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How I view most scenarios and the designers...

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I am not sure I buy into the "Americans were afraid of casualties argument".

1 - Eisenhower expected catastrophic casualty levels for the airborne drops in Normandy, but stuck with the plan.

2- American Generals seemed to care little about the bloodbath in the Huertgen.

3 - American casualties in the island hopping campaign were horrendous on a number of occasions.

I don't believe I have heard of US Combat Commands notoriously leaving trails of knocked out Shermans.  On the contrary, in the pursuit across France US (and Allied) armor was hard pressed to find German forces that were running back to the Reich as fast as they could.  The bigger problem was fuel, not wrecked tanks.  The closest reference to trails of armor might be the British armor trying to force a way past Caen.

References to North Africa are interesting but also represent America's first introduction to modern combat, yes there was a learning curve but all combatants faced that to some degree or another throughout the war.  Hell look at the behavior of Germany's Panzer Brigades in Lorraine.  Now there you definitely find trails of armor.  They just happen to be German.

Frankly at almost no point in the war did Germany ever seriously threaten the US with the loss of a division- the exception being the 104th during the opening days of the Bulge.  Put the shoe on the other foot though and German losses of full divisions was a fairly regular occurrence from 1943 on.

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7 hours ago, sburke said:

The closest reference to trails of armor might be the British armor trying to force a way past Caen.

It wouldn't have happened in my day. A trail of armour is what comes of allowing one's troopers to stop to partake of the devil's beverage "Tea". My boy's would have kept on going, until we had pushed Ruprecht von Pfalz back across the Rhine.

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On 12/5/2018 at 1:59 AM, sburke said:

I am not sure I buy into the "Americans were afraid of casualties argument".

1 - Eisenhower expected catastrophic casualty levels for the airborne drops in Normandy, but stuck with the plan.

2- American Generals seemed to care little about the bloodbath in the Huertgen.

3 - American casualties in the island hopping campaign were horrendous on a number of occasions.

I don't believe I have heard of US Combat Commands notoriously leaving trails of knocked out Shermans.  On the contrary, in the pursuit across France US (and Allied) armor was hard pressed to find German forces that were running back to the Reich as fast as they could.  The bigger problem was fuel, not wrecked tanks.  The closest reference to trails of armor might be the British armor trying to force a way past Caen.

References to North Africa are interesting but also represent America's first introduction to modern combat, yes there was a learning curve but all combatants faced that to some degree or another throughout the war.  Hell look at the behavior of Germany's Panzer Brigades in Lorraine.  Now there you definitely find trails of armor.  They just happen to be German.

Frankly at almost no point in the war did Germany ever seriously threaten the US with the loss of a division- the exception being the 104th during the opening days of the Bulge.  Put the shoe on the other foot though and German losses of full divisions was a fairly regular occurrence from 1943 on.

This is a very interesting slice of history to examine 

Points to consider outside of casualties being politically acceptable or not: 

No one wanted anymore casualties than absolutely necessary. They were prepared to take them, but other factors came into play. It took a lot of time to train men, and a lot more time to have them work together long enough to be really good, experienced soldiers. It was both tactically and strategically unsound to take a massive amount of casualties. Normally, instead of sending human waves, they’d send waves of heavy bombers, pile on the artillery, then push hard with infantry and armor. Even Germans commented on how the US would hang back and blast the hell out of them with artillery. An arty shell is cheaper than a GI’s life insurance policy. 

The US certainly pushed hard through a lot of battles, like the Hurtgen where the effects of the firepower were mitigated by terrain and climate, but it wasn’t without consequence. No one got relieved but it was still viewed as a debacle not to be repeated. 

Politics still mattered, of course, The Rapido River crossing by 36th Infantry Division is a good example. It was a disaster, and there was a congressional inquiry after the war. People within the Army were steamed. 

It could be debated a long time, but I think the preponderance of commanders weren’t keen on obliterating their units by hurrying them up. In isolated cases it may have been necessary, but I don’t think it was the norm. 

But, then again, there’s this quote:

“[Dead GIs] are nothing more than tools to be used in the accomplishment of the mission. War has neither the time nor heart to concern itself with the individual and the dignity of man. I’ve spent thirty years preparing a frame of mind for accepting such a thing” 

Omar Bradley

 

Edited by Swervin11b

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26 minutes ago, Swervin11b said:

“[Dead GIs] are nothing more than tools to be used in the accomplishment of the mission. War has neither the time nor heart to concern itself with the individual and the dignity of man. I’ve spent thirty years preparing a frame of mind for accepting such a thing” 

Omar Bradley

Man that is cold.  Honest, true, but cold.

The flip side of the Germans view of American behavior is the American view of German behavior.  Uncoordinated attacks with insufficient support.  It is no more uniformly true than the German perception of American behavior, but is certainly supported in many instances.  The fight for Bastogne being a pretty good example of multiple attacks waged with poor reconnaissance and not enough effort. 

As to the Huertgen - somebody should have been relieved.  A whole lot of somebodies.

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When the Huertgen took place the US army had a very efficient system of requesitioning replacements similar to replacing lost material. As a result the full picture was not initially recognized, meanwhile Frontline troops became greener as casualties mounted.

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Creating scenarios is a challenge and most of the ones I start to make are played be me once or twice and then another idea comes up I would like to try so the original one ends up being left for another day. I like the special forces type of scenarios @slysniper @Sgt.Squarehead and @Combatintman were talking about and took the time to make one I felt was good enough to be released to the community. Here it is:  http://www.thefewgoodmen.com/tsd3/cm-black-sea/cm-black-sea-add-ons/vega-force/ Give it a whirl and provide some feedback. 

On 11/20/2018 at 11:31 AM, SimpleSimon said:

Before I /ignore you Squarehead maybe you'll at least do yourself the dignity of answering my questions and naming some scenarios you designed? If you have any respect for your own work you will at least do this. It will also give me the opportinity to see if I was wrong about you. Up to you. 

I have read through this whole thread and this comment really gets me. I am curious @SimpleSimon, which scenarios have you made and released to the community? I am interested in trying out one you have made to see how it compares to other community or Battlefront made scenarios. 

 

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7 minutes ago, Heirloom_Tomato said:

Creating scenarios is a challenge and most of the ones I start to make are played be me once or twice and then another idea comes up I would like to try so the original one ends up being left for another day. I like the special forces type of scenarios @slysniper @Sgt.Squarehead and @Combatintman were talking about and took the time to make one I felt was good enough to be released to the community. Here it is:  http://www.thefewgoodmen.com/tsd3/cm-black-sea/cm-black-sea-add-ons/vega-force/ Give it a whirl and provide some feedback.

 

Thx man, DL'd just not sure how soon I'll get to it - roadtrip starting tomorrow.  :(

 

Edited by sburke

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I will also play this and give some feed back if you do not mind. 

8 hours ago, Heirloom_Tomato said:

Creating scenarios is a challenge and most of the ones I start to make are played be me once or twice and then another idea comes up I would like to try so the original one ends up being left for another day. I like the special forces type of scenarios @slysniper @Sgt.Squarehead and @Combatintman were talking about and took the time to make one I felt was good enough to be released to the community. Here it is:  http://www.thefewgoodmen.com/tsd3/cm-black-sea/cm-black-sea-add-ons/vega-force/ Give it a whirl and provide some feedback. 

 

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2 hours ago, slysniper said:

I will also play this and give some feed back if you do not mind. 

 

The more feedback, the better. The challenge in this scenario is not just to beat it, but rather to beat it and suffer no casualties. 

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OK, I'm done.

I played it on elite and wego. (I always feel the best judge of a scenario is playing it once and being truly blind as to what to expect.)

I can give this a very high rating.

I liked your briefing and the situation you created.

good force selection and the map you selected did a good job ( If I have any complaint, the stock maps lack a little flavor and don't use some of the accent items that make it feel a little more realistic. So the map could be dressed up, but that has nothing to do with gameplay.)

Without giving anything away, it was great gameplay. gave me a real challenge.

I achieved the main objectives without many losses but was given a nice surprise that really screwed me up as to keeping my losses low (you likely know what I am referring to.)

Anyway extracting from the map became a nightmare and only a few of my most valiant survived to fight another day. - but I enjoyed that the best to tell you the truth

 

So end result, scored 1143 to 945 (which gave me a draw)

(I fulfilled the mission but at way too heavy of a cost, 7 killed , 19 wounded and only 6 to escape)

But I did take out 3 to every one of men, so I felt their sacrifice was not in vain.

 

So your elite goal of fulfilling the mission with losing no one was not achieved by me, that is for sure.

 

Now, playing it multi times I know I could get those results much better, but that really is not a fair test is it.

Also playing real time can help you score also, but I think the AI is already at a disadvantage as it is. So having to suffer through one minute periods before I can adjust commands just seems fair to me as a little bit of a leveling device when playing the AI

 

Any way, excellent job, felt the scoring was fair and a good result for what happened.

So all in all, I would give you a score of 9 out of 10 in this design with the 1 point loss for not dressing the map up . 

Its like a Christmas present but with no wrapping paper. (its your baby, give it some finishing touches and make it perfect)  :)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited by slysniper

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On 11/30/2018 at 3:46 AM, SimpleSimon said:

The US Army could not stomach the same kind of body counts that were common on the Ostfront or even in China-Burma because of the precarious nature of the Grand Alliance and because it was fighting on the behalf of a Democracy, and was accountable to public opinion of the war. Americans were deeply skeptical of the "Germany First" strategy, which seemed an awful lot like a British ploy to get someone else to fight their war. The American public also deeply resented both the draft and the accompanying rations of raw materials and luxury foods like meat and dairy, even though this rationing was nowhere near as severe as in Britain or Germany. Despite all the "rah rah Pearl Harbor" bluster of the recruitment drives the fact is the American public's interest in the war was distant and its motivation to prosecute it minimal. The United States was directly threatened by precisely none of the Axis powers, and the public thought and cared little for the consequences of an Axis victory. American men in arms were seen as and saw themselves as "Citizen Soldiers", civilians in uniform, who were doing the Army and the Allies a big favor by being present at all. As a result, American strategy had to operate with great prudence because a "Stalingrad on the Rhine" would've been a completely unacceptable outcome for Roosevelt's administration and might well have reversed American commitment to the "Germany First" strategy agreed upon. 

As a result, American Generals and Commanders were perceived to be operating under an excessive caution when really they were left little choice in how they fought by Washington. German Generals often noted the seemingly bizarre tendency of American Divisions to advance "one Brigade at a time" when really what the Americans were doing was just compartmentalizing their attacks so that a setback didn't turn into a major disaster. Nobody wanted to be the guy who lost a Company or a Regiment or God forbid a Division because the fact was right after they pinned the Medal on your chest for all that brave sacrifice you'd still be George Pickett in 1944. If your career has been in the US military and you planned on retiring from the US military than you did not want to be him. 

Inversely, the US Army's special formations, its Armored Divisions, Combat Commands, and its much celebrated Airborne all tended to be very motivated and aggressive, to the point where they were almost dangerously reckless. The 82nd and 101st narrowly dodged total annihilation on more than one occasion and the Armored Divisions were notorious for leaving trails of knocked out Shermans up single highways (which Belton Cooper seized upon to claim in his book that the Sherman was a bad tank, and not just that American Armored Divisions were doing a bad job trying to ape the Blitzkrieg). 

 

Wow, I disagree with pretty much every word you have written here on prevailing American doctrine and public opinion. This is a post-Vietnam revisionist lens, buttressed by some postwar Generalstabs ax-grinding.

Neither early loss of the US army in the Philippines nor heavy casualties in the 1943 bomber offensives, then Tarawa and Anzio, triggered defeatism at home, or timidity in US field commanders. Quite the reverse!

Early US debacles at Midway, Guadalcanal or Salerno are readily imaginable, but they weren't about to drive Uncle Sam to down tools either.

Both Nazis and Japanese learned the hard way that American people and soldiers were far from the 'weak-kneed cosmopolitans' that their agitprop (and its pre-1941 Comintern equivalents) made out. 

And any Moon of Alabama crank standing up and declaiming 'Our Boys are dying like sheep for British imperialism and the Rotschilds!' would have been tarred and feathered by an angry mob. 

There is plenty to criticise in America's conduct of the war, but nothing like you've claimed here. 

 

 

 

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46 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Neither early loss of the US army in the Philippines nor heavy casualties in the 1943 bomber offensives, then Tarawa and Anzio, triggered defeatism at home, or timidity in US field commanders. Quite the reverse!

Well, I'm no expert, but according to what I can read on Wikipedia:

"About 23,000 American military personnel were killed or captured, while Filipino soldiers killed or captured totaled around 100,000".

So if that's correct, the "US Army" they lost in the Philippines was more like two divisions of actual US soldiers. Obviously not enough to cause defeatism in a country of the size of the US, when you consider how many casualties smaller nations were able to stomach and keep fighting  in WW2.

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7 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Wow, I disagree with pretty much every word you have written here on prevailing American doctrine and public opinion. This is a post-Vietnam revisionist lens, buttressed by some postwar Generalstabs ax-grinding.

Neither early loss of the US army in the Philippines nor heavy casualties in the 1943 bomber offensives, then Tarawa and Anzio, triggered defeatism at home, or timidity in US field commanders. Quite the reverse!

Early US debacles at Midway, Guadalcanal or Salerno are readily imaginable, but they weren't about to drive Uncle Sam to down tools either.

Both Nazis and Japanese learned the hard way that American people and soldiers were far from the 'weak-kneed cosmopolitans' that their agitprop (and its pre-1941 Comintern equivalents) made out. 

And any Moon of Alabama crank standing up and declaiming 'Our Boys are dying like sheep for British imperialism and the Rotschilds!' would have been tarred and feathered by an angry mob. 

There is plenty to criticise in America's conduct of the war, but nothing like you've claimed here. 

So it's been about 7 hours from this post. You calm down yet? 

Ahhhh i'm just kidding. I already listed you on my /ignore. I'd address your numerous and blatant misunderstands of my posts but honestly Long I don't know you and I don't care enough to figure out what your underlying personal problems are that cause you to react like this. That's a job for the more unfortunate people closer to you and from the looks of it, they've got their hands full. 

Edited by SimpleSimon

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8 hours ago, SimpleSimon said:

So it's been about 7 hours from this post. You calm down yet? 

Ahhhh i'm just kidding. I already listed you on my /ignore. I'd address your numerous and blatant misunderstands of my posts but honestly Long I don't know you and I don't care enough to figure out what your underlying personal problems are that cause you to react like this. That's a job for the more unfortunate people closer to you and from the looks of it, they've got their hands full. 

If this is the way you respond to someone who posted a challenge to your assertions, you're not going to last very long here.  Especially if your post seems deliberately crafted to illicit a response.

Consider this (for now) a friendly warning.

Steve

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1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

If this is the way you respond to someone who posted a challenge to your assertions, you're not going to last very long here.  Especially if your post seems deliberately crafted to illicit a response.

Consider this (for now) a friendly warning.

Steve

What challenge? He didn't answer anything he just accused me of lying and based it on nothing more than that he disagreed with me. 

 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Consider this (for now) a friendly warning.

This is how you respond to community grievances?! You know what. Just hit that ban button now because your forum is endangering my interest in future purchases. I already had to stomach Sgt.Slackhead's unintelligible wails over what was just a customer service issue and I see your attitude toward that is not much more enlightened. Good to know. I won't make the mistake of describing this forum as a legitimate outlet for customer outreach to anyone else. I see it's primarily a frat. 

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6 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Mr. Tittles, is that you?

Not ready to fold yet eh?  Well how about we bring out.......the comfy chair!! (Dramatic music).   

Edited by sburke

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Sburke’s references to Monty Python skits confirm it’s a frat. (You weren’t supposed to give it away, you Git!)

I agree 100% with LLFs arguments. I have no idea where simplesimon came up with his first paragraph assessment, but I grew up with family and family friends who lived through the war, and had a lifelong interest in it, read thousands of books regarding it and, more importantly, over the last 5 or so decades, have talked to dozens (more likely hundreds) of those family, friends and acquaintances about those times. None ever expressed anything other than being extremely pissed at the Axis and wanting to get at it and get it over with as quickly as possible.

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7 hours ago, SimpleSimon said:

What challenge? He didn't answer anything he just accused me of lying and based it on nothing more than that he disagreed with me. 

You posted a strongly worded opinion which lent it self to being disagreed with.  LLF posted just such a challenge in a straight forward and respectful way.  You responded with personal attacks.  I checked back three pages and did not see anything about LLF accusing you of lying. 

Quote

This is how you respond to community grievances?!

No, this is how I handle someone who is making personal attacks against another member.

Quote

You know what. Just hit that ban button now because your forum is endangering my interest in future purchases.

This implies that we should moderate behavior based on economic incentives.  Since we do not believe that is the way to moderate a Forum, whether you purchase games from us or not has no impact on how members here are handled.

Quote

I already had to stomach Sgt.Slackhead's unintelligible wails over what was just a customer service issue and I see your attitude toward that is not much more enlightened.

So I called you out on abusive behavior and then you act abusive towards another member and then myself.  That's a good way to remove benefit of doubt from how I've handled things.

Quote

Good to know. I won't make the mistake of describing this forum as a legitimate outlet for customer outreach to anyone else. I see it's primarily a frat. 

No, it's a place that doesn't tolerate personal attacks.  We tolerate a bunch of different posting styles, some of which people find irksome.  Put another way, we censor abuse not style. 

Steve

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About willingness to sustain casualties, lets recall Tunisia was the first round for the Americans, the 'lessons learned' from the conflict influenced the generals in subsequent battles. Patton in particular became a profligate waster of soldier's lives in achieving his objectives. The soldiers bitterly joked that his nickname 'old blood and guts' was referencing their blood. By contrast, following the initial 'lessons learned' in the Pacific, McArthur's casualty rate was the lowest. He borrowed that quote "Hit 'em where they ain't" and wherever he could used maneuver to isolate Japanese garrisons rather than rely on frontal bloody assault.

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12 hours ago, MikeyD said:

McArthur's casualty rate was the lowest. He borrowed that quote "Hit 'em where they ain't" and wherever he could used maneuver to isolate Japanese garrisons rather than rely on frontal bloody assault.

Agreed, it seems "Mac" was very popular with his men (other than the aforementioned 2 divisions "Dugout Doug" left in Bataan in 1942). And 8th Army indeed pulled off a bevy of spectacular maneuvers and coups de main in Luzon in 1945, aided by the functionally infinite matériel being supplied by the Arsenal of Democracy.

.... This set against the utter bankruptcy of the Japanese war machine; the stubborn dedication of its starving light infantry being all that kept it in the field by then.

Of course, minimizing casualties did not extend to Filipino civilians, alas, and still less to their property. If a structure was even suspected to have Japanese in it, it got flattened, no questions asked. Nobody wanted to be the last GI to die in a victorious war, so too bad for the "Flips". 

(... that same casual attitude of Uncle Sam, especially USAF, toward collateral damage persists to this day).

Meanwhile, the boys on Iwo and Okinawa couldn't solve their problem with either firepower or maneuver. That created some serious morale and psychological problems in the field. And led to some soul searching back home. Which led in turn to Hiroshima.... 

So harking back to my new friend's earlier comments on a distinctive  American diffidence re casualties, there's definitely a great deal in that observation, but a bit different than he suggested IMHO. Happy to explore that further, civilly.

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Instead of agitating for war, the Jewish groups in this country should be opposing it in every possible way for they will be among the first to feel its consequences. Tolerance is a virtue that depends upon peace and strength. History shows that it cannot survive war and devastation.

...

No person with a sense of the dignity of mankind can condone the persecution of the Jewish race in Germany.

...

I am not attacking either the Jewish or the British people. Both races, I admire. But I am saying that the leaders of both the British and the Jewish races, for reasons which are as understandable from their viewpoint as they are inadvisable from ours, for reasons which are not American, wish to involve us in the war. We cannot blame them for looking out for what they believe to be their own interests, but we also must look out for ours. We cannot allow the natural passions and prejudices of other peoples to lead our country to destruction.

- Charles "Alabama Moon Boy" Lindbergh, September 1941

As with every conspiracy theory - and Mr. Tittles rant was right there balleting around the grandaddy of conspiracy theories - there is a kernel of truth. Of somebody's truth - there were as many experiences and takes on Worl War 2 as people witnessed it (and survived).

It is historical fact that there existed a sizeable "America First" political movement. Which we can say it was pro Axis since anything not actively opposing the Fascist powers were enabling them.

Pearl Harbour - last step in an escalation that started with the Japanese invasion of China - and the German declaration of war - final act in an escalation that started perhaps with the tearing down of the Munich agreements and the Kristallnacht - marked a turn in public opinion in America. Lindbergh himself tried to get into the war against the Empire of Japan and eventually managed to participate in combat in the Pacific by chance. No interest whatsoever with what was going on in Europe.

I don't think that 100% of the millions (?) of US citizens that were in agreement with Mr. Lindbergh and his associates just woke up one Sunday morning to the news of Pearl Harbour, and just like Saul of Tarsus after his traffic accident on the way to Damascus, shed their ideas like one sheds dry skin or loses hair. Maybe draft dodging wasn't as much of a thing as it was in 1950 to 1953, or 1966 to 1972, other than some misguided guys of German ethnic backgrounds finding their way into the Wehrmacht. But definitely selective volunteering for service, to cherry pick the Axis power to fight was a thing. And many too came to see the war as doing their civic duty and changed their opinion, embracing the cause of their Republic as the Glorious One.

Rooselvelt had to deal too with a restive Congress. They just did not have Twitter and a 24/7 news cycle to record every little bit for posterity. But I am pretty sure that there was a lot of log rolling, pork barreling and what not going on.

Swervin has given some examples of how ruthless some senior US commanders actually were or wanted to be remembered by posterity. But quotes like that of Bradley need to be presented within their context: was it part of an interview with US newspaper reporters? During or after the war?

For another example of "callousness", Rick Atkinson in Guns At Last Light goes in length and detail to remind us of the disastrous "adventure" George Patton sent an armored infantry battalion to rescue his son in law from a German POW camp.

And definitely not every man in uniform was a saint of democracy. In the same book by Atkinson, the account of the logistical echelon of SHAEF isn't precisely an edifying read. More of a facepalm really.

Do these examples tarnish the memory of those who sacrificed their lives in the altar of freedom from fear? I do not think so. If anything, being aware of these highlights  even more strongly the value of what they gave up. Convinced of the cause, by accident, or in the many thousands of different random ways death visits upon soldiers in the battlefield.

Going back to the topic of sensitivity to losses, I think that a useful framework to understand how States at war deal with casualties is the following. Each casualty conveys a political cost for the State. That cost detracts from the political capital and legitimacy for the existing political system to conduct war.

In the 1930s and 1940s democracies, that cost was shouldered by the system, as political capital is evenly dustributed amongst a wide portion of the population. It is the government of the many, most of the time, for the many. There was certainly war weariness by 1945 in the UK, to a lesser degree in the US. This "accounting" was a factor in the decision making process that unleashed the first weapons of mass destruction.

In totalitarian states, this cost is sublimated. Somebody, anybody really, pays for it in full, and an example is made of those found responsible. Typically the oligarchy at the top, led by the despot they enabled, deflects the blame to individuals via an efficient and ruthless army of enforcers. 

Stalingrad was the spark that inspired several plots to change the despot leading Germany. On the Soviet side Beria's NKVD never had difficulties to find spies, saboteurs and "wreckers" to make up for that political cost.

Not sure how to translate any of this in game terms... other than what is done already by using victory levels. The downside is that those numbers are a surrogate for something which is always emotionally charged for anybody but psychopaths.  We don't have cutscenes with us inspecting anti aerial batteries in Seattle after a bad result in CMFB or the image of two NKVD officers turning up at our command post, to illustrate historical outcomes.

Edited by BletchleyGeek

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8 minutes ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Going back to the topic of sensitivity to losses, I think that a useful framework to understand how States at war deal with casualties is the following. Each casualty conveys a political cost for the State. That cost detracts from the political capital and legitimacy for the existing political system to conduct war.

In the 1930s and 1940s democracies, that cost was shouldered by the system, as political capital is evenly dustributed amongst a wide portion of the population. It is the government of the many, most of the time, for the many. There was certainly war weariness by 1945 in the UK, to a lesser degree in the US. This "accounting" was a factor in the decision making process that unleashed the first weapons of mass destruction.

Indeed.

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. 

3 Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain. 

4 Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. 

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. 

 

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15 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Swervin has given some examples of how ruthless some senior US commanders actually were or wanted to be remembered by posterity. But quotes like that of Bradley need to be presented within their context: was it part of an interview with US newspaper reporters? During or after the war?

I dug into it a bit, and he apparently said that while touring a battlefield during the war. (Didn’t say which one.) Someone asked him of sending men to their deaths was difficult. He delivered that line,  and added that it was probably harder for more junior officers. Pretty sure it was a reporter. 

It was in The Guns of Last Light and I looked it up again in a Washington Post story (a bit of an obituary). 

Someone else that understood that casualties were inevitable and inescapable were the soldiers themselves. They weren’t getting out until they were killed, wounded, or won the war. There is a lot of documentation pointing to that fatalistic attitude; it colored a great deal of the culture of US combat troops. 

 

 

Edited by Swervin11b

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