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Your father has a twisted sense of humor.  I like it :D  Ironically I was trying to talk with my wife yesterday on cellphones while she was in some sort of partial dead zone.  I could hear her just fine, she could only hear garbled nonsense from me (and I wasn't drinking!).  It was a bit frustrating because from my end of things everything was fine, but on her end I wasn't being useful.  Wait... that sounds like a traditional marriage ;)  Fortunately she was in someone's house and had a landline so we didn't have to go to a counselor just to figure out when I should pick her up at the airport.

Steve

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https://bigtalksmalltalk.wordpress.com/2015/02/25/debaltseve-after-the-capture-2/

Pretty much what you're saying,  Steve/Panzer et al. 

He still doesn't call it a Victory,  but a hard fought stalemate,  which denied the Russians a Victory.

For a defender caught in a very bad kettle,  preventing the kettle from closing certainly could be seen as a de-facto tactical win,  ie the enemy objective was denied/frustrated. 

With this war,  propaganda useful victories are the only ones that really count. So,  Russia had a win of sorts (they can point to Debaltsev and say OURS) while UKR can point to their intact, experienced and effective forces and say FOR NOW. 

This,  basically,  seems to be the crux of the current stalemate. UKR is too effective to steamroll quickly, and is getting better each month. If anything,  the presence of the active front line keeps the pressure up on military reform,  steadily improving UKRs resilience. 

Putin's window has closed. 

 For now... 

Edited by kinophile
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https://bigtalksmalltalk.wordpress.com/2015/02/25/debaltseve-after-the-capture-2/

Pretty much what you're saying,  Steve/Panzer et al. 

He still doesn't call it a Victory,  but a hard fought stalemate,  which denied the Russians a Victory.

That was a pretty good summary and I commend him for so quickly kicking the Russian propaganda and uniformed Western media in the teeth only days after the operation concluded.  Very few were saying anything militarily and politically objective at the time, but instead got caught up in Russian hype and their own ignorance of what intense withdrawals look like in reality.  I'm not sure if I caught wind of this blog when I was posting about Debaltseve at the time, but maybe I did.

Anyway, I take issue with a few things he wrote.  The primary one is to better define the conditions at the time of the withdrawal (and to not call it a retreat!  Different animals!).  The salient was created during the Russian counter offensive in the Fall of 2014, not a position Ukraine chose to occupy under those circumstances.  And why would they?  The position was totally untenable from a military standpoint.  So Ukraine was faced with three options:

1.  Withdraw immediately and hand over the terrain to Russia "for free".  This would be seen as a major propaganda defeat as it would indicate that Ukraine didn't have confidence that it could hold ground it currently occupied.  It would also show that Ukraine was voluntarily giving up a thorn in the side of Russia's plans.  Not a good option.

2.  Counter attack to widen the shoulders so that the neck was not so easily threatened.  Even if Ukraine could have done this (and it is questionable as Russia would no doubt have intervened earlier) the West was putting heavy pressure on Ukraine to obey the cease fire even if Russia was not.  Therefore, Ukraine basically couldn't engage in offensive actions even if it had the opportunity and means to do so.  Scratch that option.

3.  Hold onto the salient for as long as possible, hopefully wearing down Russia's proxy forces to the point of getting them to obey the first ceasefire (Minsk 1) and then later the second ceasefire (Minsk 2).  If Russia had decided, for whatever reason, to live up to their word instead of showing the world their word means nothing, then Ukraine would have retained something useful.  The risk, of course, was that there was a chance that Ukraine could not hold out against Russia's proxy forces without Russian ground forces or with significant ground support. In which case they very well might have lost several thousand men in a "kettle", which would have been a major defeat for sure.

Of the three options, #1 was the least risky, #2 was impractical, and #3 risky.  Ukraine chose #3 and hoped they could hold out until Russia was either worn out or decided to live up to its word.  Ukraine did effectively defeat the Russian proxies since after 3 months their body count was high and gains almost nil.  But it simply was not in a good position to defend against a technically better equipped and larger enemy force.

Once it became clear that Russia was going all out to destroy the Ukrainian force they had two options:

1.  Retreat in a disorganized way as quickly as possible.  Flee the battlefield, in other words.

2.  Wait for the right moment and then conduct an extremely risky and uncertain withdrawal under unknown, but increasingly worsening, conditions.

Ukraine chose #2.

Given that Ukraine made these choices, but did not choose the initial starting conditions, the concept of "victory" or "defeat" should be judged based on how well they achieved the very difficult and gutsy goals they set for themselves.  Especially given the prior defeats at the hands of Russian forces.

When judged properly in this context, Ukraine should be granted a "victory".  If this were a Combat Mission game that's exactly what would have happened because in Combat Mission if you achieve your objectives and the enemy does not, then you win and the enemy loses.  Russia did not get what it wanted in full, Ukraine did.  As I said, it is almost certain that Ukraine did not view Debaltseve as indefinitely defensible if Russia wanted to take it, so by late January it was pretty clear that they were going to have to give it up at some point.  Ukraine decided to stick it out until Minsk 2 was completed and since it did that, another reason to grant this as a "victory".

Having said that, as the old saying goes... "if we win a few more battles like that, we'll lose the war".  Debaltseve was a victory for Ukraine, but it is not the sort of victory it should try to avoid having to make again.

For a defender caught in a very bad kettle,  preventing the kettle from closing certainly could be seen as a de-facto tactical win,  ie the enemy objective was denied/frustrated. 

Absolutely.  Tactically Ukraine did not get destroyed, but the fight was largely bleed out of the Russian proxy forces probably forever.  Ukraine, on the other hand, gets stronger every day.  Strategically Ukraine came out waaaaaaaaay ahead of Russia militarily and diplomatically.

With this war,  propaganda useful victories are the only ones that really count. So,  Russia had a win of sorts (they can point to Debaltsev and say OURS) while UKR can point to their intact, experienced and effective forces and say FOR NOW. 

The benefit of controlling all mass media is that you can make propaganda claims no matter what.  So on that front Russia was always going to win.  Even if Ukraine totally defeated Russia's efforts to take Debaltseve the would have invented some way to put a fantasy positive spin on it.  "As the glorious Novorussian forces were within meters of taking back territory, our fearless leader Putin stayed their hand in order to show our Ukrainian brothers mercy!  Because Russia lives up to its word of honor it used its influence to hold the separatist patriotic fighters to the terms of the Minsk 2 agreement, despite them being on the eve of victory!".

Note I am not putting a smiley here.  This is what would have happened if Russia had gauged it ill advised to intervene at Debaltseve when its proxy forces were exhausted and unable to fight.

Playing the propaganda game is always a losing proposition when the other side cares little about facts.

This,  basically,  seems to be the crux of the current stalemate. UKR is too effective to steamroll quickly, and is getting better each month. If anything,  the presence of the active front line keeps the pressure up on military reform,  steadily improving UKRs resilience. 

Ukraine could take back the Donbas within 2-4 weeks if Russia did not put several brigades into Ukraine to stop them because Russia's proxy force is spent and finding it difficult to man the frontlines.  Lately Russia has sent it's combat forces on very small (platoon sized) raids here, there, and everywhere to give the illusion that there is still something significant on the opposite side of the Ukrainian trenches.  Twice last month Ukraine simply walked into two significant sized urban areas and took them because in one case NOBODY was there and in the other case a small holding force quickly retreated when Ukraine pushed in.  Which is no doubt why there are increasing reports of additional Russian forces and equipment moving into Ukraine over the last month. 

Given this, and the likely quantity of force Russia would have to inject to ensure another stalemate, there's a lot of incentives for both sides to avoid any sort of large scale military action.  Which is an interesting situation toi face going into to the 2016 campaign season.  I don't believe Russia is stupid enough to provoke a general Ukrainian offensive, so I don't think they will do much.  On the other hand, Ukraine still has a lot of incentives to stay put because it's a "war" they can absolutely win by staying in place.  However, either side could change it's calculus based on circumstances and therefore all bets are off.

We shall see.

Steve

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Just a quick thought on "what constitutes victory".  I think a quick rule of thumb is to see if both questions can be answered in the positive:

1.  Did you achieve the goals you set for your own forces?

2.  Did you deny the enemy from achieving his goals for his forces?

If you answer "yes" to both then there's a good chance you scored a victory.  The degree of "yes" determines how strong or weak the victory was for your side.

In this case Ukraine can very soundly answer "yes" to both questions.  I think Russia has a qualified "yes" for the first question and a solid "no" for the second, therefore it can not be considered a Russian victory, but also not a Russian defeat.  Unless the entire purpose of the operation was to destroy Ukrainian forces, in which case it was a Russian defeat.

Dunkirk is an excellent historical example to look at.  The British were also able to answer "yes" to both and the Germans "no" to at least #2 (there is a huge historical debate about #1).  So the British should classify it as a victory, the Germans may or may not count it as a defeat.

Another way to think about victory/defeat is a common question people ask when they talk about tactical wargaming.  Very regularly someone will ask "do my battles influence if Germany wins or loses the war?"  The answer is a solid NO.  The customer then asks "then I don't see the point in playing a game where one side always wins and the other side always loses".  That's because the definition of win and loss is not being kept in the proper context.  You can win all your battles and still lose the war, so the game allows for that possibility.

Steve

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Here's something interesting to read about Debaltseve.  This is a blog by a member of 40th Battalion, the prime defending unit deep inside Debaltseve.  The author is a reporter in civilian life so he combined his own experiences with research done in the months following the battle.  Here's a rather critical piece of the story, the loss of Lohvynove, which unfortunately was not continued (entry 20 is the last entry):

https://viktorkovalenko.wordpress.com/2015/11/12/debaltseve-diary-20-capture-lohvynove/

Obviously it is not written in an unbiased way, but the bulk of it checks out with other sources at the time and since.  There is some pretty blunt language about Ukrainian failures and a peek at the consequences of not having intel or not knowing what to do with it.  This is a perpetual component of combat and is yet another problem I have with war reporting and armchair second guessers... there is no military on Earth, now or ever in our history, that doesn't make mistakes on a regular basis which lead to people getting killed or bad situations being made worse.  Training, equipment, and leadership simply reduce the chances of such things happening and lessen the negative effects once they do. It's fine to point out mistakes and to hold people accountable for them, but it is also wrong to take things out of context because context is everything.  Articles like this show how far Ukraine has to go to be at "NATO standard", but it also illustrates how far they progressed in just a few short months since Ilovaisk.  Especially when compared to the "separatists".

There are other blog entries about their withdrawal that are quite interesting.

Steve

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Here's something interesting to read about Debaltseve.  This is a blog by a member of 40th Battalion, the prime defending unit deep inside Debaltseve.  The author is a reporter in civilian life so he combined his own experiences with research done in the months following the battle.  Here's a rather critical piece of the story, the loss of Lohvynove, which unfortunately was not continued (entry 20 is the last entry):

https://viktorkovalenko.wordpress.com/2015/11/12/debaltseve-diary-20-capture-lohvynove/

 

Author didn't make mention about why enemy so easy took Lohvynove, but this fact became knowingly only not long ago. M3 road was defended by 30th mech.brigade battalion, but before day of enemy advance to Lohvynove, commander of the sector C, general-mayor A.Taran ordered to move this battalion from their positions to the rear "for rest". And this in situation, when Vuhlehirsk already was taken, enemy tried to cross a river in Kalynivka area northern from Vuhlehirsk and estimately prepared to cut the M3 road ! General-mayor Taran also played own black role also in some other episodes of Debaltseve battle with own strange orders or their abscense, when fast decisions were need. What this was - incompetence or betrayal, possibly will answer current investigation. Interestengly, that Taran rejected to withdraw from Debaltseve and officers placed him in the car by force. But on the way to our position Taran suddenly "disappered" and came on our territory only through two days. Say, he want to surrender to DNR, because feared he would to response for own badly command, which lead to heavy consequences.

Also exists other official myth of this battle - as if withdrawal was planned in General Staff. But in really, after perfidious violation of truce from pro-Russian forces and renewal of Debaltseve assault, our political and top-military establishment are situated in full prostration. They only appealed to the West and "international community" in order to they influence on Putin.... Ha-ha-ha... But they relly didn't know what to do with almost encircled group iside the bulge. Then during 1-2 days, operation of withdrawal was developed by commander of 128th mountain brigade (main force of bulge defense) colonel Serhiy Shaptala and his staff. They determined two main ways of evacuation and one false. He can to sent his plan to Muzhenko and General Staff commander after consultation with Poroshenko forced to agree with this plan, but as say he have put all response for consequences on colonel Shaptala. Also Muzhenko orderd to support Shaptala's breaktrough by sector- and HQ- subordinated artillery and MLRS. Also small combined groups of airmoble troops and special forces were sent into the bulge to lead and support the withdrawal. Our artillery conducted deadly strike on enemy positions along ways of evacuation. Also knowingly about as minimum one "Tochka-U" ballistic missile launch. Enemy was shoked and could't to do anything. Russian artillery was forced to withdraw from own position and also could't threat to our withdrawal. Most of troops were warned about withdrawal and it's order by couriers. Our withdraw became a big surprise for enemy. Total five columnes was formed, three of them passed without contact with enemy, fourth was some shelled with mortars and suffered minimal losses. 23 troopers of 95th airmobile brigade with arty spotters and 17th tank brigade tank platoon seized heights along our way and had been suppresing all enemy efforts to hit passing convoys. But close to morning enemy have rallied from night panic and could more succesfully attack last fifth column, which suffered biggest loses during the withdraw (more that 30-40 dead). Last from Debaltseve moved out special forces. Colonel Shaptala was awarded by "Hero of Ukraine Gold Star" - highest militray award, but for this his brave plan of evacuation became "genial plan of General Staff". 

 

Edited by Haiduk
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I am glad these threads are kept going and thanks to those updating with key snippets of information. The blog made depressing reading as the realities of war and personal losses laid bare.

Thank you for giving us better insight to this war.

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Colonel Shaptala was awarded by "Hero of Ukraine Gold Star" - highest militray award, but for this his brave plan of evacuation became "genial plan of General Staff". 

Heh I don't think you'll find anything new there.  The numbers of participants in success always seems disproportionately large when compared to how few seem to be responsible for failure. :P

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Author didn't make mention about why enemy so easy took Lohvynove, but this fact became knowingly only not long ago. M3 road was defended by 30th mech.brigade battalion, but before day of enemy advance to Lohvynove, commander of the sector C, general-mayor A.Taran ordered to move this battalion from their positions to the rear "for rest". And this in situation, when Vuhlehirsk already was taken, enemy tried to cross a river in Kalynivka area northern from Vuhlehirsk and estimately prepared to cut the M3 road ! General-mayor Taran also played own black role also in some other episodes of Debaltseve battle with own strange orders or their abscense, when fast decisions were need. What this was - incompetence or betrayal, possibly will answer current investigation. Interestengly, that Taran rejected to withdraw from Debaltseve and officers placed him in the car by force. But on the way to our position Taran suddenly "disappered" and came on our territory only through two days. Say, he want to surrender to DNR, because feared he would to response for own badly command, which lead to heavy consequences.

Also exists other official myth of this battle - as if withdrawal was planned in General Staff. But in really, after perfidious violation of truce from pro-Russian forces and renewal of Debaltseve assault, our political and top-military establishment are situated in full prostration. They only appealed to the West and "international community" in order to they influence on Putin.... Ha-ha-ha... But they relly didn't know what to do with almost encircled group iside the bulge. Then during 1-2 days, operation of withdrawal was developed by commander of 128th mountain brigade (main force of bulge defense) colonel Serhiy Shaptala and his staff. They determined two main ways of evacuation and one false. He can to sent his plan to Muzhenko and General Staff commander after consultation with Poroshenko forced to agree with this plan, but as say he have put all response for consequences on colonel Shaptala. Also Muzhenko orderd to support Shaptala's breaktrough by sector- and HQ- subordinated artillery and MLRS. Also small combined groups of airmoble troops and special forces were sent into the bulge to lead and support the withdrawal. Our artillery conducted deadly strike on enemy positions along ways of evacuation. Also knowingly about as minimum one "Tochka-U" ballistic missile launch. Enemy was shoked and could't to do anything. Russian artillery was forced to withdraw from own position and also could't threat to our withdrawal. Most of troops were warned about withdrawal and it's order by couriers. Our withdraw became a big surprise for enemy. Total five columnes was formed, three of them passed without contact with enemy, fourth was some shelled with mortars and suffered minimal losses. 23 troopers of 95th airmobile brigade with arty spotters and 17th tank brigade tank platoon seized heights along our way and had been suppresing all enemy efforts to hit passing convoys. But close to morning enemy have rallied from night panic and could more succesfully attack last fifth column, which suffered biggest loses during the withdraw (more that 30-40 dead). Last from Debaltseve moved out special forces. Colonel Shaptala was awarded by "Hero of Ukraine Gold Star" - highest militray award, but for this his brave plan of evacuation became "genial plan of General Staff". 

 

Wow,  finally a proper description of what I've been trying to work out. That sounds very realistic in its planning and execution. 

Namely:

Comms are compromised,  use couriers (known already) 

Withdraw in separately staged columns. Use  fresh SF (their experience and standing will help drive the coordination) and exit at night.

Suppress enemy positions along route with every Arty available 

This gives the first few columns the greatest chance of clean escape, so I assume the wounded, combat ineffective were in those first two columns.

By the 3rd column the enemy breaks free of suppression, realizes what's up and starts attacking. Thence the 4th column is hit  mainly by indirect,  ranged fire,  whereas the 5th is hit by a organized coordinated attack,  as UKR Arty is running low by now.

This last column then,  is what the media here's about and sees,  because it's remains  are really the only thing there TO show. 

The advantages of both local/tactical surprise AND strategic surprise were achieved, and BOTH  had to be.

My badly uninformed impression was always of a frantic,  last minute mass rush to escape,  with Russian forces essentially in ambush,  slaughtering the columns as the passed. 

Haiducks account makes a lot more sense. 

There needs to be a documentary style film - a fully plotted, storylined reenactment which bluntly names everyone involved on both sides and gives a good, unbiased overview of the main events. Straight documentary won't sell,  but a proper film would. At least in Eastern Europe  :-)

 

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I think the truth about the withdrawal's organization is more a combination of two perspectives, with people emphasizing one over the other for their own purposes.  From what I can tell the general staff did have a plan for withdrawal and was holding off for strategic reasons as long as possible.  If Russia had lived up to its word at Minsk 2 then there would be no need for withdrawal, however the offensive continued and even increased in the week before the cease fire and the days after.  Not a big surprise to anybody given Russia's track record within this conflict and outside of it.  So I think it's totally ridiculous to think that the political and higher military command levels were surprised by Russia's continued offensive.

What the higher levels were doing was fighting a different war than the one going on in Debaltseve.  They were under a lot of pressure from the West to get a cease fire even though they doubted, with good reason, that Russia was going to actually implement it.  Since Western support is critical to Ukraine, they had to allow Russia to confirm that its word is worth less than the paper it is written on.  This is exactly what happened and the West has since taken a much harder line against Russia.  This is a victory for Ukraine that can not be overstated.

If Russia surprised everybody by living up to its word, then Ukraine would have benefited from a cease fire.  If it didn't then Ukraine had to make sure that Russia's direct involvement in the war had yet another chance to be clearly established.  Even better if it could be established AFTER the signing of Minsk 2 since it showed how little Russia cared about playing by rules, even rules it voluntarily agreed to.  That meant keeping Debaltseve until such conditions could be established.  This is exactly what happened.

I have absolutely no doubt that the general staff had a plan on paper to withdraw from Debaltseve when conditions warranted doing so.  Whether it was a good plan or not is a different question.  I believe it was this plan that was leaked to the media and therefore became impractical even if it was a good plan.  Knowing that it no longer had a plan it instructed 128th Brigade to come up with its own plan.  Which is a smart thing to do because they are the most in touch with local conditions and their own capabilities.  They formed a plan and it was sent up to the general stiff for approval.  They did approve it and sent some key forces into the battle to help with 128th's plan.

Of course I'm not 100% sure this entirely correct, but I suspect it is more correct than either extreme that the general staff did everything or the other that the 128th came up with the plan all on its own without any involvement of the general staff.

Steve

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I am glad these threads are kept going and thanks to those updating with key snippets of information. The blog made depressing reading as the realities of war and personal losses laid bare.

Thank you for giving us better insight to this war.

You're welcome.  The effort to distract/derail real discussions about this war are annoying but I won't allow them to stop it.

This last column then,  is what the media here's about and sees,  because it's remains  are really the only thing there TO show. 

This is the normal problem with withdrawal operations.  The reason for withdrawal is the enemy has superior force or better positions or both.  If a larger friendly force wasn't able to hold them back, then a greatly depleted rearguard is absolutely not going to be enough to do the job.  So once the enemy figures out what is going on it's unlikely the final rearguard is going to get away without increased casualties/hardship.  Or as is often the case, not get away at all.

I'm very glad you brought up Dunkirk because that's such a great example to look at to better understand Debaltseve.  The Germans hadn't a clue how much of the British forces were being pulled off the beaches for a long time.  When they finally realized what was going on they started to attack from the air and ground.  Things started to get really grim for the British (and the remains of other forces) at this point, but the forces that were defending the beach held out for a while, allowing even more friendly forces to be evacuated.  But the inevitable end came and the remaining defending forces were overwhelmed and everybody still on the beach captured.

The important thing to note here is that proportionally a huge amount of the starting British (and other) forces were withdrawn compared to how many were lost.  However, the casualty rate for the ones holding the beach in the end was almost 100% captured, killed, wounded.  If one focuses only on that then it looks like a disaster, but if one looks across at the channel at how many got back then it doesn't look bad at all.  In fact, it looks like a "miracle".

 

My badly uninformed impression was always of a frantic,  last minute mass rush to escape,  with Russian forces essentially in ambush,  slaughtering the columns as the passed. 

Don't feel so bad... this is the story the Russians wanted you to have and it's certainly the one they put out.  This discussion prompted me to re-read several Russian media stories about "3000 captured" Ukrainians.  What a crock of crap ;)   So combine Russian disinformation campaign for its own propaganda purposes with absolutely crap Western journalism and it's not hard to see why you had this view.

About journalists covering war... remember, these are people who routinely call an armored car or APC a "tank".  If you think people like that can adequately assess complex military operations, well I know a bridge in Brooklyn that is for sale cheap.  I'll be happy to take a deposit check for anybody wishing to buy it ;)

What journalists are really good at doing is documenting things for other people to make sense of.  The observations of Muscovite Russian accented fighters claiming to be Ukrainian, interviews with militia members admitting to committing warcrimes, photographing Russian Army only equipment, unknowingly filming Russian Army license plates, filming Buryat tankers, etc. are all extremely useful things because they add to a database of empirical evidence about what is going on.  So it's not that they are useless at their jobs, it's just that they sometimes forget they don't know what the heck they're talking about when it comes to the bigger picture stuff.

Steve

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Here's an incredible video showing what the combat was like in the final weeks of the Debaltseve battle.  It includes footage of the withdrawal:

https://www.funker530.com/battle-for-debaltseve-ukrainian-soldiers-pov/

There's a lot of things to notice, but the one that comes through more than any others is that these Ukrainian soldiers are not bed wetting conscripts prone to panic. 

I welcome people posting combat videos like this.  However, I do not want to see videos of gore or war crimes posted here.  For example, I've seen the videos that were mentioned in the blog I linked to (and sadly, many more), but I don't want them posted here.  It is important to know these crimes are being committed and it's important to know how unashamed the perpetrators are.  However, this is not the place for such videos to be posted.  So please, let's keep any videos/pictures relevant to understanding the combat and how it equates to the tactical wargames this Forum is here to support, not how the videos show how evil Humans can be towards one another.  Sadly, all of us know that too well already.

Steve

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Here's an incredible video showing what the combat was like in the final weeks of the Debaltseve battle.  It includes footage of the withdrawal:

https://www.funker530.com/battle-for-debaltseve-ukrainian-soldiers-pov/

There's a lot of things to notice, but the one that comes through more than any others is that these Ukrainian soldiers are not bed wetting conscripts prone to panic. 

Conscripts aren't prone to panic either way, From my experiences with them. Give them the right motivation ("Russian invaders") and they'll actually function well. 

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Conscripts aren't prone to panic either way, From my experiences with them. Give them the right motivation ("Russian invaders") and they'll actually function well. 

This is true to a large extent.  I think it comes down to what is "conscript".  Technically it is anybody who is obligated to join the armed forces or face significant civil/criminal penalties.  Historically that includes almost all of the armies fighting in WW2, including "elite" units on all sides. 

The problem is in English the term "conscript" is often used as a negative term for someone who is poorly trained and perhaps poorly motivated to fight.  This is how the fighters of Ukraine's armed forces are viewed by Russian media and certainly separatist comments.  And for sure it is true for some of Ukraine's units, especially early in the war.  Combat Mission uses the term "conscript" in this way.

So I think there really does need to be a new term for soldiers who are involuntarily put into uniform but are well trained and possibly motivated.  It would make things easier, at least in English.

Steve

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I think the truth about the withdrawal's organization is more a combination of two perspectives,

Recently I'm believed if General Staff version, but too much soldiers - from privates to low/mid-ranked officers told that they didn't received any order to withdraw. And all happened "suddenly". I couldn't understand this and couldn't merge these two polar versions about "spontaneous" and "organized by Genral Staff" withdrawal. But several weeks ago appeared big interview of an officer of sector artillery reckon. They have direct communications with all levels of units, through their equipment passed almost all orders from General Staff and Sector C to lower levels. And he also told about no General Staff order to withdrawal. So, that what I wrote about withdrawal plan I worote on the base of his interview. It contain also many other interest details, especially  how worked Ukrainain and Russian artillety in this battle, how commanders ruled by units. I will try to translate this article and to post here. So, now I believed that anyway plan was developed by commander of 128th brigade, though possibly Gemeral Staff also had own, but after Semenchenko, commander of "Donbas" battalion posted it in own Facebook, all can be changed...

 

So I think there really does need to be a new term for soldiers who are involuntarily put into uniform but are well trained and possibly motivated.  It would make things easier, at least in English.

I name they "mobilized". And impossible to say all of them "conscripts". About 70 % of mobilized Ukraininans had experience of service in Soviet or Ukrainain army, some had experience of Afganistan war, some Iraq and other UN missions. But big amount of people despite on their past army service had poor training and level of knowlage. And very moderate motivation. Why ? Because service in late Soviet and Ukrainain army untill 2014 was totally anecdotic marasmus, when soldiers could shot only 1-3 dozens of bullets for year of service and all other time teached Field Manual, engaged in close-order drills, "painted a grass in green color" before visit of top brass, and just used as slave work force on building of hi-ranked officers and generals villas. Army bacame synonim of corruption, thievery, stiff, stupidity etc. Also for 23 years politics brainwashed heads of cityzens, that we are peaceful tolerant nation, so such kind of state pacifism, econonic problems and state corruption, which have borned total distrust to the state, and feature of Ukrainain mentality - high motivation to fight to the death for own "small motherland", but very low readinewss to fight for distant Donbas caused in whole poor motivation of mobilized. In 2014 and early 2015 were many situations, when from battalion half of people could reject to go in fight and officers could't to do anything with this. No martial law - no tribunals, no lever of influence on soldiers. Some soldiers wrote official reject from participation in combat and their left in the rear or in dislocation points. Even in brave 93th brigade, which hardly w/o rotations fought in Donetsk airport area about 1/3 of personnel or more rejected to fight and sat in rear. In 2014 mobilized personnel received mostly bad training before sending to frontline - wasn't no time, wasn't specialists, wasn't new methods. Now full course of training is 40 days and soldiers wrote they mostly received good knowlage. But if level of experience in infantry for year raised from average "green" to average "regular", that motivation still very depending from comanders and contingent of soldiers in the unit. If in the company at least 10-15 men drinking and say "F...ck the war and damn to Poroshenko, who sent me here" and commander has small "leadership level", soon this company will be absolutely disabled.

 

Here's an incredible video showing what the combat was like in the final weeks of the Debaltseve battle.  It includes footage of the withdrawal:

 

This is 25th separate motorized infantry battalion (former 25th territorial defense battalion "Kyivska Rus' "), some my familiars of WWII re-enaction serve there ). Alas, video without subtitles, soldiers during all video play a joke, thoug around skirmishes and shellings. If you interst to translate some moments, I will translate ) Add, that this unit initialy formed mostly from volunteers and Maidan Self-defence,  Now, despite on this unit already moslty consists of from mobilized, it still one of the well-motivated units among former territorial defense battalions, which now became motorized infantry battalions and included in lists of new brigades.     

 

 

Edited by Haiduk
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Recently I'm believed if General Staff version, but too much soldiers - from privates to low/mid-ranked officers told that they didn't received any order to withdraw. And all happened "suddenly". I couldn't understand this and couldn't merge these two polar versions about "spontaneous" and "organized by Genral Staff" withdrawal. But several weeks ago appeared big interview of an officer of sector artillery reckon. They have direct communications with all levels of units, through their equipment passed almost all orders from General Staff and Sector C to lower levels. And he also told about no General Staff order to withdrawal. So, that what I wrote about withdrawal plan I worote on the base of his interview. It contain also many other interest details, especially  how worked Ukrainain and Russian artillety in this battle, how commanders ruled by units. I will try to translate this article and to post here. So, now I believed that anyway plan was developed by commander of 128th brigade, though possibly Gemeral Staff also had own, but after Semenchenko, commander of "Donbas" battalion posted it in own Facebook, all can be changed...

I think this will be debated for a while before we have a firm idea of the truth.  What you said is not too different than what I said, but there are subtle differences which historians need to debate and (hopefully) come to a majority opinion.  It is why the war is so pointless... Russia will never get what it wants out of it.

I name they "mobilized". And impossible to say all of them "conscripts".

Excellent word.  In English it can represent an experienced unit being "activated" for combat, but I think in the context of Ukraine the meaning is pretty clear.

What you said about the progression from 2014 through 2015 is accurate, of course, and good to see in this thread.  My understanding is that as 2015 progressed the units in the line were mostly motivated to fight, with the poor quality parts left back in non-combat zones.  This is true for the 93rd if I remember correctly.  This is one reason Ukraine didn't have enough reserves for Debaltseve.  On paper there were more units that could be moved into the ATO, but they were still struggling with the problems from 23 years of bad military policies.  These sorts of problems can not be solved by snapping fingers and saying "everything is all fixed!"

I remember in the early days of the war many soldiers complaining that they wanted to fight but not the junk equipment they had or the bad leadership.  They made videos which are part of the fascinating public part of this war.  They kept the people better informed about how bad things were and the people responded, therefore the politicians and military officials also had to respond.  Many were "slow learners" and lost their jobs.

Russia launched the war to keep Ukraine weak, corrupt, and therefore in it's "orbit".  The irony is the war has caused Ukraine to become more independent, more a threat to Russia's oligarch system of government, and less in its "orbit" than at any time in history. 

Maybe a draftee is a better term?

This is a good term in English, yes.  However, I do not know how well this translates into other languages.

Steve

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In checking some of the Ukrainian Invasion chronology, I got to looking at the appearance of the Green Men/Little Green Men/ Polite Men, which kicked up this useful Wiki.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_green_men_(Ukrainian_crisis)

In it, this appears.

Weapons and equipment analysis[edit]

In March 2014 the Finnish magazine Suomen Sotilas (Soldier of Finland) published an analysis of the weapons and equipment seen on photos of "little green men".

The article points to a number of weapons and pieces of equipment that it asserts are issued only to armed forces in the Russian Federation:

  • New EMR camouflage combat uniforms
  • New 6Sh112 tactical vest
  • New 6B27, 6B7-1M composite helmet
  • New 7.62 mm PKP machine guns
  • 6B26 composite helmets (used only by airborne troops of the Russian Federation)
  • 6Sh92-5 tactical vest (used only by airborne troops of the Russian Federation)
  • Gorka-3 combat uniform (used only by Russian special forces and mountain troops)
  • Smersh AK/VOG tactical vest (used only by Russian special forces)

The article goes on to conclude that with a very high probability "these troops are the 45th Guards Separate Reconnaissance Regiment of VDV" based in Kubinka, Moscow.[10]


Interestingly, it turns out the now deceased Tom Clancy and six-time collaborator (successful novelist in his own right) Mark Greaney did some pretty fair prognosticating themselves regarding events in Ukraine. Their COMMAND AUTHORITY was published in 2013 (likely written in 2012 and maybe started even earlier) calls a whole series of things which actually happened (FSB destabilization, Mafiya involvement, Spetsnaz, etc.), as well as some other disturbing possibilities. Greaney reportedly (haven't yet IDed his alma mater; not in bio on his site) has a degree in International Relations and Political Science. This honking book isn't like reading, say, TEAM YANKEE, for it is deep and complex, with a lot of intercutting of action between the current story and 30 years ago, whose events have profoundly shaped  the main thrust of the novel. A page turner (have bags under eyes as proof), but it's a real turnoff to keep encountering "site" where the item under discussion is what helps weapon aiming! This is particularly galling given the plethora of unusual (to me, at least) weapons used in the story. Obviously, these two weren't in Steve's league, but I do find it interesting they got so much right.

Regards,

John Kettler

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There are several reports written about Russian equipment in Ukraine.  The most comprehensive from the early days was published by a UK research firm named ARES:

Research Report No. 3 - Raising Red Flags

The early (Spring 2014) shipments of weapons into Ukraine were intended for maximum deniability.  They were Soviet era, sometimes dating from the 1940s/50s stocks, that theoretically could be found in Ukraine from "captured" stocks.  The cover wasn't very good for anybody with 1/2 a brain, but it wasn't intended to fool experts since the experts already knew Russia was directly involved.

The second phase (late Spring, early Summer 2014) of weaponry was far less deniable.  The "separatists" had captured all the ground they were ever going to capture, Ukrainian units were NOT defecting or being captured, and yet the quantity of armaments for the separatists continued to expand.  Where did all these weapons and ammunition come from considering there were no significant military warehouses in the Donetsk area?  From Russia, obviously.  But at this point things went way beyond simple small arms.  Even in late Spring (i.e. BEFORE the Ukrainian offensive) all kinds of things showed up in large quantities:

1.  Large quantities of MANPADs, AT-4/5 ATGMs, disposable RPGs of various marks

2.  SPA, ZSU-23 AA guns, barreled artillery, rocket artillery, and mortars

3.  Brand new military trucks, BTRs, BMPs (both 1 and 2), T-64s, and stripped down T-72s

Here again the deniability was paper thin because while it was theoretically possible that small numbers of some of these items (not T-72 or Grads, for example) could have been captured from Ukrainian stocks, the quantity was far too much to be explained away.  Not only quantity, but the variety as well.  Kinda convenient that the "separatists" managed to find not only one of everything needed to create a combined arms force, but hundreds of them.  More laughable was some of these things were more commonly found on the "separatist" side than the Ukrainian! 

Not only did the variety and quantity of equipment make Russia's denials of involvement an even more massive joke, but then there was all the logistics issues these things brought with them.  Where did the massive quantities of ammo come from?  Fuel?  Spare parts?  Who knew SBU buildings had T-72s and Grad launchers with full stocks of ammo sitting around :) The video of Chechens coming over the border in brand new trucks loaded with weapons and ammo were obviously figments of everybody's imagination.  Not to mention the "humanitarian aid" convoys that weren't filled with weapons and munitions :D

At this point (summer 2014) anybody believing that the "separatists" were arming themselves was either lying, in denial, or an utter fool.  There is absolutely no way a person with even basic analytical capacity could conclude Russia wasn't directly involved on a massive scale.

The third phase (mid summer through present day) Russia gave up trying to maintain deniability, though of course they keep denying it ;)  In this phase equipment came into Ukraine that Ukraine never had.  Things like BTR-82A, T-72B3, T-90, BPM-97, Pantir-S1, specific UAVs, etc.  Not only the frontline fighting equipment was obviously Russian, but also specialized trucks for electronic warfare, signal intercept, radio communications, counter battery fire, etc. showed up to be photographed and filmed.  Here's one quick reference to this sort of stuff:

http://russianagression.wikidot.com/russian-military-hardware-in-ukraine

At this point I don't even think someone in denial could possibly maintain the position that Russia isn't arming the separatists.  Therefore, if someone says Russia isn't arming the separatists is either lying or an utter moron.  I don't see any reasonable alternative.

Then there's the whole issue of Russia's other forms of involvement, such as fighting units, "vacationers", political oversight, etc.

Steve

 

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The use of BTR-82A and T-90 were very, very limited.  It seems most likely that they were inserted simply to field test them under real combat conditions, which is something these vehicles had never been exposed to before.

The BTR-82A was seen in a video by "separatists" that came over the Russian border to take the Marynivka border crossing south or Torez.  The T-90s were engaged north of Luhansk city.  I treated the T-90 reports as "hearsay" until eventually some photographic evidence supported the first hand combat reports (in particular Shorta swatting ATGMs).  I'll find both and report back later tonight.  Gotta run out for a bit now!

Steve

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Stills from a "famous" video from very early August 2014 as part of the first wave of Russian counter attacks..  Unfortunately the links to the video I have don't work any more.  There was a large scrubbing of Russian social media, YouTube, and other places once Russia realized how eager their troops were to document what they weren't doing :D

zeM4oqQd22w.jpg

cZc153qge5Y.jpg

These forces were part of a group that attacked, from Russia, through the Marynivka checkpoint (well documented, again thanks to video uploads) northward as the southern prong of the maneuver that formed the "southern kettle" to the east.  I am not sure this unit was identified specifically, but in other evidence from the video makes it likely that it was a Spetsnaz unit (at least in part).

Documentation of T-90A in Ukraine fighting in late 2014 with the 136th Tank Brigade in Luhansk.  First is in original Russian, second is Google Translation:

http://sled-vzayt.livejournal.com/3367.html?page=

https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fsled-vzayt.livejournal.com%2F3367.html%3Fpage%3D

I looked for the Ukrainian first hand report claiming they did battle with T-90 tanks in the same area as the above documentation, but I didn't find it quick enough so stopped looking.  I remember the report talking about shooting at the tanks and "magically" nothing happened to them.  There was one report of knocking out a T-90 during the fight, but there's been no evidence of this.  The 1st hand report surfaced a few months before the above documentation.

There were many other reports of T-90s, but they were in areas with confirmed T-72B presence.  The two are very similar so it would be easy to mistake one for the other.  From an evidence standpoint, a T-72B proves as much as a T-90A.

Steve

 

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Oh, and while looking for the T-90 stuff I ran into this one I forgot about... documentation of a "separatist" leader standing on the back of a T-80:

Bvvu6cwCEAAea9A.jpg:large

For those who don't know, the guy pictured above is Mozgovoy, former commander of "Ghost" Brigade.  One of the original Novorussian aligned units that formed part of Girkin's "army".  He was assassinated last May (second attempt) because he didn't want to heel to the LPR central authority.  This was a turning point in Russia's crackdown on troublesome units that wanted too much independence.

Because Mozgovoy was in the north, almost exclusively in Luhansk but sometimes just over the border in Donetsk, it's likely this picture was taken in Luhansk.

Steve

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Wow I didn't know the Russians sent in T-90's, got a picture or video Steve?

Also what the heck is a T-72 UMG?

 

I can add to Steve's post that T-90A participation confirmed in two episodes - 13 Aug 2014 during Russians and separatists re-seized Stepanivka settlement near the border. Ukrainian battalion of 30th mech. brigade was heavy shelled with artillery and MLRS, lost almost all armor and in panic fled from the settlement, enemy T-90A just entered on our territory, but looks like havn't direct contact with UKR tanks or infantry. Second time T-90A were involved in assault of Luhansk airport 30-31 Aug 2014. They supported Russian VDV units. Guys from 80th airmobile brigade has "Stugna-P" ATGM ("Skif" in CM), but several launches were unsuccessful  - either "Shtora" work or guidance system/ remote control panel fails. Tanks were engaged in almost hand-to hand fight with RPG and SPG-9, later artillery fire called. Several Russian tanks were damaged but could to retreat. No one T-90A wasn't destroyed. During Debaltseve battle Russians uses only T-72 mod.1989 and T-72B3 and lost several of it.

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