US Stingers

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Yeah...when I said "sink 5 merchies," I meant sink five ships overall. Like, in the whole war. Like, after those five ships, they can't sink any more because all the Russians subs are lodged in the ooze on the ocean floor. And this assumes that the Russians would even go into the North Atlantic, which I seriously feel like they wouldn't. I concur with sburke: the Russian navy isn't going to sortie in the North Atlantic. They are going to stay home and protect the homeland. Because it is far more logical for them to do so, especially since "Regional War over Ukraine" does not equal "OMG WWIII launch everything."

As for convoys, I don't know the first thing about loading ships, or convoy operations, or how REFORGER '17 would work. But I assume that you send more ships and supplies across than you need, and have it loaded so that a lucky Shipwreck doesn't take all of III Corps 155mm rounds with it. So you may sink 5 ships...but it doesn't matter, because we are sending over more than enough to sustain/equip our forces. Basically, 5 ships might not make a dent in the war. If the 1st Cav shows up missing the XOs tank in every tank company and is missing 100,000 fewer 25mm rounds out of the 5 million sent over...its not going to make a difference.

Just take out a few tanks per company and set the supply setting in the scenario editor to limited, scarce or severe  to simulate supply difficulties and losses on the convoy routes and I suspect you will see a difference

i would say a loss of 5 ships per convoy for the first two or three convoys would actually be about right as this is the time when the Russian submarine and air threat will be at its' highest for a combination of reasons. After that, as I keep saying it will drop off and become negligible by week 5 or week 6

As I also keep saying LIMITED air and sea action WON'T be too great an escalation particularly if targeting is largely restricted to military targets, ports and air ports. We are not countenancing restricted bombing campaigns or unrestricted attacks on intentional shipping here

You have also yet to explain why Putin, clearly a very clever and astute leader, is going to make the same strategic blunder Saddam Hussein did in 1990 and allow an unimpeded US reinforcement and buildup of a fearsome armoured force with amazing logistical support. That would be fighting the kind of war the US is best at Putin is not stupid and he won't let that happen without some military attempt to prevent or at leas delay it. Essentially this war an be seen as a race between a maritime power and a continental power. And sea power is going to be the deciding factor,

[Codename Duchess]

The following post has nothing to do with Stinger missiles.

Going to steal panzersauerkrautwerfer's style here.

Re:
Ships take time and plenty of Tender Love and Care to work right.  The less attention you pay to them in port, the longer it takes to get them making waves again.  Just because a force is credited with having ships on paper doesn't mean they're ready to go, let alone even in the water.  Hence...

Re: The Russian Navy as a whole
One thing that needs to be kept in mind throughout all of this: The Russian Navy is definitely NOT the Soviet Navy.  There's a reason you don't see their ships all over the world.  They do NOT enjoy the same levels of training, funding, actual at sea time (this counts a lot), maintenance, etc. And I'm not talking small discrepancies, I mean massive disparities.  All of the factors that seriously affect a fleet's readiness and ability to project power.  Compare this to...

Recommended Reading:
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/05/27/russias-navy-more-rust-than-ready/
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-russian-navy-is-on-the-verge-of-collapse-b0ce344ebf96#.7m3caiiql

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3493
 

HIGHLY Recommended Reading (this is what the War is Boring article references.  Comes from analysis from a Harvard professor on these things):
https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2015/01/14/russian-naval-capabilities-and-procurement-plans/

[On the Northern Fleet, emphasis my own]

Non-strategic submarines include one new Yasen-class currently undergoing sea trials, three Oscar II-class submarines with cruise missiles, 14 multi-purpose nuclear submarines of various classes and seven Kilo-class diesel submarines. About half of the non-strategic submarines are on active duty, while the rest are in various stages of modernisation or repair.

Overall, somewhere between 40-70% of the Northern Fleet’s ships and submarines are not fully operational.

CONCLUSION: The Russian navy will see modest improvements in capabilities by the end of the decade, with a shift in focus away from large surface units and nuclear attack submarines, and towards frigates, corvettes and diesel submarines. This emphasis shows that Russia does not see NATO as a realistic potential maritime opponent. Whereas the Soviet navy focused on building ships designed to take on carrier groups, the new Russian navy will be primarily focused on defending against smaller adversaries closer to home, at least in the short term.

Re: Decadent HATO ship people.
The USN uses a model broken into thirds, with a third of the fleet actually deployed in presence/power projection style roles, 1/3 working up for the same and ready to sail quickly, and 1/3 in a deeper maintenance period.  This is because we have maintained a presence around the world since WW2, even despite being essentially unopposed for the past 26 years.  European fleets are somewhere between the level of the USN and Russians, but I'd expect that they are more capable of surging than the Russians.  However, the European maintenance levels will be much higher.

Re: Mediterranean/Black Sea Naval Action

I won't dispute this will occur, but it will be very quick.  We've gone over the limited combat strength of the Black Sea Fleet already.  The surface combatants would be lost almost immediately, and the submarines hunted down at the leisure of NATO prior to/during any amphibious operations.  Remember this is only 2-3 boats.

Re: The Great North Atlantic Turkey Shoot

This isn't the turkey shoot you keep implying.  From above, the Northern Fleet has 18 SSNs/SSGNs.  Approximately half of these are in active duty, and not in the yard*.  So we have 9-10 nuclear boats that can prowl  the North Atlantic (we will assume the Kilos will stay and defend the Rodina because that's what they're best at and would be severely outclassed in deep water).  Remember that can =/= will.  We'll say that for whatever reason, 8 nuc boats set sail for the North Atlantic.  Russian surface forces would have nothing to gain and everything to lose by sailing into the North Atlantic so we will discount them as well.

Now the USN has 56 SSNs, divided 30/26 between West and East coasts.  USN submarines deploy more often (although usually for shorter to make up for this) than their surface brethren because they are so important.  Because of this, you'll often see 2/3 of them underway at a given time.  I can't even begin to speculate on the spooky nature of their deployments, although I do know from bubblehead compatriots that pretty much every submarine from "less than friendly" nations is accompanied by one of ours when they sail, and I sincerely doubt they're meaningfully tracked in return.  We'll say 17 east coast boats (because I went on google earth and counted 9 pierside on whatever day the photo was taken) are deployed.  Knock off 5-7 for spooky **** in the Med or elsewhere.  10 boats vs the Russian 8 in the Atlantic, at least one of which immediately would have a tail (because there's definitely an SSN watching Murmansk at all times, especially in the escalating crisis of the game).  So right away we know how many boats are sailing from that tail, and we know where they're going because they really only have one choice.  The other boats make best speed for the GIUK gap with some making it in time.  Combine this with SURTASS and SOSUS and we can get a decent fix on at least half of the Russian boats.  Oh but wait, we have P-8s and P-3s from the USN and other NATO nations that can contribute at the thing they're best designed to do.  And man is the P-8 good at what it does (I don't fly one but I've been around them).  Also, France and the UK have SSNs as well and I'm sure we'd get at least one of each either on convoy guard or GIUK hunting.  Other European D-E boats would probably be busy in the Med, Mid-Atlantic, or off Norway.

ALSO: With prepositioned forces and fast supply ships, we'd get an initial load of gear and supplies off for the first month of fighting.  This would give a month of time to organize the convoys.  This gives NATO a month to get their ASW screen in place.  If you give NATO a month to orient along the obvious threat, then I'd call it 50/50 odds that just one Russian boat gets by the screen (only to then have to contend with other MPA and surface forces/SSNs guarding the convoys).  Backfire raids could have some more success, but these would have to contend with European NATO air forces and any North Atlantic Carrier Strike Groups (which will definitely be in place given a month).  They also have to deal with NATO's response to the Black Sea itself, as they're your best option there.  If Putin decides to use them.

In conclusion, their would be no Russian "Happy Period."  Every Russian sub that sortied would be destroyed by the time the first convoy sailed.  Putin and his Admirals know this.  You would lose a capable trump card and over 1000 Russians for no gain and marginal effects.

* "In the yard" in the Russian Navy can last for literal decades, keep in mind.

 

Edited February 6, 2016 by Codename Duchess

[sburke]

No offense Lucas, but I think you are kind of caught up in the German WW 2 experience.  I seriously doubt you will see a "happy time" for the Russian boats.  If anything considering their scarce numbers, any attempt to sortie will find them being ruthlessly hunted.  With no serious surface element to present a multi tiered threat, the US can focus all of it's assets to hunting what is more likely only to be handful of boats.

Regarding the 3 months, yeah I keep going back and forth between this thread and the other on the Baltics. sorry. 

Still I think the premise still holds, the Russian military will not attempt to challenge the reinforcements coming.  It may seem counter intuitive, but really the attempt is likely to be so costly with little hope of return that Russia is better off keeping the long term view.  It needs to maintain a view to having a force post conflict.  It is costly enough trying to rebuild now versus having to replace all those ships, aircraft and crews post conflict when the international economic relationships are most likely going to be far worse than simple sanctions.  It is vitally in Russia's interests to limit the scale of this conflict, doing so keeps Russia on closer to equal terms.  The more it expands, the more the force disparity goes against them.  What Russia needs (assuming any of this makes any sense at all for Russia) is to push Ukraine into a negotiating position where in order to remove Russian tropps concessions need to be made that Russia views as strategically important to it's interests

[Codename Duchess]

As I also keep saying LIMITED air and sea action WON'T be too great an escalation particularly if targeting is largely restricted to military targets, ports and air ports. We are not countenancing restricted bombing campaigns or unrestricted attacks on intentional shipping here

I somehow missed this gem.  Do you honestly believe that Russian cruise missile strikes on US (or European ports) will be seen as "okay" by their respective populaces?  ......okay then. What happens when ALL THE TOMAHAWKS from EVERYWHERE hit Russia in return? The American public, when properly motivated, is a feisty one.  Burning piers is a very visible symbol.

Edited February 6, 2016 by Codename Duchess

[LUCASWILLEN05]

I somehow missed this gem.  Do you honestly believe that Russian cruise missile strikes on US (or European ports) will be seen as "okay" by their respective populaces?  What happens when ALL THE TOMAHAWKS from EVERYWHERE hit Russia in return? The American public, when properly motivated, is a feisty one.  Burning piers is a very visible symbol.

I am not talking about unrestricted cruise missile strikes conventional pr otherwise. i am talking about

1 Limited air and naval attacks against convoys

2 Limited air and missile strikes against transport hubs such as air ports and pots hat are or might be used for he transport of troops employing conventional HE, NOT NBC!

3 

[sburke]

 

I somehow missed this gem.  Do you honestly believe that Russian cruise missile strikes on US (or European ports) will be seen as "okay" by their respective populaces?  What happens when ALL THE TOMAHAWKS from EVERYWHERE hit Russia in return? The American public, when properly motivated, is a feisty one.  Burning piers is a very visible symbol.

Ha I missed that comment as well.  Damn Kaliningrad dock works would be a smoking ruin, as would every other Russian Naval base.  It also begs the question- if Russia sorties the tiny little fleet they have, are they going after convoys or US port facilities?  That tiny little force seems to suddenly be everywhere.  Sinking 5 ships per convoy, targeting US naval bases etc.  Dang they are good.

 

Anyway back to the post I was writing.

To put some perspective on this discussion, below is the current Russian Northern Fleet.  There are a total of 10 Nuclear attack boats in the Northern fleet.  The diesel electric Kilo boats are designed for shallow waters. So Russia in the most optimal planning could sortie 10 boats to the Atlantic.  Another 7 diesel electric boats to try and interdict coastal European waters and 5 diesel electric boats into the Med.

In 1990 the USSR had some 136 Nuclear attack boats and 65 diesel electric.  Currently it has 26 Nuclear attack boats and 20 Diesel electric.  as @Codename Duchess has noted, the Russian navy has transitioned it's force to primarily a coastal defense force.The US in 1990 had 89 Nuclear attack boats, currently it has 54.  Whatever strategy the USSR had for wartime deployment, the Russian Navy is clearly not capable of pursuing that strategy.  Rather than forcing the US navy to spread forces to find the numerically superior USSR fleet, the US now outnumbers that fleet.

In the event it had to sortie it is questionable how many could actually do so.  For example there are 9 Akula class boats listed as "active" - of those 6 are in overhaul, 2 supposedly completed in December.  Assuming those two are actually ready that means 5 of the 9 could actually take part.  Note of the 6 Akula's listed below for the Northern fleet.  2 are in overhaul, and a 3rd has just completed in December. So even a figure of 10 is hopelessly optimistic.

 

11th Squadron, Zaozersk
 Typhoon-class SSBN Dmitriy Donskoy (ТК-208) (Nerpichya)
 Two other Typhoon class submarines are assigned to this squadron but are not active.
7th Division, Vidyaevo [12]
            Commander
       RADM Aleksandr Ildashov
  Sierra I-class SSN Kostroma
  Sierra II-class SSN Nizhniy Novgorod[12]
  Sierra II-class SSN Pskov (K-336)
  Victor-III-class SSN Daniil Moskovskiy (K-414) Commissioned 1990
        other submarines

 24th Submarine Division (Yagelnaya Bay, Sayda Inlet)
            Commanders
                xxx 200x-present RADM Anatoliy Minakov
 Akula-class submarine I-class SSN Pantera (K-317)
 Akula I-class SSN Volk (K-461)
 Akula I-class SSN Leopard (K-328)
 Akula I-class SSN Tigr (K-154) [12]
 Akula II-class SSN Vepr (K-157)
 Akula II-class SSN Gepard (K-335)

43rd Missile Ship Division
    Commanders
     RADM Veregin
     RADM Avakyants
     RADM Kasatonov
     Present - RADM Aleksandr Turilin
 Kuznetsov-class CV Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov (063), Navy flagship.
 Kirov-class battlecruiser CGN Pyotr Velikiy (099), Fleet flagship
 Slava-class CG Marshal Ustinov (055)
 Sovremennyy-class DDG Gremyashchiy
 Sovremennyy-class DDG Admiral Ushakov
2nd Anti-Submarine Ship Division [12]
 Udaloy-I Class DDG Vice Admiral Kulakov
 Udaloy-I Class DDG Severomorsk
 Udaloy-I Class DDG Admiral Levchenko
 Udaloy-I Class DDG Admiral Kharlamov
 Udaloy-II Class DDG Admiral Chabanenko

4th Submarine Flotilla (Polyarnyy) [12]
    Commander
     Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Gorbunov
 Kilo class submarine-class SS Novosibirsk (B-401)
 Kilo-class SS Vologda" (B-402)
 Kilo-class SS Yaroslavl (B-808)
 Kilo-class SS Kaluga (B-800)
 Kilo-class SS Vladikavkaz (B-459)
 Kilo-class SS Magnitogorsk (B-471)
 Kilo-class SS Lipetsk (B-177)

 

[Codename Duchess]

I am not talking about unrestricted cruise missile strikes conventional pr otherwise. i am talking about

1 Limited air and naval attacks against convoys

2 Limited air and missile strikes against transport hubs such as air ports and pots hat are or might be used for he transport of troops employing conventional HE, NOT NBC!

3 

I never said NBC, I didn't even think of NBC.  That doesn't mean the US public is going to be okay with HE missiles.  Like seriously, how on Earth do you actually think we'd be okay with that?  That is like the literal definition of escalation.  It's an attack on the homeland of a NATO nation.

Edited February 6, 2016 by Codename Duchess

[sburke]

If a single Russian missile hits a US port facility, the US population would back our gov't doing damn near anything short of nuclear release and would expect absolutely that the US navy would retaliate in kind and in a way to make clear to Russia that there is only one way that fight was going to end.  It would be the single worst mistake Russia could make.  Think Pearl Harbor.

The very nature of the war would change.  The US would no longer look at it as trying to bolster some nation which would be debated in the US as being not strategically important to the US.  Instead it would escalate to a direct head to head conflict with Russia with nightly news broadcasting non stop images of whatever was struck by Russia.  Think about it, prior to that point US viewers would be watching reports of an escalation of hostilities in Ukraine and frankly I think you'd see a lot of debate in the US as to why our troops are going.  Russia might actually find some success in spinning the story of this being just another example of the US trying to fix a hopelessly screwed up European problem.  There is a strong isolationist tendency in the US.  All that would change with the first news reports of US dead on US soil.

Even if the US exercised restraint in responding, it would still mean the US populace would view this as an existential war and would seek absolute unequivocal victory.  A total commitment to the conflict, gearing up the economy. authorizing any expenditure necessary.  The world has not seen a US war machine that unified and committed in a very long time.  There would absolutely be a loser in that conflict and the regime in power in Russia can not risk the perception of losing on that scale.  I give the Putin regime more credit than that.  I realize the back story for CMBS has a 3 month timeline. but Russia would have to have a plan to freeze the armed conflict before the scales totally tipped for it.  Escalating with an attack on the US mainland would immediately do that.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

No offense Lucas, but I think you are kind of caught up in the German WW 2 experience.  I seriously doubt you will see a "happy time" for the Russian boats.  If anything considering their scarce numbers, any attempt to sortie will find them being ruthlessly hunted.  With no serious surface element to present a multi tiered threat, the US can focus all of it's assets to hunting what is more likely only to be handful of boats.

Regarding the 3 months, yeah I keep going back and forth between this thread and the other on the Baltics. sorry. 

Still I think the premise still holds, the Russian military will not attempt to challenge the reinforcements coming.  It may seem counter intuitive, but really the attempt is likely to be so costly with little hope of return that Russia is better off keeping the long term view.  It needs to maintain a view to having a force post conflict.  It is costly enough trying to rebuild now versus having to replace all those ships, aircraft and crews post conflict when the international economic relationships are most likely going to be far worse than simple sanctions.  It is vitally in Russia's interests to limit the scale of this conflict, doing so keeps Russia on closer to equal terms.  The more it expands, the more the force disparity goes against them.  What Russia needs (assuming any of this makes any sense at all for Russia) is to push Ukraine into a negotiating position where in order to remove Russian tropps concessions need to be made that Russia views as strategically important to it's interests

No offence but you are quite wrong. You assume that Putin, having once gotten himself into a war with the US is not going to listen carefully to the expert advice offered by his senior military commanders. It should be as clear as day that that advice will involve interdicting the Atlantic convpy routes.

And by the way I am not thinking of WW2 here although the same strategic principle is involved. I am actually thinking of

1 The1990 - 91 Persian Gulf War and of what the US did to Iraq having been allowed months to build up an overwhelming force. I put it to you that Putin saw that as well and is very well aware of what happened and why. The man is ex KGB for Pete's sake

2 The late Cold War era specifically the likely course of events had it turned hot for which I suggest you read Hackett's The Third World War and Michael Palmer'The War that  Never was  which, by the way concentrates very much on the naval aspect

For the Russians the strategic problem is the same as the one that faced the Kaiser's Germany, Hitler's Germany or the Soviet Union. They are a CONTINENTAL power fighting a MARITIME power. The strategy is NOT Sea Control which is a battle they cannot win. It is SEA DENIAL FR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE which is a battle that Russia might be able to win if things go well on land quickly enough. In your terms that means forcing the Ukraine and the US into a negotiating position favorable to Russia. That means delaying and inflicting damage on those convoys Exactly the same scenario as a late 1980s Cold War gone hot scenario! Sure the forces today re rather different but the essentials of the strategic problems for both sides are essentially the same! 

I put it to you that the Russian navy of today is a cold war relic that will soon  have to be replaced anyway. Some of th experienced sailors and airmen will be kept back to ensure their survival to assist in the building of the new Russian  navy The old one is essentially sacrificed to the strategic goal of delaying US reinforcements while the Russian army does it's best to win the land war in Ukraine. Which essentially is what CMBS is all aboit

So how about a few late June/early July scenarios where US forces are a little short on supplies and equipment owing to high expenditure of war stocks, losses of new AFVs/IFVs on the convoys. This should give us some indication of the likely impact of some quite limited Russian success against the early convoys. By mid/late July I suggest the Third Battle of the Atlantic will have been pretty much won and, by the end of the month supplies and reinforcements will not bw a problem for the US. As long as they weather he June/early July crisis which is when Russia has is' best shot at winning the war.

[Codename Duchess]

Did you read anything I posted in my breakdown of the orbat Lucas?  Your plans make sense, sort of, for late Soviet Union fleet.  But that was a very long 27 years before this scenario.  You are only going to get 8 submarines to do  your big plans...

http://community.battlefront.com/topic/121459-us-stingers/?do=findComment&comment=1654039

Edited February 6, 2016 by Codename Duchess

[sburke]

i suspect the expert advice offered by his senior commanders will be significantly different than yours. the comments about the sailors seems rather like Ken's commentary in his aar. LOL Lucas you are a fairly callous commander. 

Anyway I think our perspectives are just too far different. I don't see anyone on the Russian side as believing it is in their interest to escalate any conflict with the US at all.  A clinical computer war game perspective of shifting assets ignores the larger consequences.  I firmly believe Russia understands very well what those might be and would make every effort to avoid them.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

I never said NBC, I didn't even think of NBC.  That doesn't mean the US public is going to be okay with HE missiles.  Like seriously, how on Earth do you actually think we'd be okay with that?  That is like the literal definition of escalation.  It's an attack on the homeland of a NATO nation.

Nor would I. Just precluding the possibility that someone is going to make an unfounded assumption that I would imagine such weapons would be used. Certainly at this early stage of a conflict. That said Russia seems to have a rather more, let us say permissive view about nuclear weapons use. I don't know if you saw it bu there was a rather interesting drama documentary on BBC2 last week depicting a crisis management wargame, this one assuming a crisis in the Baltic States

As for the use of conventional weapons on ports, airports and the like, sure that will be a limited escalation. Most likely however it will be the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany most likely to b hit. not the US itself although I would not rule a few attacks n ports/ai ports out where they are clearly being used for troop movements. Europe however is a far more likely target for attacks of this sort. Mostly however the targets will b the Atlantic convoy routes themselves and the transport hubs required to move troops fro their disembarkation ports to the front in Ukraine. Like I keep saying Putin and his military commanders are not fools and they will have to do something to delay and reduce the buildup of US forces in Europe who will be he ones to win or lose the whole war.

Unless of course you actually do think Vladimir Putin is actually as stupid as Saddam Hussein was and is just going to sit back, watch US heavy armoured reinforcements flow unimpeded across the Atlantic and, sometime in August mount a Desert Storm style counter offensive forcing th Russian army into a battle which, at that point, it will lose - and lose badly! As I said earlier Russia's best chance of victory s early in the war. June and early July

[LUCASWILLEN05]

 

 

Ha I missed that comment as well.  Damn Kaliningrad dock works would be a smoking ruin, as would every other Russian Naval base.  It also begs the question- if Russia sorties the tiny little fleet they have, are they going after convoys or US port facilities?  That tiny little force seems to suddenly be everywhere.  Sinking 5 ships per convoy, targeting US naval bases etc.  Dang they are good.

 

Anyway back to the post I was writing.

To put some perspective on this discussion, below is the current Russian Northern Fleet.  There are a total of 10 Nuclear attack boats in the Northern fleet.  The diesel electric Kilo boats are designed for shallow waters. So Russia in the most optimal planning could sortie 10 boats to the Atlantic.  Another 7 diesel electric boats to try and interdict coastal European waters and 5 diesel electric boats into the Med.

In 1990 the USSR had some 136 Nuclear attack boats and 65 diesel electric.  Currently it has 26 Nuclear attack boats and 20 Diesel electric.  as @Codename Duchess has noted, the Russian navy has transitioned it's force to primarily a coastal defense force.The US in 1990 had 89 Nuclear attack boats, currently it has 54.  Whatever strategy the USSR had for wartime deployment, the Russian Navy is clearly not capable of pursuing that strategy.  Rather than forcing the US navy to spread forces to find the numerically superior USSR fleet, the US now outnumbers that fleet.

In the event it had to sortie it is questionable how many could actually do so.  For example there are 9 Akula class boats listed as "active" - of those 6 are in overhaul, 2 supposedly completed in December.  Assuming those two are actually ready that means 5 of the 9 could actually take part.  Note of the 6 Akula's listed below for the Northern fleet.  2 are in overhaul, and a 3rd has just completed in December. So even a figure of 10 is hopelessly optimistic.

 

11th Squadron, Zaozersk
 Typhoon-class SSBN Dmitriy Donskoy (ТК-208) (Nerpichya)
 Two other Typhoon class submarines are assigned to this squadron but are not active.
7th Division, Vidyaevo [12]
            Commander
       RADM Aleksandr Ildashov
  Sierra I-class SSN Kostroma
  Sierra II-class SSN Nizhniy Novgorod[12]
  Sierra II-class SSN Pskov (K-336)
  Victor-III-class SSN Daniil Moskovskiy (K-414) Commissioned 1990
        other submarines

 24th Submarine Division (Yagelnaya Bay, Sayda Inlet)
            Commanders
                xxx 200x-present RADM Anatoliy Minakov
 Akula-class submarine I-class SSN Pantera (K-317)
 Akula I-class SSN Volk (K-461)
 Akula I-class SSN Leopard (K-328)
 Akula I-class SSN Tigr (K-154) [12]
 Akula II-class SSN Vepr (K-157)
 Akula II-class SSN Gepard (K-335)

43rd Missile Ship Division
    Commanders
     RADM Veregin
     RADM Avakyants
     RADM Kasatonov
     Present - RADM Aleksandr Turilin
 Kuznetsov-class CV Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov (063), Navy flagship.
 Kirov-class battlecruiser CGN Pyotr Velikiy (099), Fleet flagship
 Slava-class CG Marshal Ustinov (055)
 Sovremennyy-class DDG Gremyashchiy
 Sovremennyy-class DDG Admiral Ushakov
2nd Anti-Submarine Ship Division [12]
 Udaloy-I Class DDG Vice Admiral Kulakov
 Udaloy-I Class DDG Severomorsk
 Udaloy-I Class DDG Admiral Levchenko
 Udaloy-I Class DDG Admiral Kharlamov
 Udaloy-II Class DDG Admiral Chabanenko

4th Submarine Flotilla (Polyarnyy) [12]
    Commander
     Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Gorbunov
 Kilo class submarine-class SS Novosibirsk (B-401)
 Kilo-class SS Vologda" (B-402)
 Kilo-class SS Yaroslavl (B-808)
 Kilo-class SS Kaluga (B-800)
 Kilo-class SS Vladikavkaz (B-459)
 Kilo-class SS Magnitogorsk (B-471)
 Kilo-class SS Lipetsk (B-177)

 

Still not thinking about Russian strategic aims. I know damn well that Russia will lose the war at sea and so does Putin. But th Russian aim is NOT to win the war at sea. Their aim is temporary SEA DENIAL in order to delay and somewhat reduce the flow of reinforcement and supplies over he Atlantic and that operation is going to mean the use of Russia's Northern Fleet. They will also have to do the same thing in the Mediterranean, Aegean and Black Sea which is where Russia's Black Sea Fleet comes in.

Regarding Kaliningrad and the Baltic Sea fleet. Yes there will likely be some action there and yes, the Kaliningrad Oblast will av to be isolated and possibly neutralized. Room for a CMBS scenario when we get US Marines and certain NATO nations (Poland, Germany) Something similar could at some point happen in th Crimea with possible operations to seize Sebastopol

I don't see much happening in the Far East but I would not rule out some limited clashes there due to mischance and werror although both sides would take strong steps to prevent that very early on.

[sburke]

 

I don't see much happening in the Far East but I would not rule out some limited clashes there due to mischance and werror although both sides would take strong steps to prevent that very early on.

They would fire on US coastal facilities and then try to avoid escalation in the Pacific?  Why?  For what possible reason would the US not immediately assume any Russian military anywhere is an immediate target?

[Codename Duchess]

Still not thinking about Russian strategic aims. I know damn well that Russia will lose the war at sea and so does Putin. But th Russian aim is NOT to win the war at sea. Their aim is temporary SEA DENIAL in order to delay and somewhat reduce the flow of reinforcement and supplies over he Atlantic and that operation is going to mean the use of Russia's Northern Fleet. They will also have to do the same thing in the Mediterranean, Aegean and Black Sea which is where Russia's Black Sea Fleet comes in.

No one is saying it wouldn't be smart to attack reinforcements.  The problem is, as I outlined in my post which I'm still not sure you saw, he can't.  There's simply no way with 8 submarines you would do anything but lose 8 submarines.  FURTHERMORE, with existing stocks being what they are, you're not going to see a non-airborne resupply convoy sail until every single Northern Fleet SSN is accounted for.  This isn't the Fulda Gap where we need everything the US has, right the **** now.

And ANY attack on ANY NATO homeland is a MAJOR escalation.  I don't care if you keep saying it's a "limited" strike.  It won't be seen as "limited" by the populace of any of those nations.  Seriously, look at our response to 9/11.  Look at the US public response to the Paris attacks.  Look at the recent fears in the US public of Russia already.  Look at all the people who still vividly remember the Cold War. 

It. Is. Going. To. Escalate. If. You. Attack. A. Port.

The Black Sea Fleet can only defend the Black Sea in a war with Ukraine, and they'll still lose (you admit this).  They have 4 surface combatants total, and 5-6 submarines.  Please look at fleet readiness levels in my previous post.  They won't be able to push into the Med under any circumstances.  The Northern Sea Fleet will not be able to penetrate the North Atlantic.  Look I've read Mahan, studied the buildup in Saudi Arabia ad nauseum (I went to a Merchant Marine Academy), and am aware of the late Cold War.  I know the difference between Sea Control and Sea Denial (again, I'm a west coast aviator). But times have changed and the Russian capabilities in the Atlantic have grossly atrophied.  They cannot effect ANY Sea Denial.

If they had the forces that you remember from 1989, yeah it'd be a hell of a fight.  But as sburke and I both have proven, they don't.

Edited February 6, 2016 by Codename Duchess

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

I cannot think of a stupider thing to do if you want a short victorious war than an an unambiguous conventional attack against Americans on American soil.  Literally the one thing that I can think of that will virtually ensure the American people support a war irrespective of casualties would be exactly the "limited" strikes against port facilities.  

Even from a military perspective, there's enough ports you would need many times more missile launch platforms to really justify even merely in terms of disruptive results, a strike against port (or airport) type facilities.  With the paltry number available all you are doing is generating a delay, while providing the backing for an actual full fledged military counter-offensive into Eastern Europe which will simply lead to the sort of loss Russia could not survive with the status quo  intact (while a loss of Donbass or something would be seen as unfortunate, but could still be spun as victoriously drawing a line in the sand).  The three month window becomes irrelevant if the popular will of the west is in murderdeathkill mode.

Even strikes against Europe would be disasterous.  Modern Russia relies much more on global trade, and would even in the event of victory be ensuring those lovely materials they would like to see elsewhere sit embargoed somewhere.  Because frankly even the fairly dovish Germans would be sitting around chanting "remember Bremen" if the Gazprom lines stayed open.

Short Ramble on The Soviets

Where I think we're seeing a breakdown in talking to Lucas is as follows:

1. He's confusing things Russia would like to be able to do, with things they have the means to accomplish.  The US military has a dangerous and well trained special forces community.  We would in the event of war, like to be able to arrest Putin and decapitate the whole corrupt box of lies etc etc.  But we would not drop SOF wholesale onto Moscow in the hopes one or two of them leak through to Putin's lair and successfully kidnap him because that's frankly absurd and well beyond the capabilities of even the capable SOF forces available.  Russia has a Navy more powerful than some.  Russia would like to be able to conduct complete sea denial in the event of war with the west. Russia however does not have the assets to reasonably disrupt western shipping in proportion to the losses it will sustain.  Honor, and frankly knowing we're going to be trying to snuff it out use or no use will lead to the Black Sea forces being committed, but a wider naval conflict is just Russia putting its genitals out where they can get cut off.

2. There's a very Cold War mentality that credited the Soviets with being able to accomplish literally everything.   It sounds like they're building a space laser.  IT WILL SURELY BE OPERATIONAL BY 1987 WITH NONE OF THE FRICTION WE ARE HAVING IN THE WEST, DESPITE HAVING A SMALLER BUDGET, LESS EDUCATED WORKFORCE, AND MORE LIMITED RESOURCES.  There's a new Soviet tank?  IT HAS A CANNON THAT WILL EXPLODE THE ABRAMS FROM SPACE AND THE NEW MISSILES WILL ACTIVELY SEEK OUT CAPITALISTS USING ESP DERIVED FROM MONKEY BRAINS.  There's never a practical questioning of if it was possible, it was just taken for granted that it is the Soviets, so of course everything they claim is perfectly reasonable and doubtless possible.

That of course, was incorrect, there was a lot wrong with the Soviet military, and a lot they compromised to accomplish some of their "better" things.  But it made a mentality that makes it very easy to imagine eight Russian submarines destroying dozens of cargo ships, while launching strikes that debilitate every East Coast port city, while the surface forces put up a good show instead of being literally buried under every anti-shipping missile in the US inventory because every squid wants to be able to claim THEY sank a ship for reals yo.  In understanding Russia today it is important to remember 1991 happened more than a few years ago.  

[VladimirTarasov]

Russia's navy is defensive, Submarines would be used to attack expensive air craft carrier groups. Inevitably once the Submarine unleashes its load it will be found. Imagine the US losing one of its Air craft carriers I don't think that would look good. The Kuznetsov Carrier group would most likely be in the Black Sea where it would be safe unless NATO air gets through Air defenses. Russia's coasts for the majority of it would be safe, And the Russian Navy knows that it cannot win a offensive battle against NATO.  The Russian Navy is not weak, It is lacking the bigger ships that would be needed to be offensive like the US navy.  

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

The impression of the Russian Navy as weak relates to:

1. How much smaller and less capable it is post-Soviet Union

2.  While the Russian Navy is capable of missions, it is burdened by a very bad readiness rate for crews and vessels.  This is compounded by a mission set and doctrine that still fits a much better funded, larger force.  The Kuznetsov itself is a prime example of this, as designed it is an ocean going force projection tool, but in reality it does neither especially well, but at great economic cost in proportion to that utility. 

[sburke]

The impression of the Russian Navy as weak relates to:

1. How much smaller and less capable it is post-Soviet Union

2.  While the Russian Navy is capable of missions, it is burdened by a very bad readiness rate for crews and vessels.  This is compounded by a mission set and doctrine that still fits a much better funded, larger force.  The Kuznetsov itself is a prime example of this, as designed it is an ocean going force projection tool, but in reality it does neither especially well, but at great economic cost in proportion to that utility. 

I think that is a fair general assessment of a lot of Russia's military.  It's avowed purpose for force projection far exceeds what Russia actually needs or can financially afford.  It is more a psychological feeling of a nation that wants to be an empire than it is actually a tool for Russian statecraft.  A much smaller but more capable force would actually be far more in the country's interest.  It is very human I think to want to feel you still have the place in the world that the USSR occupied, but it wasn't actually reality then much less now.  The really sad thing is I think Russia actually could play the role it envisions itself as having if it took a different stance.  From a geopolitical standpoint she is uniquely placed to influence a part of the world that is very unstable and could in fact develop a relationship with the US based on that.  My impression is the US leadership hoped that would be the case in the reset, but it just hasn't panned out.  Russia's behavior vis a vis the Central Asian nations has mostly been a liability and China is stepping into that void.  Long term I suspect Russia will look back on the Putin period as the lost years.  A time when Russia could potentially have truly became a major player in the international arena.  Putin has tried, but has done so based on an obsolete perspective.  All he has managed to do is squander a unique opportunity Russia had.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

I cannot think of a stupider thing to do if you want a short victorious war than an an unambiguous conventional attack against Americans on American soil.  Literally the one thing that I can think of that will virtually ensure the American people support a war irrespective of casualties would be exactly the "limited" strikes against port facilities.  

Even from a military perspective, there's enough ports you would need many times more missile launch platforms to really justify even merely in terms of disruptive results, a strike against port (or airport) type facilities.  With the paltry number available all you are doing is generating a delay, while providing the backing for an actual full fledged military counter-offensive into Eastern Europe which will simply lead to the sort of loss Russia could not survive with the status quo  intact (while a loss of Donbass or something would be seen as unfortunate, but could still be spun as victoriously drawing a line in the sand).  The three month window becomes irrelevant if the popular will of the west is in murderdeathkill mode.

Even strikes against Europe would be disasterous.  Modern Russia relies much more on global trade, and would even in the event of victory be ensuring those lovely materials they would like to see elsewhere sit embargoed somewhere.  Because frankly even the fairly dovish Germans would be sitting around chanting "remember Bremen" if the Gazprom lines stayed open.

Short Ramble on The Soviets

Where I think we're seeing a breakdown in talking to Lucas is as follows:

1. He's confusing things Russia would like to be able to do, with things they have the means to accomplish.  The US military has a dangerous and well trained special forces community.  We would in the event of war, like to be able to arrest Putin and decapitate the whole corrupt box of lies etc etc.  But we would not drop SOF wholesale onto Moscow in the hopes one or two of them leak through to Putin's lair and successfully kidnap him because that's frankly absurd and well beyond the capabilities of even the capable SOF forces available.  Russia has a Navy more powerful than some.  Russia would like to be able to conduct complete sea denial in the event of war with the west. Russia however does not have the assets to reasonably disrupt western shipping in proportion to the losses it will sustain.  Honor, and frankly knowing we're going to be trying to snuff it out use or no use will lead to the Black Sea forces being committed, but a wider naval conflict is just Russia putting its genitals out where they can get cut off.

2. There's a very Cold War mentality that credited the Soviets with being able to accomplish literally everything.   It sounds like they're building a space laser.  IT WILL SURELY BE OPERATIONAL BY 1987 WITH NONE OF THE FRICTION WE ARE HAVING IN THE WEST, DESPITE HAVING A SMALLER BUDGET, LESS EDUCATED WORKFORCE, AND MORE LIMITED RESOURCES.  There's a new Soviet tank?  IT HAS A CANNON THAT WILL EXPLODE THE ABRAMS FROM SPACE AND THE NEW MISSILES WILL ACTIVELY SEEK OUT CAPITALISTS USING ESP DERIVED FROM MONKEY BRAINS.  There's never a practical questioning of if it was possible, it was just taken for granted that it is the Soviets, so of course everything they claim is perfectly reasonable and doubtless possible.

That of course, was incorrect, there was a lot wrong with the Soviet military, and a lot they compromised to accomplish some of their "better" things.  But it made a mentality that makes it very easy to imagine eight Russian submarines destroying dozens of cargo ships, while launching strikes that debilitate every East Coast port city, while the surface forces put up a good show instead of being literally buried under every anti-shipping missile in the US inventory because every squid wants to be able to claim THEY sank a ship for reals yo.  In understanding Russia today it is important to remember 1991 happened more than a few years ago.  

Now WHY, having gotten himself into a war with the West over Ukraine is the closest thing the modern world and Russia in particular got tO a modern day Henry Kissinger or Otto von Bismarck not going to listen to the advice of his senior military commanders WHICH IS GOING TO BE THAT IF THEY DO NOTHING ABOUT THE US REINFORCEMENT CONVOYS THEY ARE GOING TO LOSE THE FREAKING WAR FOR EXACTLY THE SAME REASON THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN LOST

BECAUSE THE US IS VERY GOOD AT SET PIECE HEAVY ARMOURED WARFARE AND THE LOGISTICS TO SUPPORT SUCH OPERATIONS!!!!

RE-READ THE HISTORIES OF DESERT STORM WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE AUGUST 1990- JANUARY1991

NOW WHY IS PUTIN, AN EX KGB MAN AND A VERY CUNNING STRATEGIST S SHOWN BY THE WAY HE ENGINEERED THE OCCUPATION OF THE CRIMEA AMONG MANY OTHER EXAMPLES GOING TO COMMIT THE SAME VERY BASIC STRATEGIC ERROR AS SADDAM HUSSEIN DID AND ALLOW THE US THE OPPORTUNITY FOR AN UNIMPEDED BUILD UP WHICH WILL RESULT UIN RUSSIA BEING GIVEN THE MOTHER OF ALL THRASHINGS 

I should not have had to spell that out to anyone on this forum. I is a question of BASIC STRATEGY hat evven I. a History & Politics graduate, military history buff and keen wargamer can very easily grasp. And arguing "it wil just escalate the war" cuts no ice with me given that Putin has already gotten himself into war in ths scenario (likely through miscalculation on both sides - the only way this scenario can happen.

So you explain to me why Vladimir Putin is going to be as stupid as Saddam Hussein was in 1990 and take a decision that will lose him the war, his power and quite possibly his life as well - because if he loses that badly I don't see him being President of Russia afterwards.

Sheesh We might as well just fight the war and find out. Please report to your commands in Russia, Poland. Ukraine, the North Atlantic, Mediterranean and Continental United States for a prompt 0300 (GMT) start!

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Russia's navy is defensive, Submarines would be used to attack expensive air craft carrier groups. Inevitably once the Submarine unleashes its load it will be found. Imagine the US losing one of its Air craft carriers I don't think that would look good. The Kuznetsov Carrier group would most likely be in the Black Sea where it would be safe unless NATO air gets through Air defenses. Russia's coasts for the majority of it would be safe, And the Russian Navy knows that it cannot win a offensive battle against NATO.  The Russian Navy is not weak, It is lacking the bigger ships that would be needed to be offensive like the US navy.  

One of the first sensible remarks about the Russian navy I have seen. Although I can see the Admiral Kuznetzov being deployed to the Mediterranean to reinforce the Black Sea Fleet but I think deploying it in the Black Sea would simply result in it being bottled up just lie the Kaiser#s navy in WW1, If you want to employ the Bastion strategy with the Adm Kuznetov the Kara Sea, White Sea or Barents Sea would be a far better position where the Kuznetzov Group could still pose a potential threat to the Atlantic Convoys

I agree with you that the best way Russia could attack the Atlantic Convoys would be by submarines coming through what NATO calls the GIUK Gap. Also air attack employing long range ASMs would be used to harass and damage those convoys.

Th same basic strategy as was expected during the late 1980s Cold War had WW3 begun then. Only now of course the forces involved are different and probably much smaller. Although he newer Russian submarines are supposed o be far harder o detect - which is one of the qualities you need when conducting a submarine offensive.but, if that gives Putin's generals enough time to win he land campaign that will be good enough in Moscow. Probably it won't matter too much if most of the Black Sea, Baltic Sea and Northern Fleets are lost doing it as long as the strategic and military objectives in Ukraine are met. 

Sure, such a campaign will only last a few weeks before NATO tracks most of them down and sinks them but in the meantime they will be accomplishing their Sea Denial mission. They are no expected to accomplish more than that and most of them won't be expected to survive.

Possibly there may be a chance to grab the Baltic States as well given that Russia is at war with NATO anyway and the opportunity is not likely to come again

[LUCASWILLEN05]

I think that is a fair general assessment of a lot of Russia's military.  It's avowed purpose for force projection far exceeds what Russia actually needs or can financially afford.  It is more a psychological feeling of a nation that wants to be an empire than it is actually a tool for Russian statecraft.  A much smaller but more capable force would actually be far more in the country's interest.  It is very human I think to want to feel you still have the place in the world that the USSR occupied, but it wasn't actually reality then much less now.  The really sad thing is I think Russia actually could play the role it envisions itself as having if it took a different stance.  From a geopolitical standpoint she is uniquely placed to influence a part of the world that is very unstable and could in fact develop a relationship with the US based on that.  My impression is the US leadership hoped that would be the case in the reset, but it just hasn't panned out.  Russia's behavior vis a vis the Central Asian nations has mostly been a liability and China is stepping into that void.  Long term I suspect Russia will look back on the Putin period as the lost years.  A time when Russia could potentially have truly became a major player in the international arena.  Putin has tried, but has done so based on an obsolete perspective.  All he has managed to do is squander a unique opportunity Russia had.

Same can be said about the US military. However, as far as the Russian military is concerned have you not heard f the Serdyukov Reforms 2008? The Russian military may be slimmed down but they are at least trying to iron out the old inefficiencies with he aim of developing competent modern armed forces. How successful his might be remains to be seen but performance in the Ukraine/Donbass and in he current Syrian intervention might provide some indicators  

http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21602743-money-and-reform-have-given-russia-armed-forces-it-can-use-putins-new-model-army

https://russiamil.wordpress.com/tag/syria/

However, in political terms I do agree with you in that Russia could indeed play a valuable and highly constructive role although that is no reallly the issue we are discussing here

[Codename Duchess]

1) I'm still not convinced you've read my post spelling out the actual hard capabilities of the Russian fleet. You keep referencing this like it's the late Soviet Union. It's not.

2) You're assuming his generals/admirals say that it's a good idea to attack NATO where they're strongest. I'm saying that's not as likely as you see because of the vast disparity. It's like the charge of the light brigade, only worse. Give NATO any warning and the GIUK gap gets bottled up real quick. Please see my previous post, it's the second on this page.

3) I get that this strategy makes sense to you. It makes sense to the late Soviet fleet. It does not make sense to the present day, like at all. You're calling for the death of 1000 or so Russians with nothing to gain. You won't stop a single convoy. You might sink one or two ships. The USN out classes the Russians in this regard in every metric. We can have a sub follow every single one of theirs, and the Kuznetsov, and still have leftovers. Please read my post. It's the second one on this page. That's what you have to deal with.

4) The convoys aren't so desperately needed that they have to sail under overwhelming threat. Between the gradual ramp up, preexisting stocks, and the Air Mobility Command we can delay the inevitable quite a while. Again, this isn't Fulda Gap/REFORGER.

5) The Battle of the Atlantic. Somehow you don't think total air and Naval war across an entire ocean is an escalation. You are expanding a limited engagement (Ukraine) to a global one. That's escalation. The US government if it's forced to fight in the Atlantic will take that fight worldwide. As that's pretty obviously not what Russia wants in this scenario, that is a bad move.

6) "Probably it won't matter too much if most of the Black Sea, Baltic Sea and Northern Fleets are lost doing it as long as the strategic and military objectives in Ukraine are met." That's fully 3 of 4.5 Russian Fleets destroyed in exchange for the Ukraine. There's no way Russia accepts that trade. 

7) You're arguing that your grasp of "basic strategy" against two US military officers (sorry sburke, don't know your background). I understand we're arguing on the internet, but because our views are different than yours we have no grasp of "basic strategy." Yet we've both said your idea has merit, but it's impossible with the given forces. It's "basic strategy" for panzer to drive his tank company from Germany to the Kremlin because taking out leadership severely weakens the war effort. Same for if I was sent to bomb Beijing in my jet. But neither of those ideas is any more possible than you enforcing meaningful Sea Denial with 8 outclassed submarines. The Russian Navy as it stands today is very good at coastal defense. That's about it.

8) Baltics and Syria. Those have been hashed out enough in other threads that I have zero desire to repeat them in here.

9) Long ranged ASM strikes. How, in your limited engagement scenario, do the bombers get past the Norwegians, British, and any other NATO air forces? Does your limited engagement now require the invasion of Iceland and Norway? I know that was really cool in Red Storm Rising, but...

Edited February 7, 2016 by Codename Duchess

[LUCASWILLEN05]

1) I'm still not convinced you've read my post spelling out the actual hard capabilities of the Russian fleet. You keep referencing this like it's the late Soviet Union. It's not.

2) You're assuming his generals/admirals say that it's a good idea to attack NATO where they're strongest. I'm saying that's not as likely as you see because of the vast disparity. It's like the charge of the light brigade, only worse. Give NATO any warning and the GIUK gap gets bottled up real quick. Please see my previous post, it's the second on this page.

3) I get that this strategy makes sense to you. It makes sense to the late Soviet fleet. It does not make sense to the present day, like at all. You're calling for the death of 1000 or so Russians with nothing to gain. You won't stop a single convoy. You might sink one or two ships. The USN out classes the Russians in this regard in every metric. We can have a sub follow every single one of theirs, and the Kuznetsov, and still have leftovers. Please read my post. It's the second one on this page. That's what you have to deal with.

4) The convoys aren't so desperately needed that they have to sail under overwhelming threat. Between the gradual ramp up, preexisting stocks, and the Air Mobility Command we can delay the inevitable quite a while. Again, this isn't Fulda Gap/REFORGER.

5) The Battle of the Atlantic. Somehow you don't think total air and Naval war across an entire ocean is an escalation. You are expanding a limited engagement (Ukraine) to a global one. That's escalation. The US government if it's forced to fight in the Atlantic will take that fight worldwide. As that's pretty obviously not what Russia wants in this scenario, that is a bad move.

6) "Probably it won't matter too much if most of the Black Sea, Baltic Sea and Northern Fleets are lost doing it as long as the strategic and military objectives in Ukraine are met." That's fully 3 of 4.5 Russian Fleets destroyed in exchange for the Ukraine. There's no way Russia accepts that trade. 

7) You're arguing that your grasp of "basic strategy" against two US military officers (sorry sburke, don't know your background). I understand we're arguing on the internet, but because our views are different than yours we have no grasp of "basic strategy." Yet we've both said your idea has merit, but it's impossible with the given forces. It's "basic strategy" for panzer to drive his tank company from Germany to the Kremlin because taking out leadership severely weakens the war effort. Same for if I was sent to bomb Beijing in my jet. But neither of those ideas is any more possible than you enforcing meaningful Sea Denial with 8 outclassed submarines. The Russian Navy as it stands today is very good at coastal defense. That's about it.

8) Baltics and Syria. Those have been hashed out enough in other threads that I have zero desire to repeat them in here.

9) Long ranged ASM strikes. How, in your limited engagement scenario, do the bombers get past the Norwegians, British, and any other NATO air forces? Does your limited engagement now require the invasion of Iceland and Norway? I know that was really cool in Red Storm Rising, but...

You have yet to answer my fundamental question. Which is this. Given that the whole CMBS scenario assumes that Putin has already miscalculated his way into  war with NATO (f that does not happen then the fundamental basis for CMBS) cannot work.

Why would Vladimir Putin not take limited actions to make SOME ATTEMPT at delaying and reducing the flow of US reinforcements I AM NOT saying tha this is a Russian strategy hat would work i AM MERELY SAYING THAT IT IS THWE RUSSIAN STRATEGY THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE TRIED BECAUSE THERE REALLY IS NOTHING ELSE SHORT OF ALLOWING THE RUSSIAN NAVY TO BE BOTTLED UP IN PORT LIKE THE KAISER'S NAVY 1914 - 1918

And that guarantees an early Russian defeat as US reinforcements pour, unimpeded across the Atlantic, deploy to Ukraine, builds up the logistical support for the kind of military operation he US does best 

Knowing that and given that he war had already started what, other than offering the same professional advice von Runstedt gave to Hitler would be your professional advice o Putin if you were his Chief naval adviser? Limited air and naval; action directed at

1 The North Atlantic Convoys themselves

2 The transport hubs they need to use

3 Sea Denial for as long as possible in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean

4 To avoid escalation elsewhere in he world no offensive action to be taken in the Far East. Persin Gulf or Indian Ocean. Defensive actions only and Russian forces to move well away from proximity to any Western forces in these regions to avoid accidental or unintended clashes that might escalate h conflict outside of the European/North Atlantic/Mediterranean area

5 Only conventional weapons to be used and no bombing of civilian targets beyond ports, airports, major road and rail hubs. Even in those cases bombing to b carefully targeted to avoid civilian losses.

NATO is likely to be doing similar things at some stage eg targeting facilities around Murmansk., Kalingrad and un the Crimea. All this still falls within the bounds of a limited war.

Now, if Putin were to do something really stupid such as employing chemical weapons such as the Novichok agents (which I seriously doubt would ever happen in this scenario) all bets would be off  and NATO would very likely at least consider a "March on Moscow" and regime change. As I just said it would be an extremely stupid thing for Putin to do and I very much doubt he would do something like that even if desperae so let's not argue about that scenario further now

[LUCASWILLEN05]

And what the Russians have to gain for the sacrifice of their elderly Northern Fleet,and Black Sea Fleet which are by the way going to have to be replaced quite soon anyway is the best shot hwy are going to get  of delaying and reducing hwe flow f the vital US reinforcements to the theater off war in Ukraine.

We are all agreed that Russia has to win the land wa here quickly if she is going to win ii at all. The sacrifice of Russia's navy  is the bes way Russia can achieve that. In fact it is probably the only realistic way of doing it by using conventional weapons. Unless you want Putin to do what General Razov did in Eric L Harry's novel Arc Light and threaten strategic nuclear attack against the US and Europe. Which in he real world would be a seriously bad idea and far outside the concept of a limited conventional war.

Te limited Russian military actions I suggest, primarily at sea and involving some carefully targeted strikes on land against clearly designated targets are, while a slight escalation, well within the bounds of a limited war and are no more than the US would do or has done in recent military conflicts. Russia can reasonably be expected to do much the same

So, come on, what would you be saying o Putin if you were his senior naval adviser bearing in mind that allowing your navy to be bottled up will guarantee Russia loses the war. And probably gets you dismissed from command (that is if you are lucky!)