Anti-Armor Defense Data Study (SAIC analysis of US anti-armor engagements in WW II)

[John Kettler]

This gives all the pieces of the SAIC study done for the US Army, of which I've previously provided the one covering the Dom Butgenbach fight. SAN loss likely, but you'll be institutionalized wearing a smile!

https://tankandafvnews.com/tag/anti-armor-defense-data-study/

While I'm posting data, I believe both our WW II and Modern contingents will enjoy seeing the somewhat redacted declassified SECRET paper called U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND SOVIET ARMOR. WW II types see page 25 et seq., for this is where the comparison of WW II gunnery with Modern gunnery came from that was presented (after sanitization) in FM 100-5 Operations, the core manual in the FMs in the plastic covers in the 1980s. In WW II it took a 76 mm gun Sherman 13 rounds to have a 50% Ph vs a fully exposed tank at 1500 meters. For an M60A3, it was one round. MG Gorman commanded the Armor branch when he wrote the paper.

Regards,

John Kettler

Edited April 17, 2018 by John Kettler

[John Kettler]

This is as good a place as any for these pertinent additional studies.

The first one is akin to some of the material on Tank Archives.

(Fair Use)

From the Vault: Vulnerability of German Panzer III, IV and VI

February 27, 2015 by tankandafvnews Leave a Comment

https://tankandafvnews.com/2018/03/02/ardec-report-on-76mm-gun-m1a1-and-m1a2/

(Fair Use)
 

From the Vault: Comparison of Performance of 75mm and 76mm tank gun ammo

October 21, 2015 by tankandafvnews 3 Comments

https://tankandafvnews.com/2015/10/21/from-the-vault-comparison-of-performance-of-75mm-and-76mm-tank-gun-ammo/

Regards,

John Kettler

[JoMac]

On ‎4‎/‎17‎/‎2018 at 12:16 AM, John Kettler said:

This gives all the pieces of the SAIC study done for the US Army, of which I've previously provided the one covering the Dom Butgenbach fight. SAN loss likely, but you'll be institutionalized wearing a smile!

https://tankandafvnews.com/tag/anti-armor-defense-data-study/

While I'm posting data, I believe both our WW II and Modern contingents will enjoy seeing the somewhat redacted declassified SECRET paper called U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND SOVIET ARMOR. WW II types see page 25 et seq., for this is where the comparison of WW II gunnery with Modern gunnery came from that was presented (after sanitization) in FM 100-5 Operations, the core manual in the FMs in the plastic covers in the 1980s. In WW II it took a 76 mm gun Sherman 13 rounds to have a 50% Ph vs a fully exposed tank at 1500 meters. For an M60A3, it was one round. MG Gorman commanded the Armor branch when he wrote the paper.

Regards,

John Kettler

 

[JoMac]

In the CMx2 WWII Titles, it seems more like a Quarter amount of those Rounds at that range for a 50% PH.

[Vanir Ausf B]

The only way it could conceivably take that many shots to hit is if shot fall could not be observed. The cannon was plenty accurate enough to hit almost every time once range was dialed in. I find that figure suspicious, particularly since it gives an average of only 3 shots to hit in Korea, in which most of the tanks in use were the same tanks used in WW2, firing the same 76 and 90mm cannon.

[John Kettler]

Vanir Ausf B,

Seems reasonable, and if, for any number of reasons, optical contrast is poor and/or, the target, tracer or both are only intermittently visible (fog, for example) it's hard to sense where a given shot went. Have also read of confusion engendered when a glancing or solid hit on something knocked loose the tracer element. If the tracer got knocked loose from a solid impact, the target might well be damaged or dead, but the engagement would continue until the target either caught fire or exploded. How many rounds were put into a dead tank, sometimes in several different battles, because it was thought to be a live tank? These things would have the effect of driving  up shots required to get a hit. Wish I knew  more about how the Army reached the conclusions it did, but my reading of tank damage causation indicates a lot of uncertainty as to what hit and when. This reduces things to dividing shots fired by known kills obtained. We all know damaged tanks were towed out of battle, too. Otto Carius talks of this explicitly and a number of times in Tigers in the Mud. And what if a friendly tank gets hit and the gunner and TC are dead or seriously wounded, maybe everyone, so the tank's combat performance in that battle is almost certainly unknown? There's also the matter of a battle which seesaws over some piece of contested ground. Who did what, to whom and when? Did anyone retrieve tanks? OR types like things tidy, but war isn't. It further occurs to me that Army OR, given the paucity of long range engagements in the ETO, may've had to extrapolate its 1500 meter performance figures from the 750-800 typical of the ETO.

Our own Jeff Duquette cite a WO study of tank combat and tank performance in the Korean War on a Dupuy Institute forum. Believe I've found a solid explanation of why gunnery performance was so high there. Typical engagement range was 500 meters. That is the sole point of putting up the quote. Have zero trouble believing it's easier to secure hits at 500 meters (Korea) than 750-800 (ETO). The below thread is full tank goodness.

WO 342/1 Tank and anti-tank warfare: tanks; battle performance and tactics 1951 Feb - 1953 Sept

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum5/HTML/000016.html

1. The 90mm M3 gun was inferior to the 20pdr but more than capable of taking out T-34/85's at all combat ranges (usually less than 500m in Korea).

Regards,

John Kettler

 

Edited April 27, 2018 by John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Read the ARDEC report on the 76 mm gun straight through. It's a first class piece of work that takes a complex topic and makes it approachable, while also providing the various underlying equations and such. Report has lots of graphs, charts and several computer renderings of disassembled projectiles for the guns, together with detailed descriptions. There is a wealth of material in there on what the true situation was for the 75 mm, 76 mm and the what if not shortened 76 mm, using both APC and HVAP, in the case of the 76 mm. The Panzer IV/H, unless hit in the turret face frontally, was very well protected against both the 75 mm and the 76 mm guns. Part of the problem is that the firing tests used in the relevant FM were against the much more killable Panzer IV/E. The Panther side of things is heavily discussed, including what got left out of TM 9-1907 (covered ballistic perforamnce of antitank projectiles) for a number of reasons. There is a discussion of Sherman mix, the development, introduction and combat performance of HVAP, even the M18 in combat. Late in the report, we get some good Battle of the Bulge coverage, too. As far as I'm concerned, if you have any interest at all in our tank and tank destroyer gun performance against several different German tanks, from a variety of aspects, then make time to read this superb report. There is much to be learned from it, maybe even for BFC.

Regards,

John Kettler