Russian army under equipped?

[Vanir Ausf B]

This is (bizarrely) turning into a referendum on RAND Corp's professional integrity, which I have little interest in debating so this may be my last post on that subject. 

 No, that's not correct.  Those two heavy brigades were specifically coming in from Poland *after* the attack started, the NJTF would have been deployed directly into the Balkans *before* the attack started.

Of course neither heavy brigade was intended to represent the NJTF. My point was that there was another NATO brigade in play that would have had roughly equivalent combat power to the NJTF. Whether it was in place before d-day or arrived shortly after is a minor detail.

There is no question the US prepositioned equipment was in play. The report explicitly states the presence of an ABCT and that is the only ABCT in Europe.

Context is everything.  Rand used the two heavy brigades to test the "best result" NATO could hope for and then they totally neutered the additional forces by presuming that the Russian airforce decimated it.  Then they conclude that those two heavy brigades didn't have a significant impact.  Which is...

 Interesting that you think the neutering was a decision deliberately made rather than a combat result arising organically from the game rules. More on that below...

I'm a little surprised you don't see the pattern. Anything that has the potential for countering their premise that NATO is doomed is conveniently nerfed by conditions that seem to be tailor made to neutralize the challenge.

"Let's see what happens if two heavy brigades are put into action.  But let's also assume they get laid waste from the air even though Russian ground support capabilities are generally rated quite low by aviation experts.  And let's presume any force not wiped out is so combat ineffective we don't have to bother taking it into account".

Why didn't they do this instead?

"Let's see what happens if two heavy brigades are put into action.  Let's also assume that Russian ground support capabilities are only modestly effective at disruption and let's follow the results through to 60 days post invasion".

You really don't see how they've weighted the odds decidedly against NATO by the choices they've made?

According to the report this was a series of actual war games, with two competing teams and combat results adjudicated by the game rules. There was no Rand guy arbitrarily deciding combat results, therefore no "presumption" of the heavy bridges fate. The report states that "Airpower is rate limited, and against a moderately competent adversary—which is how we portrayed the Russian Air Force", (pg 6) and that the Russian air force was only able to achieve what it did through "sheer numbers" (pg 9).

So no, I do not see "the pattern" because while I share your desire for more detail and more information I am not systemically filling in the unknowns with assumptions of game-rigging and ulterior motives. Let's not pull punches here; you are more-or-less accusing RAND of perpetrating a fraud. I see no evidence of that and I flatly reject it, even if I cannot objectively disprove it, any more so than I can disprove that John Kettler is a space alien.

That's how I would approach it.

I volunteer to be the Red commander 

Edited February 3, 2016 by Vanir Ausf B

[Battlefront.com]

This is (bizarrely) turning into a referendum on RAND Corp's professional integrity, which I have little interest in debating so this may be my last post on that subject. 

No, that's not it at all.  I have already stated I have the highest respect for RAND, but I do not view them as perfect.  Even the best professionals can make mistakes or have flaws in their approach.  Biases can creep in even when unintended.  In many disciplines before something is published it has to go through some form of "peer review" to double check the veracity of the tests, how they were conducted, the conclusions, etc.  RAND, however, doesn't have to go through the peer review process and few have the skill set to dissect a study like this.  We are the few   I mean, who better to examine and critique a wargame that explores a hypothetical war between current Russian and NATO forces than people who made and play a hypothetical war between current Russian and NATO forces?

On top of this, RAND's study has to be viewed as "flawed" simply because it had to make presumptions based on 2014 not reality of 2016.  To the degree those flaws are important is the degree that the conclusions can be questioned.  I consider some of the choices we made in both Shock Force and Black Sea as "flaws" for the same reason, therefore I'm not being a hypocrite.

 

Of course neither heavy brigade was intended to represent the NJTF. My point was that there was another NATO brigade in play that would have had roughly equivalent combat power to the NJTF. Whether it was in place before d-day or arrived shortly after is a minor detail.

Holy crow!  I can not believe a wargamer like you would utter such a thing!  No it is NOT an minor detail, which is my point entirely.  Situation one is a light/medium brigade right in the path of the primary invasion force *AND* two heavy brigades on the flank after hostilities start, the other is just the two heavy brigades.

Whether the difference between these two situations matters one iota I can not say because I've not wargamed out both cases.  But neither have you and neither has RAND.  Which is why I'm highlighting that this is a potential flaw in RAND's conclusions.  My opinion is it is likely to make a difference, but I can not say if it is significant enough to alter the end result in a meaningful way.

There is no question the US prepositioned equipment was in play. The report explicitly states the presence of an ABCT and that is the only ABCT in Europe.

Again, you're getting the details wrong.  The study specifies that in the Baltics there is no armor at all.  It states that very clearly and if you look at the Table 1 showing the forces you can see that the ABCT enters the fight from Poland.  Where did this ABCT come from?  Prepositioned forces in Germany, not the Baltics as per the study:

"The quickest-responding NATO heavy armor force would likely be a U.S. combined arms battalion, the personnel for which would fly in and mate up with the prepositioned equipment of the European Activity Set stored in Grafenwoehr, Germany. Getting this unit into the fight is a complicated process that will not be instantaneous. Breaking out the equipment—24 M-1 main battle tanks, 30 M-2 infantry fighting vehicles, assorted support vehicles—preparing it for movement, transporting it by rail across Poland, offloading it, and road- marching it forward into the battle area are unlikely to take less than a week to 10 days."

After the study was complete the US announced that an ABCT would be prepositioned in Eastern Europe; one company in each of the Baltics, and the rest divided up between Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania.  Presumably this is in addition to the prepositioned forces in Germany, but it could be that for now (and perhaps by design) it is instead of.  I can not find any information to say for sure one way or the other.

Either way, RAND's study does not include prepositioned ABCT forces in the Baltics.  It also doesn't allow for the possibility that the prepositioned forces in Poland would be shifted into Lithuania or Latvia prior to hostilities starting, which seems plausible under RAND's assumed timetables and caveats about getting the ABCT from Grafenwohr (Germany) to the Lithuanian border.  Lastly, if this prepositioned equipment is indeed on top of the Grafenwohr stuff then it's possible that the US could have 1-2 battalions of ABCT in the Baltics at the start and 7-8 ABCT battalions in Poland.  Otherwise it would be 1-2 battalions in the Baltics and 4-5 in Poland  (i.e. no double dipping allowed ).

In case you're not keeping track of this:

RAND default scenario = 0 ABCT in Baltics ever + 0 ABCT

RAND "enhanced force posture" sceanrio = 0 ABCT in Baltics ever + 1 ABCT available in Poland on Day 7-10 (4 days after hostilities start)

RAND assumed enhanced posture sceanrio = 0 ABCT in Baltics ever + 2 ABCT available in Poland at a later date ("assumed to be improvised beyond its current state")

However, based on what we know now it should be:

Default scenario = .33 ABCT in Baltics + .66 ABCT in Poland prior to first shot fired *OR* 1 ABCT in Baltics + 0 ABCT in Poland (depends on various assumptions)

Enhanced force posture (simplifying to one case) = 1 ABCT in Baltics prior to first shot fired + 1 ABCT in Poland on Day 7-10 (this assumes Grafenwohr prepositioned force also exists)

Assumed enhanced posture =  1 ABCT in Baltics prior to first shot fired + 1 ABCT in Poland on Day 10 + 1 ABCT in Poland at some time after Day 7-10

 

How much of a difference does this make all on its own?  I don't know, but when combined with soft factors and a more realistic assessment of Russia's air to ground capabilities I think it could possibly be a "game changer".

 

 Interesting that you think the neutering was a decision deliberately made rather than a combat result arising organically from the game rules. More on that below...

I am questioning the rules.  Based on the analysis of Russian air to ground capabilities I do not understand how they could have produce a rule set that decimates two ABCTs to the point of ineffectiveness.  Why they did this I don't know.  I suspect it was once again using the "worst case" concept, not that the RAND guys deliberately corrupted the results to ensure a specific end result which was already determined before they started.  However, that possibility can not be completely discounted as there's a long an sordid history of this sort of thing taking place (both in private and public sectors).

According to the report this was a series of actual war games, with two competing teams and combat results adjudicated by the game rules. There was no Rand guy arbitrarily deciding combat results, therefore no "presumption" of the heavy bridges fate.

Who said there was?  Not I.  What I did was call into question the rules which led to this result.  And who made the rules?  RAND did based on something called "Lanchester excahange rates", whatever the heck that is.

Answer me this... if you had a King Tiger knocked out by a Stuart at 2000m from the front, and we said "according to our rules this is possible" would you respond:

1.  "OK, that sounds really strange but you guys wrote the rules and I'm sure you can do no wrong so I accept the result that my King Tiger got legitimately taken out and therefore whatever I had hoped it would achieve is not relevant"

*OR*

2.  "Errr... are you serious?  That looks totally borked to me!  I do not accept that my King Tiger was knocked out legitimately and because of that I feel the end result of this scenario is invalidated by it"

In this situation you are defending the results because you believe the rules are sacrosanct.  I'm looking at the results with skepticism.  Because I do NOT believe that RAND cooked the results, I'm thinking the rules should be reexamined and the scenario played out again with adjusted rules.

The report states that "Airpower is rate limited, and against a moderately competent adversary—which is how we portrayed the Russian Air Force", (pg 6) and that the Russian air force was only able to achieve what it did through "sheer numbers" (pg 9).

I read that fine, and it's yet another reason I'm scratching my head.  The "sheer numbers" premise seems to be at odds with Russia's strategic and operational readiness rates.  Although not directly comparable, here's an article about the readiness rate of Russia's handpicked force in Syria:

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/10/25/russia-vladimir-putin-ash-carter-syria/74586002/

Russia also has a problem with how many of its paper strength could be deployed at one time and how many of those would be considered adequate for modern combat conditions.

Then there's the issue of losses over the course of the scenario timeframe (seems to be 2 months max).  Russia goes into the war vastly outnumbered by US and NATO fixed with aircraft.  Each loss on the Russian side can not be made up within this timeframe, while the same is not true for either the US or NATO.  When one starts getting 2-3 weeks into the conflict the chances or Russia maintaining even air parity seems unlikely.  RAND is even more pessimistic with the statement "the Russian Air Force is sufficiently powerful to resist NATO’s quest for air superiority for multiple days".  Which is VERY puzzling because they predict that Russia will have "sheer numbers" to disrupt an armored force coming into Lithuania that is only active *after* the Russian air force loses air parity.  Total head scratcher!

I fail to see how Russian air activity could be so amazingly effective all over the place simultaneously, yet after that period when it is neutralized the NATO air forces don't seem to make a hill of beans difference to the results.  Especially given the serious doubts about how realistic their capabilities and numbers were within the wargame exercise.

So no, I do not see "the pattern" because while I share your desire for more detail and more information I am not systemically filling in the unknowns with assumptions of game-rigging and ulterior motives. Let's not pull punches here; you are more-or-less accusing RAND of perpetrating a fraud.

No, you're quite wrong here.  I've been making one point over and over and over and over and over again:

The study is decidedly designed to portray "worst case".

I have been backing up my assessment in all of these posts by showing where RAND, when given a choice, has seemingly always gone with "worst case".  I have based that assessment on the facts at hand at length.  AND I AM 100% TOTALLY OK WITH THAT!!  There is absolutely nothing wrong with worst casing things.  Unless, as I have stated, that the study makes it know that is what it is trying to do.  RAND did not do that so it means one of two things:

1.  They do not view this as a worst case scenario and, if they were here, would do a better job refuting my challenges than you have

2.  They do view this as worst case scenario and have wound up not making that point clear.  It could be oversight, it could be deliberate.  I do not know, therefore I can not say one way or the other.

 

I see no evidence of that and I flatly reject it, even if I cannot objectively disprove it, any more so than I can disprove that John Kettler is a space alien.

The evidence is there, but you seem to continually miss it's importance to the points I'm making and that is causing you to draw different conclusions.

I volunteer to be the Red commander 

With the rules and presumptions that RAND *chose* to use for this study, so would I. 

Steve

Edited February 3, 2016 by Battlefront.com

[Battlefront.com]

OK, I think I'm pretty much done pounding on the things that I feel make some of the conclusions of the RAND study suspect.  Now I want to highlight some of the things that I think the study has done a very good job of uncovering/emphasizing:

1.  Importance of multi arms "trigger forces" deployed in the Baltics on a full time basis.  While the prepositioned heavy stuff is a solid improvement over 2 years ago when the study was conducted, it's not enough.  I am sure NATO is aware of this and I suspect they are going to use a "creep" strategy.  See comments further below.

2.  Importance of having a very good handle on what Russian activities on the other side of the border mean.  Snap drills must be viewed with extreme suspicion instead of the usual worry level.

3.  The need to preposition "force multiplier" capabilities into the Balkans on a permanent basis.  This includes things like counter battery systems, electronic warfare capabilities, enhanced intel gathering, etc.

4.  While not specified at all in the RAND report, the dire predictions about how many MBTs could be in the Baltics within a 6 day window clearly calls for a practical alternative.  RAND's conclusion that more ABCTs should be raised and positioned in the Baltics is an extreme solution, so others should be looked at first.  Javelin is the first place I'd look, with TOW-2 being a close second.  A knocked out Russian tank is a knocked out Russian tank, whether it's Javelin or an Abrams.  Since you can fit a couple hundred Javelins in the same volume of space as a single Abrams, as a Blue Force commander I'd rather have a couple thousand Javelins than a platoon of Abrams (of course I'd rather both!).  Even after hostilities start a single small, fast boat from Poland, Germany, or Finland could be there in an hour or so with hundreds of Javelins.  Therefore, having large stocks of these available within a 24 hours from storage to Baltics seems important.

5.  Air defenses need to be "creeped" into the Baltics over the next few years or ready to be deployed within 24-48 hours, including hostile conditions already started.

6.  Same as #5 but with ballistic missile defenses.

7.  Same with heavy artillery.

8.  Redundant infrastructure, in particular air bases, needs to be planned for and built.

That's just the military side of things.  Political and economic stuff should also be done and I've given some hints about my thinking already.

OK, so what is the "creep" method?  This is something that Russia does all the time that apparently NATO is beginning to learn from.  The idea is that you don't push too much stuff at any one time so that you can keep below the threshold of triggering an escalated response.  For example, if you want a full ABCT in the Baltics full time start by prepositioning 3 company's worth of equipment and no personnel.  The Russians get peeved, but it's not enough to start a war over.  Next, rotate soldiers to use the equipment on an "exercise" basis.  Again, the Russians will be pissed but not to the point of hostilities.  Then add more equipment slowly over time without fanfare.  Call them replacements or whatever if Russia directly accuses NATO of a buildup.  Yet again, not enough to get too pissy about.  Then the soldiers who were previously rotating seem to not rotate out as quickly as before.  Then they stay most of the campaign season, then they stay full time.  Additional personnel comes in on an "exercise" basis, then they wind up staying longer, then they wind up staying for good.

The advantage of the creep strategy is you can work towards a goal without triggering a meaningful response.  The disadvantage is it takes longer than an outright one-time action.  RAND advocates such a one-time action and for sure Russia would be forced to respond in some way, therefore if you think there's no immediate threat it should be phased.  You can always speed up plans if things get hot.

Steve

[Vanir Ausf B]

However, based on what we know now it should be:

Default scenario = .33 ABCT in Baltics + .66 ABCT in Poland prior to first shot fired *OR* 1 ABCT in Baltics + 0 ABCT in Poland (depends on various assumptions)

Enhanced force posture (simplifying to one case) = 1 ABCT in Baltics prior to first shot fired + 1 ABCT in Poland on Day 7-10 (this assumes Grafenwohr prepositioned force also exists)

Assumed enhanced posture =  1 ABCT in Baltics prior to first shot fired + 1 ABCT in Poland on Day 10 + 1 ABCT in Poland at some time after Day 7-10

How much of a difference does this make all on its own?  I don't know, but when combined with soft factors and a more realistic assessment of Russia's air to ground capabilities I think it could possibly be a "game changer".

It is a bit confusing as to where everything is and in what quantity, but from what I can gather the entire European Activity Set essentially amounts to 1 ABCT with 1 battalion in the Baltics.

The EAS originally consisted of a single combat arms battalion set that provided equipment, but has since expanded to a full Armored Brigade Combat Team, or ABCT, primarily employed to conduct Operation Atlantic Resolve activities.

EAS consists of 12,000 total pieces of equipment, of which approximately 250 are tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and self-propelled howitzers. Approximately 1,750 other pieces are support vehicles.

EAS sites currently are located in Germany, Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania.

http://www.army.mil/article/159894/European_Activity_Set_turn_in_officially_underway_in_Lithuania/

So you have .33 ABCT in Baltics at the start with other elements arriving at intervals. RAND says 7-10 days from Grafenwoehr; transit time from Romania and Bulgaria are unknown.

I do not think this is a game-changer

I am questioning the rules.  Based on the analysis of Russian air to ground capabilities I do not understand how they could have produce a rule set that decimates two ABCTs to the point of ineffectiveness.  Why they did this I don't know. 

What "analysis of Russian air to ground capabilities" are you referring to?

I read that fine, and it's yet another reason I'm scratching my head.  The "sheer numbers" premise seems to be at odds with Russia's strategic and operational readiness rates.  Although not directly comparable, here's an article about the readiness rate of Russia's handpicked force in Syria:

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/10/25/russia-vladimir-putin-ash-carter-syria/74586002/

Russia also has a problem with how many of its paper strength could be deployed at one time and how many of those would be considered adequate for modern combat conditions.

RE: Readiness rates. It's not just something Russians deal with.

Then there's the issue of losses over the course of the scenario timeframe (seems to be 2 months max).

Where do you get that 2 month time frame? I don't remember seeing that and my impression is that it's much shorter.

Russia goes into the war vastly outnumbered by US and NATO fixed with aircraft. 

RAND lists the number of available in-theater air wings on d-day at 18.5 for NATO, 27 for Russian. If these numbers are incorrect please post the corrected numbers.

The study is decidedly designed to portray "worst case".

Even though, as I have pointed out, the Russian invasion force RAND used is much smaller that your own estimate.

With the rules and presumptions that RAND *chose* to use for this study, so would I. 

Everyone love a winner

Edited February 3, 2016 by Vanir Ausf B

[Battlefront.com]

 

It is a bit confusing as to where everything is and in what quantity, but from what I can gather the entire European Activity Set essentially amounts to 1 ABCT with 1 battalion in the Baltics.

The EAS originally consisted of a single combat arms battalion set that provided equipment, but has since expanded to a full Armored Brigade Combat Team, or ABCT, primarily employed to conduct Operation Atlantic Resolve activities.

EAS consists of 12,000 total pieces of equipment, of which approximately 250 are tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and self-propelled howitzers. Approximately 1,750 other pieces are support vehicles.

EAS sites currently are located in Germany, Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania.

http://www.army.mil/article/159894/European_Activity_Set_turn_in_officially_underway_in_Lithuania/

So you have .33 ABCT in Baltics at the start with other elements arriving at intervals. RAND says 7-10 days from Grafenwoehr; transit time from Romania and Bulgaria are unknown.

OK, so it looks like my idea that for now (at least) the prepositioned equipment is coming from Grafenwoehr.  The big stuff being forward deployed to Baltics, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania.  I presume the Romanian stuff will take longer to transit to Poland than it would from Germany.  Bulgaria could be the same.  However, the Polish portion would be there from the start.  So a mixed bag with the possibility of the Polish components (whatever they might be) being pushed into the Baltics ahead of the invasion.

I do not think this is a game-changer

On its own? Definitely not.  Even with a bunch of other problems I have with their setting addressed it still isn't a game-changer for the "worst case" scenario.  For the other two scenarios with corrections?  I think it could be.

What "analysis of Russian air to ground capabilities" are you referring to?

Exactly my point   I have no idea what they used to conclude that the Russian Airforce could even be remotely as effectively as they suggest.  Especially when considering the timeframe (see next comment) and the devastating effects against the two ABCTs they attribute to it.

 

RE: Readiness rates. It's not just something Russians deal with.

For sure readiness is a big problem for everybody.  Which is why readiness and numbers are important to consider.  That being said, there is still the issue that NATO's forces are pretty much all "modern" while a large portion of Russia's are not.   For Russia to have a fighting chance it needs to have it's best units with the best equipment at near 100% operational status *AND* have a large amount of it's second line stuff ready to fight *AND* have them all in position at one time *AND* be facing a lowish ready NATO force *AND* have the war over and done with before any NATO advantages can be brought into play.

For Russia to zap two ABCTs *AFTER* the period of time that even RAND says Russia would not have air parity or superiority, all of the things I just outlined would have to be true.  Want to wager how likely that is to happen?

Sooooo... following this logic, the two ABCTs couldn't possibly be as mauled as RAND's wargame shows, which means they would hit the southern Russian flank to a much greater degree than was wargamed.  How does that change things?

Where do you get that 2 month time frame? I don't remember seeing that and my impression is that it's much shorter.

There is references to the game being played out for up to 60 days, but no mention of which scenario.  I presume it's the more beefy Blue scenarios that made it that long.

There's yet another point.  The conclusions is that Russia basically takes over the Baltics within a few days, far sooner than NATO can respond.  Yet they have at least one of the scenarios playing out for 60 days.  What sorts of reinforcements did NATO get in that time period?  What was the state of the Russian force at the end of it.  Why didn't they highlight the factors which allowed a much longer war?  I mean, if they cased out that X factor took the war from a week to two months, don't you think it would kinda sorta a tiny bit of a good idea to maybe mention that a little bit?

 

RAND lists the number of available in-theater air wings on d-day at 18.5 for NATO, 27 for Russian. If these numbers are incorrect please post the corrected numbers.

I have no idea what the numbers are or what they would look like on D+1, +2, etc.  I also don't know what readiness levels they assume and what types of aircraft are presumed active.  That aside, RAND said they expect Russia to have the ability to contest NATO air supremacy for only a couple of days.  So whatever the starting numbers are, they do not affect my argument above.

Even though, as I have pointed out, the Russian invasion force RAND used is much smaller that your own estimate.

Keep in mind that my number was a WAG max of what they could afford to move from other areas.  If you go back and look at my comments again (or trust me ) you'll see that I had no idea how they could possibly deploy that amount along the border with just Estonia and Latvia.  RAND, obviously, did a more careful analysis of what Russia could afford to move and/or what it could physical squish into that area.  So my WAG was not really so much a "worst case" as it was "overestimate".

Everyone love a winner

Yup! Though if you want to play my version as Red, I'd be more than happy to take up Blue

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

BTW, Ukraine showed how quickly non-functional (in some cases rusting heaps!) can be brought back to operational readiness.  If the war lasted more than a month this would start to be a big problem for Russia.  While they could no doubt unmothball stuff too, it's the sort of stuff that is 10-40 years out of date vs. whatever NATO brings back from the dead.  Put another way, would you rather be playing the side that can refurbish a bunch of Leopard 2 tanks or the side that manages to get a bunch of T-72M of various marks up and running?

This emphasizes the point that if Russia is to wage war against NATO it must do so with conditions it thinks have a definite end to hostilities within a few days or weeks.  Anything less certain than that is definite suicide short term.  Even if the war only lasts 10 hours it is suicide long term due to other factors, but that's outside the military scope.

Steve

Edited February 3, 2016 by Battlefront.com

[Vanir Ausf B]

Steve, it appears you have conflated hours with days in your memory. There is no mention of any scenario being played out to 60 days. I even did a word search on the document and the only reference to the number 60 was:

Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours after the start of hostilities.

 It is not specifically stated at what point d-day+hours the strike on the Blue heavy brigades happened, but given the above statement it most likely happened within the first 60 hours, which would place it within the "multiple days" time period in which NATO does not have air superiority. Given that, there is no apparent reason why the result should be impossible. Unless you are feeling that RAND's assumption of "moderate" competency for the Russian air force is too optimistic and that the Russian pilots are actually incompetent. Not that you would ever believe such a thing

[c3k]

Not trying to get betwixt you two (my popcorn eating would be nowhere near as fun  ) , but the Russian air-ground comment in the study said nothing about decimating 2 ABCTs. It said that planned Blue counterattacks were blunted by Russian air. 

As for worst, medium, best case 3x3 grid options, why bother with the middle unless the outliers show a need? Meaning, if worst-best AND best-worst show the same outcome, why wast time with 5 other tests including medium vs any? (best, worst vs. best, worst is a 2x2 grid. Adding medium options to each makes it 3x3.) You're increasing time/expense by a large factor (9 to 4?), with possibly no change in data culled from the game. (I call it a "game" not a "study".)

The maps: They used 1:50,000 TPCs. That's "Tactical Pilot Charts". Those are meant for pilots, not ground combat. Obviously, using the "Lanchester Exchange Rates" (is that like Panzerblitz CRT?), is something I don't understand, but it sounds good. I don't have a high degree of confidence that their simulation was accurately portraying battles, but they probably came close enough to the big picture. (Meaning, if I wanted to see engagement ranges, the effectiveness and utility of the infantry weapons (they say they tabulated LMGs per squad, etc.), vehicle losses, ops tempo, I'd need to battle it with CMBS (CM Baltic States).) The point of this paragraph is that I don't think this was a high-fidelity combat simulation. It was more of a big-picture map exercise.

Back to the air-ground thing... What organic air defense assets do US/Nato units have? The stinger is really just not sufficient. The assumption has always been that USAF would provide an air umbrella. That may not be a valid assumption. A bit of air defense to keep the attacking Russian air from easy targeting would not be a bad thing to add. (No doubt it'd take 20 years and cost a few trillion dollars under the current procurement systems. Oh, wait, the US does have those nifty .50/stinger turrets on hummers. Geez.) This study implies that adding that type of tactical air defense to US/Nato ground forces could be a "game changer". (I'm not saying it is/isn't, nor am I saying Rand is/isn't doing so to help an industry partner.  )

The one week warning period is nowhere near worst case for Nato, IMO. I have an extremely low regard for the current crop of western politicians and their willingness to make hard decisions. (Hey, it's my opinion and it borders on politics: I'm only stating it so that you understand my perspective vis a vis the Rand study.) Letting Nato take action BEFORE an overt invasion is pretty nice for the blue team. Imagine the US moving an ABCT into Latvia the day after a "spontaneous" street demonstration about Russian ethnic rights occurred up in Tallinn? Ain't gonna happen...

Anyway, a lot of that detracts from the point I was making: the Rand game says that Russian air blunts some planned counterattacks, not that it decimated some ABCTs.

Would organic air defense make a difference?

 

 

 

[Ivanov]

In regards to the balance of power in the region:

"Russia will create three new military divisions on its Western flank in 2016 and bring five new strategic nuclear missile regiments into service, Sergei Shoigu, the country's defence minister, was quoted as saying by news agencies on Tuesday".

http://in.reuters.com/article/russia-army-idINKCN0UQ14420160112


At the same time the Baltic states are going to receive three companies ( not on permanent basis ). So much for the pessimism of the RAND study

Edited February 3, 2016 by Ivanov

[Battlefront.com]

In regards to the balance of power in the region:

"Russia will create three new military divisions on its Western flank in 2016 and bring five new strategic nuclear missile regiments into service, Sergei Shoigu, the country's defence minister, was quoted as saying by news agencies on Tuesday".

http://in.reuters.com/article/russia-army-idINKCN0UQ14420160112


At the same time the Baltic states are going to receive three companies ( not on permanent basis ). So much for the pessimism of the RAND study

Yup, I saw that when it was announced.  I ran it by someone offline that I trust and we are both in agreement that given the budget problems and various other issues the 3 "divisions" are going to be nothing more than a paper force.  There's some decent analysis of the move out there somewhere that I read which also points out that this is a major strategic thinking shift for Shoigu's reforms back to the way things were before 2009.  Since they concluded this structure was not a good thing it's interesting to see how it pans out.

Still, it's yet more pressure on NATO to get its act together about the Baltics.  Since NATO is not, nor ever has been, a threat to Russian Federation territory the only purpose of these "divisions" is to threaten NATO territory.

Steve

Edited February 3, 2016 by Battlefront.com

[Battlefront.com]

Steve, it appears you have conflated hours with days in your memory. There is no mention of any scenario being played out to 60 days. I even did a word search on the document and the only reference to the number 60 was:

 It is not specifically stated at what point d-day+hours the strike on the Blue heavy brigades happened, but given the above statement it most likely happened within the first 60 hours, which would place it within the "multiple days" time period in which NATO does not have air superiority. Given that, there is no apparent reason why the result should be impossible. Unless you are feeling that RAND's assumption of "moderate" competency for the Russian air force is too optimistic and that the Russian pilots are actually incompetent. Not that you would ever believe such a thing

DOH!  Yeah, got that wrong.  Late nights, too much work and what not.  However it doesn't change my point very much.  Especially because my criticism of RAND's study is far more extensive than this one issue.

The question I have now is what criteria did RAND use to declare game over?  This would answer my question about the two ABCT's impact on the war as well as others.

The point of this is warfare is not usually "first one to capture the flag wins".  RAND's study gives the impression that the end of 60 hours Russia effectively, but not totally, controls both Estonia and Latvia.  Yet they stopped the game when Russia is at its most vulnerable and NATO is just starting to get its act together.  If they presume Russia has air parity or even superiority for 2 days, what would happen to the Russian forces in the Baltics if the two ABCTs waited until 3 days to attack? 

Though this does get into a slippery slope.  If RAND's scope of study was to test the hypothesis "can NATO prevent Russia from effectively taking over Estonia and Latvia at all" then some of the objections I have are not as relevant as others.

Steve

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Anyway, a lot of that detracts from the point I was making: the Rand game says that Russian air blunts some planned counterattacks, not that it decimated some ABCTs.

Would organic air defense make a difference?

 The reality is if something brushed aside the USAF/USN air component plus NATO allied aircraft, went through PATRIOT without suffering enough losses to be crippling, I'm dubious to if an American rendition of the 2S6 would matter. 

Again as a wargamerism, we accept exceptional losses to achieve victory.  If the Russian air force is literally destroyed blunting the NATO counter-offensive, when the rest of the USAF shows up, there's simply not going to be any red air left to make the Russian IADs that key integrated piece, which then leaves the defenses formidable, but much easier to overwhelm and dismantle.  Which then leads to something similar to the Persian Gulf or Normandy 1944, where moving any ground forces invites bombs.

Every MIG or SU turned into a smoking hole trying to claw through to those ABCTs is one that cannot contribute to air defense later. And the Russians are by far in more danger from massed air attack than from two or so ABCTs.

Which really gets into playing into NATO's hand.  NATO doesn't have to physically re-take the Baltics immediately, a lengthy stand-off blood letting plays to NATO advantages, and if Russian air is defanged that becomes much easier.  It might mean the Baltic region takes it on the chin in terms of economic and infrastructure damage  but the west can sustain a long war fought largely with stand-off weapons.  The Russians cannot.  They also stand to lose the most by expanding the conflict in that they will have to mass most of their modern assets to the Baltic theater, while stripping other regions.  While there's nuclear deterrence for Russia proper...all of it's little semi-fictional friendnations it has carved off from its neighbors do not.  And taking those with the Russian military largely engaged with soaking up air strikes to hold onto real estate of marginal value would allow for things like a Georgian counter-offensive or a Ukrainian restoration of borders.  At the very least the conflict removes any aversion to actually putting NATO literally on the border of Russia which would negate most Russian foreign policy goals in Eastern Europe.

Simply put Russia has no (real) friends and many enemies.  This is a creation of its current government rather than the usual Russian nationalist drivel, however it does place a Russia at war in greater peril from many directions, while Russia in turn will be forced to pick its fights, and will not be able to win more than a few of them.

[Battlefront.com]

Not trying to get betwixt you two (my popcorn eating would be nowhere near as fun  ) , but the Russian air-ground comment in the study said nothing about decimating 2 ABCTs. It said that planned Blue counterattacks were blunted by Russian air. 

As for worst, medium, best case 3x3 grid options, why bother with the middle unless the outliers show a need? Meaning, if worst-best AND best-worst show the same outcome, why wast time with 5 other tests including medium vs any?

Because they didn't do that.  It appears they did worst vs. best and medium vs. best only.  Or more specifically worst vs. best, tad better than worst vs. best, and medium vs. best.  The common factor, as far as I can tell, was they started with fairly "best" conditions for the Russians and made no modifications to their assumptions for any of the scenarios.

The maps: They used 1:50,000 TPCs. That's "Tactical Pilot Charts". Those are meant for pilots, not ground combat. Obviously, using the "Lanchester Exchange Rates" (is that like Panzerblitz CRT?), is something I don't understand, but it sounds good. I don't have a high degree of confidence that their simulation was accurately portraying battles, but they probably came close enough to the big picture. (Meaning, if I wanted to see engagement ranges, the effectiveness and utility of the infantry weapons (they say they tabulated LMGs per squad, etc.), vehicle losses, ops tempo, I'd need to battle it with CMBS (CM Baltic States).) The point of this paragraph is that I don't think this was a high-fidelity combat simulation. It was more of a big-picture map exercise.

Exactly, and that is my primary cause for concern that the outcomes aren't reliable.  I make simulations for a living and I can tell you it is more difficult to accurately simulate "big-picture" exercise than "small-picture".  At tactical level there's a ton going on, but when something goes wrong it is easier to spot and deal with.  Here's an example.

On paper a King Tiger Battalion is pretty much untouchable, but when you start gaming out the use of King Tigers in penny packets in bad terrain against determined opposition you find out that they basically suck.  It's tough to model this at the higher level in a way that produces a consistent and generally reliable result.  It CAN be modeled, but CRTs and dice aren't really going to cut it.

Now, if you're simulating an environment where the King Tiger Battalion is not very important, then modeling problems don't impact the overall conclusions as much (depends on what the questions being asked are, of course).  However, if that King Tiger Battalion was part of a larger force that relied upon it for momentum, then the higher level conclusions could potentially be very flawed.  One has to wonder if the Germans made this mistake when wargaming out the Ardennes offensive.

 

Back to the air-ground thing... What organic air defense assets do US/Nato units have? The stinger is really just not sufficient. The assumption has always been that USAF would provide an air umbrella. That may not be a valid assumption. A bit of air defense to keep the attacking Russian air from easy targeting would not be a bad thing to add. (No doubt it'd take 20 years and cost a few trillion dollars under the current procurement systems. Oh, wait, the US does have those nifty .50/stinger turrets on hummers. Geez.) This study implies that adding that type of tactical air defense to US/Nato ground forces could be a "game changer". (I'm not saying it is/isn't, nor am I saying Rand is/isn't doing so to help an industry partner.  )

Yup, and as I said above I think the RAND study is a valid reminder that if NATO is going to be in a position where it is not guaranteed air superiority, or even parity, for critical period of time it has to figure out something else.

The one week warning period is nowhere near worst case for Nato, IMO. I have an extremely low regard for the current crop of western politicians and their willingness to make hard decisions. (Hey, it's my opinion and it borders on politics: I'm only stating it so that you understand my perspective vis a vis the Rand study.) Letting Nato take action BEFORE an overt invasion is pretty nice for the blue team. Imagine the US moving an ABCT into Latvia the day after a "spontaneous" street demonstration about Russian ethnic rights occurred up in Tallinn? Ain't gonna happen...

Again, I can envision a lot worse cases than what RAND did, but at some point they are so ridiculously bad there's really no point in going through with the map exercise as any dolt could probably come to a similar conclusion based on orders of battle alone.

Having said that, NATO is already taking action BEFORE Russia is doing anything specific (other than continuing Phase 1 and 2 of their hybrid war plan), therefore NATO is already beating your expectations.  Whether it will go beyond that, who can say?  As I said earlier, it is likely that NATO will have weeks if not months of escalation under their belts before the 6 day warning window.  I also think that NATO's members and allies have way more tricks up their sleeves to head off a Russia attack than ABCTs.

 

Anyway, a lot of that detracts from the point I was making: the Rand game says that Russian air blunts some planned counterattacks, not that it decimated some ABCTs.

My presumption of "decimation" is that the two ABCTs didn't have any apparent impact on the battle.  Which seems to be more a function of them cutting off the scenario time than anything else.  Which means we don't know to what extent the two ABCTs were degraded because the timeframe they focused on was only 1-2 days tops.  And such a disruption is definitely within reason.

Would organic air defense make a difference?

It certainly wouldn't hurt

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

 The reality is if something brushed aside the USAF/USN air component plus NATO allied aircraft, went through PATRIOT without suffering enough losses to be crippling, I'm dubious to if an American rendition of the 2S6 would matter. 

I agree with this.  However, coupled with other factors it could have a significant impact in tipping the balance NATO's way at a very specific point in a battle.

Having said that, the primary issue to ponder is RAND's cutoff time.  Because if I were in command of two ABCTs and I'm told that today there's a serious risk of air interdiction but tomorrow it will be blue skies, then I'd find a way to delay moving until the following day.  Unlike RAND's study, real life doesn't have arbitrary start and end points.

Again as a wargamerism, we accept exceptional losses to achieve victory.  If the Russian air force is literally destroyed blunting the NATO counter-offensive, when the rest of the USAF shows up, there's simply not going to be any red air left to make the Russian IADs that key integrated piece, which then leaves the defenses formidable, but much easier to overwhelm and dismantle.  Which then leads to something similar to the Persian Gulf or Normandy 1944, where moving any ground forces invites bombs.

Every MIG or SU turned into a smoking hole trying to claw through to those ABCTs is one that cannot contribute to air defense later. And the Russians are by far in more danger from massed air attack than from two or so ABCTs.

Which really gets into playing into NATO's hand.  NATO doesn't have to physically re-take the Baltics immediately, a lengthy stand-off blood letting plays to NATO advantages, and if Russian air is defanged that becomes much easier.  It might mean the Baltic region takes it on the chin in terms of economic and infrastructure damage  but the west can sustain a long war fought largely with stand-off weapons.  The Russians cannot.  They also stand to lose the most by expanding the conflict in that they will have to mass most of their modern assets to the Baltic theater, while stripping other regions.  While there's nuclear deterrence for Russia proper...all of it's little semi-fictional friendnations it has carved off from its neighbors do not.  And taking those with the Russian military largely engaged with soaking up air strikes to hold onto real estate of marginal value would allow for things like a Georgian counter-offensive or a Ukrainian restoration of borders.  At the very least the conflict removes any aversion to actually putting NATO literally on the border of Russia which would negate most Russian foreign policy goals in Eastern Europe.

Simply put Russia has no (real) friends and many enemies.  This is a creation of its current government rather than the usual Russian nationalist drivel, however it does place a Russia at war in greater peril from many directions, while Russia in turn will be forced to pick its fights, and will not be able to win more than a few of them.

Exactly.  Which is why we have to take RAND's study of a very narrowly focused military only scenario with a pinch of salt.  Their study seems only interested in if NATO could win a battle, not if it could win a war.  As I've objected to over and over again, they should make that very clear.  Russia taking over the bulk of Estonia and Latvia would be very temporary.  Days, maybe weeks.  I don't think months is very likely and absolutely not years.  Why?  Because the Russian state as we know it would collapse very quickly.

As you say, if Russia goes to war with NATO it has to go "all in".  NATO, on the other hand, can pretty much do what NATO did for the bulk of its existence... wait for the enemy to collapse from the effort of opposing it.  Unlike the Cold War, NATO would not have to wait very long.

At the first sign of Russian weakness a whole bunch of things will go wrong for it all simultaneously politically, socially, economically, and militarily.  On the latter front, RAND commented on insurgency and reminded everybody about how Russia responds to insurgencies by dredging up Chechnya.  But once again RAND didn't put that into proper context.  There is no way, no how, that Russia would have the time or resources to mount a counter insurgency operation in the Baltics.  It would be in a precarious position AT BEST and having pissed off Estonians and Latvians shooting up their rear would likely bring about an end to the military occupation very quickly.

My money is on Putin understanding that picking a fight with NATO will end with him and his buddies hanging from meathooks.  Since his personal well being is so obviously his prime concern, I doubt very much that he would deliberately get into a shooting war with NATO.

Steve

Edited February 3, 2016 by Battlefront.com

[BTR]

Yup, NATO strong, Russia weak, we can all go home. 

In the even of occupation though:

Baltic insurgency in times of occupation are Interior troops territory. Not sure how many would need to be there to reinforce military presence of the available total 170K. Insurgency strikes the hardest when there is a major cultural shock and no supporting population. Neither is the case in the Baltics, with major Russian ethnic populations in two out of the three regions that would probably be used as the base for counter-insurgency networks. Baltic population is also fairly non-reactive if we judge by post-WW2 comparisons to western Ukraine for example. 

[sburke]

Just because - Lanchester exchange rates - took a bit of poking around, but I did find a reference.

Lanchester used differential equations to understand exchange rates in losses.  It is just a manner of using formulas to figure loss exchanges.  A math geek's CRT if you will.  The real question is how did they develop the input for the exchanges.

https://books.google.com/books?id=NdlQAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA156&lpg=PA156&dq=Lanchester+exchange+rates&source=bl&ots=rFRAaMv7Ge&sig=RafzY96GjSjmx9QWM6eDAz5vqFs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiOltCnudzKAhUX6mMKHUWTAhEQ6AEILTAD#v=onepage&q=Lanchester exchange rates&f=false

Edited February 3, 2016 by sburke

[Wicky]

Tonight us brits get an eyefull of World War Three: Inside the War Room

Footage of a major war game with a committee of senior military, political and diplomatic figures as they confront a hypothetical `hot war' in Eastern Europe, including nuclear confrontation. The programme faces a scenario that has haunted western strategists since civil war broke out in Ukraine: potential Russian military involvement in the Baltic States of Latvia and Estonia

BBC2 HD
9:00pm-10:00pm (1 hour ) Wed 3 Feb 
Read more at http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06zw32h

[sburke]

Tonight us brits get an eyefull of World War Three: Inside the War Room

Footage of a major war game with a committee of senior military, political and diplomatic figures as they confront a hypothetical `hot war' in Eastern Europe, including nuclear confrontation. The programme faces a scenario that has haunted western strategists since civil war broke out in Ukraine: potential Russian military involvement in the Baltic States of Latvia and Estonia

BBC2 HD
9:00pm-10:00pm (1 hour ) Wed 3 Feb 
Read more at http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06zw32h

I don't see any dice in that pic.

[Wicky]

I don't see any dice in that pic.

On the other channel at the same time (recording) is Madam Secretary - hopefully she'll sort it all out!

So far 10 minutes in, Russians in Estonia are revolting - Putin is twitching and heads are talking.

Edited February 3, 2016 by Wicky

[sburke]

Now that is just not fair.  Russians anywhere are just ordinary people.  No reason to start name calling! 

 

Gonna have to see if I can vpn into UK, they don't allow viewing here.

Edited February 3, 2016 by sburke

[Wicky]

Well that got messy really quickly > http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zpm8xsg   They didn't want to upset Putin when he bought up tactical nukes, ignored 72 hour deadline to vacate Latvia, and sunk some NATO ships!

Coincidently we have a friendly Estomian barmaid at my real ale local - when things kicked off a couple of years back at the Russian war memorial in Estonia, as I have Hungarian roots asked her view on it - didn't get the answer I was expecting as she's ethnic Russian.  I should have guessed as her hubby is called 'Rus'!

Edited February 3, 2016 by Wicky

[Battlefront.com]

 Damn, the dog ate my post

Yup, NATO strong, Russia weak, we can all go home. 

No, Russia is strong, but NATO is in every way stronger.

In the even of occupation though:

Baltic insurgency in times of occupation are Interior troops territory. Not sure how many would need to be there to reinforce military presence of the available total 170K. Insurgency strikes the hardest when there is a major cultural shock and no supporting population. Neither is the case in the Baltics, with major Russian ethnic populations in two out of the three regions that would probably be used as the base for counter-insurgency networks. Baltic population is also fairly non-reactive if we judge by post-WW2 comparisons to western Ukraine for example. 

Oooo... don't agree with this at all.  The Baltics fought two wars for independence and an insurgency after the close of WW2.  Lithuania stood up to a military crackdown by Russian forces in 1992 and that triggered the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union.  While it is true that Russia deliberately placed Russian populations in these three countries to use as leverage, it hasn't done much for Russian policy over the last 24 years despite years of covert and overt attempts to use them to cause problems.  The ethnic Russian areas are concentrated along the Russian border and that is a disadvantage for controlling the population with "natives".

As for culture shock, you're way off.  The Russian method of rule is not compatible with the current culture of these three countries.  Do not expect them to sit around as Russian oligarchs steal everything they've worked so hard to create in the past two decades.

But this is really irrelevant.  Insurgencies are very easy to start and very difficult to get rid of.  Russia will not be allowed the time nor resources to conduct such an operation.

Just because - Lanchester exchange rates - took a bit of poking around, but I did find a reference.

Lanchester used differential equations to understand exchange rates in losses.  It is just a manner of using formulas to figure loss exchanges.  A math geek's CRT if you will.  The real question is how did they develop the input for the exchanges.

https://books.google.com/books?id=NdlQAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA156&lpg=PA156&dq=Lanchester+exchange+rates&source=bl&ots=rFRAaMv7Ge&sig=RafzY96GjSjmx9QWM6eDAz5vqFs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiOltCnudzKAhUX6mMKHUWTAhEQ6AEILTAD#v=onepage&q=Lanchester exchange rates&f=false

Thanks for finding that.  More reinforcement that I'd go "yuck!" if I saw the game conditions which were used for this test.  Though to be fair, gaming higher level stuff is definitely more problematic than tactical (as stated earlier).  Personally, I think a modern warfare game at this scale needs to simulate individual platoons, complete with soft factors  And to do that you really need to put it in the computer instead of on paper.

Steve

[sburke]

 

Personally, I think a modern warfare game at this scale needs to simulate individual platoons, complete with soft factors  And to do that you really need to put it in the computer instead of on paper.

Steve

Agreed, Wicky you gonna run with this?  Go back to BBC and tell them we want a 15 mission campaign for CMBS and if they could also get to work on the ToEs for NATO members for the module set that will be needed that would also be appreciated. Oh and before I forget we will also need artwork for buildings etc for regional flavor. 

[Battlefront.com]

Well that got messy > http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zpm8xsg

Pretty solid premise for the start of things.  Russia either directly manufacturing an excuse for action or setting the conditions that weight the odds in favor of one happening spontaneously is taken straight from recent history in Ukraine.  Plenty examples of this happening, repeatedly.  But here's the thing to consider.

Ukraine is BY FAR more important to Russia than the Baltics.  Russia had thought Ukraine was pretty much totally in its pocket until 2004 and still thought it controlled it in 2014.  When the government collapsed Russia thought it could regain control without having to use overt military force.  That failed so Russia sent in armed agitators and supported them in order to create the conditions necessary for false justification of sending in "peace keepers".  This plan was so advanced that the "peace keeper" force was moved up to the Ukrainian border (complete with Russian peace keeping markings on vehicles).  Yet the "peace keepers" didn't go in in.  Why not?  It is unclear because the people involved aren't exactly talking about what was going on behind closed doors.  However, I think one factor was Ukraine stating that it would consider the presence of Russian "peace keepers" an act of war.  Another factor was probable stronger than expect talk in back rooms between Western and Russian leadership.  I do not think this was anticipated and it introduced all kinds of possibly nasty consequences. 

So the question is, if Russia backed down from outright invasion of Ukraine, a country that it was vastly more interested and invested in controlling, would Russia really have the sort of risk appetite to take on NATO directly in a place that doesn't hold extremely large strategic value to Russia?  No, I don't think so.

From the BBC report above:

Ambassador Brenton: The thing that keeps you in power in Russia is a reputation for strength. If Putin is confronted by a Nato challenge he loses politically. Moving troops in is a step too far.

Putin wants to live long enough to spend some of the billions he has stashed away all over the world.  He's got a pretty good chance of doing that for a long time if he continues pushing things right up to the limit, but not beyond.  I think he's smart enough to know that attacking NATO forces would go too far.

Steve

[sburke]

and you know how he will spin it - NATO and the West are war mongers, but Russia will not be deterred from seeking peaceful solutions... blah blah blah