Jump to content

Russian army under equipped?


Recommended Posts

Looking more locally for a simile, most family households are not equipped to fight off an invasion of biker gangs. That doesn't mean they're inviting biker gangs to come invade or that gangs can go around committing such offenses with impunity. Russia is currently being severely punished for its anachronistic forays into fascist expansionism. The vise keep tightening and tightening on them. Everything done to promote Putin's trans-national ethnic Slav superstate fantasy has come at a steep cost, and more importantly without benefit. Its like a biker gang invades someone's home only to find they've got to keep up the mortgage payments. What's the upside? How many more Crimeas can Russia afford to annex before they break their bank?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Quantitative assessment in this case is funny. It is impossible to qualitatively and quantitatively match equipment against a 125K strong Russian force for the entirety of supposed joint Baltic Defense Force. I am also not sure why apples and oranges are being thrown at each other, "combined Baltic military force" vs Russian ground force. What happened to air and naval parts of the equations for the Russian team? The latest conflict involving conventional forces, showed that a 13K land force (3 of them irregulars) can overwhelm a 19K land force in 4.5 days given superior intelligence and air support. Mobilization scenario over long periods (you mentioned a month) for the Baltics is not relevant here since these countries lack any strategic depth.

Furthermore active and ready "BDF" forces that require no prior organization to deploy in case of an attack combine to approximately (quick look past wiki) 16+18+13 for the entire forces, Navy, Air, Ground, National Guard, Military Police, Ceremonial troops and paramilitary. RAND's assessment sounds a lot less like agenda-pushing in that light. 

Edited by BTR
Grammar
Link to comment
Share on other sites

BTW, using the rule of thumb that minimum defense is 1/3 the side of the attacker, assuming a 125,000 sized Russian attack force means having roughly a 45,000 defense force.  By the numbers we crunched it does have that with reserves factored in.  Combined with NATO forces that would be a pretty good building block for a successful defense.  It could even be enough to trip up the Russians long enough to bring in another 50k or so.  That's really situationally dependent.

That sounds a lot more reasonable if you only count personnel and don't count artillery, aircraft and armored vehicles :P

EDIT: Ninja-ed 

Edited by Vanir Ausf B
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Looking more locally for a simile, most family households are not equipped to fight off an invasion of biker gangs. That doesn't mean they're inviting biker gangs to come invade or that gangs can go around committing such offenses with impunity. Russia is currently being severely punished for its anachronistic forays into fascist expansionism. The vise keep tightening and tightening on them. Everything done to promote Putin's trans-national ethnic Slav superstate fantasy has come at a steep cost, and more importantly without benefit. Its like a biker gang invades someone's home only to find they've got to keep up the mortgage payments. What's the upside? How many more Crimeas can Russia afford to annex before they break their bank?

Will if he hired some ex Wallstreet risk managers he could be speculating the stock market rewarding the western defense industries for their increased order portfolio's linked to Putins cowboy adventures, which in the end will of course bite back viciously  ;-)

Edited by Lethaface
Link to comment
Share on other sites

That 1/3 ratio is I think predicated on a prepared defense model worst case scenario. As much as I think Russia's offensive capabilities are over rated, I don't think the above ratio is applicable either excepting for built up areas. Russia forces would be much more mobile than the defense. It would be interesting to see what the defensive strategy is, in other words what are likely choke points that ciould slow down a Russian advance if any. Sounds like a great opportunity to check out a map!

Link to comment
Share on other sites

That sounds a lot more reasonable if you only count personnel and don't count artillery, aircraft and armored vehicles :P

EDIT: Ninja-ed 

Sure Russia has absolute overpower in all those categories but if the Baltics would be able to mount a defense similar in concept to what Hezbollah managed in 2006, things could get pretty nasty for an armoured spearhead invasion. Especially if NATO is giving a helping hand. Given the 26 years they had to prepare it is not impossible to imagine this possibility.
However, I'm not in the position of knowing but, my impression is not that the Baltics have prepared for such a thing the way Hesbollah did or have the necessary territory. In my book they joined NATO for security 
and went for a full volunteer professional force like the rest of EuropeI do know that their economies, which are steered quite competently in my opiniondon't really allow for large military expenditures that would be necessary to field a strong defense force that can credibly face Russia in a conventional war. 

People wise the Baltics could be three low populated, (very) poor, provinces of the Netherlands. How in earth could they be able to pay for an army much larger than the current Dutch army and sufficiently geared up? 

Edited by Lethaface
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Quantitative assessment in this case is funny. It is impossible to qualitatively and quantitatively match equipment against a 125K strong Russian force for the entirety of supposed joint Baltic Defense Force. I am also not sure why apples and oranges are being thrown at each other, "combined Baltic military force" vs Russian ground force. What happened to air and naval parts of the equations for the Russian team?

Naval would not likely play much of a role because they would be highly exposed.  Air, obviously, is a big one.  How that plays out depends heavily on what NATO does before the first shot is fired and how effective Russian ground support is when being challenged by NATO interdiction.  Likewise, how effective NATO ground support is when being challenged by Russian interdiction.  This is the element that is most important for both sides to settle in their favor.  NATO has an inherent advantage, though it is unknown how that advantage would be applied to this scenario.

The latest conflict involving conventional forces, showed that a 13K land force (3 of them irregulars) can overwhelm a 19K land force in 4.5 days given superior intelligence and air support. Mobilization scenario over long periods (you mentioned a month) for the Baltics is not relevant here since these countries lack any strategic depth.

There are lessons to be learned from the Georgian War, but there are so many differences that one has to be very careful about what lessons are drawn from it.

Furthermore active and ready "BDF" forces that require no prior organization to deploy in case of an attack combine to approximately (quick look past wiki) 16+18+13 for the entire forces, Navy, Air, Ground, National Guard, Military Police, Ceremonial troops and paramilitary. RAND's assessment sounds a lot less like agenda-pushing in that light. 

Yes, that is correct.  There are all kinds of assumptions that have to be made.  One major assumption I am making is that Russia would not have the advantage of a strategic surprise.  Reserves and rapid reaction forces from NATO become viable for inclusion in the initial invasion scenario.  After that time becomes a major factor because for sure the Baltic states alone could mobilize significant forces, though only if there was time to do it.  NATO is the major wildcard in this whole thing, which the Rand study did examine in different scenarios.

That sounds a lot more reasonable if you only count personnel and don't count artillery, aircraft and armored vehicles :P

EDIT: Ninja-ed 

Yes, when talking about the weaponry things get extremely difficult to assess because one has to make major assumptions of what NATO would do and also how effective the Russian equipment would be in that particular scenario.  Choke points, Javelins, time of year, etc. all factor into effectiveness of those sorts of assets.  It also matters a lot if Russia comes in through Belarus (highly doubtful) or Kaliningrad (more likely) in any significant numbers.

There are so many variables in this scenario it really does make it impossible to have a coherent discussion about it.  Change one variable and possibly the outcome is affected.

I'll say again... my opinion is that the Baltics and NATO need only disrupt the attack, they do not need to defeat it outright.

Steve

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'll say again... my opinion is that the Baltics and NATO need only disrupt the attack, they do not need to defeat it outright.

Basically correct, but more specifically it's a race to see if NATO can move sufficient reinforcements directly onto the AoO before Russia slams the doors shut. Geography would give the Russians some advantages here. The Baltic states are collectively so small Russian anti-air can blanket them from within Russian territory. That makes direct reinforcement by air unlikely. Reinforcement by sea is always a crapshoot and would take more time (and this is also where Russian naval assets, probably submarines, would play a roll in interdiction). That leaves the land routes, and this is where the position of Belarus becomes critical. If Belarus sides with NATO then Russia is probably screwed. But if Belarus is neutral the only land corridor into the Baltics is the Lithuanian/Polish border, which is only about 30 miles (50km) wide.

Edited by Vanir Ausf B
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Yup, the conditions are important.  In my view the attack at all is very unlikely no matter what, so the conditions necessary for Russia to seriously consider attacking would be pretty dire.  Dire isn't likely to come about in 24 hours or even 72 hours.  This means the West should have warning enough to increase its response to a pending invasion.  Given NATO's moves over the past few months in particular, I expect stuff would flow into the Baltics roughly proportional to the threat level.  Some would be quite out in the open, but some of it would be very hush-hush.  The overt stuff would be more units, the covert stuff might be ammo stockpiles, more Javelins, intel gathering assets, etc.

The point is NATO forces facing Russia would larger and more capable than what is in the Baltics now, just like what is in the Baltics now is greater than last year, and last year greater than pretty much any year prior.  NATO might not be moving as fast or boldly as some think, but for sure they are not sitting around doing nothing.

The terrain is a really interesting thing to consider.  In many ways it is favorable to the Baltics, especially if Belarus stays completely neutral (I think it would, but it's not certain).  It is horrible tank country, large chunks impassible to vehicles, and plenty of cover for tactical engagements.  This in many ways reduces the effectiveness of Russia's heavy armor component.  Back in WW2 days the Soviets certainly had a ton of trouble taking back the Baltics for that very reason.  Therefore, the Russian attack force would have to deploy in echelons to some extent, though I'd have to do a lot of research to say what that would be. Those of us who are operational and strategic gamers, not to mention up on groggy military history, know that what counts in a battle is often how many forces you can have at the front more than how many forces you have in total.  At least for a while.

What this could mean is that Russian local superiority might not be as big as one might think.  It might only be able to get 50,000 forces in the line at one time and NATO maybe 30,000.  In a war of attrition Russia might win, but I don't think a war of attrition is a viable means of waging warfare any more.  At least not for Russia or NATO.

As for the punishment that can be dished out by Russia's artillery and air branches, it's certainly got a really big potential to inflict massive damage.  But it's yet to be seen how that lines up with reality.  NATO has spent its entire existence developing methods for dealing with Russia's massed fire potential, so it's not like there wouldn't be a meaningful challenge (or at least a potential of one).

Steve

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Naval power is going to play a role even without having to move from mooring in Kalinigrad with ranged support. Plus for your numbers game, apart from just Naval Infantry, the navy in that vicinity has one motor-rifle brigade, one rocket artillery brigade, one tube artillery brigade, one motor-rifle regiment and other supporting land formations like EWAR battalions and such. 

The Russian superiority in the Baltic region does not come from a numbers game, but from the fact that BDF lacks entire classes of weaponry and thus capabilities. Very limited tube artillery past 100-120mm, no MLRS as class, no counter-battery detection, no helicopter fleet (at all), no naval power, no high precision long ranged tactical weaponry, no EWAR capabilities, the list goes on. It isn't just about armor, and even there it isn't just about MBTs. 30mm autocannons are nearly ubiquitous in the Western/Southern MD forces, even on lighter APC's while they aren't proliferated if if we take the whole three Baltic armies. Again, RANDs assessment in that light sounds fairly in-line with what the current conditions are. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

If the Baltics were invaded those forces in Kaliningrad aren't going anywhere.  If they do they may find Polish troops sitting on the docks when they come back.

Russia has to factor these in and it is a good 200 miles plus before Russian troops not in Kaliningrad can make it to the Polish border and they have to cross the Daugava first.  This data is 5 years old.  Another reason for Belarus to insist on neutrality.

As of 2011, the Armed Forces are in the middle of a long-term modernisation programme. Immediate plans involve new anti-aircraft missile systems, ballistic missile defence systems, a Lead-In Fighter Trainer (LIFT) aircraft, medium transport and combat helicopters, submarines, unmanned areal vehicles, as well as self-propelled howitzers.

Land forces[edit]

Air Force[edit]

Navy[edit]

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Naval power is going to play a role even without having to move from mooring in Kalinigrad with ranged support. Plus for your numbers game, apart from just Naval Infantry, the navy in that vicinity has one motor-rifle brigade, one rocket artillery brigade, one tube artillery brigade, one motor-rifle regiment and other supporting land formations like EWAR battalions and such. 

The Russian superiority in the Baltic region does not come from a numbers game, but from the fact that BDF lacks entire classes of weaponry and thus capabilities. Very limited tube artillery past 100-120mm, no MLRS as class, no counter-battery detection, no helicopter fleet (at all), no naval power, no high precision long ranged tactical weaponry, no EWAR capabilities, the list goes on. It isn't just about armor, and even there it isn't just about MBTs. 30mm autocannons are nearly ubiquitous in the Western/Southern MD forces, even on lighter APC's while they aren't proliferated if if we take the whole three Baltic armies.

 

This is all applicable to one and only one scenario:

--> Russia attacks tomorrow without any warning and without any meaningful reaction from NATO

All of your statements are predicated on the current standings, which even then you're not completely correct because there are now US forces, tanks, and artillery in position.  Perhaps not a lot and not currently crewed, but that gets me to the point in my previous post.  NATO is already moving towards changing many of the the things you listed to be less favorable to the Russian side.  As security concerns over the Baltics grows, the pace and quantity of response will increase along with diversity.

Let's take EWAR and counter battery for examples.  If NATO made a decision to deploy those systems today, they could be in place within a few days.  They are not that difficult to deploy as they do not require large infrastructure changes nor a large logistics tail.  Shove a bunch of them onto a C-130 and they are there.

Naval is the biggest hole in your argument.  If you think NATO would allow Russia freedom of movement in the Baltics if a war went hot, I do not know what scenario you can come up with that would produce that result.  NATO knows where all vessels are at a given time and it could easily intercept anything it wanted to.  The Baltic, like the Black Sea, is a bathtub with capable counter forces all along the edge.  No, Russia would have to go into the Baltics without any meaningful naval activity.  Which gets us to sburke's post.

The moment a shooting war starts Russia will only have access to Kaliningrad via the sea and Belarus (land and air).  The sea would be off limits and air totally impractical, so the only possible way would be land route through Belarus.  Lukashenko has shown that he's likely to err on the side of better relations with Europe than with Russia.  If NATO gave Belarus an ultimatum to not allow any Russian military activity over its soil I think there's a better than good chance it would comply in a meaningful way (e.g. special forces would be allowed through, trains of tanks not).  Therefore, it is likely that whatever is in Kaliningrad before the shoot starts is all there is going to be.  That also includes munitions, food, fuel, manpower, equipment, and other consumable items.  I doubt the forces there would be able to do much more than harass Lithuania's border because the force would be obligated to assume a defensive posture.

Poland has agreements within NATO and specifically with the Baltics to aid in their defense.  Poland has long standing claims on the Kaliningrad territory and for sure does not want Russia as a neighbor.  I would expect there would be considerable interest in their forces moving into Kaliningrad for their own purposes.  Doing so would also open a land bridge for NATO forces to move into the Baltics without using air or sea routes.  It is probable that this could be used as leverage with Lukashenko to stay out of things (i.e guaranteeing Belarus port access if he stays out, barring him if he does not).

 

Again, RANDs assessment in that light sounds fairly in-line with what the current conditions are. 

Key phrase is "current conditions".  Besides my objections to the probable lack of soft factor considerations, this is the other aspect that weakens their assessment.  Though to be clear, they did have alternative scenarios are more like I am describing.  Those scenarios produced a more favorable result for the Baltics.

Steve

Edited by Battlefront.com
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Polish response and subsequent invasion to Russia would activate CSTO treaties bringing Belarus into the conflict, which altogether is a different scenario. Looking at the beginning of this discussion, one of the primary assumptions was that NATO wasn't involved and that Baltics were not supported. The original setting in examination were current conditions as well, and that is what I stuck with. This is an equally unrealistic scenario to that of Russia invading a NATO country. However, as I think I've managed to demonstrate, your original conclusion that the Baltics have a chance against a directed Russian aggression on their own for even the "first month" of fighting is also overly optimistic (idealistic even?). 

The current trend is to reinforce the Baltics, how much of it is political will which may change with administration change is very much up to question, especially with renewed ME US deployments now also being in the equation.

On Baltic fleet, if you re-read my original statement, in worst case scenario it remains a force multiplier even without having to leave its mooring. A very similar situation to WW2 and the role the Baltic fleet took during the battle for Leningrad. 

Edited by BTR
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Polish response and subsequent invasion to Russia would activate CSTO treaties bringing Belarus into the conflict, which altogether is a different scenario.

Yup, totally different scenario.  We also have to consider that Belarus would not live up to its treaty obligations.  I do not know about the details of CSTO, but with the NATO treaty a nation that unilaterally attacks another nation is no longer entitled to collective defense protection.  I took a very quick look at a summary of the CSTO and a statement was made that implies that might also be true for CSTO.  Even if it is not, I could see Lukashenko saying "hey, Russia started this nonsense so I don't see why we should have to bail them out".  Which would be the smart thing to do from Belarus' standpoint since it has absolutely nothing to gain by waging war against NATO and Europe, but a lot to lose.

At the very least, I think Russia would not find Belarus reliable enough to use its forces in Kaliningrad for significant offensive purposes.

Looking at the beginning of this discussion, one of the primary assumptions was that NATO wasn't involved and that Baltics were not supported. The original setting in examination were current conditions as well, and that is what I stuck with. This is an equally unrealistic scenario to that of Russia invading a NATO country.

The premise "what would happen if Russia invaded the Baltics" is a valid condition to explore since certainly Putin has made overt and covert threats against the Baltic states.  If that premise is going to be properly tested then the best guess at circumstances for such an action should be made.  Context is important, especially in warfare.

However, as I think I've managed to demonstrate, your original conclusion that the Baltics have a chance against a directed Russian aggression on their own for even the "first month" of fighting is also overly optimistic (idealistic even?). 

I've already retracted that ONE statement I made.  I didn't even make it full heartedly :)  While I do think under some situations it might be possible for the Baltics to win on their own, I don't think it is very likely. 

Tomorrow I hope to have some information from a serving Estonian Army NCO that I am in contact with.  If he has anything interesting to add to the discussion I'll pass it along.

The current trend is to reinforce the Baltics, how much of it is political will which may change with administration change is very much up to question, especially with renewed ME US deployments now also being in the equation.

For sure there are many questions about where things are headed.  However, deterring Russian aggression has moved from near the bottom of NATO's list to the top.  Which is partly self serving for NATO since there were some who wanted to disband it because they felt it no longer serves a purpose.  That argument is much harder to make in 2016 than it was in 2013.

On Baltic fleet, if you re-read my original statement, in worst case scenario it remains a force multiplier even without having to leave its mooring. A very similar situation to WW2 and the role the Baltic fleet took during the battle for Leningrad. 

Possibly, but the methods for "reaching out and touching" are a lot bigger now than they were in WW2.

Steve

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Re: Belarus

I think regardless of what treaties they sign, they will firmly try to carve out a middle route that pleases absolutely no one.  Only Russia unambiguously has supported their weird little state, while at the same time, Russia as a trading partner/ally is a bit of a white elephant.  It neither has money or true international reach, while alienating the entire west effectively closes off access to anything really meaningful in terms of economic ties.  

They'd likely somehow want to avoid being caught up in the inevitable straight up embargo of export/imports to Russia and allied states, while avoiding an out and out Russian invasion.  

Either way I would not hold out hope for truly honoring any agreements they've made to any parties at this point.

Re: Baltics on a whole  

Subtopics a-way!

a. Outside of a true unambiguous non-green manned provocation from the Baltic states, a Russian victory is going to be a sour one indeed.  Russia is not the Soviet Union, and this recent oil price drop combined with the existing sanctions highlight that it is no longer an Eastern Block capable of independent operation, but instead simply a link on the global trade chain.   

That offers very little outside of MIGs and AKs you cannot buy elsewhere.  While Georgia and even the Ukraine are in weird ambiguous places conflict-wise, the Baltic states are not.  "Welcoming" any of those states back into the Russian federation, or even establishing puppet states would go well and beyond sanctions and likely into a straight up comprehensive embargo (and perhaps even blockade).  And that will hurt given how much Russia relies on import/export matters, without causing much of a hiccup to economies elsewhere.  

b. Eastern Europe is rapidly becoming a priority for the US in a very concrete and real military sense.  And Russia only has itself to blame for it to be honest.  There used to be some historical resistance to deploying troops and equipment for fear of offending the Russians/upsetting regional balance...but that apparently left no impression with the Russians.  There is no remaining good will, or sensitivity in any event.

There is also fairly limited desire to become more deeply involved in the Middle East.  Fairly limited forces, largely light expeditionary ones are involved at all, minus last time I checked, an ongoing "heavy" unit rotationally deploy to Kuwait.  This is likely where things get capped off in the ME.  Conversely, there's a lot of underutilized facilities and historical infrastructure in Europe, and now there's suddenly a clear and possibly present danger to allied and US interests in Europe (unlike the Pacific, while tensions or no demands fairly limited ground forces).

c. As to who'd win in a fight, it's really a question of if it'd be "worth it" for the Russians to win.  It will certainly not be easy, and it will certainly be costly in terms of equipment and personnel.  For NATO, this is a problem, but defending three fairly free countries from invasion by pan-Slavic ultra-nationalists is somewhat of a noble cause, there's no sympathy for Russian claims in the Baltic outside of Russia.  If a few thousand Russians come home in boxes, and there's not insigifncant damage to the Russian military in exchange for land that doesn't want a Russian presense, that doesn't offer assets that easily translate out into a more prosperous Russia, and comes with universal condemnation and a pariah status....will Russians accept that as a good trade?

That is of course, assuming a Russian "victory."  The more surprise the Russians have obviously the better for them, but they've shown their hand, and we are all quite sensitive to the sudden appearance of airsofters and PMCs in T-80s now.  A longer delay, or more early detection will make likely simply result in too daunting of an objective for the Russians to attempt, let alone take.  

 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

 

Poland has agreements within NATO and specifically with the Baltics to aid in their defense.  Poland has long standing claims on the Kaliningrad territory and for sure does not want Russia as a neighbor.  I would expect there would be considerable interest in their forces moving into Kaliningrad for their own purposes. 

 

May I ask where did you find this information? Poland has absolutely no claims to Kaliningrad. There are no military capabilities, nor political will, to invade this Russian territory. As to NATO plans, they focus now on the so called "Suwalki Gap". A strip of territory between Kaliningrad and Belarus, which would need to be defended in order to maintain the land connection with the Baltic states.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/29/fulda-gap-nato-russia-putin-us-army/


Right now, Poland has practically no military units there and the vast majority of it's active brigades is still located in the west of the country, exactly where they were stationed in 1989. Currently there are some plans to form few territorial defence brigades in the east. We'll see about that. All in all, I'm pretty sure that the first troops we would see in the Baltic would be the US paratroopers and the cavalrymen on Strykers.

Edited by Ivanov
Link to comment
Share on other sites

 

May I ask where did you find this information? Poland has absolutely no claims to Kaliningrad. There are no military capabilities, nor political will, to invade this Russian territory.

At the moment, absolutely correct.  In the event of war with Russia I am sure stance towards Kaliningrad would change substantially from what it is now.

As for claims on the territory, they go back a few hundred years but they do exist.  I'm not saying that Poles are running around saying "we want our land back", but they do have a claim to it.  Far, far more than Russia has a claim to it since Russia had no history of control and forced out the German, Lithuanian, and Polish majority population to make room for relocated Russia.  Therefore, if Poland were to invade it would not be as outrageous as marching into St. Petersburg or some other definitively Russian area.  What would happen to the territory after a theoretical NATO invasion from Polish territory?  Probably hand it back to Russia under certain conditions (permanently demilitarized?).

This point, however, is way, way, way, way off topic.  I only mention it because of the military relevance to a hypothetical Russian attack on the Baltics.

 

As to NATO plans, they focus now on the so called "Suwalki Gap". A strip of territory between Kaliningrad and Belarus, which would need to be defended in order to maintain the land connection with the Baltic states.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/29/fulda-gap-nato-russia-putin-us-army/


Right now, Poland has practically no military units there and the vast majority of it's active brigades is still located in the west of the country, exactly where they were stationed in 1989. Currently there are some plans to form few territorial defence brigades in the east. We'll see about that. All in all, I'm pretty sure that the first troops we would see in the Baltic would be the US paratroopers and the cavalrymen on Strykers.

My comments are only in the context of what would happen if Russia attacked the Baltics.  There is no reason for Poland to even contemplate marching into Kaliningrad otherwise.

In any case, Russia would not be able to assume Poland would sit around doing nothing.  Quite the opposite.  Russian planners are traditionally quite concerned about leaving open back doors.  I do not think that in an invasion scenario Russia would take the forces in Kaliningrad and attack northward at the expense of leaving their southern border effectively undefended.

Steve

Edited by Battlefront.com
Link to comment
Share on other sites

As for claims on the territory, they go back a few hundred years but they do exist.  I'm not saying that Poles are running around saying "we want our land back", but they do have a claim to it.  Far, far more than Russia has a claim to it since Russia had no history of control and forced out the German, Lithuanian, and Polish majority population to make room for relocated Russia.  Therefore, if Poland were to invade it would not be as outrageous as marching into St. Petersburg or some other definitively Russian area. 

That's factually wrong. That territory never belonged to Poland. If anything, Germans could have some claim to it, but of course they won't do anything. Interestingly, Poland could have territorial claims to Lithuania and Russia would love if that happened. There's a substantial Polish minority in that country ( no Polish minority in Kaliningrad ) and there's a suspicion, that it's leaders are on the Russian payroll. Just imagine the Russian "little green men" appearing in Estonia and Latvia and at the same time Polish insurgents starting a rebelion in Lithuania. That would be Mr. Putin's dream come true. In that case, it would be very difficult for Polish government to explain to the public, why it's sending the troops to suppress it's own minority in a neighboring country. If you thought the Middle East was complicated - the demons of the past are still very near the surface in Europe.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

That's factually wrong. That territory never belonged to Poland.

Not really important to this discussion, but Poland controlled this region for about 200 years starting with the defeat of the Teutonic Knights.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish–Lithuanian–Teutonic_War

Again, I only mention this as an aside to differentiate Poland moving forces into this area vs. Poland moving forces into Moscow.  Conceptually there's a difference, even if in practical terms Kaliningrad is defacto as Russian as Moscow from a population standpoint.

If anything, Germans could have some claim to it, but of course they won't do anything. Interestingly, Poland could have territorial claims to Lithuania and Russia would love if that happened.

Yes, European borders are still very messy.

There's a substantial Polish minority in that country ( no Polish minority in Kaliningrad ) and there's a suspicion, that it's leaders are on the Russian payroll. Just imagine the Russian "little green men" appearing in Estonia and Latvia and at the same time Polish insurgents starting a rebelion in Lithuania. That would be Mr. Putin's dream come true. In that case, it would be very difficult for Polish government to explain to the public, why it's sending the troops to suppress it's own minority in a neighboring country. If you thought the Middle East was complicated - the demons of the past are still very near the surface in Europe.

Russia has been actively working this and other local unrest angles for 20+ years.  From what I can tell it's Lithuania's #1 concern with outright war way down on the list.  Rightly so, because Russian policy is more usually about denying other countries control and stability, not trying to take territory for itself.  Which is why annexation of Crimea came as a big surprise to most people, including people like me who predicted Russia would invade at the soonest opportunity.  The presumption was more or less what Russia is trying to do with Donbas (i.e. have effective political and economic control, but stick Ukraine with all the bills and have it screw up Ukrainian internal politics).  Direct annexation of land by Russia hasn't happened since Kaliningrad, ironically.

Steve

Link to comment
Share on other sites

well in summary I think we all pretty much agree that there really isn't a scenario that makes sense from even the Russian perspective to warrant invading the Baltic States.  Little to no return for the risk involved.  The threat may be more interesting from a pressure perspective for Russia and maybe an incident could occur because of brinksmanship on both parties, but an actual invasion is far fetched.

Not to put you on the spot Steve, but it does beg the question as what might be a scenario for an additional modern era CM game.  You could go totally hypothetical with something like the story line in Larry Bond's cauldron, but I don't see you guys going that route.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I wanted to contribute with a little bit of info I have regarding the state of Latvian army. First off, as Vanir Ausf B already noted, the active land force component is the smallest in the Baltics, with only 2 line infantry battalions.  These battalions are currently mechanized in BV 206, but thanks to purchase of ex-GB CVR(T)s will be transitioning to a new platform within the next few years.  The battalions themselves are somewhat on the largish side - with 4 line infantry companies, a CSS company and several platoons (see TO&E from NATO.int site) .  There is also a SF component, of roughly company strength. Latvia has been participating in Iraq and Afghanistan missions, so at least a portion of the force has recent combat experience.  Recent acquisitions, mostly driven by Ukrainian experience include Harris Falcon III (AN/PRC-117G) radio sets, new digital camo uniforms reflecting Latvian terrain (prior uniforms were "desert"), new body armor, abovementioned CVR(T)s and a reset of army helicopter force. Uniforms and body armor will be used by NG as well, though I don't know in what quantity.

The other major portion of the Land Force is the National Guard (Zemessardze).  They consist of 18 infantry battalions, and are primarily a territorial defense force.  During emergencies, they also act in aid to the police and emergency services.  As far as I know, most servicemen leaving active service do not transition into National Guard.  The preparedness level of Zemessardze for high intensity combat is fairly low.  The men train about for 30 days during first year's basic training and about 20 days a year in the following years. There is some movement towards improving the readiness levels, with each battalion designating a "High Readiness Company" by 2018.  This company will consist of best prepared and most experienced soldiers within the battalion - and probably will have first priority on receiving any new equipment as well. 

In terms of resisting a hybrid force backed up by Russian armed forces using the Ukrainian model (i.e. SF, EW escalating to direct involvement of Russian armored and artillery forces), Latvian land forces are insufficient in both quantity and quality.

 

 

Edited by Krater
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Not really important to this discussion, but Poland controlled this region for about 200 years starting with the defeat of the Teutonic Knights.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish–Lithuanian–Teutonic_War

 

Truly not important for the discussion but I just want to get the facts straight and I'm not going to mention it again. After the Thirteen Years' War (1454-66), the Eastern Prussia become nominally vassal territory of the Polish king. However ethnically and culturally this region remained German not Polish. Already in the XVII century the Prussias formed an alliance with the Swedes and invaded Poland. Over hundred years later Prussians were the principal initiators of the Partitions of Poland ( during the Kościuszko's times ).

Back to the hypothetical war scenarios in the Baltics - a full blown Russian invasion is unlikely, however in m opinion the Russian would have a significant advantage during the initial stages of the operation. Later on, they could successfully prevent NATO from sending in the reinforcements there, thanks to their A2/AD capabilities and by closing the Suwalki Gap. Except for the US, currently NATO armies are on lower readiness level than the Russians. The Baltic States possess minuscule military capabilities, while the Polish military is in the middle of a chaotic modernization and right now it's a complete mess. Polish armeded forces would be unable to defend the territory of Poland east of Vistula river, not to mention any intervention in the Baltics. 

A more likely scenario would include a start of insurgency based on the ethnic minorities. As in Donbas those insurgents could receive a substantial military aid from Russian and battalion size tactical groups could occasionally cross the border. Those tactical groups could clash with a NATO rapid reaction forces and any potential modern era CM game could exploit that scenario.

Edited by Ivanov
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I wanted to contribute with a little bit of info I have regarding the state of Latvian army. First off, as Vanir Ausf B already noted, the active land force component is the smallest in the Baltics, with only 2 line infantry battalions.  These battalions are currently mechanized in BV 206, but thanks to purchase of ex-GB CVR(T)s will be transitioning to a new platform within the next few years.  The battalions themselves are somewhat on the largish side - with 4 line infantry companies, a CSS company and several platoons (see TO&E from NATO.int site) .  There is also a SF component, of roughly company strength. Latvia has been participating in Iraq and Afghanistan missions, so at least a portion of the force has recent combat experience.  Recent acquisitions, mostly driven by Ukrainian experience include Harris Falcon III (AN/PRC-117G) radio sets, new digital camo uniforms reflecting Latvian terrain (prior uniforms were "desert"), new body armor, abovementioned CVR(T)s and a reset of army helicopter force. Uniforms and body armor will be used by NG as well, though I don't know in what quantity.

The other major portion of the Land Force is the National Guard (Zemessardze).  They consist of 18 infantry battalions, and are primarily a territorial defense force.  During emergencies, they also act in aid to the police and emergency services.  As far as I know, most servicemen leaving active service do not transition into National Guard.  The preparedness level of Zemessardze for high intensity combat is fairly low.  The men train about for 30 days during first year's basic training and about 20 days a year in the following years. There is some movement towards improving the readiness levels, with each battalion designating a "High Readiness Company" by 2018.  This company will consist of best prepared and most experienced soldiers within the battalion - and probably will have first priority on receiving any new equipment as well. 

In terms of resisting a hybrid force backed up by Russian armed forces using the Ukrainian model (i.e. SF, EW escalating to direct involvement of Russian armored and artillery forces), Latvian land forces are insufficient in both quantity and quality.

Thank you for the information.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest
This topic is now closed to further replies.
×
×
  • Create New...