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Attrition vs Maneuver .. secrets revealed!! (long)


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I am not the one who first called the Kiev decision a fatal instance of attrition thinking, or departure from true maneuver doctrine. That dubious distinction falls to Heinz Guderian. Who, for those in Rio Linda, commanded the armor diverted, and just incidentally, invented modern mobile doctrine. It has been repeated by numerous historians since.

If ASL Vet thinks it wrong and Kiev was advisable, all he has to do is say so, and I will heartily agree with him. So far, however, he has not done so. He has only repeated the statement that both choices are maneuver, without deciding between them himself.

If he agrees that Kiev was the right decision, but calls it maneuver, then I shall settle for his departure from the strictures of certain school masters, call it realism and a focus on destruction of enemies forces, and applaud it. If he picks Moscow, I shall continue to see a real difference between his view and mine, and I will continue to trace, what I regard as an error, to certain school masters.

But I do not care what he calls it. I just want him to *make* the decision, to choose. Regardless of how improbable it may seem to ASL Veteran, I really am more concerned about the real disagreement between my own conclusion, and Guderian's, than I am with ASL Vet's choice of words.

Not to put too fine a point on it, if ASL Vet prefers Kiev, I think he is agreeing with me, and our differences (at least on that) are matters of semantics and the native stubbornness we both are blessed with. If he agrees with Guderian and prefers Moscow, then he really does not agree with me.

He may perhaps excuse me if I consider the latter disagreement, which certainly exists between me and some others, as rather more fundamental than which side of it ASL Vet chooses to stand on, let alone what color he paints the standards in each camp.

I regard attrition and maneuver as means, below the level of an entire war. They are, indeed, meant to be adapted to the enemy's deployments and choices, and the choice between them should be in the commander's tool box, not decided for him beforehand once and for all. Just as the different choice whether to attack or defend, in the local circumstances, should be.

At the strategic level, I think the framework of analysis that I consider attritionist, but which others are pleased to call "total war", or sometimes "decisive battle", is the right one. I notice that my attrition framework applies in a case like Korea, that historians usually call limited war and oppose to total, and to slow processes (like sinking all of Japan's ships in WW II) as well as the rapid ones usually meant by "decisive battle", but those are terminological quibbles.

The content, as opposed to the terms, of the strategic frame I recommend, is a focus on the destruction of enemy forces, and the preservation of one's own, rather than (as I conceive it) focusing on territory, or who is attacking.

And the reason behind this recommended focus has also been stated. It is, that if a fielded force ratio sufficiently favorable can be achieved, it will prove decisive in itself, regardless of other factors. This is, conversely, as much to be avoided as something conceeded to an adversary.

I go over this because it is possible I have created confusion between these two levels, the strategic frame, and the technique of operations and tactics. At both of the latter levels (or as many as their really are, down the "chart"), I regard both maneuver and attrition as tools.

For maximum clarity, I will state the two propositions I consider myself to be denying. One, that maneuver is the appropriate framework for the highest level of strategy, rather than a focus on fielded forces. And two, that at all levels maneuver is always the best method and superior to attrition methods in all cases.

To me these two propositions are distinct. Because I do recognize the usefulness of maneuver ideas in operations and tactics, as one of a set of options, capable of countering certain enemy choices or making the most of certain situations or advantages.

But I find that opposition to the two propositions, comes from more or less the same set of people, and the reasons they give for disagreeing with me on both propositions are more or less the same reasons (or attitudes, or sometimes mere slurs).

I call these people "maneuverists". But I am not an inquisitor as to heresy within their camp. Some of them may agree with some of my points made in passing, but neither proposition; some with one of the propositions but not the other. Some may agree with me on both propositions, but still choose to consider themselves "maneuverists" (they are heartily welcome).

Some may labor under the misimpression that I think maneuver is not a proper part of the operational or tactical tool kit. Since I am speaking for the usefulness of attrition concepts in particular cases, and weaknesses of maneuver ones, some may think that means I do not recommend using maneuver in operations and tactics, or that e.g. in CM, my own methods are all attritionist. Not at all.

I will maneuver like anybody, and when I do I try to apply the same sorts of ideas recommended by the "maneuverists" (from Guderian to modern U.S. doctrine) when I think the situation calls for it. I just don't *always* think the situation calls for it. Proposed "matches" in which I am to use "just attrition" and another to "just maneuver" are beside the point. Half of the point of my own argument is that which to use, depends on which the other side uses; fixing that decision in stone defeats the whole point.

One does not tell someone trying to explain that pass-rushing and run-rushing operate on different principles "oh yeah? Then let's play a football game, and you only run-rush the whole time". (Is he trying to get *by* me or trying to get *at* me?). No one proposes boxing matches between fighters who throw only hooks and fighters who throw only jabs. The whole point is to have both available, to assess the situation and the enemy, and to use the right one, while being prepared for the opponent trying either.

And while I am certainly disagreeing with those who think there are not two styles to choose between, or that only one of them works or makes sense, I am also asking honest questions because I do not think I have the answers to them. The issue I have been trying to get people to address - which Capt. for instance has - is when to use which style. I am interested in picking the brains of maneuverists too, on this subject. But I can't get their help in addressing the "when" question, if they keep singing "always, always" off the same hymn sheet.

I have advanced some factors that I think effect the "when" decisions, and I have given examples of e.g. deployment differences that to me clearly favor the use of one method or of the other. But that does not mean I think I have a definitive answer to the "when" question.

Capt. suspects nobody does, and I think he is probably right. What springs to mind, however, are the numerous cases where good battlefield commanders made exactly this sort of assessment or decision, and it seems to me at any rate, were able to get it right.

Examples - MacAuliffe at Bastogne, Walker in the Pusan perimeter, Ridgeway after the Chinese intervention. They made excellent decisions about when to be supple enough to give ground, when to stand to avoid enemy maneuvers, when to focus on destruction of the enemy.

In other cases the judgments seem sound although the courses recommended were not taken, as with many of Manstein's recommendations for AG South. Some are similar but so obvious it is amazing anyone still defends the opposite course, like Rundstadt on the Ardennes offensive.

An accurate assessment of the real capabilities of the opposing forces, of the changing shape of the battle, of the real alternatives on defense and attack as well as the decision between them - that is the noticable feature in those cases, compared to their relative absent in others, or on the part of others making different recommendations.

I do not disagree, then, with Abteilung, that these things are pieces and not the assembled puzzle. I do not think we will notice and learn from others before, putting it together well, if we think all the pieces are large squares. Some attention to their edges and how they fit together, the differences in their shapes, is required. But it is not quite enough to simply note that they are all shapes, and it depends, and pretend noticing this will assembly the thing.

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OK, here is another attempt to get people to see the issues I am driving at.

Consider any game of CM you have recently played, in which the winning side did well because it applied some definite maneuver - used some route over the ground, avoided this or that trap or defender's strength, came at them from this angle, managed to fight these and then those in sequence instead of at the same time. Whatever it is, so long as you think you understand how it worked.

Now, ask yourself. If I used the same map, exactly, but *doubled* the size of the opposing forces, and doubled the length of the game in turns - would exactly the same approach have worked? The main variable I just dialed to a different setting is "force to space". I also took away, probably, any need for hurry.

There are fewer open areas; it is much harder to move any serious force along any given avenue without it being easily spotted. Reserves can be more substantial and react to a clearer threat. But with a long battle, issues of ammo, rallying disorganized forces, running out of key items like guns or tanks, all rise in importance. It is more feasible to use slower processes of firepower to chew through the enemy force. Fights at longer ranges are no longer as indecisive or "safe".

Is there anyone who thinks the situation has not been severely altered by such a change? That the same ideas will work as before, in the same manner, and that new alternatives have not arisen? That artillery hasn't risen in effectiveness relative to the tanks and infantry platoons? That overall odds hasn't risen in importance compared to say, terrain, initial placements, or average unit quality?

[This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 02-14-2001).]

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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by The_Capt:

I hear ya Slappy,

These were the days!! Back when tactics were king. Now it's mod this, Newbie that and "When is CMBB coming out".

I do miss talking about war.<hr></blockquote>

You can always have a look at the last few pages of the 'Bring out your dead' thread...

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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by The_Capt:

These were the days!! Back when tactics were king. Now it's mod this, Newbie that and "When is CMBB coming out".

I do miss talking about war.<hr></blockquote>

In that case I'd like to invite you to the "TD overwatch" thread on the tips and trick forum.

The thread is not overly interesting right now, but you can change that :)

[ 12-13-2001: Message edited by: redwolf hates artillery ]</p>

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This maybe somewhat tangent to this thread (I really haven't followed this discussion at all), but it is an interesting series of observations by J.N. Rickard in his book "Patton At Bay, The Lorrain Campaign, September to December 1944"

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The Civil War had a profound impact on U.S. Army doctrine. One philosophy in particular survived the Civil War to be taken up by American officers for the wars of the twentieth century. "Despite the veneration of R. E. Lee in American military hagiography," states Russell Weigley, "it was U.S. Grant whose theories of strategy actually prevailed." Grant chose to offset Lee's Napoleonic manoeuvre sur les derrieres, brilliantly conducted at Second Manassas and Chancellorsville, by locking Lee's army in continuous battle where a trade-off in casualties favored his superior resources of men and equipment. Grant's strategy of attrition was virtually codified into Army doctrine in the years between the world wars by the various service schools.

As the American Army followed the British lead and began to codify principles of war, highest priority was placed on one particular principle, that of the objective. Grant's principal objective had been to destroy the main Confederate force. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. American doctrine thus came to reflect Clausewitz's teaching that the ultimate objective in war is the destruction of the enemy's main body. The American concept differed markedly from the Europeans in one important aspect, however. Weigley notes that in comparison to the Germans, the American doctrine was different in the "extent to which they expected overwhelming power alone, without subtleties of maneuver, to achieve the objective." By 1939 a commentator on the revised army field manual FM 100-5, which outlined the army's doctrine, could declare with little thought of professional censorship that "no matter what maneuver is employed, ultimately the fighting is frontal. . . . One must accept the formula or not wage. Here was a blatant belief in the correctness of Grant's strategy. Patton the cavalryman did not accept the formula.

Patton was well acquainted with the teachings of Clausewitz, having fully annotated his copy of On War by 1926. His notation that one should always "go the limit" in the destruction of the enemy's forces' reflected Clausewitz's principal thesis. Similarly, he wrote in Herbert Sargent's The Strategy on the Western Front that "the only end of war and strategy is the destruction by battle of the enemy. Yet he was never swayed by those in the army advocating frontal assaults as the only means to cripple an opponent and achieve the objective. He believed frontal assaults were justified only when circumstances dictated no other course of action. Specifically, they became valid operations beyond circumstantial necessity when used to flank an opponent.

In Moltkean terms, a frontal assault designed for this purpose was a "fixing" attack. In Pattonesque terms, this became Patton's famous dictum, "Hold them by the nose and kick 'em in the ass." Moreover, Moltke noted that "which attack [the frontal or flanking] is to be viewed as the main attack and which as the secondary attack will depend on the general operational intention, the disposition of hostile forces, and the terrain.""' Patton, however, clearly favored flanking movements.

The key to avoiding limited tactical situations where frontal assaults offered the only solution was mobility, but the lesson was so obvious that few picked it up. The vast bulk of Patton's contemporaries adopted the attrition strategy of Grant, and therefore, according to Blumenson, were "bland and plodding . . . workmanlike rather than bold" in their operations in World War II. Patton, however, though he would display Grant's bulldog tenacity, leaned more towards the indirect approach of Stonewall Jackson and William Tecumseh Sherman. British historian and theorist B. H. Liddell Hart suggested that Sherman's methods of fighting "fired Patton's imagination-particularly with regard to the way that they exploited the indirect approach and the value of cutting down impedimenta in order to gain mobility."<hr></blockquote>

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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by ASL Veteran:

Let us now examine some examples in history to flesh out my theory. Verdun … ‘Attrition’ or ‘Maneuver’? Well let us apply our definitions. Falkenhayne’s plan was to attack the French army at Verdun. He chose Verdun because he knew that the French had a special reverence for that location that exceeded its strategic value and would fight to the last man protecting it. Falkenhayne’s battle plan was so constructed, however, that he could never actually take Verdun. Actually capturing Verdun was not Falkenhayne’s intention – destruction of the French army was. Well, as examined earlier, destruction of the French army is the objective and so far we can apply both ‘attrition’ and ‘maneuver’ to this battle. However, is Falkenhayne’s plan a plan for ‘decisive battle’? Absolutely not. There is absolutely no chance of the Germans capturing Verdun and ending World War 1 in decisive fashion. Verdun is an attempt to gain victory through battle that is not decisive. It is a simple numbers game – Falkenhayne thinks he can kill three times as many French soldiers as he loses German and that is the basis of his plan.

<hr></blockquote>

Unfortunately, you're wrong. Having just finished rereading Guderian's "Actung Panzer" he makes the point that in reality, the Germans made a post-ipso facto justification for Verdun. In reality, Falkenhayne sought a breakthrough initially at Verdun. It was not until he was checked, that he change the justification for events to that of supposedly having planned an attritional battle from the beginning.

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I think Rickard's discussion of Weigley, Patton, Moltke, and other US generals is too apples-and-oranges to have a lot of meaning, although some of what he wants to say about Patton may be correct nonetheless.

In his discussion of a broad front strategy and Grant, Weigley is talking about the allied grand strategy for fighting in Europe. Decisions at this level involve things like whether the US troops land on the beaches to the east of the british or to the west. If you're opting for a narrow front strategy, the US lands to the east of the british because that's closest to Germany, so where the strongest force needs to be for a direct strike (strongest considering replacement ability, etc.). For a broad front strategy, you land to the west because you have the manpower to spread out through France.

During the civil war, under Grant, the US Army also chose a broad front strategy. Important elements of this strategy included things like stopping prisoner exchanges (they used to be exchanged and rejoin their army) because the loss of one prisoner was a proportionally greater loss to the south than to the north.

By contrast, the German grand strategic plan in France was a narrow front strategy calling for a strategic war-ending breakthrough in the ardennes.

The advantage of a broad front strategy, of course, is that it is much safer: there's no danger of a large part of your army (typically, the best part) getting cut off and encircled if the breakthrough doesn't work. Of course, you have to have the manpower to be able to adopt a broad front strategy to begin with. And broad front strategies do have a place for breakthroughs: they happen after the enemy has been stretched and attrited so much that it's pretty easy to punch a hole.

Patton is a couple of levels below the grand strategic level discussed above, and Patton's breakthrough did not come from a powerful punch delivered by the third army, but from the general breaking of the German line due to attrition.

And Patton handled his exploitation (I think that's probably the right word) about perfectly. Unfortunately, there's no one really to compare him to. He's not a Rommel or a Stonewall Jackson who was able to defeat equal or larger enemies by manuver and fighting them in detail. He's not a Guderian, either, smashing through and encircling dangerous forces.

What he is, really, is cavalryman in the 19th century cavalry-vs-indians sense. He is much faster than his opponents, and he can easily defeat any of the weak, isolated bands that he faces. The problem for Patton is that there are so many bands to fight,and the ones you don't fight, or capture, will eventually regroup and form a real army again. What Patton did so well was cover a lot of area while dealing efficiently with whatever resistance he met. Efficiently, in this sense, means that Patton peeled off enough of his force to deal with isolated resistance, and kept the bulk of his force always moving. It's easy to defeat an inferior enemy by attacking it with most of your force, but if you spend three days capturing every village defended by a battalion, most of the other German units would be able to escape.

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Sorry for butting in on this very interesting exposition but maybe there's a place for the idea of Decisive War. That is one battle, in effect completes the war -- that's really what everybody dreams -- hence nuclear weapons.

I vote nuclear war as the ultimate attrition --

Ghengis Khan the ultimate maneuver?

Everything else is namby pamby.

My apologies again.

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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Splash:

Sorry for butting in on this very interesting exposition but maybe there's a place for the idea of Decisive War. That is one battle, in effect completes the war -- that's really what everybody dreams -- hence nuclear weapons.

I vote nuclear war as the ultimate attrition --

Ghengis Khan the ultimate maneuver?

Everything else is namby pamby.

My apologies again.<hr></blockquote>

for ultimate manuverist you chose Khan???? how could you over look Hannibal?!?!

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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Brian:

Unfortunately, you're wrong. Having just finished rereading Guderian's "Actung Panzer" he makes the point that in reality, the Germans made a post-ipso facto justification for Verdun. In reality, Falkenhayne sought a breakthrough initially at Verdun. It was not until he was checked, that he change the justification for events to that of supposedly having planned an attritional battle from the beginning.<hr></blockquote>

I don't agree with you here, Brian. When I visited Verdun in 1993 the french historican who led us told us that the German army could've taken Verdun by concentrating on certain areas in the early stages of the battle.

This was not done because of Falkenhayn's plan of Verdun as a "Blutmühle" (literally "bloodmill", meatgrinder)for the french army. When I visited Verdun a year later with the german-french brigade french officers told me the same.

Why should someonce enforce a breakthrough in one the most fortified areas of that time?

[ 12-14-2001: Message edited by: ParaBellum ]</p>

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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by ParaBellum:

I don't agree with you here, Brian. When I visited Verdun in 1993 the french historican who led us told us that the German army could've taken Verdun by concentrating on certain areas in the early stages of the battle.

This was not done because of Falkenhayn's plan of Verdun as a "Blutmühle" (literally "bloodmill", meatgrinder)for the french army. When I visited Verdun a year later with the german-french brigade french officers told me the same.

Why should someonce enforce a breakthrough in one the most fortified areas of that time?

[ 12-14-2001: Message edited by: ParaBellum ]<hr></blockquote>

Perhaps you should take the matter up with Mr.Guderian? Afterall, he was writing from German sources. He was also a veteran of that war and had served with many of the staff officers who had planned the various operations during WWI.

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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Splash:

Sorry for butting in on this very interesting exposition but maybe there's a place for the idea of Decisive War. That is one battle, in effect completes the war -- that's really what everybody dreams -- hence nuclear weapons.

I vote nuclear war as the ultimate attrition --

Ghengis Khan the ultimate maneuver?

Everything else is namby pamby.

My apologies again.<hr></blockquote>

Chingiz was good. Jebadai, his most able and best commander was better. Jebadai during his career fought from southern China to Poland, from one end of Asia to the other and was never defeated. If you want a "Great Captain" of history, one cannot ignore his contribution IMO.

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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Brian:

Perhaps you should take the matter up with Mr.Guderian? Afterall, he was writing from German sources. He was also a veteran of that war and had served with many of the staff officers who had planned the various operations during WWI.<hr></blockquote>

Still don't agree with you. Although i respect Guderian very much and have read most of his publications i think he's wrong in this aspect.

Maybe Guderian, always looking for cases in which the infantry wasn't able to achieve breakthroughs in order to underline the need for tank divisions was a little biased here.

Falkenhayn mentioned that he didn't see a possibility to achieve a decisive breakthrough on the western front since the numerical advantage of the allies was already too big (150:119 Divisions).

And, when looking back at the allied attacks of 1915 he saw that even with a numerical advantage those attacks ended only with terrible losses for the attacker.

His plan for the Verdun offensive was to use a lot of arty but only a small force of infantry (10 Divisions). The infantry should capture the heights at Verdun IN FRONT OF the fortress so that the arty could shell the city and the fortresses. For the french high command there were only 2 options. Give up Verdun or try to recapture the dominating hills with (expected) horrible losses. He wanted to attack sharp and briefly and then use the advantages of defensive warfare to "bleed out" the french troops.

Source: Office for military science (Germany)

[ 12-14-2001: Message edited by: ParaBellum ]</p>

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Brian said - "Falkenhayn sought a breakthrough initially at Verdun."

This is false. He told the operational commander to attack with the goal of seizing the city. He did so in order to make the attack convincing. But he told the Kaiser the object of the attack was to draw in the French reserves and bleed the French army white. And he held reserves out of the battle, doling them out to keep the fighting going. Yes Virginia, sometimes senior generals tell subordinates the goal of an action is X, when it is really Y, as they faithfully report to their superiors.

Why? "Your mission is to act as bait by dying in an infantry battle, to draw in the French, so not you but the artillery can kill them. We won't be sending you more help, because we don't want too many of our guys killed. But you dying won't be 'too many'. Actually, you have precious little chance of taking that town over there, but your duty is to get killed attacking towards it. Now, march." That doesn't work too well as a gung ho morale boosting speech. "By capturing Verdun we will shatter the French army and their will to resist, and achieve decisive breakthrough, winning the war and sending everybody home by Christmas", for some unfathomable reason, works better.

"But why should I believe your statement over Guderian's?" Because I can quote exactly what Falkenhayn told the Kaiser. "To achieve that object the uncertain means of a mass breakthrough, in any case beyond our means, is unnecessary. We can probably do enough for our purposes with limited resources. Within our reach behind the French sector of the western front there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed to death - as there can be no question of a voluntary withdrawl - whether we reach our goal or not... The objectives of which I am speaking now are Belfort and Verdun. The considerations urged above apply to both, yet the preference must be given to Verdun." He said this before the attack, not after it. It was written in December 1915, and presented to the Kaiser. Falkenhayn was chief of the general staff, not a junior officer. The memo in question is the origin of the battle, not something made up afterward. There is no question Falkenhayn consciously employed an attrition strategy at Verdun.

[ 12-14-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]</p>

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Hey guys,

I could write a five or fifty page thesis defending my position with historical examples, but instead I'll simply say: IT'S BOTH. To win most wars I've ever heard about you need effective use of both attrition and manuever.

Without effective manuever, you will not achieve favorable attrition--except with a truly overwhelming force. (Imagine long narrative citing dozens of examples.)

And without utlimately achieving large scale attrition of the enemy's main force, all the manuever in the world won't win the war for you. (Imagine long narrative citing even more examples.)

Ultimately, this discussion reminds me of those arguments about which major organ is most vital: do we need the lungs or the heart more. Hey, guys. We need BOTH.

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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

Without effective manuever, you will not achieve favorable attrition--except with a truly overwhelming force.

<hr></blockquote>

How many Americans were on the ground in Afghanistan? Hundreds? Against 60000 Taliban?

If you count the air crews there were probably only thousands of Americans in Afghanistan at any one time. Counting northern alliance troops as well, the ratio of troops was probably no better than 1:2 -- far less than the 3:1 supposed to be necessary to attack.

There were no manuevers in Afghanistan. Just look at the lines with binoculars, night vision equipment, air recon, satellite photos, etc., and punch in the GPS-accurate target coordinates. Then GPS-aimed iron bombs rain down and obliterate everything remotely close to what you point at.

How could this possibly be considered a war of manuever? This is about as pure a war of attrition as one can imagine.

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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Wreck:

There were no manuevers in Afghanistan.

How could this possibly be considered a war of manuever? This is about as pure a war of attrition as one can imagine.<hr></blockquote>

I absolutely agree. This is a perfect example of a war of attrition won by the application of overwhelming force. In this case, comparative ground troop counts are simply irrelevant, however. The overwhelming force comes from

allied air power, against which the Taliban has no counter whatsoever.

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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Wreck:

How many Americans were on the ground in Afghanistan? Hundreds? Against 60000 Taliban?

If you count the air crews there were probably only thousands of Americans in Afghanistan at any one time. Counting northern alliance troops as well, the ratio of troops was probably no better than 1:2 -- far less than the 3:1 supposed to be necessary to attack.

There were no manuevers in Afghanistan. Just look at the lines with binoculars, night vision equipment, air recon, satellite photos, etc., and punch in the GPS-accurate target coordinates. Then GPS-aimed iron bombs rain down and obliterate everything remotely close to what you point at.

How could this possibly be considered a war of manuever? This is about as pure a war of attrition as one can imagine.<hr></blockquote>

Even in Afganistan you need troops to gather information in situ, guide those bombs etc, to make your attrition fire more effective. And you need allies to move and encircle the opponent, deny ground and take hideouts. Or did the US airforce destroy the Taleban without any help? Best to use both in coordination. Case closed.

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Sorry, "best to use both" does not even begin to engage on the substance of the discussion. The two styles of fighting use all arms. They differ as styles because of the ways the arms are used, which are subordinate to which, which provides the decision and which ministers. Both styles can work when conditions favor them.

Briefly, for people who haven't paid any attention to the whole thread, you can subordinate the maneuver arms to fire, or you can subordinate the fire arms to maneuver elements. The former works with a goal of targeting the enemy front line forces. The latter can work either with many-on-few engagements in sequence, again directed at fielded forces but trying to seperate the time and place each is engaged, or (some say, anyway) can be directed against C3I, rear areas, etc.

The strategy being applied in Afghanistan right now is transparently one based on fire, with maneuver elements minsterial to the firepower arms. That is not the only way to fight. It is not even official US army or Marine corps doctrine, both of which are based on a maneuver warfare theory that explicitly envisions maneuver elements as the decisive arms, and rear area C3I etc rather than enemy fielded forces, as the preferred target. Don't take my word for it, read the military manuals. What they are actually doing in Afghanistan isn't in them.

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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JasonC:

The strategy being applied in Afghanistan right now is transparently one based on fire, with maneuver elements minsterial to the firepower arms. That is not the only way to fight. It is not even official US army or Marine corps doctrine, both of which are based on a maneuver warfare theory that explicitly envisions maneuver elements as the decisive arms, and rear area C3I etc rather than enemy fielded forces, as the preferred target. Don't take my word for it, read the military manuals. What they are actually doing in Afghanistan isn't in them.<hr></blockquote>

Allright, I accept most of your points, and evade by saying that In Afganistan politics play a decisive role. They were supported by the majority only for short while, when people thought they were bringing peace. But after that they have been a suppressive governement that can only be compered to Mussolini, Hitler, Pol Pot and such. Good riddens. Fighting against a popular governement or movement would be a totally different story - and was, as the Russians found out. Just wars are easier to win than unjust, or maybe, hopefully, the only really winnable wars. Things tend get really bad when both sides are wrong, like in Palestine.

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