Recent presentation about Nozh ERA

[Haiduk]

Photo with 152 mm EFP hit is not from Donbas. This was big presentetion and it part about Nozh ERA touched not only the war, but about this ERA at all. Georgian military blogger issued only several photos from this document.

[IMHO]

30 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Nozh can defeat also DM53 APFSDS as well as Mango

How do you know? 2008 testing was very limited. Not a full scale testing against at all angles, all speeds, testing after ERA blocks were partially deformed by lower-caliber fire or artillery fragments etc.

@Sgt.Squarehead, so I did a quick search on the scientific papers databases. I was travelling so I did it from my phone - it's really quick and dirty search. The papers I found are not in liner shaped charge applications to the Nozh conditions but rather an optimum use of circular EFPs. If we make an assumption that circular EFP results give a rough idea of the best application of EFP then Nozh is far away from them as possible. So:

• As a sum of traits copper is very good for EFP liner. Nozh uses copper.
• To properly form into slug-like projectile copper EFP needs about 60ms and by that time it will travel about 100m. That corresponds to the military EFPs that are ranged at 100-200m.
• After 60ms/100m the slug is travelling at 1700m/s and further velocity loss is relatively low.
• Energy density for copper after the slug is formed is 0.169kJ/g.

For circular EFPs at 0.5-1.0m from the barrier (conditions the Nozh is used) the liner still looks exactly like a flat pancake at travel at about 500-700m/s.

IMO things to note:

• The form is a flat pancake
• Velocity is just 500-700m/s
• Energy density is about 1/3 of the maximum

What do you think? The long rod Nozh is supposed to act upon will be 7-10kg at 1'500-1'800 m/s and having over 10MJ of energy.

[Sgt.Squarehead]

TBH I find it hard to imagine that more than one charge could act on a long-rod at once, all the others would be at sub-optimal distances.

There's a video modelling the likely effect of that charge in the thread IIRC (made by a dude who either does explosions for a living or is studying to do so) and I certainly don't know enough to contradict it.

Edited January 22, 2020 by Sgt.Squarehead

[IMHO]

28 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Photo with 152 mm EFP hit is not from Donbas. This was big presentetion and it part about Nozh ERA touched not only the war, but about this ERA at all. Georgian military blogger issued only several photos from this document.

1. Not so big - they allocated 30 mins (with or without questions?).
2. The original name of the report is "UKRANIAN ARMOURED VEHICLE PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK FROM THE DONBASS"  by Col. Vadim Slyusar, Principal Research Fellow, Arms Institute, Ukraine Armed Forces

[Haiduk]

18 minutes ago, IMHO said:

The original name of the report

Nothing bad to tell about what is ERA and what it capabilities, using recent test photos. Our elephants are the best, buy our elephants!

1M133... heh... When that tank was hit, initially that was Fagot. The elephant has grown %)  Though, Kornets used too.

How do you know

Of course tests were limited, but they took place with known photos. And of course you can claim your elephants (K-5, Relict) are better than our just because both are product of "Great Russia" and Ukrainain developments "apriory sucks". This is question of religion and faith, no more. Like ethernal holywar what better T-72 or T-64 lines.

Edited January 22, 2020 by Haiduk

[IMHO]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

your elephants (K-5, Relict) are better than our just because both are product of "Great Russia" and Ukrainain developments "apriory sucks". This is question of religion and faith, no more. Like ethernal holywar what better T-72 or T-64 lines

Yeah, I believe K-5/Relikt are better than Nozh but I also believe K-5/Relikt are not up to today's standards. They're good against APFSDS of 80-90s but not of 2000+. And in T-72 vs. T-64 holy war I'm on T-64 side   Malyshev's school was one of the few in Soviet Union that was setting trends for the rest of the world. It was way ahead of Omsk and Leningrad and probable decades ahead of Tagil. And KhBTM's diesel engine is still world class despite the lack of funds in Ukraine. Still much better than the one created for Armata in Chelyabinsk at the cost of tens and hundreds millions of dollars.

So I'm not saying it's bad just because something comes from Ukraine. It's just today to develop weapons one has to have a home customer with enough money to pay for mass production. Unfortunately even sufficient financing for R&D won't help without mass production. Better have a less advanced but mass produced weapon than a disruptive idea that's not rolled out into industrial scale. And actually I believe the Russian situation in MIC is exact replica of Ukrainian just on a grander scale. You try to match Russian lineup of weapons and Russia tries to do the same with US. Both tasks are not up to their respective pockets.

Edited January 22, 2020 by IMHO

[MikeyD]

Take photos on the web of sabot penetration of turret fronts of Russian or Ukrainian tanks with a grain of salt. These days the outer shell is only the first line of defense. There's still 'special armor' and the inner shell to get through before the tank's officially 'penetrated.' I recall a few decades ago there was NATO live fire testing done against T72s and the testers were dismayed that M735 105mm sabot wasn't penetrating, and to add insult to injury Carl Gustav HEAT couldn't even ignite the fuel in the fender fuel cells!

Haiduk posted:

Quote

I know, Donbass campaign cannot be compared with hypothetical US-Rus war...

Well, that's pretty much what the Pentagon is doing. They've got a very thick folder on 'lessons learned' from the conflict that they're taking to heart. After 4-5 decades of chasing down dirt farmers in backwater countries with rusty AKs it was an eye opening experience to watch how modern war gets waged.

[DerKommissar]

Thanks for sharing this. Despite it smelling of White Paper, the stats are perplexing. I'm going to take them with a pinch of salt, because maybe they reflect specific circumstances -- rather than the general rule. Maybe the rules of engagement preferred artillery harassment and static armour, rather than combined arms incursions.

I suppose this report implies that artillery is still the god of war. At least, in a theatre with very little CAS. I was shocked by the limited percentage of AFVs lost to ATGMs. Less shocked by the limited IFV/Tank kill percentage.

I recently heard that Rommel believed that artillery should engage tanks, instead of other tanks. Maybe he had a point. Still puzzled by the ineffectiveness of ATGMs.

[ikalugin]

The idea is that most of targets (even those that do get to the front lines - ie AFVs) are destroyed outside of the direct contact with the enemy.
This is why direct fire weapons such as the (majority of) ATGMs provide fewer kills than indirect fire weapons (most of artillery).

I think it is an interesting thing to think about - the impact of dumb artillery on AFVs.

Edited January 23, 2020 by ikalugin

[Haiduk]

10 hours ago, DerKommissar said:

I suppose this report implies that artillery is still the god of war. At least, in a theatre with very little CAS. I was shocked by the limited percentage of AFVs lost to ATGMs. Less shocked by the limited IFV/Tank kill percentage.

This is Donbas war specific - it is mostly a distant war of artillery and MLRS. By this case most of battles will be very hard to reflect in CMBS. Direct clashes of tanks and other armor of course took place too, but this almost never was like CMBS type company vs company or battalion vs.battalion meeting engagement. Advances on unknown terrain without knowledge about enemy and own forces around, sometimes long raids, ambushes, clashes for small positions - platoon strongholds and endless mortar, artillery and MLRS fire. This is very strange that CMSF2 has BM-21 Grad, but CMBS doesn't, though this is typical brigade-support weapon system, like SP-guns.

Edited January 23, 2020 by Haiduk

[Sgt.Squarehead]

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

This is very strange that CMSF2 has BM-21 Grad, but CMBS doesn't, though this is typical brigade-support weapon system, like SP-guns.

I'm optimistic that this will be sorted in the upcoming module.....IMHO we should also see the larger systems like Uragan & Smerch.

@BFCElvis mentioned that the module was in the works and that the team are still open to nagging suggestions, so now is probably the time to be asking. 

[exsonic01]

On 1/22/2020 at 5:44 PM, MikeyD said:

Take photos on the web of sabot penetration of turret fronts of Russian or Ukrainian tanks with a grain of salt. These days the outer shell is only the first line of defense. There's still 'special armor' and the inner shell to get through before the tank's officially 'penetrated.' I recall a few decades ago there was NATO live fire testing done against T72s and the testers were dismayed that M735 105mm sabot wasn't penetrating, and to add insult to injury Carl Gustav HEAT couldn't even ignite the fuel in the fender fuel cells!

These are different topics from Nizh, but may I ask what is your opinion towards btvt references? Also, as far as I know this game's 105mm is not using M735 but using M800, is this right?  

On 1/22/2020 at 5:44 PM, MikeyD said:

Well, that's pretty much what the Pentagon is doing. They've got a very thick folder on 'lessons learned' from the conflict that they're taking to heart. After 4-5 decades of chasing down dirt farmers in backwater countries with rusty AKs it was an eye opening experience to watch how modern war gets waged.

Speaking of 'modern war', any plan to consider different theater for hypothetical modern hot war, like East Asia? Like Taiwan or Korea. As you may know, PRC is one of the potential hostility for any possible "total war", even if in a sense of "limited total war". Experts are expecting "fait accompli" style strategy of Russia and China, so it is likely to see something similar in Asia too... 

Edited January 26, 2020 by exsonic01

[exsonic01]

On 1/23/2020 at 4:58 AM, Haiduk said:

This is Donbas war specific - it is mostly a distant war of artillery and MLRS. By this case most of battles will be very hard to reflect in CMBS. Direct clashes of tanks and other armor of course took place too, but this almost never was like CMBS type company vs company or battalion vs.battalion meeting engagement. Advances on unknown terrain without knowledge about enemy and own forces around, sometimes long raids, ambushes, clashes for small positions - platoon strongholds and endless mortar, artillery and MLRS fire. This is very strange that CMSF2 has BM-21 Grad, but CMBS doesn't, though this is typical brigade-support weapon system, like SP-guns.

I kinda agree that huge percentage of artillery is something specific about Donbass war. TO&E of both sides were very artillery heavy. Russian BTG force structure contains 1 armor company + 3 mech. infantry companies  + 1 AT company + 1 AA company + 2~3 artillery company. Those are heavily reinforced battalion group, which strengthened heavy artillery (rockets and heavy tubes) to enhance independent operational capability. [A.C.Fox & A.J. Rossow, 2017 & L.W.Grau & C.K.Bartles, 2017]

However, I feel any "modern" battle field will be heavily rely on firepower and counter firepower, and related EW / SIGINT / ELINT operations. So I was feeling that current CMBS is not capturing such features of various artillery and counter artillery nicely...

Plus, I think typical map size of CMBS is kinda too small to depict such clash of combined arms. I wish if there is any chance to see 10km x 10km + map size for modern battle in the future, though I think chances would not high... 

Edited January 26, 2020 by exsonic01

[Haiduk]

39 minutes ago, exsonic01 said:

Russian BTG force structure contains 1 armor company + 3 mech. infantry companies  + 1 AT company + 1 AA company + 2~3 artillery company.

No, typically only one artillery battery as BTG support. 

43 minutes ago, exsonic01 said:

However, I feel any "modern" battle field will be heavily rely on firepower and counter firepower, and related EW / SIGINT / ELINT operations. So I was feeling that current CMBS is not capturing such features of various artillery and counter artillery nicely...

EW in very symplified way is reflected in CMBS. All other is operative level, though close-range counter-battery radars to detect enemy on-map mortar positions would be great thing.

46 minutes ago, exsonic01 said:

Plus, I think typical map size of CMBS is kinda too small to depict such clash of combined arms.

Оh, yes. Even for Donbas war, conditions in 18 sq.km, which allow CMx2 engine, completely not enough to reflect many battles in full volume, which developed on the big teritories with relatively small number of units.

[IMHO]

1 hour ago, exsonic01 said:

However, I feel any "modern" battle field will be heavily rely on firepower and counter firepower, and related EW / SIGINT / ELINT operations. So I was feeling that current CMBS is not capturing such features of various artillery and counter artillery nicely...

If you mean near-peer conflicts then the battle will be decided long before the action comes to the grunts of CMxx-level. Or rather there's hardly a chance we could have CMBS action at all. So it's somewhat akin to the discussion that CMSF2 RPG-7 is too powerful compared to RL results as seen during Iraqi invasion. It's just CMSF2's weapon configuration is not present IRL and making it closer to RL would have made the game dull and uninteresting.

[exsonic01]

22 hours ago, Haiduk said:

No, typically only one artillery battery as BTG support. 

https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/publications/LWP-112-Making-Sense-of-Russian-Hybrid-Warfare-A-Brief-Assessment-of-the-Russo-Ukrainian-War.pdf

At the point of 2020 Jan, this report is slightly outdated but still it captured important observations during Dobass war. This is the first reference I cited in post above, check second reference too. 

From figure 2 and 3, you can check very artillery-heavy Russian (include Pro-Russian) BTG formation during Donbass war. I guess this is only particular example for Donbass campaign, and I think this also supports the first slide of presentation from very first post, International Armored vehicle conference presentation from UA: Most of the damage was done by artillery. But you also mentioned the effect of UA rules of engagement, which sounds interesting. Do you have any references for UA side rules of engagement? 

But still, regardless of any theater, I think artillery with FASCAM and DPICMs should be included as well as at least simplified feature of SIGINT/ELINT operations and counter battery operation. Those are critical factors for any "modern" battlefield. While examples of Donbass campaign might be biased due to artillery-heavy TO&E, firepower / counter firepwower plus description of various EW operations would be significant. 

 

Edited January 27, 2020 by exsonic01

[Sgt.Squarehead]

3 minutes ago, exsonic01 said:

But still, regardless of any theater, I think artillery with FASCAM and DPICMs should be included as well as at least simplified feature of SIGINT/ELINT operations and counter battery operation. Those are critical factors for any "modern" battlefield.

I have to agreee.....Quite how it would be implemented I'm not sure, but IMHO it deserves some thought (I wondered if FASCAM could be modelled by setting mines as reinforcements, but the game engine won't have it).

[exsonic01]

24 minutes ago, Sgt.Squarehead said:

I have to agreee.....Quite how it would be implemented I'm not sure, but IMHO it deserves some thought (I wondered if FASCAM could be modelled by setting mines as reinforcements, but the game engine won't have it).

Well, I never wrote they would be easy, but if CM series wish to depict "modern" battlefield more accurate, then I think those are significant... 

Both FASCAM and DPICM can use graphic of current cluster artillery.

For DPICM, if the CMx2 engine is possible to depict each submunitions then that would be great. But if not, it should be modeled in a way to induce AT damage against top armor within certain range from artillery strike position, with some RNG-based location decision of submunition inside effect radius of each shell. 

For FASCAM, CM series already has damage model for mines. It would be great if engine can depict each minelets. But if not, we could rely on RNG-based location decision algorithm for specific number of minelets inside effect radius of each shell (random mix of AP/AT), except inside the building tiles. 

For SIGINT / ELINT, now this is totally outside the touch of field commander, but we can assume the data from information / signal company / battalion under higher formation is shared to player or AI commander on the field. Then it could depict very rough location of HQ unit, radar-sam unit, and GSR unit in a form of "unidentified icon"  within AO, for random duration of time, shown in the map for every random or semi-random frequency of time. This can be depicted like fixed seed number with narrow RNG range. I also don't like to rely on random, but there is no other options to depict such things without RNG for current scale of CMx2. 

I think map size should be increased if possible for "modern battle". Info-sharing and optics / sensors / EW of modern battlefield make it possible to engage at quite far distance. Wider map will provide much more opportunities for maneuvering, infiltration / counter infiltration, and will increase the importance of recon operations (and heliborne if possible). FASCAM can be tactically important asset as it can be used for area denial or delaying. DPICM can be used for counter battery and counter armor. ELINT/SIGINT information can be nicely mixed with infiltrated SF / recon team to guide precision munitions or to assist direct assault of SF / recon / light infantry team on HQ / SAM / artillery assets. 

What I really wish to see is more field engineering feature but that would be even more difficult I presume... 

Edited January 27, 2020 by exsonic01

[Sgt.Squarehead]

1 hour ago, exsonic01 said:

I think map size should be increased if possible for "modern battle". Info-sharing and optics / sensors / EW of modern battlefield make it possible to engage at quite far distance. Wider map will provide much more opportunities for maneuvering, infiltration / counter infiltration, and will increase the importance of recon operations (and heliborne if possible). FASCAM can be tactically important asset as it can be used for area denial or delaying. DPICM can be used for counter battery and counter armor. ELINT/SIGINT information can be nicely mixed with infiltrated SF / recon team to guide precision munitions or to assist direct assault of SF / recon / light infantry team on HQ / SAM / artillery assets. 

What I really wish to see is more field engineering feature but that would be even more difficult I presume... 

Again.....I agree.

As mentioned elsewhere a few of us are experimenting with small forces on big maps.....This seems to get the most out of the CM:BS engine.

Edited January 27, 2020 by Sgt.Squarehead

[Haiduk]

2 hours ago, exsonic01 said:

https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/publications/LWP-112-Making-Sense-of-Russian-Hybrid-Warfare-A-Brief-Assessment-of-the-Russo-Ukrainian-War.pdf

At the point of 2020 Jan, this report is slightly outdated but still it captured important observations during Dobass war. This is the first reference I cited in post above, check second reference too. From figure 2 and 3, you can check very artillery-heavy Russian (include Pro-Russian) BTG formation during Donbass war. I guess this is only particular example for

 

I sure this "2 artillery battery in BTG" really is 120 mm mortar battery of battalion + attached artillery battery of brigade level (122 or 152 mm). Of course, if need, higher levels can be added. But one artillery battrey in support is typical for BTG. 

 

2 hours ago, exsonic01 said:

and I think this also supports the first slide of presentation from very first post, International Armored vehicle conference presentation from UA: Most of the damage was done by artillery.

Most of damages from artilery (plus to here moratr fire and MLRS like parts of artillery equipment) can't say about presense of several barrel artilery batteries in BTG. 

Here the list of Russian units, invaded in 2014, you can see that composition of forces is very different. And only several units have additional MLRS battery to existing artillery battery. There is upgraded list already exists, but I can't find it... this one composed possibly in 2015.

About Zelenopillia. Russians initially uncovered the presence of big UKR activity by using SIGINT. Our soldiers in mass used cell phones, so for enemy SIGINT operators their basecamp looked as big bright point, which cried "We are here!!!" 

Very strange, that in major battles didn't meant battle for liberation of Lysychansk and Siverodonetsk cities agglomeration with 300 000 population. This was biggest opertaion in 2014 (after operation of closing the border) and first urban warfare experience. 

Edited January 27, 2020 by Haiduk

[exsonic01]

On 1/27/2020 at 4:22 PM, Haiduk said:

I sure this "2 artillery battery in BTG" really is 120 mm mortar battery of battalion + attached artillery battery of brigade level (122 or 152 mm). Of course, if need, higher levels can be added. But one artillery battrey in support is typical for BTG. 

Figure 4 of the report I linked also describes about potential weapons capabilities of Russian BTG during Donbass campaign. One or two Rocket arty company, and one or two tube arty company. BM21, BM27, BM30, and 9A52-4 as rocket, and 2S19 (direct and indirect) and 2S1 as tube. It coincides with your comment of "higher level".

And yeah I agree "typical BTG" of Russians are not that arty-heavy, but "Russian BTG during donbass conflict" looks like particularly reinforced artillery capability. My guess is probably Russians and pro-Russians increased / reinforced their artillery capability in the middle of Donbass campaign. I guess this is because of terrain? Not much cover, flat terrain makes them rely on artillery. Or, they may wanted to reduce the burden to leave evidence of direct Russian intervention.

In the PDF I linked, page 10, "Reconnaissance-Strike Model and the Russian Artillery Mindset" is written. Report mentioned the drone technology + typical Russian doctrine of firepower favor, saying "It must be noted that Russian action during the Donbas campaign parallels the historic Russian approach to the employment of rocket and artillery fire" 

On 1/27/2020 at 4:22 PM, Haiduk said:

About Zelenopillia. Russians initially uncovered the presence of big UKR activity by using SIGINT. Our soldiers in mass used cell phones, so for enemy SIGINT operators their basecamp looked as big bright point, which cried "We are here!!!" 

Do you have a source for this part, where cell phone use of UA soldiers helped SIGINT operation during Donbass which caused artillery casualty? 

[exsonic01]

On 1/27/2020 at 3:59 PM, Sgt.Squarehead said:

Again.....I agree.

As mentioned elsewhere a few of us are experimenting with small forces on big maps.....This seems to get the most out of the CM:BS engine.

Good, we all wish next module of CMBS or any modern CM series would nicely cover modern battle. 

[ikalugin]

The issue is that should Russia decide to conduct large scale operations much like CMBS campaighn assume those would be done in Army formations, with concentrated regiments, brigades (possibly divisions) and not dispersed BTGs.

With a lot of artillery support but mostly exploiting the advantage in the numbers of tank units to conduct manuever battle.

Edited January 30, 2020 by ikalugin

[exsonic01]

2 hours ago, ikalugin said:

The issue is that should Russia decide to conduct large scale operations much like CMBS campaighn assume those would be done in Army formations, with concentrated regiments, brigades (possibly divisions) and not dispersed BTGs.

With a lot of artillery support but mostly exploiting the advantage in the numbers of tank units to conduct manuever battle.

Well, in real-life Donbass campaign, Russians were mostly based on BTGs rather than brigades or division operations. But this is because of unique political motivation which I don't even need to mention.

However, in CMBS, the game hypothetically suggested what if scenario of full-scale attack of Russians to UA. In this case, I think regiments, brigades and divisions are major part of any Russian OMG (Operational Maneuvering Group). But there will be small-formation and small-group skirmishes of course.  

So, I wish if future CMBS module provide a larger map, like at least 10km x 10km or more, to properly describe at least regiment size combats. I think it is not enough but I also think CMx2 game engine would not be easy to depict anything larger. 

Edited January 30, 2020 by exsonic01

[exsonic01]

On 1/27/2020 at 4:22 PM, Haiduk said:

About Zelenopillia. Russians initially uncovered the presence of big UKR activity by using SIGINT. Our soldiers in mass used cell phones, so for enemy SIGINT operators their basecamp looked as big bright point, which cried "We are here!!!" 

I found the source myself. 

https://www.janes.com/images/assets/111/80111/The_Czar_of_battle_Russian_artillery_use_in_Ukraine_portends_advances.pdf

Report from Janes mentioned

Quote

It is possible that during Zelenophillya that scouts from Russian special forces were used to locate and target the 79th Airmobile Brigade before the engagement.

But it also mentioned 

Quote

There are also reports that Russian electronic warfare (EW) assets, such as the RB-301B Borisoglebsk-2, were used to direct artillery fire. Borisoglebsk-2 is a multifaceted EW platform that can be used to jam radio signals or intercept mobile phone communications. Zhirokhov noted that Ukrainian forces often communicated via mobile phones to correct artillery fires at the outbreak of the conflict, prompting Russia to deploy EW systems that enabled them to listen in. 

So it was work of both SoF recon + SIGINT operation.