Russian army under equipped?

[Battlefront.com]

Very, very interesting gentleman. 

Thank you for the info and briefing. I'll push a question out as far as I need to properly understand why it is wrong/right in its initial premise, but I'm not precious about it. 

I now consider my initial understanding quite erroneous, especially in terms of the consequences for both sides. Further reading required! 

It's good also to know that despite the 8K number bandied around that the actual number in danger was about half that. Pulling almost 3K put despite the heavy Russian Arty is a pretty good result,  considering the situation. 

This battle could be a very interesting study when compared/contrasted with other such retreats from pockets, and the end results for the various sides. 

Yup, it's definitely a very interesting study and I don't fault you for having some misconceptions about the battle.  Mass media does an absolutely horrid job covering military conflicts when it comes to this sort of stuff, Russia has been deliberately misinforming the world since the early days of Maidan, and then there's just the usual problems that go along with a battle that's so recent.  It will take many years to get most of the full story.  We'll have to wait a lot longer to get the Russian side of things without the government filters.

I think I see exactly where this train is going.

Oh, I think we saw that coming from the very start  

Steve

[A Canadian Cat]

1. This is an asymmetrical conflict.  It won't be decided by attrition, or even strictly speaking areas controlled.  It will be decided by which side quits Eastern Ukraine first, 

2. What is most likely is either the Ukraine cannot sustain itself in the face of Russian hostility and simply must accept Russian intentions or face dissolution as a functioning state (and even accepting Russian interests, might just be effectively dismembered anyway), or Russia can no longer afford the investment in Eastern Ukraine and leaves the Donbassian Patriots to the mercies of the Ukrainians.

I strongly expect that you are correct. However  I still maintain the Russian government can keep this up for much longer than we expect. They know that given enough time Ukraine could grow impatient and do something that will upset the West and trigger that ovrert reaction from Russia. Or the West could just get tired and slowly back away from sanctions and condemnation. After all we have done it before. 

I worry there is a third option where the Putin government just keeps things frozen like this for much longer than Europe can keep their back bone stiff and eventually gets what they want.

 

[VladimirTarasov]

I like sburke's question... do you admit that there was even one?  How about one from the 6th Guards Tank Brigade?  Can you at least, finally, admit they were there?  That would at least be a start.

Steve

The Regular Russian military was used but not in the numbers stated. I can explain some detail into it, As it will not matter either way. During Debaltseve, There were certain Russian tank units used, They were used as spearhead units during the operation. Crews from tank brigades were used and mixed into Separatist units, The Regular Russian army units have been used in dire situations, And not in great number mostly as a support asset for a operation. Let's not forget these units weren't in regular strength or build. Russian strategy in Ukraine is Advisory, Training, And supplies. To say even one Russian tactical battalion is in Ukraine is not correct. The units sent there are specialized to be mixed into the NovoRussian army. I won't deny that the NovoRussian army's HQ directly answers to the Russian armed forces' command, But when the rebellion started those guys did not even have HMG as a company level support. Normally, The Russian government will not stand by and let the Ukrainian army do what it did in the Eastern Ukraine, The decision was made to supply this group and turn it into an army, The DNR and LNR has had luck with getting equipment from Ukrainian stocks, And most of their equipment until recently were of Ukrainian army origins. 

[Kinophile]

Aaaaaaaa here we go again. 

[Kinophile]

Aaaaaaaa here we go again. 

[Battlefront.com]

The Regular Russian military was used but not in the numbers stated.

Well, finally!  So you admit that all the times you argued that this was not true you didn't know what you were talking about?

I can explain some detail into it, As it will not matter either way. During Debaltseve, There were certain Russian tank units used, They were used as spearhead units during the operation. Crews from tank brigades were used and mixed into Separatist units, The Regular Russian army units have been used in dire situations, And not in great number mostly as a support asset for a operation. Let's not forget these units weren't in regular strength or build. Russian strategy in Ukraine is Advisory, Training, And supplies.

Except for the special forces, tank, mech infantry, artillery, command and control, electronic warfare, surveillance, and command structure I agree they are there only as advisers, trainers, and suppliers of forces made up of a large percentage of Russian citizens fighting on behalf of the Russian state while on vacation or lost.

To say even one Russian tactical battalion is in Ukraine is not correct. The units sent there are specialized to be mixed into the NovoRussian army. I won't deny that the NovoRussian army's HQ directly answers to the Russian armed forces' command,

Another change of tune from you.  Twice in one post.  That's progress.

But when the rebellion started those guys did not even have HMG as a company level support.

Nobody denies that, aside from special forces and "vacationers", there was no regular Russian units fighting in Ukraine until July 2014.  Shelling Ukrainian positions from Russian soil and driving into Ukraine to fire off salvos, yes, but strictly speaking no regular line units of the Russian Army were stationed in Ukraine until July 2014.  They have been there ever since, though not in large numbers in 2015 after Debaltseve.

Normally, The Russian government will not stand by and let the Ukrainian army do what it did in the Eastern Ukraine,

You mean try to retake it's sovereign territory from military forces that came in from Russia with official support of the Russian government?  I'm sure Russia would not resist any invasion of its territory, so why should Ukraine?  Those damned Ukrainians.

 

The decision was made to supply this group and turn it into an army, The DNR and LNR has had luck with getting equipment from Ukrainian stocks, And most of their equipment until recently were of Ukrainian army origins. 

That is an outright lie and there is SO MUCH information to show that it is a lie.  You should possess enough commons sense and observational skills to know that it is a lie.  Therefore, you should not repeat the lie.  Plus, you're only insulting your own intelligence by thinking we are stupid enough to believe the lie.

Steve

 

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Aaaaaaaa here we go again. 

BREAK THE DEAL FACE THE WHEEL.

 

I strongly expect that you are correct. However  I still maintain the Russian government can keep this up for much longer than we expect. They know that given enough time Ukraine could grow impatient and do something that will upset the West and trigger that ovrert reaction from Russia. Or the West could just get tired and slowly back away from sanctions and condemnation. After all we have done it before. 

I worry there is a third option where the Putin government just keeps things frozen like this for much longer than Europe can keep their back bone stiff and eventually gets what they want.

 

I think the third option was Russia's calculus when they kicked off this mess.  However I believe they overestimated how important Russia was to the rest of Europe, while at the same time counting on a less economically challenging landscape.  And I'll also contend that the Ukraine given more time will simply complicate the problemset for Russia to a degree where it is not solvable on the acceptably cheap (and may have passed beyond that point already).  

The longer Russia is disengaged from Europe, is the longer Europe gets friendly with Iran, shale oil, and other petrochemical sources, and the longer it is to realize how unpleasant Gazprom is/was.  There's nothing Russia offered that wasn't replaceable or available elsewhere and only at coming in with an even more modest profit margin (which is something very challenging to do with how high Russia needs oil to be vs how much the rest of the world is paying).  

I don't think it's a matter of more will, but Russia loses more than the west does with disengagement.  There's not much Russia has to coerce the west back with as evidenced by the more or less non-impact of it's counter-sanctions (and the willingness of the Russian people to flaunt same).  
 

Dunno.  Just calling it like I see it.

[sburke]

The Russian government will not stand by and let the Ukrainian army do what it did in the Eastern Ukraine,

But Dbaltseve was an offensive, not a defensive operation and launched in the midst of an accord to try and find an end to the conflict.... that seems to put you in an awkward position....

you wouldn't happen to spend much time with Chris Christie do ya?  Never mind- it's an American thing.

[sburke]

 

Dunno.  Just calling it like I see it.

what I'd almost like to see and it may have been you who said this once on this forum - Ukraine just say screw it, the ceasefire line is now the intl boundary, everything on the other side is Russia.  Congratulations Putin, the mess you created is now yours, have a nice day. Yeah I know they won't but I'd pay a lot to see Putin's face if they did it.

[Battlefront.com]

a. The best Ukrainian strategy is denying Russia a decisive military victory that could threaten the remainder of the Ukraine, while also denying Russia the justification for overt Russian military involvement in the Ukraine.  This plays best to the Ukrainian strengths (preventing full Russian investment, while still forcing the Russians to commit major resources to preventing a Ukrainian counter-attack), while avoiding Russian strengths (as until there's an unambiguous reason to invade, the Russians are only able to employ a modest amount of their strength).  

Yup.  I've been saying this since Russians first landed in Crimea... time is on Ukraine's side, not Russia's.  Even if crude oil prices hadn't fallen through the floor this is not a sustainable operation for Russia long term.  This is not the usual small hinterland province swiped away from a small country.

b. Russia is in a classic military dilemma.  It has effectively two bad choices.  It can either fully invest in the military situation and effectively invite NATO to park on its borders while driving plenty of its nominal client states right into the waiting arms of the EU/NATO (and negate it's entire war aims), or it can withdraw and accept defeat as again the Nazi hoards of Ukrainians feast on the babies of good Russian families.  This might also have major political repercussions thanks to the ultra-nationalist element.  The third option of maintaining the status quo is a false one, Russia cannot afford to prop up, let alone make the fakestates stand on their own, eventually it will be unable to support either unless it forces a Ukrainian recognition of the two, which frankly is very unlikely at best.

Russia has not invaded in full force for two reasons:

1.  Russia is afraid of opening Pandora's box with regards to NATO and even China.  There are some big cards that the West are holding that they have not played yet in order to prevent a full invasion and it appears Putin doesn't want to see them play out.  A full and obvious invasion of Ukraine would definitely see some of those put into play.  Cutting off from SWIFT would be one, ATGMs would no doubt be another.  Putin's fear of military aid from the West has been obvious one from the start and with good reason.  Which gets to the second reason...

2.  Russia is afraid it will not win (which is a little different than losing).  Given how surprised the Russian leadership is in Ukraine's capabilities shown since February 2014, my guess is they do not view invasion as viable.  Afghanistan and the First Chechen War are reminders of the limitations of military force.

It is pretty clear that Russia's plan is to maintain the current "frozen conflict" until something changes in its favor.  Rising oil prices, a total collapse of the Ukrainian government, the West willing to sell Ukraine down the river, etc.  It has to hope for something like this because long term this form of frozen conflict is not sustainable.  So it's either hope for something to change or give up now.

So if you're talking about "heavy casualties" or "major losses" or "Russian military prowess" I'd argue all of those are entirely irrelevant if they do not cause a Ukrainian capitulation of some kind.  And right now I feel and I get the impression I'm not alone in this, that Russian efforts are unlikely to create that capitulation. 

Much to the Kremlin's surprise, no doubt.  Much to the surprise of many Ukrainians as well!

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

I think the third option was Russia's calculus when they kicked off this mess.  However I believe they overestimated how important Russia was to the rest of Europe, while at the same time counting on a less economically challenging landscape.  And I'll also contend that the Ukraine given more time will simply complicate the problemset for Russia to a degree where it is not solvable on the acceptably cheap (and may have passed beyond that point already).  

It's *very* clear to me, as someone who predicted this war years ahead of time and followed the war daily, that Russia made some major miscalculations. 

Russian (and Soviet) strategy is a long term one, but not in the Western sense.  Russia sets for itself certain goals with only a general concept of how to achieve them.  It puts things in motion that it believes get it closer to obtaining its goals without a clear sense that any one of them will work.  The idea is to put so many things into play that eventually goals are achieved, even if there's no way to predict what exact combination/circumstance gets them there.  This is how Russia fought the war with Georgia (which started years before).  It is how it has kept Ukraine under its thumb for the last 20+ years.  So yes, generally this strategy has been effective.  Until now.

Russia made four serious miscalculations:

1.  It completely misread the Ukrainian people.  They thought, for sure, they could get a large chunk of Ukraine to revolt and force about a collapse of the central government. At which point they would ensure that the reconstituted central government would be constitutionally redesigned in order to ensure Russian domination to a far greater extent than the previous strategy provided for.  The opposite happened.  Not only did the areas targeted by Russian not rise up, they in fact actively opposed Russian interference.  Even in Donetsk.

2.  It thought that Ukraine would be in political chaos after Yanukovych fled, at which point they could leverage their assets within Ukraine and regain political control.  Instead there was a fairly orderly transition of power to the new government and, as recently demonstrated two weeks ago, Ukrainians believe the government is "good enough" to keep from another Maidan (though for how much longer I can not say).

3.  It overestimated how much clout it had purchased with European right wing political groups, politicians, and industry.  It fully expected it could avoid things like meaningful sanctions, losing energy business, and generally being treated as an aggressor state by driving "wedges" between European countries and (in particular) Europe and the US.

4.  It overestimated the degree it could threaten and intimidate Europe and the US with its military and economic power.  Europe has been pissed, not frightened, but Russia's blatant threatening military actions.  NATO once again has the ear of politicians and things are happening.

In short, Russia thought it had things set up for a quick success.  None of them worked.  Like Nazi Germany, Russia's plans are predicated on a quick and fairly bloodless victory, not a protracted confrontation.  Russia was given many opportunities to get out of the corner it put itself in, but each and every time Putin has decided to dig Russia's grave deeper.  I think it's a bad choice, but I'm not the one that will get strung up by the neck for failure.

 

The longer Russia is disengaged from Europe, is the longer Europe gets friendly with Iran, shale oil, and other petrochemical sources, and the longer it is to realize how unpleasant Gazprom is/was.  There's nothing Russia offered that wasn't replaceable or available elsewhere and only at coming in with an even more modest profit margin (which is something very challenging to do with how high Russia needs oil to be vs how much the rest of the world is paying).  

I don't think it's a matter of more will, but Russia loses more than the west does with disengagement.  There's not much Russia has to coerce the west back with as evidenced by the more or less non-impact of it's counter-sanctions (and the willingness of the Russian people to flaunt same).  
 

Dunno.  Just calling it like I see it.

Russia is going to have to live with the effects of its invasion of Ukraine for probably 20 years.  Since Russia's brief time of affluence was a direct result of positive contact with the West, the result of negative contact should be pretty easy to predict.

Steve

[Tempestzzzz]

"The beginning of a war is like opening a door to a dark room. One never knows what is hidden."

                                                                -Adolph Hitler

 

 

Edited March 2, 2016 by Tempestzzzz

[sburke]

"The beginning of a war is like opening a door to a dark room. One never knows what is hidden."

                                                                -Adolph Hitler

 

 

"Life is like a box of chocolates...." - Forrest Gump

[Jotte]

"War is like a box of choclates, you never know when it will hit your ass..." Adolph Gump

 

 

[Kinophile]

Ahhh  Godwin's law. 

Never fails.... 

[VladimirTarasov]

Steve, There are countless footage showing shelling from Ukrainian artillery units onto the cities of DNR and LNR, My aunt herself lived there and had to go to Crimea... But personal stuff away, 90% of the fighting force in Ukraine is people from the territory, And most people there support DNR and LNR. If you were to visit there it would change your look onto the war. Instead of believing that a counter offensive into Debaltseve was to invade Ukraine and occupy the Ukrainians (Yes this was a shot fired to Sburke) Remember that it wasn't the Separatists who invaded their own territory, It was the Ukrainian armed forces who invaded these territories. This is the same hypocrisy shown towards Kosovo by NATO.... I guess when a largely Russian and Ukrainian population decide that they won't be apart of a government they didn't vote for it is wrong. I wish there were 8 Russian tactical battalions in Ukraine during the fighting, Maybe less innocent people would have died. 

 

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Recall that virtually no time elapsed between the fall of the very Russian friendly government and the invasion of internationally recognized Ukraine by Russian forces and Russian armed criminal elements.

The 1999 Kosovo fighting was only after demonstrated crimes against humanity committed by the Serbian forces, after nearly a decade of off and on again conflict.  And when the NATO forced did deploy they were stuck protecting both the Albanian and Serbian elements of Kosovo.  

Russia's actions in the Ukraine fall so far below even a modest standard of international scrutiny and decency that virtually every country on the planet has condemned them without a hint of debate as to if they were moral or not.  Even the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 which should stand as a classic example of unilateral action against the interests and desires of the world at large was more accepted and supported than virtually anything Russia has done since the start of the conflict (which frankly was not a conflict until Polite Men and others started showing up from somewhere).

Prior to the Ukrainian conflict, I believed Russia was to an extent, a contributing member of the world at large (although a rather transparently self interested one) that could be part of a greater global community as an equal.

Now?  Not so much.  Russia, and the Russians behind Putin are digging their own graves and gleefully jumping in.  And it won't be NATO, Ukrainians, Black people, or secret space jews, but when Russian blood is spilled again and spilled in quantities, both the killers and their victims will be "true Russian patriots" of some manner.  And all your weapons, all your various stupid little fake republics you've carved off from your neighbors won't mean a damn when the monster you've all kept in your closet, and diligently fed for the last twenty plus years comes out.  

So again, this is the last time I'm going to address the Russian element of this forum's rendition of reality in the Ukraine, in that I hold it in such contempt that I find it both laughable, and a damning statement on the direction of the Russian nation.

[sburke]

Steve, There are countless footage showing shelling from Ukrainian artillery units onto the cities of DNR and LNR, My aunt herself lived there and had to go to Crimea... But personal stuff away, 90% of the fighting force in Ukraine is people from the territory, And most people there support DNR and LNR. If you were to visit there it would change your look onto the war. Instead of believing that a counter offensive into Debaltseve was to invade Ukraine and occupy the Ukrainians (Yes this was a shot fired to Sburke) Remember that it wasn't the Separatists who invaded their own territory, It was the Ukrainian armed forces who invaded these territories. This is the same hypocrisy shown towards Kosovo by NATO.... I guess when a largely Russian and Ukrainian population decide that they won't be apart of a government they didn't vote for it is wrong. I wish there were 8 Russian tactical battalions in Ukraine during the fighting, Maybe less innocent people would have died. 

 

if all that were true

1 why is the OSCE still being blocked from monitoring effectively in the occupied zone or the border

2 why is Russia totally uninterested in a monitored election process or for an international force inserted into the conflict zone

3 since when do Ukrainians enjoy a total lack of judicial process cause there is none under the so called separatists. 

4 there is plenty of footage and OSCE reports of "separatists" basing artillery in civilian areas essentially using them as a human shield and I am looking forward to the war crimes trials   

The problem with espousing those views here is none of us buy into this crap.  We ask questions and if the answers smell then in all likelihood they are BS. Considering the things we know that are true have continued to be denied by you up until a couple posts above, your reliability as a source is discredited. 

And incidentally, Russian sources themselves have complained about the lack of support they are receiving. Better get straight which story you are repeating as they seem to conflict with what is coming out of the Russian side. 

Edited March 2, 2016 by sburke

[Kinophile]

Oh cmon Vlad.

Steve, this has gotta start being considered trolling?...

Vlad, You know exactly the reaction you'll get the second you post your stuff, it's been going on long enough that anytime you join a thread it's just a very short matter of time before you twist and distort the discussion into RUS truth v. WEST lies.

It's gotten really old, really dull and frankly,  quite boring. 

For those who have been distracted,  this thread was morphing into a discussion of UKR armed forces competence during/after Debaltsev. 

I'm curious, where might be the best sources on Iloviask? Did the UKR command smarten up after that? What have they learned from both battles? 

Sburke,  Debaltsev as a campaign would be incredibly interesting. It would also allow for some serious  RUS arty,  which the current campaigns never really bless us with. The research required to be accurate would be of huge interest in itself. 

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Oh cmon Vlad.

Steve, this has gotta start being considered trolling?...

Vlad, You know exactly the reaction you'll get the second you post your stuff, it's been going on long enough that anytime you join a thread it's just a very short matter of time before you twist and distort the discussion into RUS truth v. WEST lies.

It's gotten really old, really dull and frankly,  quite boring. 

For those who have been distracted,  this thread was morphing into a discussion of UKR armed forces competence during/after Debaltsev. 

I'm curious, where might be the best sources on Iloviask? Did the UKR command smarten up after that? What have they learned from both battles? 

Sburke,  Debaltsev as a campaign would be incredibly interesting. It would also allow for some serious  RUS arty,  which the current campaigns never really bless us with. The research required to be accurate would be of huge interest in itself. 

I think one of the greatest forces on military reform and improvement is the failure of your military to perform.

In that regard I think it's difficult to talk in terms of "smartening up" nearly as much as a lot of the inertia of "the old ways" and systems* that were impractical for combat went away and it became okay to throw a lot of stuff out the window in favor of what worked.  Further the Russians gave a boatload of push towards a broader Ukrainian nationalist identity, and pairing this with the earlier revolution you have the transformation of the Ukrainian military from a force that's trying to mirror the Soviet army of 1989, largely manned by folks who do not want to be there, to a force that's discarded anything Soviet that didn't work, kept anything that had a purpose, gone asymmetrical (such as crowd sourced equipment) in novel ways, all the while now having a clear national purpose.

So in that end of things, smart is not the correct term, a lot of the things that were broken about the old Ukrainian military were known to be broken all along, there just existed neither the will or justification for the sort of efforts to fix them.  The war has provided both the will and the justification and now we're seeing old problems getting addressed often with novel or at the least outside the box solutions.

Doesn't hurt the Ukraine is getting help on the backend from various Western partners.  Non-lethal aid sounds really weak until you realize what a big deal radios are in the military context.  Same deal with organizational-doctrinal type training vs the "shoot a rifle like this!" training.

*Like how different parts of a military interacts vs equipment systems  

[Battlefront.com]

VladimirTarasov,

As the saying goes, "you are entitled to your own opinion, but not your own facts".

Without Russia's involvement there would be no war in Ukraine, no death, no destruction.  It was started by Russia, it continues ONLY because of Russia.  Russian The irony is the only Russian Ukrainians that live in fear are the ones trapped in the despotic, chaotic areas under the thugs put in place by Russia.

If you wish to argue this then do so on another Forum.  This is not a place to discuss the Earth being only 9000 years old, the Holocaust never happening, or Russia not waging a war in Ukraine for the selfish interests of the Russian political elite at the expense of both Russians and Ukrainians.

Remember that it wasn't the Separatists who invaded their own territory,

On this one point we agree!  The Russian Federation citizens that started this war were trained in Russia, sent into Ukraine by Russia, armed by Russia, led under the direction of Russia, backed up by Russian military forces whenever they screwed up, and protected by Russia from having to make peace do not qualify as "separatists" .  By definition they qualify as "invaders".  I know you don't understand this rather simple concept, but it's a pretty well established legal principle in the world outside of Russia.  Which is why everybody else holds a very different view of this conflict than you do, despite the mountain of evidence showing your position to be factually and morally incorrect.

Steve

[VladimirTarasov]

Panzer, You know alot about our history and monsters we have been carving. If I continue on about Kosovo and NATO bombing of Yugoslavia it will be totally off topic, And Steve being the big guy of the company I will respect him not wanting me to continue these arguments  

 

I'm curious, where might be the best sources on Iloviask? Did the UKR command smarten up after that? What have they learned from both battles? 

If the Ukrainian government attempted to send reinforcements while trying to establish secure corridors for those reinforcements, The outcome of llovaisk would have been different. The ATO was successful in entering llovaisk, Holding their territory was the problem.

 

[Battlefront.com]

Oh cmon Vlad.

Steve, this has gotta start being considered trolling?...

Technically Vladimir thinks he is setting the record straight, not trolling.  Under normal circumstances this is fine.  However, in the case there is no legitimate room for debate about the nature of the war itself.  It is a Russian war of aggression waged against the entire state of Ukraine in order to benefit the political elite of Russia regardless of the costs to the peoples of the world (including Russians).  All the facts support this position, none support the position that it is a genuine "uprising" or civil war".  Therefore, debating with someone who believes the latter is about as interesting as debating someone who believes the Sun revolves around the Earth. 

For those who have been distracted,  this thread was morphing into a discussion of UKR armed forces competence during/after Debaltsev. 

I'm curious, where might be the best sources on Iloviask? Did the UKR command smarten up after that? What have they learned from both battles? 

Adding to what Panzerkraut had to say...

The Ukrainian military prior to the Russian invasion was in a horrible state of dysfunction.  In no small part due to Russia's influence, the Ukrainian military was riddled with profiteering officers and civilian officials who siphoned money away from maintaining a credible military force.  Most of the equipment was left over from the Soviet days, from tanks to field tents.  Even the stuff that wasn't so bad 20-30 years ago became bad through neglect and age.

The doctrine of the Ukrainian military was also neglected.  It was a mix-mash of old Soviet style doctrine combined with sprinklings of Western teachings.  In fact, I know a guy who was training Ukrainian junior officers about small unit leadership.  He said something along the lines of the students he had mostly "getting it" and then having it squashed out of them as soon as they left the classroom because there was no support from higher echelons.  Without support the teaching was fairly pointless at the time.  However, many of those junior officers wound up fighting and I am sure they fought better because of their training.  So I think it did wind up having a positive impact through necessity.

Early in the conflict the corrupt internal forces within the civilian and military organizations tried to play by the old rules.  Body armor was paid for and what was delivered had foam inserts instead of Kevlar.  Tanks were "refurbished" and sent to the front with nothing more than a still wet coat of new paint.  Uniforms were bought by the state and then resold to soldiers instead of being issued.  Donated MREs were also sold instead of being handed out.  Etc. etc.

Because Ukrainians were dying and the free press of Ukraine was exposing these sorts of major failings, some of the very first REAL reforms within Ukraine were centered around the military.  Lots of officers were sidelined, procurement was taken away from the military, bids had to be submitted in a transparent way, and there was accountability (to some degree) for fraud.  Imperfect?  Yes, but it made a difference fairly quickly and the Ukrainian military runs much better now than it has ever functioned before.  Probably better than the old Cold War days of the 1950s and 1960s I would guess.

These improvements were NOT present in the Summer of 2014 and Ilovaisk helped kick them into high gear.  The loss of life, the shame of being so totally defeated and helpless had a significant effect on the Ukrainian military as a whole.  More leadership was sacked, field officers with combat experience were promoted in their place, and Ukrainian politicians started to pressure the military to reform faster and more effectively.

This has also allowed Ukraine to not only ask for assistance from NATO but to actually put it into practice.  The soldiers who are training with NATO instructors know that the more they learn from them the better they will be against their Russian and Russian proxy adversaries.  The US trainers that have been interviewed have said the level of basic skill and enthusiasm shown by the Ukrainians is nothing short of impressive.  They are said to be quick learners.

A friend of mine is an OSCE observer who has lived in the area (Ukraine and Moscow) for a long time.  He and I have an ongoing conversation about the changes since the start of the war and how they appear to him at the frontline as he interacts with Ukrainian forces.  The changes are observable and fundamental.  As a former US Army officer himself, he is fully qualified to judge what he sees and it is profound.

This can be seen in the differences on the battlefield since the Russian Aug/Sept 2014 counter offensive.  The fighting quality of the Ukrainian forces has improved overall, but in some cases it's done much better than that.  The DPR/LPR forces, on the other hand, seem to be in an arrested state of dysfunctional development.  Either they are untrainable or their trainers aren't teaching them the right stuff or both.  Which is why the DPR/LPR would collapse within 2-4 weeks of a Ukrainian general offensive if Russian regular forces stepped aside.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Panzer, You know alot about our history and monsters we have been carving. If I continue on about Kosovo and NATO bombing of Yugoslavia it will be totally off topic, And Steve being the big guy of the company I will respect him not wanting me to continue these arguments  

Thank you. 

If the Ukrainian government attempted to send reinforcements while trying to establish secure corridors for those reinforcements, The outcome of llovaisk would have been different. The ATO was successful in entering llovaisk, Holding their territory was the problem.

 

It is more complicated than this, but the result is about the same.  The primary reasons for Ilovaisk are as follows in order of importance:

1.  Ukraine had been on the offensive for more than 2 months with a military that was poorly equipped, trained, or led for such a sustained campaign.  By the time of the Russian counter offensive they were running out of ready stocks of fuel, ammo, vehicles, parts, food, you name it.

2.  Ukraine did not have the manpower available to take back such a large amount of land and secure it's flanks along the Russian border to the south.  In other words, all forces were pretty much engaged and engaged directly in the ATO.  There were no reserves to speak of except for poorly trained, equipped, and led conscript forces that weren't even supposed to be engaged in combat.

3.   In July roughly 4 battalions of regular Russian forces were deployed to arrest the Ukrainian offensive.  Because the Ukrainian offensive was already running on fumes by this point, these had a pretty negative effect on the Ukrainian advance.  Casualties went up, progress slowed.  However, they came in a bit late and so the collapse of both the DPR and LPR were still on track.  In other words, Ukraine was going to win before it ran out of steam.

4.  The Russian counter offensive struck BEHIND the ATO and along the Sea of Azov.  Ukraine, already running on empty, had nothing left to counter the large, well equipped Russian force.  Disaster for Ukraine was inevitable.

5.  Poor Ukrainian leadership and procedures at the brigade through ATO level.  I put this last because even if command had been excellent, things still would have gone very poorly because of the other factors.  One can not command a force that doesn't exist to do things it isn't equipped to handle even if it did exist.  The poor leadership, however, most likely made the outcome worse than it could have been with better leadership.

Steve

Edited March 2, 2016 by Battlefront.com

[Kinophile]

 Non-lethal aid sounds really weak until you realize what a big deal radios are in the military context.  

My brother was in the Irish Guards,  Signals. His last exercise before leaving,  in Kenya,  he masterminded the destruction of the OpFors radio coms - his signature was to let questions go through but to bugger up the answers with static and random civilian radio bursts (from file).

His reasoning was that psychologically,  few things are more maddening than asking a vital,  urgent,  time dependent question and getting a garbled useless reply. (I work in Film/TV,  where radios are absolutely critical on set. ****ty coms drive everyone bananas!).

It worked swimmingly,  with each mangled communication piling frustration upon stress upon distraction. I believe HQ had to step  in  and tell him to stop,  OpFor was learning nothing but various ways in how to lie down and play dead.... 

So not just signals degradation but also some psyops! 

Edited March 3, 2016 by kinophile