US Stingers

[jpratt88]

Im starting to see a pattern in that the US Stinger seems to be completely useless against Russian aircraft...is anyone else noticing this?

[A Canadian Cat]

Nope, l have lost Russian air craft to stingers. The stingers do seem less effective but another factor could be concentration of fire. My Russian soldiers recently downed an enemy air craft by firing three missiles at once. I have yet to have a US force with more than two launchers available and that was only once usually there is only one launcher around. The Russian anti air at the tactical level is just better on average.

[jpratt88]

Yeah that one that you shot down with three missiles...was me. They went up in a nice triangle...splash one F15!

[A Canadian Cat]

Oh LOL I did not make the connection there. Yeah I was thrilled to see that. Just last turn two stingers went up and I got very nervous. But I actually forgot to check my air support status afterwards.

[gnarly]

I've certainly had good results with Stingers. Better it seems if multiple launched at once (from differing aspects) to (I assume the game algorithsm can handle this?) decrease the chance of pilot evasion/decoy.

[A Canadian Cat]

I would say yes based on my experience.

[jpratt88]

That's why I wanted to ask. I'm having terrible luck with them...mine seem to fire a lot with no luck...of course this could just be my bad luck...;)

[GhostRider3/3]

Im starting to see a pattern in that the US Stinger seems to be completely useless against Russian aircraft...is anyone else noticing this?

Yes... they are completely useless,  Just played through the US campaign.  "Up against a Wall" I think was the name of it.  Had 3 Stinger teams deployed... they never fired a shot but the Russian helicopters took out 1 Abrams, 7 APC, and murdered probably 30 troops..... Pointless to have even deployed their dumbasses.  Replayed it a few more times (saved game).. but never had one launch.  Checked their inventory and nothing.  I have to say though the Russians have a at least 2-3 Helos maybe in that scenario...

[MikeyD]

Whenever Stingers have failed for me its always been my own darned fault. Place them too close to a wood line or building and the woods & buildings will block their LOF. Place them in a terrain depression and the surrounding hills will block LOF. AA units are the only units where you want to avoid defilade positions and place them in an open exposed position. It goes against a player's natural inclinations to keep your units safe. What other unit would you march into the middle of an open field and have him just stand there?  

[c3k]

That. They need a good LOS to the enemy air.

[Abdolmartin]

Whenever Stingers have failed for me its always been my own darned fault. Place them too close to a wood line or building and the woods & buildings will block their LOF. Place them in a terrain depression and the surrounding hills will block LOF. AA units are the only units where you want to avoid defilade positions and place them in an open exposed position. It goes against a player's natural inclinations to keep your units safe. What other unit would you march into the middle of an open field and have him just stand there?  

This. I remember that I put my Stingers over a hill in "Bridgehead over Kharalyk" and they destroyed three enemy helos, two in a single turn!

[GhostRider3/3]

Whenever Stingers have failed for me its always been my own darned fault. Place them too close to a wood line or building and the woods & buildings will block their LOF. Place them in a terrain depression and the surrounding hills will block LOF. AA units are the only units where you want to avoid defilade positions and place them in an open exposed position. It goes against a player's natural inclinations to keep your units safe. What other unit would you march into the middle of an open field and have him just stand there?  

Well I tested the hell out of it.... Maybe it was glitch that day, because they were in OPEN Field... massive line of sites.. they just never pulled the trigger.. all the while my forces where getting decimated by Soviet helicopters.  Anyways.. after more testing.. they seem to work fine.. although I somewhat feel a little sketch whenever I hear helos and I only have 1 or 2 stinger units.  The one thing with the US. there are NO.. AA equipment besides the Stinger and Hawk systems, ... while the Russian forces are massively equipped for anti air..   This is probably true as we would most likely carry out Anti Air destruction first with Weasels etc..

 

Anyways this is not a complaint.. as it was more of getting my ASS handed to me by X2 Mil Mi24's or Havoc's  HOLY JESUS..... if you have no AA defense you are AOL.....

So PBEM.. make sure you have at least one Stinger team

 

Semper Fi....

[Abdolmartin]

I hope that in a future module or patch, we'll see the implementation of the idea that panzersaurkrautwerfer put forth about simulating fighter-based AD, and all these Stinger issues will be eliminated.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

US anti air defense does seem to be a key weakness. The assumption appears to have been that the USAF will swiftly dominate the skies as it did over Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The M6 Linebacker variant of  the Bradley was supposed to fulfill that role but was cancelled in 2006. There is also the AN/TWQ-1 Avenger which is mounted on a heavy HMMWV.

In the early days and weeks of a war like that portrayed in the game the US military would suffer the cosequences of the above defense procurement decisions and there might have to be "field solutions" to that such as borrowing some Ukrainian systems to fill the gap 

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

US anti air defense does seem to be a key weakness. The assumption appears to have been that the USAF will swiftly dominate the skies as it did over Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The M6 Linebacker variant of  the Bradley was supposed to fulfill that role but was cancelled in 2006. There is also the AN/TWQ-1 Avenger which is mounted on a heavy HMMWV.

In the early days and weeks of a war like that portrayed in the game the US military would suffer the cosequences of the above defense procurement decisions and there might have to be "field solutions" to that such as borrowing some Ukrainian systems to fill the gap 

For those of you interested, there's an eight page thread in which this position gets more or less gets discredited, then wanders into a neat OT about 1990's era tank and helicopter simulators.  

But in a TLDR version:

The US air defense scheme revolves around a very capable combination of frankly some of the best air to air systems, mounted to some of the best jets, flown by some of the best trained pilots, married to a wide ranging and powerful sensor network.  It is then backed up by a SAM system so powerful it can shoot things falling from space down with a degree of accuracy that does not require a warhead (current PATRIOT missiles are simply very big KE type projectiles).  

To put it in perspective there are no peer air forces that even remotely approach the USAF alone in size or capability, let alone the combined might of the USAF, USN, and USMC air wings (the US Navy for instance, fields more F/A-18s than total frontline fixed wing fighters in the entire Russian Air Force).  While Russian ADA will complicate NATO efforts to bomb Russian forces, the ability of Russian aviation to penetrate and conduct normal CAS missions would be very doubtful indeed (or likely more focused on strategic/operational targets which are more likely to be valuable in proportion to losses than trading MIGs for a tank or two).

Which is why I again, firmly believe there needs to be something to simulate that kind of anti-air in the game, or Russian higher echelon SAM support, because frankly neither the US or Russia's ability to defend against air threats comes down to a few guys in a hole with a MANPAD or a few 2S6s parked somewhere.  

[Jotte]

Something along the lines of the EW setting that regulated the chance/risk for the air assets arrivial as suggested above would be very welcome indeed.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

For those of you interested, there's an eight page thread in which this position gets more or less gets discredited, then wanders into a neat OT about 1990's era tank and helicopter simulators.  

But in a TLDR version:

The US air defense scheme revolves around a very capable combination of frankly some of the best air to air systems, mounted to some of the best jets, flown by some of the best trained pilots, married to a wide ranging and powerful sensor network.  It is then backed up by a SAM system so powerful it can shoot things falling from space down with a degree of accuracy that does not require a warhead (current PATRIOT missiles are simply very big KE type projectiles).  

To put it in perspective there are no peer air forces that even remotely approach the USAF alone in size or capability, let alone the combined might of the USAF, USN, and USMC air wings (the US Navy for instance, fields more F/A-18s than total frontline fixed wing fighters in the entire Russian Air Force).  While Russian ADA will complicate NATO efforts to bomb Russian forces, the ability of Russian aviation to penetrate and conduct normal CAS missions would be very doubtful indeed (or likely more focused on strategic/operational targets which are more likely to be valuable in proportion to losses than trading MIGs for a tank or two).

Which is why I again, firmly believe there needs to be something to simulate that kind of anti-air in the game, or Russian higher echelon SAM support, because frankly neither the US or Russia's ability to defend against air threats comes down to a few guys in a hole with a MANPAD or a few 2S6s parked somewhere.  

There is such a thing as planning to fight the last war, not the next. While the USAF is very good, just having the best is not always enough. Look at the French army in 1940 which had better tanks than the Germans in terms of armour and guns at least. In the Ukraine scenario the USAF will probably get control of the air after a few weeks or so but will still have to deal with Russian air defenses for quite a while. However, the problem, will be the period before that happens and it may b the US military could be in for a nasty shock. While many Russian ir strikes might be prevented by air power some will get through. The in game Russian aircraft are the ones that do get through However, as I said earlier there would be field solutions including borrowing some Ukrainian Tunguskas to fill the gap. But there could be significant losses before the lesson is learned

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

1. I think you have this persisting problem with understanding this basic concept:

Lack of US Air Dominance is not a defacto permissive environment for Russian CAS.   

It is really as simple as that.  There is not a window in which Russian forces do pretty much whatever they want at will with a gradually building NATO response, it's going to be pretty much a painfully lethal environment for all fixed or rotary wing assets for a while, where ANYONE struggles to accomplish strikes, let alone CAS, with through numbers and superior capability NATO eventually carving out some semblance of Air Superiority over Russian lines (not to be confused with Air Dominance).

Even on day one, all Russian ADA fully mission capable, every Russian platform in theater available, flying near "blue" forces is going to be a supremely dangerous exercise in being illuminated by AWACS, dodging missiles fired from F-22s, F-15Cs etc, etc, while PATRIOTs try to reach out and gently caress their way through your airframe.

The US generally still must establish some kind of air superiority before it commits CAS assets.  I'm really curious how you think a much less capable force will magic its way through some of the most advanced anti-aircraft systems in numbers sufficient to be worth the heavy losses it will surely suffer.  

Which is to say I am really confused at how you apply all these restrictions to US airpower and how long it'll take to accomplish mission, while basically assuming Russian aviation will accomplish mission on day one.  

2. Your French tank analogy is about on par for most amateurs.  It's not a matter of technology strictly speaking, it's a matter of organization, logistics and training.  The crippling problem with French armor was not that of numbers, or raw mechanical statistics, it was what existed was arrayed in a deeply ineffective way, operated by crews that had just left FT-17s, and supported by a logistical network entirely not up to the task.  As the case is between US and Russian air combat literally meaningful category from airframes, to training, to support networks, to readiness and beyond is something in which the US commands some significant advantage.  There's no parity in some places, or Russian superiority in others, simply put it's a second rate air force in largely obsolete planes flying into the face of the force that quite honestly invented and honed the cutting edge for much of what is being employed today.
 

3. The great advantage to the US air superiority doctrine is instead of relying largely on a ground mounted system, using our extensive fleet of airborne C3 nodes, we can mass fighters on threats as they're detected.  Unlike someone using mostly a ground based network, assets can be massed where required, or rapidly moved around the battlefield at Mach 1.5+.  Which is to say even if there was a leaking SU-24 or something, it's likely going to get maybe a run in before it is trying very hard not to die terribly in the face of F-22s.  

Which is why using Russian strike fighters in the CAS role is doubtful.  If you're going to get one shot, something that's a larger, more high value target is more worthy of losing some planes over than trying to spot tactically deployed armor or infantry in the field.

4. If the largest air force in the world couldn't stop Russian CAS, all 2S6s attached to US formations will do is frankly die at the hands of the apparently unstoppable masses of frontal aviation super pilots in MIGs protected by force shields.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

1. I think you have this persisting problem with understanding this basic concept:

Lack of US Air Dominance is not a defacto permissive environment for Russian CAS.   

It is really as simple as that.  There is not a window in which Russian forces do pretty much whatever they want at will with a gradually building NATO response, it's going to be pretty much a painfully lethal environment for all fixed or rotary wing assets for a while, where ANYONE struggles to accomplish strikes, let alone CAS, with through numbers and superior capability NATO eventually carving out some semblance of Air Superiority over Russian lines (not to be confused with Air Dominance).

Even on day one, all Russian ADA fully mission capable, every Russian platform in theater available, flying near "blue" forces is going to be a supremely dangerous exercise in being illuminated by AWACS, dodging missiles fired from F-22s, F-15Cs etc, etc, while PATRIOTs try to reach out and gently caress their way through your airframe.

The US generally still must establish some kind of air superiority before it commits CAS assets.  I'm really curious how you think a much less capable force will magic its way through some of the most advanced anti-aircraft systems in numbers sufficient to be worth the heavy losses it will surely suffer.  

Which is to say I am really confused at how you apply all these restrictions to US airpower and how long it'll take to accomplish mission, while basically assuming Russian aviation will accomplish mission on day one.  

2. Your French tank analogy is about on par for most amateurs.  It's not a matter of technology strictly speaking, it's a matter of organization, logistics and training.  The crippling problem with French armor was not that of numbers, or raw mechanical statistics, it was what existed was arrayed in a deeply ineffective way, operated by crews that had just left FT-17s, and supported by a logistical network entirely not up to the task.  As the case is between US and Russian air combat literally meaningful category from airframes, to training, to support networks, to readiness and beyond is something in which the US commands some significant advantage.  There's no parity in some places, or Russian superiority in others, simply put it's a second rate air force in largely obsolete planes flying into the face of the force that quite honestly invented and honed the cutting edge for much of what is being employed today.
 

3. The great advantage to the US air superiority doctrine is instead of relying largely on a ground mounted system, using our extensive fleet of airborne C3 nodes, we can mass fighters on threats as they're detected.  Unlike someone using mostly a ground based network, assets can be massed where required, or rapidly moved around the battlefield at Mach 1.5+.  Which is to say even if there was a leaking SU-24 or something, it's likely going to get maybe a run in before it is trying very hard not to die terribly in the face of F-22s.  

Which is why using Russian strike fighters in the CAS role is doubtful.  If you're going to get one shot, something that's a larger, more high value target is more worthy of losing some planes over than trying to spot tactically deployed armor or infantry in the field.

4. If the largest air force in the world couldn't stop Russian CAS, all 2S6s attached to US formations will do is frankly die at the hands of the apparently unstoppable masses of frontal aviation super pilots in MIGs protected by force shields.

The point is that air dominance is not going to happen overnight as it was in Desert Storm or over Yugoslavia in 1999 s you blithely assume. You are making the classic mistake of learning the lessons from the last wars, not considering what may happen in the next. I am not saying the USAF won't win the air war. It probably will but the air war against the Russian air force will be strongly contested for several weeks at the least. And in this scenario ii is the Russians who start the conflict with the initiative. not the US. It will certainly not be an air war won on the first night as was the case with Operation Desert Storm or Kossovo as you assume will be the case. And, if you are wrong about your assumptions in regard to a quick US win of the air war then I fear the US ground forces are going to be in for a nasty shock. And may find itself experiencing a little of the treatment meted out to the Iraqis and others.

The question you are not answering is what happens during the period  before US air dominance is actually established. And the results may very well be deeply unpleasant and shocking for the US army given the weakness of tactical air defense,.

Look. I don't have the time to debate the issue further so I tell you what. Why don't we just fight the war and find out Please assemble promptly at the Russian - Ukrainian border

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

The point is that air dominance is not going to happen overnight as it was in Desert Storm or over Yugoslavia in 1999 s you blithely assume.

This is where I understand you simply do not actually read my posts.

For the benefit of anyone else who might be reading:

I was stationed in South Korea for a couple of years in a Combine Arms Battalion.  One of the considerations we had in the event of outbreak of war was that CAS would simply be largely unavailable for the first few days to a week.  This was in spite of a fairly competent South Korean Air Force, a quite large USAF contingent in Korea and Japan, and the majority of the DPRK's assets being hopelessly obsolete.  

It was just a given fact that CAS missions were fairly risky to airframes and crew in anything but a permissive environment.   While virtually without a doubt the majority of the DPRK Air Force would be destroyed in hours, and most of the major SAM threats knocked out shortly thereafter, there was still a basic assumption it would be a while before committing heavily loaded CAS planes would be reasonably safe, even in the face of mostly massed AA machine gun fire at worst.

Now again, this is with a gross disparity in attacking air element to air defender.  The DPRK as defender relies on MIG-21s, and a whole mess of 14.5 machine guns taped together and third rate knockoffs of 1970's Soviet MANPADs.  The attacker has cutting edge stealth platforms, stand off precision munitions, and all sorts of advanced sensors.

Mr Lucas here continues to assert that what the US cannot achieve on day one with North Korea is something that the Russian air force can, and will be able to accomplish against US military forces.   

In any sort of air campaign you realistically will not see CAS from either side until some level of air control is attained.  CAS assets are just too vulnerable to operate in a high threat environment with large numbers of active enemy fighters and significant sensor coverage.  

What you will still likely see is interdiction or more directed strikes against infrastructure, simply because the exposure of a plane dashing in to hit a bridge or some other chokepoint is more limited (no need to loiter, targets are less dispersed, one or two good hits=mission successful), but that is well into the realm in which we use Avengers, dismounted MANPADs PATRIOTs etc for. 
 

In no way have I EVER argued a quick win, but that simply in an air war with the US vs a near peer state, it will be much too dangerous for anyone to fly CAS, but only the USAF/USN/USMC have the reasonable amount of assets and capability to potentially wind up with enough air control to run CAS missions.  Which renders the need for a yankee ZSU-23 or 2S6 moot, and is why the M6 Linebacker was retired without replacement, because even without having air dominance, the air arms of the various US services, and the larger ground based systems can certainly deny the air control required to conduct CAS* to any opponent on earth (unless there's a USAF vs USN/USMC civil war).  

 

So to boldface reply:

Pre-US Air Dominance will be too dangerous for any CAS platform blue or red to reliably strike targets.  Planes conducting CAS operating in a contested environment might as well be babies smothered in steaksauce at a cannibal convention.  It baffles me to no end that someone can be possibly dense enough to believe that contested air space equals anyone is especially safe to conduct strikes, and that the choice to move away from short range ground based air defense was anything but one done with no small amount of thought, by professionals in the air defense and maneuver community.

*Or perhaps, CAS as conducted by a sane person.  I'm fairly certain if the Russians simply did not want to have an airforce anymore they could brute force their way in and conduct some strikes, but at the sort of loss rate to preclude having a functional air force at the end of the day. However this is not 1944, and losing even fairly modest numbers conducting CAS fairly rapidly becomes well above and beyond what any country can sustain.  

[AttorneyAtWar]

 

*snip*

Yup to put that first point simply, air force priorities go something like this-

1. Neutralize enemy airforce/capability to launch planes and achieve air superiority

2. Attrit enemy air defenses aka SEAD

3. CAS and high value targets

Edit: Actually I guess "High value targets" was a bit vague for #3, if were talking NK for example, SCUDS and launch sites would absolutely be at the top of this list.

Edited January 23, 2016 by Raptorx7

[MikeyD]

I recall early in the title-building process I posited the concept of the US losing an AWACS and/or a couple valuable tanker aircraft early in the conflict due to either extra-long-range AA missiles or sabotage operations across European bases. Losing a couple KC-135s would hurt more than losing a dozen fighters. That would be enough to 'inconvenience' any plans for control of the airspace. probably long enough to have an impact on ground operations. Basically, that's why there are Russian helos virtually flying the skies in the game.

Defensive armies have a common problem of either planning to fight the last sort of war or planning to fight a war that's never going to happen. The war they find themselves faced with is often a surprise. Offensive armies have the advantage of picking the time & place for their war and deciding beforehand what sort of war they're going to conduct. But even that is not guaranteed. You concoct a false flag guerilla war and eventually wind up having to send in ground troops to fight your own proxy armies after they're gone rogue. You try a full-up classical military invasion and wind up having to contend with dirt farmers making fertilizer bombs.

[sburke]

The point is that air dominance is not going to happen overnight as it was in Desert Storm or over Yugoslavia in 1999 s you blithely assume. You are making the classic mistake of learning the lessons from the last wars, not considering what may happen in the next. I am not saying the USAF won't win the air war. It probably will but the air war against the Russian air force will be strongly contested for several weeks at the least. And in this scenario ii is the Russians who start the conflict with the initiative. not the US. It will certainly not be an air war won on the first night as was the case with Operation Desert Storm or Kossovo as you assume will be the case. And, if you are wrong about your assumptions in regard to a quick US win of the air war then I fear the US ground forces are going to be in for a nasty shock. And may find itself experiencing a little of the treatment meted out to the Iraqis and others.

The question you are not answering is what happens during the period  before US air dominance is actually established. And the results may very well be deeply unpleasant and shocking for the US army given the weakness of tactical air defense,.

Look. I don't have the time to debate the issue further so I tell you what. Why don't we just fight the war and find out Please assemble promptly at the Russian - Ukrainian border

I can probably come up with a theoretical scenario where Russia commits a surge right out of maneuvers to occupy the Baltic states which could see US forces caught wrong footed like say having a Cav unit doing a political relations tour driving around Poland and the Baltic region

The problem with that though is I believe the Russian leadership is smarter than that and would not risk an accidental confrontation. Personally I believe they would only consider such an action when there were no US ground troops around.  Russia clearly does have an understanding of how to manipulate Western public opinion and spends a fair amount of hard cash doing so.  A few US casualties from an unprovoked assault on Lithuania though could unwind that pretty darn quick. So from a strictly CM perspective I don't think I can see a scenario of Russia operating CAS forces in a tactical role.  The US has the ability to stage a lot of air assets with our friends in Europe faster than we could stage boots on the ground.

[sburke]

Just out of curiosity and because I think it is germane to this discussion, does anyone have comparison figures for Russian, US and NATO training time?  Live fire exercises, large scale maneuver training, flight time etc etc.  Numbers only give part of the picture, combat readiness has come up prior in this thread, but not with any numbers to look at.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

I can probably come up with a theoretical scenario where Russia commits a surge right out of maneuvers to occupy the Baltic states which could see US forces caught wrong footed like say having a Cav unit doing a political relations tour driving around Poland and the Baltic region

The problem with that though is I believe the Russian leadership is smarter than that and would not risk an accidental confrontation. Personally I believe they would only consider such an action when there were no US ground troops around.  Russia clearly does have an understanding of how to manipulate Western public opinion and spends a fair amount of hard cash doing so.  A few US casualties from an unprovoked assault on Lithuania though could unwind that pretty darn quick. So from a strictly CM perspective I don't think I can see a scenario of Russia operating CAS forces in a tactical role.  The US has the ability to stage a lot of air assets with our friends in Europe faster than we could stage boots on the ground.

Given the scenario portrayed in the game back story it would be reasonable to assume a Russian air surge from the start. The USAF will be behind the curve at the start needing to deploy aircraft and the logistics to support them 

In this scenario the Russians may very well have used maneuvers as a cover for the attack into Ukraine and probably staged/provoked a border incident or two to justify the invasion. It will take some time for US/NATO forces to catch up/ Classic Boyd Cycle

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop

And as I already said the tactical weakness in air defenses will be a problem until the USAF win the air battle. In the meantime it might not take many aircraft to really wreck a Combat Team's day.