there was one, and completely contrary to the printed dictums about avoiding the enemies frontal line, frontal attacks squandering combat power, yada yada. They focused so entirely on destroying the enemy that there was nothing left behind them when they reached Kuwait city.

The gulf war was overdetermined because just about anything would have won it, but there is no question the actual strategy employed was an attritionist one based on overwhelming firepower. The 24th Mech's hook to close the back door was a valuable multiplier from successful maneuver, but its goal was entirely the destruction of enemy forces, and VII corps would have blasted everything left to ashes inside 48 hours, even without the help, if the NCAs hadn't called them off.

The 101s airmobile adventures farther north were an inessential sideshow, and the Marine's "maneuverist" contribution consisted of a non-executed feint up the gulf that was rightfully never seriously contemplated because of the unnecessary danger from mines.

What has actually happened, although it seems none of the maneuverist maneuver-element-branch commanders seem willing to admit it to themselves, is that the maneuverist elements have made themselves more irrelevant than ever, by refusing to gear their doctrine to one ministerial to firepower arms.

The result is simply that air force boys call all the shots. They've got the JDAMs and the daisy cutters, and nobody but nobody wants to mess with them. Even the navy flyboys having taken a back seat because F-18s and cruise missles are too pinpricky by comparison.

The army has reacted by emphasis on deployability, which has gone hand in hand with maneuverist doctrine because both are vaguely evoked by the concepts of speed and of avoiding frontal engagements. If all you have is LAVs and armed hummvees, frontal firepower attacks don't look so good as they do when you have M-1s and MLRS.

But what is the reality even of such deployments? They are not maneuverist exercises in the maneuver battalions razzling and dazzling, they are cautious patroling or snake-eater camping trips to spot for the air force. Firepower arms and their attritionist power remains in the drivers seat more than ever.

When the Marines had to do some serious attacking in the gulf instead of spotting for planes, they borrowed M-1s from the army. Why? Because after all, frontal attacks are best delivered as deliberate firepower-based affairs, methodically chewing through all the defenders by sheer firepower, than as vertical envelopments in tilt-wing toys to knock out C3I and "paralyze" the enemy with "shock".

The maneuverists continue to talk as though firepower based attritionist methods are stupid and waste friendly lives, while completely ignoring the incredible successes at tiny human costs such strategies have achieved, given the huge multiplier effects modern technology have given to US firepower arms.

The air force, attack helos used directly against enemy front-line forces, modern artillery on the ground, and the heaviest firepower land warfare systems, have proven over and over that they are vastly superior to bobbing and weaving in LAVs.

The fundamental maxim of what is called attritionist doctrine, merely to criticize it (which term I have accepted as a badge of honor simply because its opponents are so vacuously full of themselves I don't care what they call it), was stated almost a century ago now and remains as true as it was then. "Firepower kills", said Petain in WW I. And it is even more true today, when firepower is a B-2 out of Missouri blowing the top off of mountains clear on the other side of the world, than when it only meant 155mm and 210mm howitzers blasting sections of trench.

Yet the maneuverist manuals continue to bleat that just shooting at the enemy is never decisive and that targeting his fielded forces wholesale is obviously a mistake (hitting strength) and must obviously get tons of friendlies killed, for all the world as though everyone is still an infantryman with a rifle and the firepower party wanted them to go over the top at the Somme all over again. Which is simply out of touch with reality. Printed ground combat doctrine has never been more purely an academic cult or so distant from the practical realities of how our military actually fights, than today.

[The_Capt]

Geez Jason, I think you and I actually agree on something, although manouevre does have it's place and I am not ready to throw it out either..balance in all things.

I would also argue that you can still be intent on destroying an En(Attrition) and still be "manouevrable". A light LAV force backed by B-52s racing into the enemies rear and shooting up the place seems like a good solution to me.

You see, it is the Sun Tzu "Win without firing a shot" metality I find a little bit suspicious. Yes if we can do it we should, we should turn a flank or drop airborne into the rear. We should hit CCC assets with speed and agression. Envelopment is always a good option no matter what you call it. But none of this precludes you from killing the enemy with Firepower in detail.

I would argue that Attrition is a means by which to achieve Manouevre, and Manouevre is a means by which you can employ Attrition better (faster and at a weaker spot).

Now when you have overwhelming firepower the question remains, why bother. In CM if I am tasked to take out a town, I usually send a Coy in first to Probe and find the enemy, then I shell him and move a larger force with armour in to kill him. If I can find a weak spot I will take it, if I can find a piece of Vital Ground he forgot about I will take it. But in the end I will destroy him in force.

Now let's say I had 20,000 points to employ. Well I would buy about 10 CAS and a whack of Elite 14 inchers(the shells drop during the plotting turn), Elite 240mm rockets, TRPs a Coy Pershings and Sherman 105s, and a platoon. I would then blow the living guts out of the place, pound anything that moves with the Pershings (and a few things that don't) and then march the platoon up to take the flags.

I would argue Manouevre only means something when facing an equal or greater force. Against an enemy who is as good or better than you. Then you may have a good reason to employ it. But when you are large enough and big enough, concentrated firepower centrally planned and coordinated will work very well.

It almost seems as though the Doctrine is a "poor mans" doctrine when you cannot establish conditions for a straight Attrition "ass-whooping". What concerns me is that we have made it our central focus and way of doing business to the exclusion of the other doctrine.

[ 12-18-2001: Message edited by: The_Capt ]</p>

[xerxes]

Just to bring things down to earth. Translated into CM terms, what would the maneuverist vs attritionist doctrines be?

For a meeting engagement?

For an attack?

For a defence?

Just wondering.

-marc

[Kallimakhos]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by The_Capt:

I would argue Manouevre only means something when facing an equal or greater force. Against an enemy who is as good or better than you. Then you may have a good reason to employ it. But when you are large enough and big enough, concentrated firepower centrally planned and coordinated will work very well.

It almost seems as though the Doctrine is a "poor mans" doctrine when you cannot establish conditions for a straight Attrition "ass-whooping". What concerns me is that we have made it our central focus and way of doing business to the exclusion of the other doctrine.

[ 12-18-2001: Message edited by: The_Capt ]<hr></blockquote>

Exactly. Raate road battle in Winter war is one classical example. The only advantage Finns had was their speed and thats what they had to use, they could'n afford to wait for the enemy to establish a base and to launch an attack. And once pocketed, the enemy had to be subdued quickly, because in this case it was better to take prisoners than destroy. The loot was worth it.

In CM terms, maybe a large armoured ME on a large hilly map qualifies as a test? Axis with their big heavies controlling the ground, hoping to engage the lighter (but faster) allied tanks frontally - or just Daimlers etc. -, allied using their speed to get flank and rear shots.

[The_Capt]

Guys,

Good points all. I will respond in detail tomorrow.

Quick one for Mr Audacity, is your e-mail current? If not can you correct or just send to me directly, Fionn wants to speak to you but as he has been cast into the Outer Darkness for being a bad boy he can't do it here.

[ASL Veteran]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Pillar:

Capt,

just what are we debating? If you are debating manueverism, it's simple.<hr></blockquote>

Yes, it is all so simple. Everything is perfectly clear for you. Unfortunately "maneuver" and "Attrition" mean different things to different people. If everyone understood attrition and maneuver the same way you did, it would be simple and there wouldn't be a discussion. Alas, each contributor to this thread has a different definition of attrition and maneuver (and they range from moderates to extremes) - and that is why the discussion has gone on so long. What seems like a pointless exercise to you (because you have it all figured out) is really a multi headed monster of a discussion if you are willing to study the merits of each person's contribution and weigh those contributions when forming your opinion of what defines each 'category' or 'non category' (if you don't see any difference). You may find that things are not so clear. I agree with The Capt and Blackhorse on many things. I even agree with Jason on many things. However, there are still major differences of opinion on some items. Items which may be transparent to the casual reader, but will become crystal clear when / if you become fully embroiled in this discussion. Something you may feel is obviously attritional in nature may be maneuverist to someone else.

A discussion is only pointless if you feel there is nothing to learn by participating in it. By the way, some may want to note the dates of the original posts in this thread prior to posting responses - some of the original participants may have altered their stance since this thread was originally posted. I know Jason's stance has been somewhat modified since this thread was posted (although he still stands by his core position). My stance has also been modified somewhat from further reading on German tactical methods during WW1. It almost makes Verdun make sense! :eek:

[ASL Veteran]

Oh no, I wasn't feeling slighted . I only wanted to point out that describing this discussion as simple is not to read the discussion (either an admission that you have not plumbed its depths, or an admission that you have dismissed other viewpoints out of hand. Either way it puts you in a bad light). Take air power for example. I would regard the Strategic bombing campaign against Germany as Attritional. I can also pull some quotes from this very thread that state that the strategic bombing campaign is maneuverist - and they cite sources to back it up. Any discussion where two different people describe an action in opposite terms is a complicated discussion - unless the opposing viewpoint is just plain wrong (in your estimation) and carries no value.

You see, this discussion isn't just about attrition and maneuver, but also a set of beliefs about the conduct of battle. I would say that it is similar to a Christian and a Muslim arguing about the relevance the Jesus Christ. If you believe Jesus is the savior, then anyone who thinks otherwise is wrong. You see, it really is simple isn't it?

[The Commissar]

Well, Ive found this whole discussion very interesting (if somewhat long winded). A few posts ago, The_Capt asked for an example of maneuvre from the game. So here I present to you, gentlemen, a possible example of maneuvre in a game I am currently playing. I say possible because I leave it to you to decide if what Im doing is really maneuvre or not. Whatever your thoughts, please do explain.

I am playing a 5000 point QB. If you must know, its a medium hills/medium map/village set up. Combined arms, certain restrictions like the Fion76 rule, etc.

The VL's on this map are all large flags, and are seperated into two groups. One group consisting of 3 VL's is on my left, situated in and around an 'indent' in the ground where some light trees and open space is enclosed by the sorrounding closely sorrounding hills, allowing only limited visibility of anyone outside the indent into the little valley formed by it. The second group of VL's is on my right, but we will concentrate on the former.

I have in a safe reserve something like a company of Sherman 75's with heavy support in the form of Priests and Hellcats, in support of a motorized infantry company.

So far in the game, my opponent and I have been thrusting and parrying with scouting teams in and around the group of VL's we are discussing. The maps slopes towards the direction of my opponent, giving him an advantage in concealment.

However, here is where I formed what I think may be an example of maneuvre.

The plan:

First and foremost, I am calling down large calibre arty fire into the little indent with the VL's. This fire will be great in volume, but most likely low in accuracy. Smoke will be used to obscure possible enemy AT gun positions by having spotters smoke a side of the indent and creating a smoke screen.

As this is going on, 2 tank platoons supporting 2 motorized platoons will perform a semi-circle and enter the indent through one of its sides. I calculate that any enemy infantry concealed in the light trees that grow in the indent will surely be forced to flee or die under the massive barrage. Thus, my attacking forces will enter a savegely smoking but relatively empty piece of territory.

Now, so far, this may seem like attrition at work. However, this is simply the execution of the plan. The idea behind it is to position my men in such an area that will, without expending manpower hunting the enemy down, block his access to the 3 VL's in the indent. You see, the indent is formed in such a way that any enemy wishing to enter it (the only way to reach the VLs) would have to expose himself at a very short range - something like 200 metres at maximum - and thus encounter heavy resistance from my men and armor.

Thus, as you can see, I would have taken the VLs while only scaring off any enemy occupiers and not actually participating in an attritionist slug fest.

Best yet, the only possible way for my opponent to reclaim the VLs would be through attrition tactics, as there is no safe approach to the indent from my enemy's side of the map.

At least that's the way I see it. I will let you know, if you are interested of course, if this plan actually works or fails misserably, as attempts at unsuccessful maneuver sometimes do.

So, is this maneuvre, quaisi-maneuvre, or a strange strategic mutt too entangled to really classify as one thing or another?

I eagerly await your thoughts.

Cheers,

Commissar

[JasonC]

First to the commissar's example - that is definitely maneuvering. The artillery is meant merely to force the enemy out of a spot of ground you want to position your own maneuver elements on, and to conceal them during the approach. Your heavy ranged firepower ministers to your movements, which seek local control of (supposedly) important ground by concentration of force. This does not mean "attrition serves to further maneuver". It means fire is used, of course, but the strategy hinges on maneuver and the fire is ministerial to it.

Now, the fact that the riposte is simply to evacuate the area and then shell the daylights out of your folks who enter the area, same as you did, may set up a game of "artillery tag", and you may find your maneuver plan doesn't settle the question of who will live to hold that spot of ground at the end of the day - but that is a qualification about interactions of strategies, not a change in your strategy. Which is clearly maneuver thinking. The decision is supposed to be attained by placing a spearhead of maneuver elements at a key spot.

As for the question what books I am reading, I am reading the training manuals. What are you guys reading, press releases? lol. The US army training manuals are full of denigration for attritionist methods and counsel strongly against them. A few weasel words are allowed in key places to allow secondary meanings to just fit some attritionist methods into allowed actions, but the clear meaning is always the maneuver idea of decisive breakthrough followed by rear area romping.

You want examples. Well, flanking is always better than penetrating the enemy because it avoids his front, and all actions against the enemy front squander combat power - thus spoke Zarathustra. And penetrating the enemy is always better than pushing him on a broad front, because that avoids his front even less, since at least penetrating (always being successful, apparently) is temporary. Amen. And all commanders attack whenever it is possible, because the offensive is the only decisive form of warfare - all hail the offensive, hoorah! It has to be explicitly stated that a commander transitioning to the defensive is not required to attack forward to seize the ground he will stand on, but may occasionally even retire. (If the focus were killing the enemy not ground control, this would be so obvious it would hardly require permission).

Then, all of the indirect fire assets are to target absolutely everything, with the possible afterthought exception of the enemy's front line forces bunched up into schwerpunks. Because the available artillery has to hit all of his C3I, fire support, supplies, interdict his movement, follow on forces, air defenses, yada yada - all of which have local target densities slightly south of Florida. Not be massed into the Wrath of God right on top of his massed forward elements as they attempt breakthrough - because the idea is not to kill the enemy maneuver elements but to baffle 'em with static on the command net. (Ask any attack planner what he fears most in a breakthrough attempt. Dollars to donuts 9 out of 10 will say "massed indirect fires on the bunched up guys trying to make the breach, before they can manage it").

The manuals are so against defense they say the purpose of artillery deployed minefields is to facilitate counterattacks. I kid you not. They don't even say the reason penetration schwerpunks are dangerous is because everybody bunches up - the only danger they are thinking of is the enemy front line maneuver elements. Proof - they think it is even more dangerous to push on a wide front, instead of less (when one's own target density and thus vunerability to indirect fires is obviously less in that case).

The official manuals are so against any notion of hitting 'em where they are, instead of hitting 'em where they ain't, that they can't bring themselves to admit that counterattacking reserves are directed *at* the attackers, instead of away from them. They say, move to some empty location where the enemy isn't, but from which you can shoot at him (as though he can't shoot back at you unless you are right on top of him).

Then there is the paradox that the recommended defense is all depth and reserves and falling back, with practically nothing at the FEBA, and most indirect fires also directed at rear areas. Yet the attacking doctrine assumes the FEBA is the most dangerous place by far. Why? All the reserves aren't going to hit you until you are deep in the kill sacks chasing the "breakthrough" will-o-wisp - at the FEBA the attacker will have overall odds times 3 for defender depth without facing significant indirect fire because that is all shooting at anything but. The attackers will eat the forward screen easily, and won't get killed for it unless they try to get fancy or go deep. Which they simply don't need to do, at all.

You don't need clever maneuvers to fight 1/3rd of the enemy at a time in sequence - his own depth deployments will do that for you, if he never varies his deployments from the manual dictated scheme. That scheme will definitely stop breakthrough attempts - though it would do even that better if indirect fires were massed instead of dissipated. But that only shows the basic problem with the whole doctrine. It is based on fantasies of reproducing 1940 and 1941 breakthroughs against defenders who know modern mobile defense doctrine, which is a higher card in the same suit.

I agree with Captain that maneuver ideas have their place (providing an occasional force multiplier when conditions are ripe) - but they are not staying in their place, and that is the problem. They are turning into a cult of the offensive, which is downright dangerous, and they are making the ground arms irrelevant in overall war planning, because their doctrine is out of synch with the revolution in military firepower.

Which does not counsel 1940-41 breakthroughs with maneuver elements in the driver's seat - anymore than breech loading steel artillery was compatible with faith in l'arme blanche prior to WW I. And the cultists are in the process of scrapping the heavy army (M-1s, Brads, the artillery, etc) to replace it with headline copy about how brillantly they will use javelin teams dumped out of LAVs and Humvees, in just the right spots, "paralyzing" the enemy. Meanwhile, no politician is going to risk thousands of American lives in thinly armored cavalry raids because of advertising copy - not when they can just send the airforce instead.

Ground combat doctrine has to get with the program, and realize that their function is to help coordinate the impact of firepower arms and to multiple *its* effects, by spotting, by limiting areas available to the enemy and thus intel and targeting requirements, by stealth, and above all by forcing enemies to provide nice bunched up targets - of front line forces, not C3I - if they are to avoid death by ground action. When that threat is not taken seriously, they have to be able to deliver that death by ground action. When it is taken seriously, they won't need to bother their heads about delivering the paralyzing razzle dazzle, because the firepower arms will blow the bunched up defenders to kingdom come.

Last, I address the speculation that maneuver is really only relevant when any equally capable enemy outnumbers you. Um, please read the "what happened to the Lorraine panzer brigades?" thread. Attempting offensive maneuver when the conditions are not ripe for it is a quick way to squander combat power. And an enemy with equally sound doctrine (not the 1940 French or 1941 Russians, note) and superior numbers is not generally going to provide the necessary conditions, which include local odds in your favor in the non-armor arms (as well as armor, obviously), sufficient logistic strength to see the action through without being clobbered by an enemy's advantage on that score, etc.

In short, no you are not likely to get away with large multipliers from offensive maneuver when the enemy is just as good as you and more numerous to boot. There is such a thing, though I realize it chills the heart of cult of offensive acolytes even to consider it, as a time to stand on the defensive. If a more numerous enemy has an antiquated doctrine or lousy quality, you might manage something. But just as good as you and more numerous, and "seize the initiative, schwerpunk, the offensive in the only decisive form", blah blah will just throw away your reserves, making it that much easier for the enemy to attack you successfully - after he has eaten your (wannabe) "spearheads".

The time when you can reap the multipliers from maneuver are when you are likely to win anyway, but want to do it cheaper - by e.g. wiping out a third of his army without having to blast each soldier individually. And also when your quality is enourmous compared to his, regardless of odds (like the Brits in Libya against mere Italians). Near run things are generally won by attrition methods, and properly used even modest odds and an attrition strategy can produce decision. In which maneuver may figure, once the conditions for it are created by successful attrition, shoving the odds ratio high enough to make e.g. breakthrough attempts both feasible and relatively cheap.

I realize that many seem to have taken my previous post as an extreme statement. I ask them to read it again, very slowly, and see whether there is any sober realism in it. To my eyes, the more extreme maneuverist positions - which are not strawmen but all through the official manuals by now - are so obvious out of touch with what army and Marines are actually doing daily when they really fight - that that is exactly how it looks. Academic boasting, while the air force runs the nation's wars. The emperor is scantily clad at best.

Maneuverist tenets are duly enshrined in ink and in grey matter, but honored in the breach when actually fighting is involved, it appears to me. Even many maneuver gurus say so, they just think it is lamentable and a mistake - to win wars the way we've been winning them lately.

I realize that sophists may claim that whatever is done is maneuverist to save the face of a school. But there is a clear difference between subordinating what the maneuver elements do to fire action, and using fire action to put the maneuver elements in supposedly decisive positions. There is a difference between methodically blowing away every asset the enemy has, and expecting him to "collapse" when you get behind him or knock out his radios. There is a difference between hitting the enemy where he is (his front line forces), and hitting where he isn't.

And we today subordinate all ground elements to distant fires, which we expect to produce the decision. We methodically blow away every asset the enemy has, even if he turn the lights out first. We hit fielded forces wherever they are, and hit them over and over, not just surgical strikes at C3I. We aren't using maneuverist strategies, because whatever the sophists say, the airforce still believes with Petain that "firepower kills". Which was not a maneuverist maxim, I assure you.

[JasonC]

Nevermind - I think I've made my argument lol.

[ 12-19-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]</p>

[mr_audacity]

Jasonc said

To my eyes, the more extreme maneuverist positions - which are not strawmen but all through the official manuals by now - are so obvious out of touch with what army and Marines are actually doing daily when they really fight - that that is exactly how it looks. Academic boasting, while the air force runs the nation's wars. The emperor is scantily clad at best.

Indeed, tell that to the civilians of Srebrenica. US foreign policy and the Powell doctrine often mean that a lack of ground deployment ensures that the USAF and USN Tomahawks are the only means by which to engage the enemy. Doubtless you can pound ground targets without proper air defence systems in countries like Afghanistan, but as the Serbs showed, against a more sophisticated enemy air power was pretty ineffectual and ground force were eventually realised to be the only option.

Now the question is: does the US Army or USMC follow their own manuals? Well yes! The Army follows its pumped up attritionalist theory with the operational art bolted on, and the Marines a manoeuvre like one. I say like one as I believe that although many of the officers in the USMC ‘get it’ some still do not.

I also note that the much heralded revolution in US military doctrine, now verbally committed to maneuverist theories, is nowhere in evidence practically. Every recent war we've fought with attrition strategies and successfully so. The idea that the Marines frontal blast up the coast road in the gulf as "maneuverist" is laughable on its face.

I suggest Jason that you have a much closer look at what exactly the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions got up to. To me their whole approach screams surface and gaps.

And just to end these circular arguments let me spell it out clearly once and for all - MANOEUVRE WARFARE DOES NOT ESCHEW FIREPOWER! In fact at the tactical level it emphasises it. Ground attacks require very very very heavy fires in support of the manoeuvre element that will close with the enemy. As stated before 3:1 - 6:1 fire support to manoeuvre element force levels in infantry attacks have long been proven to produce the desired result - i.e. you assault element arrives at the enemy location intact! That means in a two up battalion attack your forward two companies have all but one rifle platoon ‘shoot in’ the assault platoon onto the objective. Do this in CM and you will not go too far wrong. Attritionalist will claim this is typical of their practice and I would say maybe. But it is very much maneuverist in that the weight of fire-power is not intended to kill the enemy before your assault platoon arrives (though that would be nice) but it is intended to suppress them so they don’t slaughtered on the way there.

[ 12-19-2001: Message edited by: mr_audacity ]</p>

[Grisha]

Jason, in the Bring out your dead thread you wrote a reply on how a combined arms attack would be done over open ground. The one thing you didn't address was defensive indirect fire, or 'how do you stop all those guys crawling in the grass from getting slaughtered by artillery before they ever get close enough to lob grenades?' I actually agree with your assessment, but would like to know how this would be dealt with. The best I can think of is to use smoke for cover, and keep the grass crawlers widely spaced and moving albeit slowly from the crawl.

I remember a similar situation like this in one game, and all I did was keep them crawling(though they were in cover - trees) and use whatever smoke I had for cover. I did take losses but it seemed that the continuous movement frustrated the overall enemy barrage. Eventually the barrages ended, and it was business as usual. If there's a better way to do this, I'd like to know.

[The_Capt]

HEY AUDACITY!! YOUR E-MAIL?? Is that a current address or do you have another one?