Stryker vs Bradley

[HerrTom]

2 hours ago, Oleksandr said:

So yes I view all descussions about hardware as a huge "what if."

I think you misunderstand me.  Of course the overall discussion is "what if we could change the Stryker?"  What I'm saying is that beyond that, your approach to design is traversing through the chain of "what ifs" of situations.  Naturally, to some extent, one can approach design this way  - what if my linkage breaks?  What if the supplier gives me parts that only rate to a fifth of their claim?  There are certain points where the what if becomes a little absurd and outweighs the cost.

While you have a point - if things go wrong on the battlefield - it costs lives.  That's quite the big cost.  But you can still bring the cost and feasibility into it by considering the big picture beyond the narrow scope of the tactical battle.

Taking your example of the Puma - it is indeed a fine vehicle, but if you consider it in context it might not make sense for everyone. It may make sense for the Bundeswehr since they anticipate using a small number of them (say a brigade) in any combat they anticipate being in.  But would it have made sense for the USSR to design and build a similar vehicle?

I may get some flak for this, but I'd argue the BMPs and BTRs are actually fairly well designed for their role in the battlefield.  The USSR primarily needed a lot of steel to fill out its massively motorised army and accomplished just that with effective, if not elegant or ergonomic vehicles.  They may not win 1:1 against the enemy, but that doesn't matter when you have very mobile vehicles with a lot of firepower that can stack your odds 20:1 with mobility and suppression.  Would I want to ride in one?  No.  But I could see the attractiveness as a brigade commander, for example.

[Sgt.Squarehead]

Quantity has a quality all of its own.....As someone was apparently fond of suggesting. 

[HerrTom]

Indeed.  One could argue that the other way to solve the problem of needing 30,000 IFVs is to have a smaller army.  Pansies! 

[IMHO]

On 1/3/2018 at 3:03 AM, Oleksandr said:

4 (OPTIONAL) - Weapons module should  have an option to be controlled from the distance (with main engine being turned off) - so you dig in on lets say in long term defensive position and then you leave your vehicle and control its turret from the distance while sitting somewhere safe. 

[MOS:96B2P]

5 hours ago, IMHO said:

+1  COOL!!!!

[MOS:96B2P]

18 hours ago, Oleksandr said:

I'm just going to leave this here... he he

 Nice my friend!  +1.  

[Kinophile]

Tbh, as a non military type, if a US unit has attrited on ability, force and basic common sense  to the point of using its Bradleys/IFVs as a remote controlled  static, emplaced light artillery/ATGM post (?)  then no amount of features or technology on those Bradleys is going to outweigh the fact that it's now doing the exact opposite of what it was specifically designed to do. 

And if a future IFV was designed to be able to used like that then calling it an IFV is a complete misnomer. 

I believe... 

 

Edited January 5, 2018 by kinophile

[c3k]

One word: Ogre

Ogre and its sequel, G.E.V., are tactical ground combat games set in the late 21st century. In 2085 A.D., armored warfare is faster and deadlier than ever. Hovercraft, tanks and infantry slug it out with tactical nukes. But the most feared weapon of all needs no human guidance. It's the giant cybernetic tank called the Ogre

http://www.sjgames.com/ogre/

You can learn all about non-manned tanks, and how it is inevitable that they will turn on their human overlords. 

Unmanned tanks? No thanks.

[Erwin]

Don't they mean "Remote Control Tanks" as in Drones etc?   Along with remote controlled military aircraft (and auto-driving cars and trucks), that seems to be the future. 

Am more worried about the cars and trucks for regular use on roads as for sure they will get hacked.  In fact I doubt we will see that happen commercially until a lot further in the future than the year 2025 being forecast by Uber and Musk etc.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

On 12/12/2017 at 11:45 PM, DougPhresh said:

The Americans might’ve saved 15 years and a lot of money if they just bought LAVs in the first place.

If the SBCT was just a fleet of wheeled armored vehicles, then you'd have a point.  As the case was it was an entire Brigade built around a variety of information age innovations that have since trickled over the fence into ABCT/IBCT (it's worth keeping in mind the SBCT as a paper concept predates the entire BCT construct, and in many ways served as it's model).

Also the LAV platform for a variety of reasons served as a good launching point, but ultimately the platform just isn't the same as a Stryker.  

Re: Topic

A bit late to the party but it's comparing apples to electron flux capacitors.  You can't eat the electron flux capacitor, you can't go back in time and almost seduce your own mother with the apple.  IFVs have a distinct role as an element of the combined arms fight.  Wheeled APCs like the Stryker have their own distinct mission.  There's some overlap between the two, but again this gets to the reality that the Stryker does not look like a Bradley because it doesn't have the same mission set/design considerations so of course it's going to be "different"

Re: Dragoon

It's not a bad idea.  In a lot of places the 105 MM is too much gun, and the low ammo capacity is a hindrance on extended missions.  The 105 MM does have a bit more anti-armor capacity...but the anti-armor for an SBCT unit comes more from ATGMs than the MGS vehicles anyway.  30 MM is more handy for most situations, and the fact it doesn't require a highly specialized vehicle is pretty cool too.

[sburke]

to @panzersaurkrautwerfer's point If you want to understand the SBCT you need to do a little more reading than just looking at vehicles. The concept that it evolved from is almost 25 years old now.  If you want to read a good document on development of the concept and it's eventual deployment and combat experience you can pick it up for $3 on Amazon.

https://www.amazon.com/transformation-combat-first-Stryker-brigade/dp/B003HKRPNA

The concept was 6 years in the making before the vehicle was decided upon.  The MGS was the most problematic variant and should give pause to those trying to fit the concept with heavier weapons than fit that concept.

For those critical of the Stryker, it's initial evaluation from the NTC OPFOR is interesting.

Although Millennium Challenge 2002 demonstrated the brigade's capabilities on only a small scale and minor problems with equipment occurred, the units that deployed did well in the exercise. After the first simulated mission, the soldiers of the National Training Center's permanent Opposing Force, the 11th Armored Cavalry, noted that the Stryker went places at greater speeds and with less noise and more agility than any vehicle they had previously encountered. The vehicle's digital communications suite also permitted it to call quickly for a lethal array of supporting fire. As a result, the 11th Cavalry began preparing for the full brigade's upcoming certification exercise at Fort Irwin long before it would have done so for a Bradley- or M1-equipped unit.

Department of  Defense. From Transformation to Combat: The First Stryker Brigade at War - The Test of Combat in Iraq in 2003 - 2004, Mosul, Baghdad, An Najaf, Tall Afar, Carter Ham (Kindle Locations 260-265). Progressive Management. Kindle Edition.

 

[Los]

Here's a sample mission for the SBCT at NTC where the unit performed well:

http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2017/JUL-SEP/pdf/10)TN3-Courchaine-Stryker.pdf

Edited January 7, 2018 by Los

[Thewood1]

You can pick up the "Transformation to Combat. The First stryker brigade at War" for $0 at https://history.army.mil/brochures/Stryker/Stryker.pdf

I think that's the same book.  I downloaded it a couple years ago.

[sburke]

9 minutes ago, Thewood1 said:

You can pick up the "Transformation to Combat. The First stryker brigade at War" for $0 at https://history.army.mil/brochures/Stryker/Stryker.pdf

I think that's the same book.  I downloaded it a couple years ago.

Yep same book

[Sgt.Squarehead]

Possibly of interest:  http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN3238_ATP 3-21x91 FINAL WEB.pdf

[The_MonkeyKing]

2 hours ago, Sgt.Squarehead said:

Possibly of interest:  http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN3238_ATP 3-21x91 FINAL WEB.pdf

Good read!

 

For example this was a good reminder on how to use MGS Strykers. Too bad in CMBS you only got 5 HE shells on board.

Quote

MOBILE GUN SYSTEM PLATOON
1-48. The MGS platoon provides precise long range direct fire in support of Infantry and Cavalry units. Its
function is to destroy or suppress hardened enemy bunkers, machine gun positions, sniper positions, and
long-range threats. It also creates Infantry breach points in urban, restricted, and open rolling terrain. The
MGS 105 mm main gun provides the platoon with limited antiarmor, self-defense capabilities. The MGS is
not a tank, however, and should not be employed in the same manner as a tank; nor should the MGS platoon
be employed in the same manner as a tank platoon. (See figure 1-3.)

 

[IICptMillerII]

7 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Too bad in CMBS you only got 5 HE shells on board.

This is the actual combat load of the MGS stryker. It does not carry much ammunition at all, and is one of its biggest weaknesses. There are a lot of other problems with the MGS as well. 

[MikeyD]

In CMSF the MGS ammo loadout is 10 HE, 5, HEAT and only 2 KE. In CMBS that changes to 5 HE, 8 HEAT and 5 KE. That's because CMBS is such an unusually armor-heavy title. I don't know if there's a scenario where you're not facing Red armor of one sort on another.

[Kozlice]

That's quite realistic too, I imagine (for an alternative universe that CMBS is), no? Better be ready for armor and face infantry only than the other way around 

[Kinophile]

I read up on that first Stryker deployment to Iraq. What stood out for me was the huge redirect the brigade had make when insurgents started blowing bridges. IIRC they went on a 100+km detour to reach their target AO. They did a good job in doing so, but they were lucky they didn't face a properly coordinated enemy.

Essentially, my read was that the enemy identified a weakness (lack of amphibious ability) and tried to shape the operational engagement using that weakness. The brigade was able to out maneuver and beat through the Insurgents OODA loop by sheer road speed and operational lightness,but their success strikes me as a function of the enemy's disorganization rather than an inherent advantage. 

I doubt VERY much the brigade could have succeeded in that march south against a Russian backed force such as the Donbass rebels. There are at least 2 choke points in the brigades march where the operational pause/detour would have been a perfect funnelling of the entire brigade into an artillery/mlrs death trap. 

I understand the need to balance priorities in any vehicle, but for me, personally, considering how mobile, effective and long range modern Russian artilker/mlrs are, a non-fording capable troop AFV is a serious operational and tactical limitation. 

[Sgt.Squarehead]

It seems a bit of an issue to me too.....But I thought the Stryker was based on the Grizzly/LAV, so why did they dump the amphibious capability? 

[Rinaldi]

More armor. LAV-III ain't swimmable either, and never has been. No idea about MOWAGs. The ability to ford rivers is secondary to the US, who's bridging abilities embarrass most other countries. 

In the same time it takes to prepare a BMP for a river crossing operation, we're as likely to just try and slap a few ribbons across. River crossings are deemed routine for both sides, but for different reasons.

Edited March 2, 2018 by Rinaldi

[Kinophile]

@Rinaldi dies it really take that long to prepare? Do we have some comparison data available? 

Even so, it still limits the fording  corridor to small number of bridges, which themselves occupy their own logistical tail. 

Prep 15 BMPs x 1 Hour = potentially 15+crossing points. 

Prep 3 x Bridges x 1 Hour = potentially 3 crossing points.

I guess it's just a different approach, but I'd be interested in a BS scenario where a US stryker company reaches a river (with an intact bridge, for map editor process) but has to wait a nominal amount of time before it can cross (to simulate the call up and emplacement of the bridge).

Now let's give the Russian side battalion+ level F'S and see what damage is done. 

Then swap sides and see what happens when the BMPs reach the river....

Btw, I forget - are BTR 82As amphibious? 

 

[Rinaldi]

3 minutes ago, kinophile said:

@Rinaldi dies it really take that long to prepare? Do we have some comparison data available? 

Even so, it still limits the fording  corridor to small number of bridges, which themselves occupy their own logistical tail. 

Prep 15 BMPs x 1 Hour = potentially 15+crossing points. 

Prep 3 x Bridges x 1 Hour = potentially 3 crossing points.

Yeah, exactly. The best way to think of a BMP is an assault raft that can carry right on and attack with the infantry; the range of a MRR or MRB that has a bridgehead is no further than their current load of fuel. A river-crossing by a BMP unit is no different than a typical cross-river attack with rafts in principal: to secure the far bank for bridging.  You got to get one across and keep it intact to continue any type of operational movement. 

American doctrine puts a lot more faith in the infantry's ability to deal with threats in a limited environment and lots of support, whereas a lot of Soviet/Russian literature (learning from Afghanistan and Chechnya) believe that Infantry suppress and mop up after the supporting vehicles do their job. Considering both approaches have been successfully borne out in conflicts I can't really slag either, its a difference in philosophy and TO&E. 

BTR-82As are swimmable yes. The BTR remains a remarkably light vehicle after slapping a 30mm on it. If I had to go off the top of my head it's only a 3-4 tons heavier than it was in its first configurations. 

[HerrTom]

6 hours ago, Rinaldi said:

Yeah, exactly. The best way to think of a BMP is an assault raft that can carry right on and attack with the infantry; the range of a MRR or MRB that has a bridgehead is no further than their current load of fuel. A river-crossing by a BMP unit is no different than a typical cross-river attack with rafts in principal: to secure the far bank for bridging.  You got to get one across and keep it intact to continue any type of operational movement. 

American doctrine puts a lot more faith in the infantry's ability to deal with threats in a limited environment and lots of support, whereas a lot of Soviet/Russian literature (learning from Afghanistan and Chechnya) believe that Infantry suppress and mop up after the supporting vehicles do their job. Considering both approaches have been successfully borne out in conflicts I can't really slag either, its a difference in philosophy and TO&E. 

BTR-82As are swimmable yes. The BTR remains a remarkably light vehicle after slapping a 30mm on it. If I had to go off the top of my head it's only a 3-4 tons heavier than it was in its first configurations. 

An important thing to distinguish is that a MRR also has an engineering battalion attached that can bridge that secured bridgehead with MT-55s and TMMs carrying pontoon bridges in an hour.  So their range extends by the (admittedly limited) throughput of those light bridges.  Presumably the next mission would be to capture the nearest real bridge!