Future US AFV development

[MikeyD]

I recalled something I read years ago, before the last couple wars, perhaps late 90s. It was a peacetime army report detailing Abrams tank fires. At the time of the report Abrams had managed to catch fire some 500 times, if memory serves. Including total write-offs of vehicles. A problem the old M60A1 simply did not have. The list of causes was vexingly long and random-seeming, making finding solutions difficult. Wasn't there a famous photo from Iraq (the run up to Bagdad?) of a burning Abrams on the highway? Apparently the NBC filter had spontaneously caught fire judging from where the flames were coming from.

When talking about advances in tank design its easy to focus on the 'sexy' stuff. But a vehicle design also includes wiring, duct work, rubber seals. Unsexy engineering stuff can count just as much for success as the exotic stuff. We do not have a clue about the how the 'unsexy' bits of Armata are performing. The best tank in the world might have batteries that are prone to catching fire or leaky suspension seals or short track life. Its not sexy but small problems do add up.

[Michael Emrys]

1 hour ago, MikeyD said:

Its not sexy but small problems do add up.

"For want of a nail..."

Michael

[Armorgunner]

On ‎2017‎-‎09‎-‎04 at 3:50 AM, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

 

That's cool and all, but it's not really that relevant.  Or at least, the assumption is somehow the Abrams is especially vulnerable to fuel shortage.  My company had access to enough fuel to give each tank a little over a third of complete fuel capacity (in as far as a fueler that accompanied my company's HQ element).  That was usually consumed daily (or even if wasn't consumed, we'd still do an extra top-off before sending it back), and replaced with another fueler.  For longer movements, you'd have used ROMs (basically a linkup with a fueler element, sort of a fly by night gas station), but there were other sneaky stuff we'd do (a neat trick was dropping fuel blivets by helicopter) if forced.

Basically my contention is that the logistical "needs" of your tank are going to be based on the logistical capabilities of the Army it's built for.

And frankly if there's a fearsome branch to the US military, it's the logistical one (there's no many countries that can hack 150,000 soldiers over the horizon).

I don't know if I'd buy it as a foreign customer simply because the "export" armor package isn't that great, and the gas turbine is something that takes some serious dedication to use (I wouldn't have traded it for a diesel though).  Also cheap Leo 2s are still a thing for reasons.  

 

 

 

I Think you missed my Point totally here. This is what i wrote:

"And that might not seem to be a problem in Peace, and in a war when you are in Control of what is happening. But in an allout war, when your supplychain is britteling, that can be of most importence"

And thats only when the big difference in fuel consumption, really kicks in as a gamechanger.

Edited September 6, 2017 by Armorgunner

[Armorgunner]

On 2017-09-04 at 3:50 AM, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

Every tank has vulnerable spots within it's frontal arc.  That said, your contention is there's an especially big one on the Abrams that's just asking to suck down 30 MM fire for a vehicle kill.  My contention is that no such special gap exists, and having been shot at extensively, and having had several major overhauls, nothing that been done to adjust the described gap.  The only place I've seen people claiming that gap is a real thing to kill Abrams from the frontal has been Russian trollposting, and repeating of said trollposting.

I worked around Abrams for most of my active military career.  I'm pretty familar with the places not to be shot.  While I wouldn't like to get hit anywhere on the tank, I revert to my bear analogy.  It's distinctly possible that if you could somehow get a round into that gap, you might be able to exploit it. However, getting that round there apparently is an uncommon enough event to as to be unheard of.  

So as to your contention, again I'm doubtful about this "big gap" and "Achilles Heel" thing.

 

First of, I made it like a question. Could it stop 30, 40, or 100mm APFSDS, Right? Not that 30mm fire would suck in there and kill it?

And i dont really care, about your low intencive wars since after GW1. My only thinking is what happens when we meet Russia, in a high intencive war. When total airsupremacy might not be. And you might encounter capable enemys at all ranges.

And since i´m very familiar with the disignchoises of the M1 to. I also knows the pros, and cons with the design. As with the Leopard. The design is the same today, even though the armored modules is better.

And even if the Russians of today, to my knowledge. Dont have any topattack at-missiles. They do have been known to extensive use of topattack artilleryfired bomblets in the Ukraine, from time to time. Even though that has nothing to do with the gap in frontal protection. It might show that the US have been to busy, fighting lowintensive wars for to Long. Neglecting more advanced modern threats?

Now, dont missunderstand me. We are on the same side. And my wish is that the US armed forces is at peak performance level. Since you are the only credible help we might hopening to recive, maybe with a little help from GB and Germany. If Russia decides to take the Baltics, and thereby needs the Swedish Island of Gotland. For example.

Edited September 6, 2017 by Armorgunner

[Armorgunner]

Theese are the "threat ammo" that was used for the tests.

This is testfiring on M1A2 armored modules, whithout the Swedish addonarmor. Later tested.

Tests on hull armor of Leclair, with Swedish addonarmor. ( a note though, there was lower requirement on the frontal hull. Than on the turret )

Note though.

This has not anything to do with any gaps in armor. Since it is the modules tested.

	Leclerc	Leopard 2 Imp	M1A2
Rörlighet	2	1	3
Verkan	3	1	2
Överlevnadsförmåga	3	1	2
Ledning	3	2	1
Drift & Underhåll	3	2	1
TOTAL:	14	7	9

Edited September 6, 2017 by Armorgunner

[Armorgunner]

translation: Low Score is better.

Rörlighet=Mobility

Verkan=Effect

Överlevnadsförmåga=survivability

Ledning=C2

Drif & underhåll=maintenance

This was the final verdict

This was the final score of the competition between the last contenders. And to that, is the price per unit. Witch is secret, since its not just the unitprice. Its as mush of if we buy this from you! What can you buy from us?

Edited September 6, 2017 by Armorgunner

[Armorgunner]

Sorry for spaming

I just dont have mush time. And when I have some. Its like this

Edit: I know a few, that wanted the M1 to be the new tank. For different reasons ( Army ones, Not political ) But it had to do with different prioritising, of what was the best thing to prioritize at the time.

Edited September 6, 2017 by Armorgunner

[Apocal]

5 hours ago, MikeyD said:

Wasn't there a famous photo from Iraq (the run up to Bagdad?) of a burning Abrams on the highway? Apparently the NBC filter had spontaneously caught fire judging from where the flames were coming from.

This one?

It was struck by a SPG-73 in the rear hull, which led to a fuel fire that they couldn't extinguish.

Edited September 7, 2017 by Apocal

[sburke]

4 hours ago, Armorgunner said:

And even if the Russians of today, to my knowledge. Dont have any topattack at-missiles. They do have been known to extensive use of topattack artilleryfired bomblets in the Ukraine, from time to time. Even though that has nothing to do with the gap in frontal protection. It might show that the US have been to busy, fighting lowintensive wars for to Long. Neglecting more advanced modern threats?

 

Considering our budget I don't think it matters what type of war we may have been fighting, the R&D still goes on for a variety of threats.  The folks in development labs pay little attention to current fighting and more about what kind of tech is being developed.

[Sgt.Squarehead]

Interesting to see that the M1 is the easiest to maintain, that's somewhat contrary to my expectations.....Every day's a school day, as they say. 

20 hours ago, Armorgunner said:

My only thinking is what happens when we meet Russia, in a high intencive war.

Is Sweden planning on invading Russia?  Not sure it's a good idea, the historical precedents don't bode well. 

Edited September 7, 2017 by Sgt.Squarehead

[Armorgunner]

12 hours ago, Sgt.Squarehead said:

 

Is Sweden planning on invading Russia?  Not sure it's a good idea, the historical precedents don't bode well. 

We want revenge, for the awkward loss at Poltava 1709 

[Mishrae]

4 minutes ago, Armorgunner said:

We want revenge, for the awkward loss at Poltava 1709 

Just make sure your king doesn't 't charge the Ruskies without armour this time 

[MikeyD]

Just for fun, here's the American 'Armata' circa 2002. based on the Abrams. Crew-in-hull, overhead gun, autoloader. It looks like the ammo was still stored in-hull and God knows what it was using for optics.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

4 hours ago, MikeyD said:

Just for fun, here's the American 'Armata' circa 2002. based on the Abrams. Crew-in-hull, overhead gun, autoloader. It looks like the ammo was still stored in-hull and God knows what it was using for optics.

[Thewood1]

Funny, you can actually play with that in Steel Beasts.  Don't know why the devs put it in, but was a big feature in the latest big update.

[Sgt.Squarehead]

For further comparison, here's Armata's older brother:

T-95

Very similar indeed aren't they, but you could say the same about pretty much everything from Assault Rifles to Stealth Fighters. 

The firepower of the T-95 does slightly set it apart though, it's a 152mm & it has a 30mm cannon in a co-ax mount! 

Does anyone know if this thing could fire Kornet or an equivalent GLATGM?  The calibre is right.

Edited September 8, 2017 by Sgt.Squarehead

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Re: Flaming Abrams

There were a few issues with the early models.  One of the big problems I already mentioned was the fuel and smoke generator not cooperating.

As a possible correction, it might have been a JP8 problem though.  Again keep in mind I was 7 for the 1991 conflict, so a lot of the early Abrams stuff is just what I've read/stories from my crustier counterparts.  Having talked to a few dinosaur tankers recently, it appears the US Army used diesel with the Abrams not at all infrequently in the 1980's to no special ill effects.  With that said, the JP8 we use now has a higher ignition threshold, so unlike the diesel which would smolder on the smoke generator, the JP8 would just splash onto the heating element and slosh around, which could have been a hazard at a later date.

As to the case of 500 fires, doubtless some of them were constructive losses, but the high number can be deceiving. Or basically the system for tracking automotive incidents doesn't have a "small fire" or "big fire" box, it has a "fire" option.  Like one of my tanks caught fire, but it was an electrical short the fire suppression system handled it, and the tank would have been mission capable had it happened in combat.  But because there was a fire, it was treated much the same as if the tank had actually burned (but not burned to destruction).

The Thunder Run Abrams that burned took a recoiless rifle hit to the aft.  This did not disable the tank automotively, but it did result in an extensive fuel leak that dumped fuel onto the very hot engine surfaces.  The fire suppression system knocked out the fire, but it couldn't cool off the engine, or stop the leak, and repeated efforts to stem the fuel leak failed (although the fire was "put out" several times over, only to reignite).  The choice was made to abandon the tank to keep the rest of the element from getting fixed in place and massed on, and it proved as is common with the Abrams, frustratingly hard to destroy.

 

On 9/6/2017 at 2:57 PM, Armorgunner said:

First of, I made it like a question. Could it stop 30, 40, or 100mm APFSDS, Right? Not that 30mm fire would suck in there and kill it?

And i dont really care, about your low intencive wars since after GW1. My only thinking is what happens when we meet Russia, in a high intencive war. When total airsupremacy might not be. And you might encounter capable enemys at all ranges.

And since i´m very familiar with the disignchoises of the M1 to. I also knows the pros, and cons with the design. As with the Leopard. The design is the same today, even though the armored modules is better.

And even if the Russians of today, to my knowledge. Dont have any topattack at-missiles. They do have been known to extensive use of topattack artilleryfired bomblets in the Ukraine, from time to time. Even though that has nothing to do with the gap in frontal protection. It might show that the US have been to busy, fighting lowintensive wars for to Long. Neglecting more advanced modern threats?

Now, dont missunderstand me. We are on the same side. And my wish is that the US armed forces is at peak performance level. Since you are the only credible help we might hopening to recive, maybe with a little help from GB and Germany. If Russia decides to take the Baltics, and thereby needs the Swedish Island of Gotland. For example.

The implication is that there is a big weak spot in that region.  My instructors, and subordinates pulled no punches about places on the Abrams that were weaknesses and to be kept away from the enemy, or to be aware of.  I know people who've lost crewmen or tanks.  The "weak spot" you mentioned has never came up again, outside of internet speculation.  Maybe the armor there is actually weak, but the small practical side of the low armor area is just hard to actually get at.  I don't know,  but again, there's just no "evidence" there's an especially weak area in that region, and the Abrams has been pretty extensively destructively tested in multiple settings.

As to "not really caring" about low intensity, I'm sorry but clearly you're not paying attention to armor operations.

a. The most likely setting for most tanks to be employed will be in a situation short of "full spectrum" conflicts.  How well an AFV performs in a asymmetrical conflict is profoundly important.  

b. Even an enemy who's less capable, but very motivated to kill you will find a way to test your systems.  Just because a test set doesn't exactly mirror what you're looking for, doesn't mean discarding it is a wise choice.

As to "neglecting modern threats" not so much.  It might have been the case closer to 2011-2012, but the last few years have seen a renewed focus on what the Army calls "full spectrum" conflicts (basically a recognition of Russian hybrid warfare, the entire range from unconventional/terrorist type fighters working on the same battlefield or in conjunction with near-peer adversary forces).  There's a certain understanding and much discussion of Russian capabilities.

Basically when you do a training rotation (tabletop/computer to NTC/JRTC/YTC type rotations), you're facing a fictional version of the Russians that literally have all the advantages.  All their stuff works exactly as advertised.  They have effectively infinite logistics, can afford to lose 70% of every airframe, tank, naval asset without suffering any political repercussions etc.

You get to show up, and you'll get your teeth kicked in over and over again until you've ironed out all the kinks.  It's a profoundly frustrating experience, but it's a lot of learning to be done. 

In technical terms, we're cooking up some interesting stuff.  A lot of it isn't the kind of stuff you put on a parade and need to tow off when it breaks down, but there's a recognition of Russian strengths and weaknesses, and our deterrence options have evolved accordingly.  Some of that might be the fairly modest stuff about better recognizing Russian influence/unconventional conflict indicators, and adapting law enforcement behaviors accordingly, some of that is crazy weirdo over the horizon stuff that if it was Russian would have been furiously masturbated over by that lame James May knockoff they use for their RT programming.  

 

 

On 9/6/2017 at 2:36 PM, Armorgunner said:

I Think you missed my Point totally here. This is what i wrote:

"And that might not seem to be a problem in Peace, and in a war when you are in Control of what is happening. But in an allout war, when your supplychain is britteling, that can be of most importence"

And thats only when the big difference in fuel consumption, really kicks in as a gamechanger.

As already discussed, the big fuel suck isn't tanks and tanks alone, it's mechanized/motorized unit on a whole.  If your logistics cannot support mechanized/motorized units, then yeah maybe skip out on the M1.  Or the Leo 2.  Or just tanks in general.  But in practice the Bradley and M1 both required about the same amount of logistics push on the march to Baghdad, which opens interesting questions about just how relevant the on-paper fuel consumption/testing circumstances are.  

[LUCASWILLEN05]

8 hours ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

Re: Flaming Abrams

There were a few issues with the early models.  One of the big problems I already mentioned was the fuel and smoke generator not cooperating.

As a possible correction, it might have been a JP8 problem though.  Again keep in mind I was 7 for the 1991 conflict, so a lot of the early Abrams stuff is just what I've read/stories from my crustier counterparts.  Having talked to a few dinosaur tankers recently, it appears the US Army used diesel with the Abrams not at all infrequently in the 1980's to no special ill effects.  With that said, the JP8 we use now has a higher ignition threshold, so unlike the diesel which would smolder on the smoke generator, the JP8 would just splash onto the heating element and slosh around, which could have been a hazard at a later date.

As to the case of 500 fires, doubtless some of them were constructive losses, but the high number can be deceiving. Or basically the system for tracking automotive incidents doesn't have a "small fire" or "big fire" box, it has a "fire" option.  Like one of my tanks caught fire, but it was an electrical short the fire suppression system handled it, and the tank would have been mission capable had it happened in combat.  But because there was a fire, it was treated much the same as if the tank had actually burned (but not burned to destruction).

The Thunder Run Abrams that burned took a recoiless rifle hit to the aft.  This did not disable the tank automotively, but it did result in an extensive fuel leak that dumped fuel onto the very hot engine surfaces.  The fire suppression system knocked out the fire, but it couldn't cool off the engine, or stop the leak, and repeated efforts to stem the fuel leak failed (although the fire was "put out" several times over, only to reignite).  The choice was made to abandon the tank to keep the rest of the element from getting fixed in place and massed on, and it proved as is common with the Abrams, frustratingly hard to destroy.

 

The implication is that there is a big weak spot in that region.  My instructors, and subordinates pulled no punches about places on the Abrams that were weaknesses and to be kept away from the enemy, or to be aware of.  I know people who've lost crewmen or tanks.  The "weak spot" you mentioned has never came up again, outside of internet speculation.  Maybe the armor there is actually weak, but the small practical side of the low armor area is just hard to actually get at.  I don't know,  but again, there's just no "evidence" there's an especially weak area in that region, and the Abrams has been pretty extensively destructively tested in multiple settings.

As to "not really caring" about low intensity, I'm sorry but clearly you're not paying attention to armor operations.

a. The most likely setting for most tanks to be employed will be in a situation short of "full spectrum" conflicts.  How well an AFV performs in a asymmetrical conflict is profoundly important.  

b. Even an enemy who's less capable, but very motivated to kill you will find a way to test your systems.  Just because a test set doesn't exactly mirror what you're looking for, doesn't mean discarding it is a wise choice.

As to "neglecting modern threats" not so much.  It might have been the case closer to 2011-2012, but the last few years have seen a renewed focus on what the Army calls "full spectrum" conflicts (basically a recognition of Russian hybrid warfare, the entire range from unconventional/terrorist type fighters working on the same battlefield or in conjunction with near-peer adversary forces).  There's a certain understanding and much discussion of Russian capabilities.

Basically when you do a training rotation (tabletop/computer to NTC/JRTC/YTC type rotations), you're facing a fictional version of the Russians that literally have all the advantages.  All their stuff works exactly as advertised.  They have effectively infinite logistics, can afford to lose 70% of every airframe, tank, naval asset without suffering any political repercussions etc.

You get to show up, and you'll get your teeth kicked in over and over again until you've ironed out all the kinks.  It's a profoundly frustrating experience, but it's a lot of learning to be done. 

In technical terms, we're cooking up some interesting stuff.  A lot of it isn't the kind of stuff you put on a parade and need to tow off when it breaks down, but there's a recognition of Russian strengths and weaknesses, and our deterrence options have evolved accordingly.  Some of that might be the fairly modest stuff about better recognizing Russian influence/unconventional conflict indicators, and adapting law enforcement behaviors accordingly, some of that is crazy weirdo over the horizon stuff that if it was Russian would have been furiously masturbated over by that lame James May knockoff they use for their RT programming.  

 

 

As already discussed, the big fuel suck isn't tanks and tanks alone, it's mechanized/motorized unit on a whole.  If your logistics cannot support mechanized/motorized units, then yeah maybe skip out on the M1.  Or the Leo 2.  Or just tanks in general.  But in practice the Bradley and M1 both required about the same amount of logistics push on the march to Baghdad, which opens interesting questions about just how relevant the on-paper fuel consumption/testing circumstances are.  

Apparently the Iraqis lost a fair number of M1A1tamks but those would have been the export models lacking the fancy gear http://www.janes.com/article/39550/iraqi-abrams-losses-revealed

[Armorgunner]

On 2017-09-07 at 4:47 AM, sburke said:

Considering our budget I don't think it matters what type of war we may have been fighting, the R&D still goes on for a variety of threats.  The folks in development labs pay little attention to current fighting and more about what kind of tech is being developed.

Except for not having any form of APS. I dont think the problem is really coming down to budget. 

In theory, you can make your tank protected from all threats. From all aspects. The problem is, that that tank. Wount be mobile. And you already have one such tank. Its called NORAD, in the Cheyenne Mountains. And it is still trying to move from Colorado spring without success.

what i mean was that the 20 years of uncon warfare, maybe. Has colored of, in the places you put the armor on. With about the same weight on two tanks. And one has much better side armor. It probably sacrificed armor on some other part of the whehicle.

[Armorgunner]

15 hours ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

 

As already discussed, the big fuel suck isn't tanks and tanks alone, it's mechanized/motorized unit on a whole.  If your logistics cannot support mechanized/motorized units, then yeah maybe skip out on the M1.  Or the Leo 2.  Or just tanks in general.  But in practice the Bradley and M1 both required about the same amount of logistics push on the march to Baghdad, which opens interesting questions about just how relevant the on-paper fuel consumption/testing circumstances are.  

I think you are a little damaged, of fighting lowintensive wars for to long. On the march to Bagdad,  you, or your supplychain was attacked exactly zero times by Iraqi interdiction aircrafts. You had 99.8% air superiority. And everything you say, i hear that you are not living in a world when that is not so.

But if we go back to "a potentional war with Russia". And you dont have 99.8% air superiority. And you in you tank potentionally can meet Ka-50 Hokum choppers. And your supplychain can be attacked by Su-24 Fencers, Su-34 Fullbacks, and heavy rocket artillery bombardment. Then maybe only 20% of the fuel might reach your unit. And if you after refuling,  can drive only 40 miles, or in the Leopard case 82 Miles. With the delivered fuel. Thats not relevant to You? 

Edited September 9, 2017 by Armorgunner

[Rinaldi]

You keep speaking as if the Americans will maneuver and operationally plan like that against a real foe. Or that the average American general officer thinks every mechanized attack is going to be OIF. They don't, if you can't gather that for yourself. But I suppose you chose to ignore @panzersaurkrautwerfer's comments about how the NTC OPFOR are given every possible advantage imaginable to sober everyone up. You've been choosing to ignore most of the points raised, actually.

In fact, can I ask if you actually have a point yourself besides saying "well actually?" You've just been a stubborn contrarian going "but what about" to every cogent point raised. Saying the US's conventional warfighting skills have eroded in the last 15 years is not precisely a hot take, but thanks for sharing. You left out the part where they are the only NATO country, with the exception of the United Kingdom, with conventional combat experience to fall back upon. 

Like yes, no one in the US Army has ever templated vertical threats to their LOC when it comes to a war in Central Europe. Or radio-electronic warfare, or the thought that the enemy is offensively capable. Ever. 

[Armorgunner]

2 minutes ago, Rinaldi said:

You keep speaking as if the Americans will maneuver and operationally plan like that against a real foe. Or that the average American general officer thinks every mechanized attack is going to be OIF. They don't, if you can't gather that for yourself. But I suppose you chose to ignore @panzersaurkrautwerfer's comments about how the NTC OPFOR are given every possible advantage imaginable to sober everyone up. You've been choosing to ignore most of the points raised, actually.

In fact, can I ask if you actually have a point yourself besides saying "well actually?" You've just been a stubborn contrarian going "but what about" to every cogent point raised. Saying the US's conventional warfighting skills have eroded in the last 15 years is not precisely a hot take, but thanks for sharing. You left out the part where they are the only NATO country, with the exception of the United Kingdom, with conventional combat experience to fall back upon. 

Like yes, no one in the US Army has ever templated vertical threats to their LOC when it comes to a war in Central Europe. Or radio-electronic warfare, or the thought that the enemy is offensively capable. Ever. 

Please quote, instead of a general: Im not happy with what you are saying post. 

[Armorgunner]

If it was me you where talking to, which I Think? I did 8 post here on side 3 before yours, And non with a "well actually" in it

[IICptMillerII]

14 minutes ago, Armorgunner said:

And if you after refuling,  can drive only 40 miles, or in the Leopard case 82 Miles. With the delivered fuel. Thats not relevant to You?

Lmao uh what? This myth that the Abrams is completely useless because it "guzzles gas like a typical Murican abomination" seriously needs to die. 

Sweden bought the Leopard 2 over the Abrams because it was significantly cheaper than the Abrams, and the Abrams variant Sweden would have gotten did not have the full armor suite. This ridiculous notion that Sweden bought Leo 2s because "muh gas" and "muh armor" is absurd. The Leo 2 was cheap, plain and simple. 

20 minutes ago, Armorgunner said:

I think you are a little damaged, of fighting lowintensive wars for to long. On the march to Bagdad,  you, or your supplychain was attacked exactly zero times by Iraqi interdiction aircrafts. You had 99.8% air superiority. And everything you say, i hear that you are not living in a world when that is not so.

Ahh yes, I forgot that the US Army only ever trains for the best possible case scenario. Nevermind all that stuff Panzer said about NTC being "hard." What does he know anyways? 

I think the solution here is obvious; the US Army needs to get rid of all these gas guzzling tanks and replace them with the latest model of Prius. Just slap some 4x4 tires on em and have an infantryman riding shotgun with a Javelin. Boom, problem solved. It can drive half way across Europe on one tank of gas, and has perfect anti-tank capability thanks to the Javelin. Hell, put another infantryman in the back seat with a Stinger. Now you're protected from those dreaded KA-52s you mentioned! Check and mate, pesky Russians. Remember, the only thing worse than a WW3 scenario, is a WW3 scenario that also is heavy on carbon emissions!

[Rinaldi]

There's no need to quote specifics Armorgunner. In this thread you have been making incorrect assumptions generally, and I can therefore address everything said generally. 

Edited September 9, 2017 by Rinaldi