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US Stingers


jpratt88

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Given the scenario portrayed in the game back story it would be reasonable to assume a Russian air surge from the start. The USAF will be behind the curve at the start needing to deploy aircraft and the logistics to support them 

In this scenario the Russians may very well have used maneuvers as a cover for the attack into Ukraine and probably staged/provoked a border incident or two to justify the invasion. It will take some time for US/NATO forces to catch up/ Classic Boyd Cycle

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop

And as I already said the tactical weakness in air defenses will be a problem until the USAF win the air battle. In the meantime it might not take many aircraft to really wreck a Combat Team's day.

I think that the USN deploying a carrier task force to the Black Sea is part of the backstory, although I could be wrong. If they are deployed, the US will at least have a quick reaction force consisting of the Superbugs in that CTF. And their primary mission, initially, will be SEAD and CAP, until USAF assets and probably allied assets arrive which should take less than a week. And I think that Western distrust of Russia is sufficiently high to warrant the preparations to deal with any kind of massed invasion if there are any provocative actions by Russia. So although the Americans might be surprised, they simply won't be caught with their pants down so much as to prevent them from stopping Russian CAS, especially since CAS is one of the most vulnerable missions possible.

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First it is entirely possible that Russian actions will be misread or indeed concealed. Remember the Russians are very good at deception (Maskirvoka) added to which the West won't want to get involved in a war with Russia over Ukraine. That delays military preparation despite the distrust of Putin. Consider that the preparations for invasion might well be concealed under the guise of military maneuvers. That carrier task force will take a few days to get into the area and its' ability to generate air support over Central Ukraine will be limited early on and it will be opposed by Russia's Black Sea Fleet and airforce/air defenses. .NATO will deploy aircraft to Poland, the Baltic Sates and probably Romania assuming of course Article 5 is activated. Which is be no means politically certain. It is Ukraine that is attacked here, not a NATO nation. Even though the US in this scenario does intervene the other NATO nations may not go along with this initially

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There is nothing in the back story that presumes NATO is surprised by a sudden launch from maneuvers.  In fact the back story presumes NATO is very aware that the "maneuvers" are not following normal standards.  In the highlighted items below it is clear that the US and NATO have had time to build up forces.  There is nothing in there that would presume Russia is going to achieve any kind of air superiority that would enable a large CAS mission.

Now none of that precludes you from developing your own scenario and a completely different conflict.  Hell I am working on a map of mountain terrain on the Syria, Turkish border.  Do what you want.

 

During early 2017, the gears of war begin to turn. Russian units in Joint Strategic Command South and West begin mobilizations. Russian combat units fill their manpower shortages and deploy along Russia's shared borders with Ukraine. Although officially labeled training exercises by the Russian government, Western observers note that important logistical and Air Force elements usually not used for training have also mobilized or heightened readiness. Additional Russian troops are moved to Crimea.
In response to the observed Russian mobilizations, Ukraine begins to mobilize low-readiness units and call up reservists. An expeditionary NATO force comprised of American and European military units is moved to eastern Poland, adjacent to the Ukrainian border. An American mechanized unit on rotational training in Germany joins them. The United States begins to prepare logistically by moving more prepositioned supplies and equipment to Germany, while transportation plans for stateside units to be moved overseas are put in motion.
On a morning in early June 2017, the situation comes to a head when a firefight erupts between Russian and Ukrainian forces at one of the isolated garrisons. The violence claims the lives of multiple soldiers on both sides. The next morning, fighting breaks out on the border, and the conflict begins.

 

 

 

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I wonder how much of what we take for granted by way of NATO power is based on past cold war preparedness and doesn't reflect today's reality. I recall there was a small article I spotted online, months into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, talking about the German army finally pulling Leopard tanks out of mothballs in order to have more than the paltry 130(?) tanks then in active service. I'm probably off on that number but not far off. It might take longer than we think to spool-up the mighty NATO the military engine. Their AAA defenses are no doubt largely pack away in warehouses somewhere, their tanks drained of oil with extended storage weather sealing applied.

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I wonder how much of what we take for granted by way of NATO power is based on past cold war preparedness and doesn't reflect today's reality. I recall there was a small article I spotted online, months into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, talking about the German army finally pulling Leopard tanks out of mothballs in order to have more than the paltry 130(?) tanks then in active service. I'm probably off on that number but not far off. It might take longer than we think to spool-up the mighty NATO the military engine. Their AAA defenses are no doubt largely pack away in warehouses somewhere, their tanks drained of oil with extended storage weather sealing applied.

Maybe but not really relevant to whether the US is going to be able to move air assets forward in a 4-6 month time frame that the back story allows for.  Personally I think almost every country over rates it's military capacity and responsiveness.  That gets lessened somewhat if you have had practical experience to prove real capability.  For the US that logistical capacity has been in action for many years now so there is a much better sense of real versus assumed capability.

For this thread a lot of assumptions are being made about Russian capability.  For example, Russia might be able to pull off an attack from maneuvers but how truly capable is the Russian war machine to effectively pursue an offensive on that scale?  Are they even really all that capable to coordinate an air campaign to take on US and NATO air forces?  Based on what?  What actual experience does Russia have coordinating a campaign on that scale and how much training time do their pilots get for that type of environment? Corrupt autocratic governments often make assumptions at the top divorced from what they are actually capable of doing. (not to say the democracies don't have their own issues, but at least there is some capability to objectively analyze).  Frankly I have not been very impressed with Russian capabilities in the armed conflicts they have been involved in over the past number of years.  I just don't see any basis for being so optimistic about Russian capabilites while maintaining that level of pessimism about the West.

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Oh lawrd.  Where to start?

Re: SURPRISE!

Here's the deal.  Look at how the US has reacted to virtually every possibly military crisis in the last few years.  What is virtually the first thing to arrive in theater?

Hint: It is not heavy armor formations.

Which is to say, if we're seeing US heavy formations, even ones drawn from preposition yards, they're going to be arriving in theater well after fighter wings, and other aviation assets.  In the event of total masterstroke super Soviet Russian Maskirvoka which leaves NATO with pants firmly on floor, there will simply be no ground forces to speak of located in theater.  

So again, if there was some bizzaro US 2S6 or similar platform, or the M6 was resurrected, it would be arriving well after there was significant air elements already in theater.  

Interestingly enough, I find it perplexing that someone believes ground based local air defense would do better protecting ground forces against a Russian surge o' aircraft than fixed wing fighters.  It's a pretty easy matter to overwhelm local defenses and grind them into dust.

Which is to say, if the USAF can't handle it, it's a pretty safe bet the Linebacker or 2S6 Ameirungksa wouldn't be much help either.

Re: The Readiness Is All

Training time:

My company spent about 25% of a year in some sort of field exercise.  The big stretches were two month long "gunnery complexes*" but we did at least three week-week 1.5 long FTXes I can distinctly recall.  They all sort of blur together in some regards to be honest.  We also held usually at least one monthly platoon level maneuver exercise for all platoons in the tank simulator, and there was sort of a near-constant flow through the gunnery simulator, tank driver's training, various technical instruction periods and other classroom blocks of instruction like AFVID.  We also supported quite a few of the large Korea/Pacific-wide exercises, although that impacted the officers more than the enlisted.

It's sort of hard to put a finger on the "training vs admin" breakdown, simply because while 2nd platoon is in the tank simulators, 3rd platoon might be doing the weekly sexual assault prevention classes, while 1st platoon is changing track.  The field training is easiest simply because at that moment, the entire company was parked somewhere, doing a thing.  Irregardless it seemed we spent a lot more time on our equipment doing soldier things than our ROK counterparts, and the ammunition throughputs alone seemed to be much higher than some of the NATO folks I've worked with.

Part of it was simply because I loved tanks and pushed pretty hard to maximize time on the vehicles doing "mission" related activities.  We were also in Korea which was largely immune from the ongoing budget issues until the end of my tenure.  However having talked to my peers who were tank company commanders CONUS, it looks like we shot more often, but they got to do more maneuver (Fort Hood having more real estate than Dongduchon and all).  

Readiness levels:

Split reply:

NATO: There's a great degradation of many Western military forces.  While I feel France is still capable of unilateral military action, or being a major player on its own, the British seem increasingly to be setting up to be purely a coalition member vs a real independent force.  I am also uncertain if the Germans showed up to a major shooting war if anyone would notice simply given deplorable readiness standards, military funding, and generally just the shabby way the German Soldier** has been treated post 1992 or so.  Suspect it might get some revision later.  On the other hand Poland seems to be taking military preparedness quite seriously, and the Baltics look like they're taking a Russian threat seriously.  On the other hand, NATO still contains the USA, which is a pretty big trump card to hold.

Russia: One of the things that seems to affect perceptions of Russian capability is older analysts and armchair generals who grew up staring down the allmighty unstoppable Soviet Bear, and have difficulty seeing either the historical reality (powerful yes, but deeply flawed) or Russia (a shadow of what it once was).  It is the same tendency that made the MIG-25 an unstoppable killsallplanes threat, that triple stacked ERA was a real thing, or had us concluding there was a Soviet stealth planes with lasers controlled by its pilot's thoughts somewhere.  It is an old habit that doubtlessly will only die off with the folks who hold onto it for dear life.  As the case is, the Russian military has had some pretty trying times and organizationally appears to be still suffering from the post 1991 neglect.  While no means a non-threat, it is a weaker force by all reasonable assessments than the west, has very real strategic, economic, and political restraints on its courses of action.  This includes being rather outclassed in the air, and unlikely to achieve sufficient air control to reliably accomplish CAS missions without them during into fiascoes (either in aborts or actual combat losses). 

*The winter one was live fire through crew level, then two or so weeks worth of field training.  The summer one was live fire all the way through Company level live fires, with supporting combined arms, generally from our organic mortars, 155 MM and AH-64s or A-10s.   

** I get the impression that they've got good pay, decent benefits, but not much else.

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That carrier task force will take a few days to get into the area and its' ability to generate air support over Central Ukraine will be limited early on and it will be opposed by Russia's Black Sea Fleet and airforce/air defenses. 

(Sigh) 

You just don't really get it, do you?

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Actually Luke FMM and with the greatest respect I do get it. You see what  am taking into account here are the strategic and operational aspects of deploying that US CVBG into the Black Sea. It can be done, I am not disputing that, bu you need to consider what is going to be involved for the USN (almost crtainly 6th Fleet as this is its' area of responsibility. The Russians are not simply going to roll over and let this happen. There is something called the Russian Black Sea Fleet which includes air, surface and submarine assets. Oh, did I mention that the CVBG will probably at some point want to enter the Black Sea and the only way to do that is via th Dardanelles Sraits. On or two Russian submarines parked there could really ruin a US Admiral's day for very obvious reasons which I should not have to spell out.

What a US attempt to deploy int the Black Sea involves is very likely going to involve a serious sea battle fought most likely somewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean and/or the Aegean Sea. It involves anti submarine warfare and probably mine clearance in the Dardanelles. Then it involves taking out Russian naval air bases in the Crimea and along the Black Sea coast line plus further anti submarine warfare, probably some more relatively minor surface actions (but remember in the age of the anti ship missile even a small vessel poses a potentially lethal threat. Even a single missile hit can matte a great deal. A hi  or two probably won's sink a carrier but it could still be what is called a Mission Kill for example if i damages the electronic systems severely enough. Kind of difficult to operate  warship if the electronic systems are not working. And if you don't believe me look at what has been happening recently with the new British Type 45 Daring Class vessels recently

And all of the above has to be completed to a reasonable degree before you can begin the mission of ground support and air superiority (that one however will be part of the CVBG  initial forced entry into he Black Sea)

And how do I know all of this? Well I don't jst game moderns on land you know! I game the period at sea in my case using the Harpoon ANW computer game which by the way teaches you an awful lot about modern naval warfare a the tactuical and operational level. Iand I used to play operational/strategic level boardgames quite a lot. So I know that there is an awful;lot going on far beyond the scope of CMBS hat directly impacts upon the debate we are having. And these issues are why US airpower is not going to achieve air dominance on the first day of the war as it did in Operation Desert Storm. And remember by the way that first night success in Desert Storm required months of planning.

Repeating something like that in our 2017 Ukraine War just is not going to happen. At best the air campaign is going to require several days and, far more likely several weeks before air superiority is established. Even then you still hav to duel with the Russian air defense network which is one hell of a lot better than anything the Iraqis had. And the Russians wll ave been watching what the USAF did in Iraq (1991 and 2003), Kossovo and against Islamic Sate. And they will be learning not o mention adapting their tactics.

All of which is why the air war over Ukraine is going to be a hard fought affair and certainly no walkover for the U\SAF. And, if you can't see that, where I am coming from and why I am saying what I am,then perhaps it is you that s not getting it. Perhaps we need to star from the reasonable assumption that the air campaign is going to be a bitterly contested and quite possibly prolonged affair.

And you cannot argue that this "does not matter" at the tactical level we are gaming at because it does! A bittelly contested air war is going to affect the amount of air support we actually get on our battlefield and how much the enemy gets. And that is th point I am making and that is how I got there!

 

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I think that is an awfully optimistic assessment of what the Black Sea fleet is capable of.  A couple US carrier groups in the Aegean would make life hell for any subs "parked" on the other side of the strait. They aren't going to be subtle about it, they don't have to.  They would likely just flood asw assets (helo and other air assets) and ping the crap out of anywhere they want close to the Turkish coast.  The air space there would be extremely hostile space for Russian aircraft.  What air assets are sent to try and block the carrier groups aren't going to be there to help defend against NATO air forces over the mainland.

Not sure what Naval forces you are expecting to be active in the Med or Aegean, but they would preclude mining the straits.  If Russia puts units in the med then tries to block the straits with mines they must be assuming those assets aren't coming home.  Probably a good bet.

As to mining, you can forget mining by aircraft.  Anything that ventures even close is gonna have to do so in hostile air space.  Turkey is more than willing to shoot down Russian aircraft.  That leaves submarine mine laying as about the only option.  Any Russian surface ships that leave the protection of port will be resting on the sea bed pretty darn quick.

The Russian sub fleet would need to sortie prior to hostilities through the strait if they are going to contest the Aegean.  That is going to be blatantly obvious to NATO.  So Russia's choice- telegraph it's punch and sortie the sub fleet or assume it is not going to contest the Aegean and stay in the Black Sea.  That allows free movement of US carrier groups into the Aegean with little opposition. (a sortie would also face Turkey potentially denying access.)

Granted this is all conjecture, but Russia does have a limit to how many air missions it can take on and if we are discussing a general escalation, that covers the Baltic to the Black sea.  Major commitments can't be done everywhere simultaneously.  On the other hand NATO has a lot of assets to put on the table and can pick where to concentrate assets and do it simultaneously from multiple directions.

I frankly do not know the actual figures, but even if we assume the ones given by @panzersaurkrautwerfer (dude you need to consider shortening your handle.  If it weren't for cut and paste I'd have to give you a cheesy nickname) are overblown and cut NATO's assets by half (and I don't see the basis of doing so, but just for argument's sake) we are still left with a Russian air force being forced to a defensive posture.  There are simply too many threats from too many directions.  Are you going to provide resources to attempt to provide a large CAS capability, try to defend Black Sea air space, try to cover the Baltics, make sure the Pacific bases are protected?  You can't do all of these. 

Edited by sburke
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And how do I know all of this? Well I don't jst game moderns on land you know! I game the period at sea in my case using the Harpoon ANW computer game which by the way teaches you an awful lot about modern naval warfare a the tactuical and operational level. Iand I used to play operational/strategic level boardgames quite a lot. So I know that there is an awful;lot going on far beyond the scope of CMBS hat directly impacts upon the debate we are having

It shows actually.  

Some of the greatest flaws of wargaming as a mechanism for understanding conflict:

1. Often the capabilities of forces are tweaked, or scenarios written to create a "good" fight over a "realistic" fight.  As the case is in the modern era it is usually by making the western forces much smaller than the opposition, placing unrealistic restrictions on same, while giving a significant number of forces to whatever the OPFOR is, while assuming favorable performance of same.

2. The wargaming conflicts are in effect, always wars of national survival level priorities.  The only thing that really matters is meeting the game's priorities for winning.  However those priorities are set in a way that is artificially aggressive, and frequently divorced from real capabilities or intent.

So tying that all together, as to the first point the Russian air arm, and Navy are both simply not up to the task of aggressively attacking NATO forces.  They're smaller, less technically capable, and by most estimations worse trained/prepared for high intensity combat.  As to the second, in a limited war like the Ukraine, in order to keep the US Navy out (for a time), the Russians would be looking at losing a significant portion of their surface and subsurface fleet (that they do not have the resources or facilities to construct replacements with) for fairly limited odds of lasting success.  The same applies to their air force.  An aggressive 1989 style deployment of either the Russian Air Force, or the Navy is really only likely in situations were the choice is use the asset, or lose (the asset, or the country) and a limited Ukrainian type of war does not present that sort of situation, nor does current NATO manning, and strategic orientation indicate a march on Moscow.

Wargaming is fun, and can teach important tactics in the right context.  But even the most lazy reading of Clausewitz leads to the conclusion that war is a continuation of politics by other means.  Weapons systems do not exist in a vacuum to be hurled at each other until enough are broken, they exist to further national level objectives.

And the total destruction of the Russian Navy in the west, and likely evisceration of the Russian air force for the marginal gains of accomplishing some CAS  do not support Russian national objectives.  Employing fixed wing only when local air superiority can be accomplished against worthy targets, or keeping the Navy as a threat in being vs the newest black sea diving locations are much more likely and much more in line with a strong Russia, victory or no.

Either way it remains unaddressed how improved local air defense for US forces would be relevant in a fight where Russian air power from Lucasworld is powerful enough to sweep aside the much more potent and much larger western Air Forces.  

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Still missing the point actually. You want to position a Carrier battlegroup into the Black Sea. Fine, you can do that and the US navy can do it. But the Russians get a say in that as well. Like I said there is something called the Russian Black Sea Fleet for starters. And there is only one way our Carrier Battlegroup can go - via the Dardanelles Straits which are very easily interdicted by submarines (the Russians have some very good ones which are rather difficult to detect) and mines. Do you seriously believe that the Russians are not going to deploy submarines and minefields to interdict the Dardanelles very quickly after he outbreak of war to prevent or seriously delay just this move. Any Russian senior commander worth his salt knows this as would senior NATO commanders. Even a civvy like myself can see that much! And this makes it harder to use carrier borne US airpower to greatest effect at least in the opening battles of the war. Once air domiance is achieved after a few weeks or a couple of moths perhaps the story is going to be very different. At that point NATO air power will be blasting Russian positions with monotonous regularity.

Oh,, and take a look at this discussion concerning he difficulties of deploying a carrier group into the Black Sea. It supports everything I have been saying. Although the discussion relates to the late Cold War many of the issues will remain the same today. Plus there are such things as land based anti ship missiles (some are mobile) and your response times are measured in seconds. We are talking shooting galleries here

http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/navy-maritime/us-carriers-black-sea-during-cold-war-7744/

It could probably be done of course but it would be one hell of a fight and the US navy could lose several capital ships sunk or severely damaged to accomplish that mission.

But if you cannot and will not recognize that this position won't be achieved right away and probably not for quite some time I really don't want to waste any more of my time on this. Please have the sense to recognize that the destruction of he Russia navy (including submarines), clearance of naval minefields, destruction of an effective Russian airforce is a process that will take several days in the best possible case and more likely several weeks to a couple of months. And while that is going on Russian airpower will, to some degree, be able to influence the tactical battlefield to some degree.

I suggest you concede that principle and then we can move on from ther. If you don't, I am not going to waste more time on this discussion

Edited by LUCASWILLEN05
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Which is neat and all, but I will again ask the question that you cannot seem to be able to answer:

If US Carrier aviation cannot get close to the Ukraine, USAF forces are not deployed to theater yet, and there's a virtual blockade of everything thanks to overwhelming Russia plane super-strong or whatever, how in the hell is an Armored Brigade Combat Team getting into the Ukraine to get hit by Russian CAS?  

Which therein gets to why local air defense is largely irrelevant.  If Russian airpower is so strong as to have effective air control over an area, US heavy forces are not going in until there's some sort of air parity if not superiority.  On the defense, US heavy forces will arrive sometime after significant USAF/USN air superiority tools, and PATRIOT batteries are installed, making Russian air superiority very doubtful.  There are virtually no reasonable scenarios in which an armored or Stryker unit rolls into a country alone and unafraid*

*The only unit that realistically could have gone from waking up for PT one morning, to at war that night was 1-2 ABCT 2 ID in Korea.  2 CR is not a bad unit, but it is still positioned and postured in a way it'd be a few days before it showed up to much from a cold start.  In the event of a Russian build up of course, it could be deployed in time to be on the ground at the start of a conflict, but in that event the shot to bang time for USAF deployments is faster simply because they're flying over an ocean to existing bases with all the support equipment already in place.  

So again, in summary, on the offense heavy units are not on the move until some sort of air superiority has been established.  On the defense, you won't have the sort of units that would come with Russian type of ADA networks if they existed for the US, until well after there's already a sizable number of air superiority assets in theater.
 

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The point is that, at the start of this scenario it is the Russians, not the US  that has the initiative, the US is responding, trying to catch up and gain parity. Much as would have been the case in the 1980s Cold War Germany scenario. US heavy aroured forces, as in that scenario will be deploying from CONUS by sea and by air exactly as they would have done in the 1980s scenario. US commanders won't be able to wait until the air war has been won to deploy heavy armour into Ukraine. And of course the Russian Atlantic Fleet will be making some attempt to interdict th Atlantic Convoy routes. The Russians are not fools. They aren't simply going to let US heavy armoured divisions and US logistics deploy to Europe just like that!

I am certainly not saying that there won't be a serious Russian ir threat as the deployment to Ukraine stats. There will be and Russian SSMs will be chewing up ports and airports throughout Europe as will Russian air raids. Certainly for let;s say the first week to ten days before NATO gets a handle on this

And I am not saying that a CVBG cannot at some point deploy into the Black Sea. It probably can but just not at the early stage of the conflict for the reasons given earlier. And he USAF is going to be directing more resources to the air superiority battle at this point. Later on, as the air superiority and sea control battles are won you can expect more asses for the ground forces.And don't try quoting Desert Storm at the There were almost 6 months to prepare for that one and the Russians are not going to sit there and let the US prepare a set piece conventional offensive supported by first class logistics - which is the kind of war the US loves to fight. Putin is no fool and he certainly won't be repeating Saddam Hussein's mistake. Far from it. Once war with the US breaks out he is going to push, and push hard

Now the US heavy armoured divisions are certainly be going into Ukraine and they will be deploying as fast as they possibly can. But, and here is the rub, they will be deploying under conditions of t the very least a contested air situation. Which means that Russian air attack is going to be  serious risk in spite of NATO air power and despite of PATRIOT. The point is that at least some Russian air strikes are going to get through and that could seriously ruin your day as a Combat Team commander given that you only have a few stingers to play with. What happens when fast moving attack jets catch you at a bad moment for example when you are crossing a bridge or one of your platoons is crossing some open ground. Sometimes you are going to have to do things like this and, despite the best precautions in the world you could take some pretty nasty casualties. And there are always incompetent officers who don;t know what they are doing who can make even bigger mistakes. You will weed them out pretty fast as the war develops  I am quite certain but by ten they have already done their damage. Hopefully you catch most of them before the war but all it needs is one incompetent in the wrong place at the wrong time!

I remember one CMBS game where I screwed up badly and fell foul of a Russian airstrke. But I learned from the mistake I made and never made the same error again. Luckily it was a computer simulation game, no a real war but nevertheless the experience taught me something about the danger of moving over open fields without air defenses deployed to cover the move, Just lucky it was not a real war and the casualties were not real ones. It might well be the kind of screwup that gets a commander removed from command in the real world.

I am sure you personally can do your job and would not make stupid mistakes but you still could be unlucky despite doing all you need to

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What he said. 

Also does anyone have projections for combat range for a naval air group?  From the Aegean to Crimea is approx 300 miles. Do US carriers even need to enter the Black Sea to have an immediate impact to the air war?  My completely uneducated guess based on some cursory searches is about 350nm strike range. 

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Also does anyone have projections for combat range for a naval air group?  From the Aegean to Crimea is approx 300 miles. Do US carriers even need to enter the Black Sea to have an immediate impact to the air war?  My completely uneducated guess based on some cursory searches is about 350nm strike range. 

Combat radius for an F-18 trucking along with 6,000 lbs of bombs is something like 330 miles.  So missions out that far, but with in flight refueling, or just choosing to base the planes ashore would be possible and lower risk.

 

Onto the Lucas however

 

Now the US heavy armoured divisions are certainly be going into Ukraine and they will be deploying as fast as they possibly can.

There are currently zero armored divisions in the US military.  Just so you understand this much, there are division HQs which carry various lineages (1st Armored and 1st Cavalry) but there are no longer concrete division sized units.  The whole concept of the Brigade Combat Team plan was to basically have lego-type divisions built of Brigades for the mission.  So in that regard, a response to Korea might have been 2 ID comprised of 1 ABCT and 1 SBCT from 2 ID, with 1 IBCT from the 101st and the 82nd respectively, with 1 CD comrpised of 1 ABCT from 1 CD, an SBCT and IBCT from 25th ID, and then another ABCT from 1 ID.

So just the way you keep talking about armored divisions seems to apply a lack of familiarity with modern operations.

 

But, and here is the rub, they will be deploying under conditions of t the very least a contested air situation. 

Not so much.  They're either deploying in Poland under blue air umbrella and massing to go in theater after air superiority has been established, or they're establishing defenses in the field 1-2 weeks after half the USAF showed up to Western Europe.  There's just no practical way that ABCTs arrive in theater and commit to missions before there's an air threat that dwarfs what Russia can reasonably deploy.

 

The point is that at least some Russian air strikes are going to get through and that could seriously ruin your day as a Combat Team commander given that you only have a few stingers to play with.

The point is the US can trade a few tanks for a lot of MIGs.  The Russians don't have the ability to establish the kind of air superiority needed to accomplish CAS safely in the face of NATO aviation.  If they cannot do it safely it will be a fairly short period of time before there's simply no CAS for the Russians at all, because it is scattered in pieces across the Ukraine.  This is another flaw of wargamer logic, so long as the mission is accomplished this sort of loss rate is acceptable.  However trading 1:1 planes for tanks against NATO is a losing proposition, and even in the event of leaker CAS, the S-3 to F-15C/F-22/other NATO fighter complex makes it very doubtful that CAS will survive another run, be able to loiter close enough to the battle to continue mission, or even escape back to friendly lines.

If you're doing a cost benefits analysis, inflicting some losses on US forces in exchange for rendering Russian strike fighters totally combat ineffective, or even worse, sacrificing multi-role fighter  than might help hold off US CAS just doesn't make any sense.  The damage done to ensure a modest number of losses is totally out of proportion, and will simply hasten the ability of NATO to achieve total air superiority (and perhaps even dominance).  

CAS is just so far down what you can accomplish in contested air space that it really genuinely confuses me how you seem to think it is a realistic threat.  Not even the Americans in environments much more permissive than what Russia would face expect CAS to work until air superiority is established to a degree the Russians are simply unable to accomplish.  Only in a world devoid of higher strategy and operational level thinking would a Russian CAS campaign be considered, let alone effective.

 

What happens when fast moving attack jets catch you at a bad moment for example when you are crossing a bridge or one of your platoons is crossing some open ground.

If it's a bridge, there's likely a CAP mission associated with it, so whoever is trying to bomb it will have to be dodging F-15C/F-22s starting at about 30 miles out.  Allow me to assure you an SU-24 or SU-25 is not especially able to dodge much of anything loaded with bombs.  Which generally results in bombs being jettisoned as the CAS package goes "nopenopenope" and flies away dumping counter measures.  If it's a bridge more to the rear, then it'll also likely have Avenger coverage and be under a PATRIOT system too.  As far as a platoon going into the open, it's doubtful simply because the ability of S-3s or even the radars on F-15Cs/F-22s to spot enemy CAS (or determine something is up from the amount of jamming coming in) to give a "red air" warning, which means we'll hold tight for a spell.  The best defense for a ground unit facing CAS is to remain low profile, opening up with LAAD simply ensures they now know where you are at, and the p/k for even advanced LAAD platforms is low enough to make it an emergency effort only.  

Simply put you're giving the Russian air force much too much credit, while not having a grasp on what the USAF/USN/NATO air component is capable of.  This for the hundredth time, no longer 1985 and the rules have changed.  Sensor systems and weapons standoff has made LAAD increasing irrelevant nor is there any air force on earth than can accept the sort of losses a highly opposed CAS campaign would incur.    

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jpratt88,

Properly sited, with good fields of fire and in command, in my very limited experience, I found Stingers to be quite effective. A pair of Su-25s attacked, but one was downed and the other driven off. Unfortunately, by then my positions came under heavy attack. Events shown and described below.

https://www.dropbox.com/s/1n1hke5tz5c522s/Screenshot 2015-08-20 00.23.17.png?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/hn8zz5ju3mjg3pw/Screenshot 2015-08-20 00.12.57.png?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/8b4jldc31exqtsc/Screenshot 2015-08-20 00.12.09.png?dl=0
 

"A frog may not weigh much, but to be where a FROGFOOT jumps is something else altogether. While JasonC is indeed correct regarding insane overclaiming by tacair in attacking AFVs, there is no gainsaying what that airstrike did to me in the first minute of battle. The Bradley was hidden behind a house, but that turned out not to be hidden from the air. Results? Obliterated 2-story house and dead Bradley. Weapon appears to have been a bomb of appreciable size. Pics to follow.

 

ASA (Army Security Agency) radio intercept transcript  Intercept target: COMINT between REDFOR CO and CAS

 

"Berkut One (call sign for Su-25 element lead) to Comrade Sudoplatov (call sign REDFOR CO I.S. Sublimovitch). Over."

 

"Comrade Sublimovitch. Report. Over"

 

"Berkut One advises good strike. Repeat. Good strike on center of Objective Zapad. Hits observed on imperialist infantry positions. Personally destroyed Bradley and dismounted fighting position next to house at (gives grid)."

 

"Comrade Supoplatov to Berkut One. Excellent work! Repeat. Excellent Work! There's a medal in this for you."

 

(abrupt strong Russian oaths, followed by garbled message)

 

"...zenith rockets! Zenith rockets in air! Break left! Break left!"

 

(explosion, gurgling sound, then silence)

 

In his ACRV (NATO nomenclature) the formerly exuberant I.S. Sublimovitch's mood first crashes like his downed Grach, then turns to apoplectic rage. In one of those famous Russian COMSEC gaffes going back to WW I, one of the radio operators had inadvertently switched from presumed secure data link to a detected too late poorly protected frequency. ASA intercept operators (and later, Higher) found what came next most entertaining.

 

"Berkut One? Berkut One? Report. Report now!"

 

(timorous agitated voice comes up on CAS command net)

 

"Berkut One. Berkut One. This is Berkut Two. Advise Berkut One is down. Hard. No chute. Repeat. No chute. (Russian epithet regarding zenith rockets "Stinger"). Drawing ground fire but am continuing attack! Out."

 

In his ACRV, with his hapless staff trapped with him in the very close hot confines of the command track, Podpolkovnik Sublimovitch went through a whole series of emotional states in rapid succession, all expressed aloud, before regrouping internally and regaining his sang froid.

 

"They shot down my "flying tank" ? They shot down my "flying tank" ? How is that possible? I know for a fact that in the Georgia Operation, an Su-25 survived a Buk hit and made it back on one engine. A Buk hit! Compared to a Buk, the zenith rocket "Stinger" is a gnat! 

 

(rustling is heard, then gentle calm voice IDed before as Y.A. Nidanovitch, ops officer and close friend of the Komandir)

 

"I'm sorry, Iosef Sublimovitch, but we have three separate reports of seeing the plane hit by zenith rockets then falling out of the sky ablaze."

Granted, this is one QB's worth of results, but it is clear to me that Stingers are a deadly. Of two Su-25s committed, both got off an attack, but one died coming off the target in the initial pass and the other was driven off when re-attacking. That said, it's better when the Stingers engage before the sky falls on you!  I had my Stinger teams well sited on high ground, but the attack didn't come in on the likely threat axes, evidently resulting in tree obscured LOS and delaying the engagement cycle. I guarantee you Sublime feels Stingers are a mortal threat to his CAS, whether fixed wing or rotary wing. It is possible, though, considering how tiny is the Stinger warhead relative to that of a Buk hit described above, that what I got was a golden BB level result, the air defense equivalent of a lethal vision port hit on a Tiger 1 by a HEAT rifle grenade. I have no way of knowing the true situation one way or another. On balance, based solely on that QB, Stingers do not need any adjustment other than what might be gained if, say, new seeker capabilities are developed, or lost if Russian countermeasures against it improve.

As for the broader issue of what all those wonderful capabilities the US has for aerial warfare are expected to do, I thought it might be instructive to see things from the Russian side of the fence. The author of the most informative piece "Pesticide for Super Hornets" is a retired Colonel of Aviation and fighter pilot. Please note what he has to say about the AWACS problem and how the Su-27 deals with AMRAAM armed Super Hornets and such. It can do things I never heard of before in the latter case. 

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-060807-1.html

Regards,

John Kettler

 

 

 

 

Edited by John Kettler
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I don't have time for a full response as I'm on my phone, but John take a heaping pile of salt with all of that post. While I'm semi-familiar with the Russians long range AWACS killers I haven't heard much in terms of operation or training. As for his engagement with the Super Hornet, it's borderline absurd. A lot of the tactics are feasible but they greatly underestimate our own capabilities, tactics  (this is a hard training number here, folks. US pilots fly orders of magnitude more than Russian pilots), and so forth. Also the idea of an RWR guiding a missile (that the Hornet *somehow* doesn't know about) actually made me reread that section three times to see if he was kidding. I can personally attest we practice BVR fighting too.

Also as of December Russia has only 40 SU-35s. Maintenance being what it is, go ahead and call it a generous 30 ready at a given time. That's not going to last you more than a day if you commit them seriously.

Edited by Codename Duchess
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General Comment

I'm confused by this talk of bringing in heavy forces to defend Ukraine, a discussion which then engendered a discourse on putting a CVBG into the Black Sea. Was under the impression we were talking about using Navy tacair to deal with an invasion of the Balkans, for which, last I checked, no trip into the black Sea would be needed. 

Codename Duchess,

I appreciate receiving your feedback on an article which looked interesting but which I wasn't able to read in detail, still less fully grok. I provided it chiefly because of the discussion on AWACS killing. I directly worked on a program at Hughes called ANTISUAWACS, so I have some familiarity with the broad topic. Simply put, poke out the eyes in the sky from ranges where the defenders can't reach the attackers. The Russians are well aware (I read a fair amount of their military literature in translation) of the value of not just the AWACS, but JSTARS, TR-1 and other pieces (RC-135 COMBAT SENT, anyone?) of what they call the Reconnaissance Strike Complex. I can also say that they have, for decades on end, analyzed the problems these pose and fielded an array of sensor defeating and platform killing measures. The S-400 Triumf system explicitly addresses hard kill of such platforms, as seen here.

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-S-400-Triumf.html

Fair Use

The second missile added to the S-400 is the new 40N6, a long range weapon with a cited range of 215 nautical miles, equipped with an active and semi-active homing seeker, intended to kill AWACS, JSTARS and other high value assets, such as EA-6B/EA-18G support jammers. Further details of this weapon remain to be disclosed. The range improvement to around twice that of the 48N6E2 suggests a two stage weapon, or a much larger motor casing with a larger propellant load. Russian media reports citing PVO senior officers in 2010 indicated that 40N6 range may be a great as 240 nautical miles, and the missile completed State Trials (Russian OpEval) in 2010, and was to enter production. To date no images of the 40N6 missile, launcher container or TEL have been made public.

 

What I'm saying is that the Russians aren't depending on fighter or even bomber delivered LRAAM to deal with such threats. They have a robust SAM capability, too, against such assets. At best, this is likely to put a crimp into US and NATO air operations employing such platforms. It will interfere with Deep Look recce and targeting, too. At worst, a bunch of high leverage, scarce assets fall out of the sky in flames. As for the FLANKER attack concept, it might be hooey, but on the surface seems worth a look. When I was in the business, we worried about the IRSTs on both the MiG-29 and the Su-27, since they provided the capability for radar silent targeting. I believe there was a LRF, too. I don't know whether the US DAS can detect Russian data link signals to a missile flying out under Command Inertial mode as it heads toward an acquisition basket for its active radar seeker or IR seeker (typically you get one of each), which is even worse in terms of knowing it's coming. Finally, there is absolutely no doubt in my mind our people are far better trained and get not just an order of magnitude (if not more) flight hours a month, but operate at a level of complexity and technological sophistication the Russian pilots simply can't match.

Regards,

John Kettler

 

Edited by John Kettler
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Combat radius for an F-18 trucking along with 6,000 lbs of bombs is something like 330 miles.  So missions out that far, but with in flight refueling, or just choosing to base the planes ashore would be possible and lower risk.

 

Onto the Lucas however

 

There are currently zero armored divisions in the US military.  Just so you understand this much, there are division HQs which carry various lineages (1st Armored and 1st Cavalry) but there are no longer concrete division sized units.  The whole concept of the Brigade Combat Team plan was to basically have lego-type divisions built of Brigades for the mission.  So in that regard, a response to Korea might have been 2 ID comprised of 1 ABCT and 1 SBCT from 2 ID, with 1 IBCT from the 101st and the 82nd respectively, with 1 CD comrpised of 1 ABCT from 1 CD, an SBCT and IBCT from 25th ID, and then another ABCT from 1 ID.

So just the way you keep talking about armored divisions seems to apply a lack of familiarity with modern operations.

 

Not so much.  They're either deploying in Poland under blue air umbrella and massing to go in theater after air superiority has been established, or they're establishing defenses in the field 1-2 weeks after half the USAF showed up to Western Europe.  There's just no practical way that ABCTs arrive in theater and commit to missions before there's an air threat that dwarfs what Russia can reasonably deploy.

 

The point is the US can trade a few tanks for a lot of MIGs.  The Russians don't have the ability to establish the kind of air superiority needed to accomplish CAS safely in the face of NATO aviation.  If they cannot do it safely it will be a fairly short period of time before there's simply no CAS for the Russians at all, because it is scattered in pieces across the Ukraine.  This is another flaw of wargamer logic, so long as the mission is accomplished this sort of loss rate is acceptable.  However trading 1:1 planes for tanks against NATO is a losing proposition, and even in the event of leaker CAS, the S-3 to F-15C/F-22/other NATO fighter complex makes it very doubtful that CAS will survive another run, be able to loiter close enough to the battle to continue mission, or even escape back to friendly lines.

If you're doing a cost benefits analysis, inflicting some losses on US forces in exchange for rendering Russian strike fighters totally combat ineffective, or even worse, sacrificing multi-role fighter  than might help hold off US CAS just doesn't make any sense.  The damage done to ensure a modest number of losses is totally out of proportion, and will simply hasten the ability of NATO to achieve total air superiority (and perhaps even dominance).  

CAS is just so far down what you can accomplish in contested air space that it really genuinely confuses me how you seem to think it is a realistic threat.  Not even the Americans in environments much more permissive than what Russia would face expect CAS to work until air superiority is established to a degree the Russians are simply unable to accomplish.  Only in a world devoid of higher strategy and operational level thinking would a Russian CAS campaign be considered, let alone effective.

 

If it's a bridge, there's likely a CAP mission associated with it, so whoever is trying to bomb it will have to be dodging F-15C/F-22s starting at about 30 miles out.  Allow me to assure you an SU-24 or SU-25 is not especially able to dodge much of anything loaded with bombs.  Which generally results in bombs being jettisoned as the CAS package goes "nopenopenope" and flies away dumping counter measures.  If it's a bridge more to the rear, then it'll also likely have Avenger coverage and be under a PATRIOT system too.  As far as a platoon going into the open, it's doubtful simply because the ability of S-3s or even the radars on F-15Cs/F-22s to spot enemy CAS (or determine something is up from the amount of jamming coming in) to give a "red air" warning, which means we'll hold tight for a spell.  The best defense for a ground unit facing CAS is to remain low profile, opening up with LAAD simply ensures they now know where you are at, and the p/k for even advanced LAAD platforms is low enough to make it an emergency effort only.  

Simply put you're giving the Russian air force much too much credit, while not having a grasp on what the USAF/USN/NATO air component is capable of.  This for the hundredth time, no longer 1985 and the rules have changed.  Sensor systems and weapons standoff has made LAAD increasing irrelevant nor is there any air force on earth than can accept the sort of losses a highly opposed CAS campaign would incur.    

First the reason I used the term "heavy armoured divisions" was for clarity of communication with readers who might  not be familiar with the nature of organisation of the modern US. Most of the senior members will know about these things but we could well have people reading this who do not know, And that's another thing, we should not use acronyms such as HBCT without explaining what they mean, You and ~I know it means Heavy Brigade Combat Team but we cannot expect a junior member new to the game is going to know that - we hope he will but should not make this assumption  

So I do in fact know what I am talking about. I am simply communicating effectively with th wider target audience by not assuming special subject knowledge which some individuals might not have. A point Panzrsaurkrautwerfer does not see,m to have  paused to consider.

Now getting back to the air war . This Russians are one of the top air forces in the world. It is not the Iraqi air force or is it he Serbian air force, We must assume that they will have been watching how the USAF does thing. Nor are there going t be months of planning for the air war as there was before Desert Storm. Plus, in this scenario it will be the Russians, no the USAF who start the the initiative.

To assume, as Panzerkrautwerfer does hat US air superiority, let alone air dominance will be achieved instantly, as he appears to believe is arrogant to the point of hubris. And even when you have dealt with the Russian air force you have to deal with the Russian air defense network which includes systems such as the much feared S-300. Remember what happened to the Israeli air force i the opening days of the Yom Kippur War? Well, the same thing could happen to a overconfident USAF in the opening days of a war with Russia.

I am not saying the USAF "won't win" just that that victory will take considerably longer than previous wars and will come at a higher price.

In the meantime of course US ground forces will have to deeply into Ukraine and fight under conditions where the Russians have at least air parity. It is that phase of the war we should bwe worried about.

As regards your bridge situation well, yes. That is how it should be handled. But mistakes can happen. And the reason I know it can happen is because I made exactly that mistake just once in one of my very early games. On that occasion it was just a computer war game. A simulation of really if you will. But if I had been a real commander, perhaps newly appointed to command and, perhaps because I feel rushed by the demands of my superiors I fail to take the precautions I should take and get caught by the Russian air force there will be real destroyed vehicles, dead and wounded men and real widows and orphans. Because I, the commander, screwed up and did not wisely take the time to deploy my air defenses to cover he move. Now, I am sure an experienced armour commander like panzerkrautwerfer won't make a mistake like that and I having learned a particularly hard lesson (this game can be really unforgiving) won't make that blunder a second time) The point is that my experience in the particular game I refer to is an object lesson of what can happen when someone messes up!

Edited by LUCASWILLEN05
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Combat radius for a Super Hornet carrying 4 x 1000 lb bombs, 2 x external tanks and 2 x Sidewinder is 390 nm or 448.8 statute miles or 722.3 kilometers--using onboard fuel only. That sort of payload, with today's miniaturized smart weapons, translates into a lot of target kill potential. Considerable range improvement is possible via powered version of JSOW. From a strike standpoint, it is a sad fact that even the Super Hornet can't begin to compete with the very heavy payload and combat radius of an A-6E Intruder, which is no longer with us, having been retired.

Regards,

John Kettler

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All i know is using any computer game experience as your credentials as to why you understand a conflict better is kinda suspect to me. Especially versus someone whose seen combat and was very recently a serving officer in the US military. Im not sayng everything Pzsaurkraut has to be gospel but any post that begins with "my years of playing CM and harpoon have taught me.." kinda makes the rest of the arguments dubious to me at best.

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First the reason I used the term "heavy armoured divisions" was for clarity of communication with readers who might  not be familiar with the nature of organisation of the modern US. Most of the senior members will know about these things but we could well have people reading this who do not know, And that's another thing, we should not use acronyms such as HBCT without explaining what they mean, You and ~I know it means Heavy Brigade Combat Team but we cannot expect a junior member new to the game is going to know that - we hope he will but should not make this assumption 

The HBCT is gone.  The designation went out of use circa 2012, with ABCT simply being the new terminology, but seeing as the ABCT has gone a revision in strength (up to three CABs, more tubes in the artillery battalion, 100% more engineers) it is worthwhile to consider the HBCT the "Iraq era" MTOE for armored units, with the ABCT representing the post-Iraq and into the near future composition.

 

Now getting back to the air war . This Russians are one of the top air forces in the world. It is not the Iraqi air force or is it he Serbian air force, We must assume that they will have been watching how the USAF does thing. Nor are there going t be months of planning for the air war as there was before Desert Storm. Plus, in this scenario it will be the Russians, no the USAF who start the the initiative.

They are up there, but behind the both the USAF and USN (the USAF dwarfs the Russian Air Force in numbers of multi-role fighters, the Navy has about a 100 more multi-roles than the Russian airforce, but if you add in the USMC the size difference is even more pronounced).  The average USAF/USN airframes are also more capable and flown by better trained more experienced aircrew.  Once you start adding in major US allies in region you're basically increasingly the gap in capabilities and size a few hundred airframes at a go.

So equally so we cannot dismiss the Russian Air Force out of hand, we cannot simply assume it will be successful because it is one of the larger air forces in the world.  

In regards to the scenario, the Russians having initiative might be doubtful outside of the very unlikely total surprise situation.  More likely the Russians would fire the first shot, but the platform doing the shooting will have been observed all the way to the launching point, with NATO assets preparing to receive.  Initiative will be contested, this is not going to be a pure bolt form the blue (or there wouldn't be NATO forces on hand to receive it anyway).  

 

To assume, as Panzerkrautwerfer does hat US air superiority, let alone air dominance will be achieved instantly, as he appears to believe is arrogant to the point of hubris. And even when you have dealt with the Russian air force you have to deal with the Russian air defense network which includes systems such as the much feared S-300. Remember what happened to the Israeli air force i the opening days of the Yom Kippur War? Well, the same thing could happen to a overconfident USAF in the opening days of a war with Russia.

Let's try an experiment:

To assume, as Panzerkrautwerfer  Lucas does that US air superiority Russian airstrikes, let alone air dominance  CAS will be achieved instantly, as he appears to believe is arrogant to the point of hubris. And even when you have dealt with the Russian NATO air forces you have to deal with the Russian NATO air defense network which includes systems such as the much feared S-300 PATRIOT. Remember what happened to the Israeli  Arab air forces in the opening days of the Yom Kippur War? Well, the same thing could happen to a overconfident USAF Russian Air Force in the opening days of a war with Russia the west.

The inability of the NATO forces to conduct airstrikes and control Russian air space does not defacto result in Russian air superiority or even parity over NATO formations.  This is quite possibly the most confusing thing about Lucas's arguments:

1. Russian Air Force is strong and so are their strategic SAMs so it will be a long time before NATO can control the skies.

2. The reverse does not apply to NATO, despite having a much stronger air force, and equal if not superior theater level SAM capability.

I have never assumed regional air superiority.  I simply have stated a CAS type mission, as in a plane loaded for bear with AGM munitions, loaded on a supremely unstealthy platform (like the SU-25 or SU-24) will be in mind boggling amounts of danger flying at what could very well be one of the largest collections of AWACs, modern air superiority fighters (including the F-22), and flying towards missiles with accuracy and speed to shoot down objects falling from low orbit.

Could some Russian planes make it through?  Maybe.  But they're going to incur enough losses "leaking" to make whatever is accomplished in the CAS role at best a phyrric victory, but more likely effectively a very costly defeat in terms of the air war (trading 6+ planes for banging up a tank company is a poor deal, and with how Russian bombers have performed in Syria, it opens the question to if they'd be any good with an F-15C trying to murder them while trying to find US forces that have gone to ground).  

 

I am not saying the USAF "won't win" just that that victory will take considerably longer than previous wars and will come at a higher price.

In the meantime of course US ground forces will have to deeply into Ukraine and fight under conditions where the Russians have at least air parity. It is that phase of the war we should bwe worried about.

This might be the root of the problem, it's not the USAF and the Russians starting at 0 and racing to air dominance, it's starting at what is likely air superiority, if not dominance within each other's own lines, and then a period in which both parties try to force the issue.  In world war one no one was concerned about the lack of machine guns located inside the field kitchen because the enemy had to claw his way through all the other defenses to get there.  There was no need for an armed and armored stove to provide local area defense to the kitchen.  Both US and Russian forces will have to first claw through each other's defenses before CAS becomes an issue, and the Russians simply do not have the numbers or means to overcome those defenses.

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Getting back to the original question, yes in game Stingers can be effective. There are typically far fewer simply because of the US ToE built around a different expectation of what kind of air umbrella they'd be operating under. However if we assume somehow that because of strategic issues and the international situation there was a perceived need to provide local AA assets, it wouldn't be particularly difficult to vastly increase the amount of AA weapons available in theater.  Both at local level (Stingers) and theater level (Patriots).  

Want to to have a go at an alternate scenario and see how it might play out, add a bunch of stinger teams and have a go at it.  I did so as a test early on in the beta process.  I think you will find enemy air activity to be markedly less effective. 

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The HBCT is gone.  The designation went out of use circa 2012, with ABCT simply being the new terminology, but seeing as the ABCT has gone a revision in strength (up to three CABs, more tubes in the artillery battalion, 100% more engineers) it is worthwhile to consider the HBCT the "Iraq era" MTOE for armored units, with the ABCT representing the post-Iraq and into the near future composition.

 

They are up there, but behind the both the USAF and USN (the USAF dwarfs the Russian Air Force in numbers of multi-role fighters, the Navy has about a 100 more multi-roles than the Russian airforce, but if you add in the USMC the size difference is even more pronounced).  The average USAF/USN airframes are also more capable and flown by better trained more experienced aircrew.  Once you start adding in major US allies in region you're basically increasingly the gap in capabilities and size a few hundred airframes at a go.

So equally so we cannot dismiss the Russian Air Force out of hand, we cannot simply assume it will be successful because it is one of the larger air forces in the world.  

In regards to the scenario, the Russians having initiative might be doubtful outside of the very unlikely total surprise situation.  More likely the Russians would fire the first shot, but the platform doing the shooting will have been observed all the way to the launching point, with NATO assets preparing to receive.  Initiative will be contested, this is not going to be a pure bolt form the blue (or there wouldn't be NATO forces on hand to receive it anyway).  

 

Let's try an experiment:

To assume, as Panzerkrautwerfer  Lucas does that US air superiority Russian airstrikes, let alone air dominance  CAS will be achieved instantly, as he appears to believe is arrogant to the point of hubris. And even when you have dealt with the Russian NATO air forces you have to deal with the Russian NATO air defense network which includes systems such as the much feared S-300 PATRIOT. Remember what happened to the Israeli  Arab air forces in the opening days of the Yom Kippur War? Well, the same thing could happen to a overconfident USAF Russian Air Force in the opening days of a war with Russia the west.

The inability of the NATO forces to conduct airstrikes and control Russian air space does not defacto result in Russian air superiority or even parity over NATO formations.  This is quite possibly the most confusing thing about Lucas's arguments:

1. Russian Air Force is strong and so are their strategic SAMs so it will be a long time before NATO can control the skies.

2. The reverse does not apply to NATO, despite having a much stronger air force, and equal if not superior theater level SAM capability.

I have never assumed regional air superiority.  I simply have stated a CAS type mission, as in a plane loaded for bear with AGM munitions, loaded on a supremely unstealthy platform (like the SU-25 or SU-24) will be in mind boggling amounts of danger flying at what could very well be one of the largest collections of AWACs, modern air superiority fighters (including the F-22), and flying towards missiles with accuracy and speed to shoot down objects falling from low orbit.

Could some Russian planes make it through?  Maybe.  But they're going to incur enough losses "leaking" to make whatever is accomplished in the CAS role at best a phyrric victory, but more likely effectively a very costly defeat in terms of the air war (trading 6+ planes for banging up a tank company is a poor deal, and with how Russian bombers have performed in Syria, it opens the question to if they'd be any good with an F-15C trying to murder them while trying to find US forces that have gone to ground).  

 

This might be the root of the problem, it's not the USAF and the Russians starting at 0 and racing to air dominance, it's starting at what is likely air superiority, if not dominance within each other's own lines, and then a period in which both parties try to force the issue.  In world war one no one was concerned about the lack of machine guns located inside the field kitchen because the enemy had to claw his way through all the other defenses to get there.  There was no need for an armed and armored stove to provide local area defense to the kitchen.  Both US and Russian forces will have to first claw through each other's defenses before CAS becomes an issue, and the Russians simply do not have the numbers or means to overcome those defenses.

Whatever

First the Russians, not the US start this war with he initiative which mean land, air and naval assets are out of place

I suggest you use Harpoon ANW to game the air and naval war. The Russian Black Sea Fleet surface elements last a day or two depending on how long it takes to find and engage them. Submarines and minefields take rather longer So say a week to two weeks to clear the Dardanelles of Russian submarines and naval mines and to eliminate the Russian land based anti ship missile 

Next we need to look at the Third Battle of the Atlantic which, in the event of a war in Ukraine is going to take place in the event of war. Do you honestly think that Putin and his military commanders are going to just let US reinforcements flow across the Atlantic and build up for some huge set piece offensive which is what the US military is best at? No of couse not! The Russians will be using air and sea power (mostly submarines to interdict the Atlantic convoy routes

I am not saying the US won't win the air war and I am not saying hat they won't build up a large and effective force in Europe. They can and will do it. Eventually and at a significant cost. It will likely take 6 to 8 weeks to build up the required force levels and achieve at least some measure of air superiority/ Th point is it will take a while for hese conditions to vbe achieved.

If you will not or cannot accept that you really are suffering from a bad case of hubris for which I suggest you ead this 

http://r.search.yahoo.com/_ylt=A7x9Un0sTrJWrgwA82p3Bwx.;_ylu=X3oDMTByaDRqYzNhBHNlYwNzcgRwb3MDNgRjb2xvA2lyMgR2dGlkAw--/RV=2/RE=1454554796/RO=10/RU=https%3a%2f%2fwww.usnwc.edu%2fPublications%2f-Luce-nt-%2fArchives%2f2013%2fEthics%2fSmith_Military_Operations_The_Harmful_Effects_of_H.aspx/RK=0/RS=OLvaoIiiU6Di.uVcS20ng5vvYz4-

http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/us-military-folly-air-power-hubris/p4291

And this as an object lesson from military history as to what the bloody military costs of hubris can be

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/02/bloody-consequences-military-hubris

If you continue with that attitude then, like Publius Quinctillius Varus or the arrogant Prussian officers who sharpened their sabers on the steps of the French embassy in 1806 then you could be heading for a modern day version of the Tetoburger Wald or Jena-Auerstadt this time fought out in the woods and fields of Ukraine/ Or at he least a nasty Kasserine like battle in which US forces are handed a nasty initial defeat - it could take something like that to teach you enough humility so that you don't underestimate the enemy. But future staff college students will still write essays pointing out how stupid the US military was at the start of the 2017 Ukraine War (or if future historians choose to name the conflict that way World War 3)

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I think it may be debatable that Russia would extend the war into the Atlantic. Would it make military sense to do so? Yes, of course it would. But to the American public, I feel like fighting in some random eastern European country is one thing; watching the USS Carl Vinson explode off the east coast from ASMs is another. Once you start sinking American ships in international waters, things can start to escalate. Oh, you sunk our merchant ship and drowned the entirety of the 23rd Infantry Battalion? Well, some B-1s are going to visit Murmansk tomorrow morning. In the game, Russia and the West seem determined to limit the war to Ukraine. Declaring the North Atlantic a free-fire zone runs contrary to that assumption. Further, the Russian navy's ability to project power in this day and age is...suspect, to say the least. There are two Russian navies - the one and paper, and the one that mostly rusting at the moors. Yeah, they've made some impressive strides over the past few years, but the fact that their flagship had to have a tug tag along in case of breakdowns doesn't bode well for them. And although the number of Russian submarines has drastically decreased, convoy-capable surface combatant haven't suffered attrition as much. Although the art of ASW has definitely eroded over the years, Russian subs still have to survive the GIUK gap, their own mechanical difficulties, and then a US Navy that is largely well-equipped, well-trained, and confident in its ability to get the majority of its charges across the Atlantic. Yeah we'd lose ships...but at the end, like Russian CAS, it would be trading the Russian navy for a largely negligible effect on US reinforcements.

As for the next topic...

I sincerely doubt that panzersaurkrautwerfer is suffering from hubris. Rather, I think he is trying to provide a logical argument, based upon HIS TEN YEAR SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY, (which will forever and for all eternity largely trump any experience gleaned from video games), of why the Russian air force will not roam around and bomb M1 Abrams tank willy-nily. He's not saying the US military is going to beat everything and everyone because 'Merica; he's saying that after looking at the cold, hard numbers, past military history, and American military doctrine, Russian CAS intervening in engagements with US forces are either 1) short lived and desperate, 2) nonexistent, or 3) unsustainable. And believe me, historically, America doesn't tend to underestimate the Russians...it tends to blow them out of proportion into an nearly invincible force that if it really wants to can walk to the Rhine in four days and conquer the world in seven. And as history has shown, that is quite far from the mark. I'm not saying that Russia isn't a force to reckoned with...but I believe that we tend to turn them into an omni-potent, all-knowing entity that has the answers to every military problem. Kind of like what people tend to do to the CIA and NSA.

Edited by Currahee150
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