Armata soon to be in service.

[Battlefront.com]

I thought that was already discussed at length in this thread...did I mix that up with another thread?

 

It was and you aren't

 

Well,

the idea is very good, but I see a limitation there, and it's a time constraint. While we all see APS systems racting very quickly, a tank movement might not be so fast. I can see that the automatic movement of the tank in certain cases is feasible but in the time laps of an "APS action", no I don't really see a tank reacting fast enough to place the right gear, start giving gas, the sprocket weel moves, it takes too much time compared to the fraction of time an APS works.

Exactly. Anybody that doubts this is free to take a standard shift vehicle, put it into 1st gear, then try to reverse within 1-2 seconds. Then report back If the vehicle is still able to drive afterwards, then try doing the same thing in 3rd gear and see how that goes.

Likewise, drive down a road with a friend sitting in the passenger seat. Allow him to hold onto the steering wheel firmly and you take your hands off it. Next, at some random time punch your friend in the head really hard. If you survive, report back

(Battlefront.com legal disclaimer... DO NOT ACTUALLY TRY THIS AS IT IS BOTH STUPID AND VERY DANGEROUS. Just had to say that ).

If it was simply an obscurant though, then the speed and trajectory of the javelin missile would let it just follow through and hit the tank anyway. it would be going that fast that by the time the tracker and the obscurant have been fired, the angle would just carry the missile on to where the vehicle was anyway unless it moves itself out of the way. We are talking a very slim envelope for the missile to be spoofed by the aps and lock onto a different target instead otherwise it would hit the tank anyway.

This is true, but auto-corrected course/speed changes present a host of major problems. As I said in the posts you apparently didn't see, these unintended consequences may be preferable to certain death, but they are hardly a good solution. And for a vehicle that is stationary, it's not an option at all since the lag between detection and maneuver is too long to be practical.

The only thing I can conceive of is a well trained driver getting a warning that the APS has detected an incoming top attack and then the driver starts immediate evasive maneuvers while the APS handles popping smoke. This is how aircraft avoid incoming guided missiles so it's a long established concept. It's just never been applied to a vehicle before to this degree.

Steve

[L0ckAndL0ad]

Sure, in theory. There are probably a couple different approaches in R&D world wide that could theoretically lead to a hard kill against a top attack. Certainly many nations are working on this problem because it's obviously needed in the modern battlefield. Russia, of course, is one of the countries most interested in the technology since it's weaponry (including exports) are the most likely to be killed by such a weapon.

As I said, it is logical that Russia is attempting to have a hard kill APS against top attack. What isn't logical is to conclude that since they want it to happen that it will happen by 2019, it will work as advertised, and it can be affordably produced and maintained.

No, I meant specifically about the APS boxes in the rear of the turret, not the vehicle itself. Meaning, just because there's a metal box with some round shiny things in it doesn't mean much at this point. They could be mockups/placeholders for a system that hasn't yet been developed.

 

Not many things go as planned. Doesn't mean everyone should stop making plans.

 

If they want to start full-fledged field trials by 2016 and mass production by 2019 (with 2016-2019 period meant for addressing uncovered issues and teething problems, not just waiting for stuff to get R&D-ed and built), most of the systems should be more or less operational and factory-tested by now. Is that logical to assume? In my opinion, it is.

 

Oh, I'm sure that I did because that's generally what I do when someone is dancing around a particular point. But it's a waste of time to go back and check.

 

How would you know if I dodge questions then?

 

As I said, the "tactic" I used is standard debate procedure because finding a direct quote to represent a very large and multi facetted point of view is almost impossible to do. Which is why the technique of paraphrasing a position is done *all the time* in debates. You don't have to like it.

 

Paraphrasing can be done differently. I've explained how different, and why your method did not work.

You misunderstood. Let me try again.

Complaining and bad economic conditions do not necessarily change governments. If it did most governments would collapse every month or two (like Italy ). So obviously there needs to be a combination of things for a change in government to happen. However, when a government is toppled by the people (as opposed to an internal coup) it is always preceded by complaints and almost always by bad economic conditions. Which means for Putin to have any threat to his rule there must be complaints and bad economic conditions for that to happen. It's not even close to being enough to cause Putin more than a little trouble. For now at least.

If Putin continues to cut domestic spending and clamp down on personal freedoms, while at the same time not doing anything meaningful about Russia's longstanding problems of corruption and top-down economic environment, the "complaints" will get worse. The more Russians see the military spending robbing them of their pensions, education, food, etc. then the "complaints" will be more focused.

Ukraine's government collapsed in 2014 because of "complaining" and bad economic circumstances. It obviously took a long time and a whole new generation to make such a big change, but it did happen. In theory it could happen in Russia as well, which is why Putin is putting so much effort into preventing it. The war in Ukraine is mostly a product of this thinking. A stable and economically improving Russian speaking democracy on Russia's borders is the real threat to Putin's regime, not NATO.

How much "complaining" will it take to collapse Putin's regime? A ton. In fact, so much that I don't think it will happen. Not without a massive economic crisis, which is quite possibly on the way for the 2017-2020 timeframe. Also possible is an internal coup because some faction senses Putin's public support is weak enough that they can get away with it.

 

Sure, I agree. Except for Ukraine part.

 

Although I obviously do not live in Russia or Ukraine, I do understand the larger forces at work there to a fair degree. It allowed me to predict Ukraine's eventual change in government, as well as Russia's reaction to it. I also understood the seizure of Crimea and the faked referendum. Though for sure I've been surprised by many things, mostly because I gave Putin's pragmatism far more credit than he deserved.

 

Lots of things that you're basing your theories and predictions upon are wrong, in my opinion. Your lack of language and culture understanding alone makes you blind to a whole Mariana Trench of information, that is available to those that do have such understanding. Vague predictions by themself aren't that valuable. Saying that corrupt regimes will collapse eventually is like saying that the sky is blue.

 

You are changing the definition of "afford". This might be a language/cultural issue. Here is an official English definition of the word:

" to be able to do (something) without having problems or being seriously harmed"

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/afford

 

The former economics minister, and world wide examples, show that 4%+ GDP spending is not sustainable for a peacetime economy. The opposite of sustainable is unsustainable. This is the definition:

"Not able to be maintained at the current rate or level"

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/unsustainable

Which is why economists, like the former economics minister, is saying that 4%+ GDP defense spending is neither sustainable nor affordable.

 

If you put it this way, yeah. In Russian, afford means "being able to", "being capable to". Obviously, cutting other budgets, like social spendings means "harm". So in the end, "they are able to do it" is what I wanted to say.

 

Your position, basically, is that all the economists are wrong. Including the one responsible for Russia's major economic recovery. You are free to hold such an opinion if you wish, but I don't find it a very credible one. For a year or two, maybe. But we're talking about 10-15 years.

 

No, my positions is that they can do it. While harming other budgets. I think that theoretically they can even avoid harming non-military budgets if they'd substantially optimize military budgets. If they'll stop spending money on an actual war they're doing. You know, theoretically.

Edited May 24, 2015 by L0ckAndL0ad

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Re: automatic driver nonsense

 

The state of the art is not there yet.  Not to mention it opens the possibly amusing door to simply decoying highly automated tanks into precarious positions, or "suppression" via a host of fairly cheap decoys (given the sort of reaction/flight times there  has to be a very proactive "OH GOD MISSILE LAUNCH" determination pretty early in the process, simply something that behaved somewhat like a missile, especially a top attack one could cause the crew fits while the autodriver tried to save them through a series of decoy launches.  Hell, thinking about it it'd be a neat trick to put on an Abrams, get lased, pops off a reasonable Javelin early launch proxy, and the Armata crew is suddenly losing it's shot.  I have to wonder a what havoc you could do with a decoy volley against a company).

[Stagler]

It was mentioned in the Russian coverage of the vehicle it possessed some kind of automated driver system, I was speculating whether it was linked to the aps system. Would be interesting if it was, or if it was parked reverse on to a deep ditch at the time of firing ha. Even if it was something as simple as automatically putting into reverse at a slow pace it would serve its purpose that I speculated.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

 

 Even if it was something as simple as automatically putting into reverse at a slow pace it would serve its purpose that I speculated.

 

Nah. It'd have to be going pretty fast or else it's just going to move the point of impact a bit.  Through the driver's hatch vs through the commander's hatch.  The sort of "sagger drill" moves you make to dodge missiles are done at pretty high speed, and a movement started with a sabot in the air is going to do exactly nothing*

 

Which again brings to mind an entire company worth of Armatas going CRAZY because of rocket salvo.

 

 

*At extreme range a last minute move can cause a miss, but it's usually something like the vehicle started to change direction somewhere between lasing and firing, but the actual perception of the direction change occurred at the instant of firing.

 

Which is to say until the tank or tank crew is capable of precognition, dodging a sabot by turning is not a helpful tactic.  

[Vanir Ausf B]

http://gurkhan.blogspot.com/2015/05/blog-post_45.html

Intended for maneuver warfare against any opponent as part of the tank and mechanized infantry units as the main multi-purpose combat funds in terms of use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Hopefully the translation is off kilter, or the Russians are taking combined arms to a new level

[Nerdwing]

Maybe the auto drive is just to assist in parallel parking?  

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Think it's something designed to support either a short crew or possibly allow the Armata to be used as a UGV if I was going to conjecture.  

[Battlefront.com]

Think it's something designed to support either a short crew or possibly allow the Armata to be used as a UGV if I was going to conjecture.

As you say, I can't think of any practical APS related situation where this would be useful. I also can't think of many situations that it would be useful at all, except for one.

Let's say a tank company needs to get three new tanks to replace three damaged/destroyed tanks. Currently this would require three men to ferry the new tanks to the front. With remote driving it is theoretically possible that this could be reduced to 1 man in the first tank and having the two following tanks slaved to it. This could quickly become a mess for tight tactical situations, but for getting three tanks out of a depot and down a fairly debris free path near to the front? Similarly, a long road march could allow the drivers of the following vehicles to rest while one drives the column.

I can see that working OK, though I don't think that's good enough to justify the R&D and production of the system.

Steve

[HUSKER2142]

Possible image of a tower of the tank

 

https://youtu.be/40zz3I_Kuxc

Edited May 25, 2015 by HUSKER2142

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

 

I can see that working OK, though I don't think that's good enough to justify the R&D and production of the system.

 

Concur.  If there's a feature that seems to do the least utility with a very high price in time and money (and maintenance complexity), it's that auto driver option.  More interesting that if there's a practical functioning Russian auto-driver system, even if it is simply follow the leader, it'd be much better as a bolt-on, or even redone crew cab for logistical vehicles than a combat platform.  It'd do a lot to reduce the number of required logistics vehicle drivers, and allow "more" to move with "less."  The US has done a lot with this simply for this reason, that logistical tail is a giant manpower suck, and having a resupply operation that simply needs some security element and no other human element would be ideal.  

[Battlefront.com]

Not many things go as planned. Doesn't mean everyone should stop making plans.

Of course not. As a good friend of mine is fond of saying, "a plan is but a point to diverge from" However, basing conclusions on plans without considering the plan's potential faults isn't a good idea either. Knowing what I know about military development, there are three constants that all projects fall victim to:

1. It takes longer to make than expected

2. It costs more to make than expected

3. It does less than expected

Some projects fall into more of one category than another, some overcome a problem in one area by penalties to the others, some fail big time in all three (Sgt York). We do not know which of these three things A/K/B will have problems with the most, and what the outcome of each will be, but it is a very safe bet that it will run into problems. Most likely the problems will not affect A, K, and B equally or in the same ways.

As I have said from the beginning... the biggest challenge is the quantity of things that Russia has to do simultaneously and roughly according to plan for this to all work out.

 

If they want to start full-fledged field trials by 2016 and mass production by 2019 (with 2016-2019 period meant for addressing uncovered issues and teething problems, not just waiting for stuff to get R&D-ed and built), most of the systems should be more or less operational and factory-tested by now. Is that logical to assume? In my opinion, it is.

No, you are again making a "faith based" statement. It is logical to assume that the plan is to have everything ready to go for field testing by 2016, it is not logical to assume that everything went according to plan.

Look at the Stryker program. The plan was to have all variants operational at roughly the same time. The MGS ran into major issues and that caused the first Stryker Brigade deployed to Iraq with ATGM variants standing in place of the MGS. This was not the plan, so anybody saying "logically the MGS will be ready for the first deployment because they said it would be" would have been proven very wrong.

 

How would you know if I dodge questions then?

Because I know that you failed to answer some very direct yes/no questions. I just don't remember if they were relevant to the part you are complaining about.

 

Paraphrasing can be done differently. I've explained how different, and why your method did not work.

It worked fine for me

 

Sure, I agree. Except for Ukraine part.

I know you think that the only reason why Maidan happened is because Nulland was giving away cookies, but I think several hundred thousand people that participated would not agree. As you know, one of our testers was present for some of the the Maidan period and as far as I know he didn't get a single cookie

 

Lots of things that you're basing your theories and predictions upon are wrong, in my opinion. Your lack of language and culture understanding alone makes you blind to a whole Mariana Trench of information, that is available to those that do have such understanding. Vague predictions by themself aren't that valuable.

Vague predictions are of value if they are proven right when others, who have access to the whole Mariana Trench of information, weren't predicting it at all. But my predictions were not "vague". Besides correctly calling the invasion of Crimea, the faked uprisings in the south/east, and the insurgent war while so-called experts were baffled by what was going on, I've had other things correct that you did not. You might recall I even correctly pegged the day that Putin ordered the invasion when some people were still debating if there was an invasion at all. You argued against my conclusions of the date at the time, yet Putin himself (this year) admitted to the very same date. I made my argument without the "Mariana Trench", you made yours with it. Which should tell you something about the practical value of that "Mariana Trench".

Aside from that, my "vague" argument (which was actually very detailed) that Russia would fake the referendum was something you totally disagreed with. I explained how and why the results would be faked. You countered each point I made with what turned out to be wishful thinking. Again, I did this without the benefit of the "Maria Trench" that you had access to.

Though to be sure many of my predictions were not perfect in detail. For example, even though I expected the invasion years ago, I didn't think it would be so ridiculously lied about. I also thought Putin would follow the usual Russian "play book" by giving an artificial unrest in the Crimea time to develop prior to introducing "peace keepers". He did, however, do this in the east/south. Though in my defense, pretty much nobody has been able to predict his actions in detail even before this crisis. As far as I know you didn't think you were going to be invaded so soon, if at all, or that the Green Men would denny they were Russian military. And you have access to the "Mariana Trench".

So again I say that while I have my failings and my blind spots, on the big issues my track record is pretty good and not nearly as "vague" as you portray it.

 

Saying that corrupt regimes will collapse eventually is like saying that the sky is blue.

Sure, but I've done more than that even in this very thread. Although it would be foolish for me to claim how/when Putin's regime will fall, I've indicated the things to watch for. I've also identified things that Putin is doing to hasten an internal confrontation, the budget priorities being one of them. The rest is not really on topic.

 

If you put it this way, yeah. In Russian, afford means "being able to", "being capable to". Obviously, cutting other budgets, like social spendings means "harm". So in the end, "they are able to do it" is what I wanted to say.

Yeah, I got the sense we had another issue like we had with the Russian concept of "certain" vs. the English concept. The best way to think of it is many Americans were "able to" purchase homes they were not "capable of" paying for. In the end, they lost their homes because they "could not afford it". Remember, the signs of not being able to afford something may not be obvious until a later time, but in hindsight they were there from the start. Personally, I recognized the US was in a housing bubble since the late 1990s and I financially sheltered myself from it in early 2000s when I thought the market was ready for an adjustment. I was right about the overall circumstances, but not the details. Better to predict something too "vaguely" and act accordingly than react to something that's already happen. At least I thought so when my people lost 50% of their retirement savings in a week and I lost about 0.05%

 

No, my positions is that they can do it. While harming other budgets. I think that theoretically they can even avoid harming non-military budgets if they'd substantially optimize military budgets. If they'll stop spending money on an actual war they're doing. You know, theoretically.

Sure, theoretically. But I don't see that happening. Or at least not to the extent necessary to avoid significant problems. Similarly, in theory the US could proactively fix "entitlement spending" before encountering a major crisis, but given the nature of politics these days only a fool would bet that it's going to happen.

Steve

[L0ckAndL0ad]

Of course not. As a good friend of mine is fond of saying, "a plan is but a point to diverge from" However, basing conclusions on plans without considering the plan's potential faults isn't a good idea either. Knowing what I know about military development, there are three constants that all projects fall victim to:

1. It takes longer to make than expected

2. It costs more to make than expected

3. It does less than expected

Some projects fall into more of one category than another, some overcome a problem in one area by penalties to the others, some fail big time in all three (Sgt York). We do not know which of these three things A/K/B will have problems with the most, and what the outcome of each will be, but it is a very safe bet that it will run into problems. Most likely the problems will not affect A, K, and B equally or in the same ways.

As I have said from the beginning... the biggest challenge is the quantity of things that Russia has to do simultaneously and roughly according to plan for this to all work out.

 

I agree with highlighted part.

 

No, you are again making a "faith based" statement. It is logical to assume that the plan is to have everything ready to go for field testing by 2016, it is not logical to assume that everything went according to plan.

Look at the Stryker program. The plan was to have all variants operational at roughly the same time. The MGS ran into major issues and that caused the first Stryker Brigade deployed to Iraq with ATGM variants standing in place of the MGS. This was not the plan, so anybody saying "logically the MGS will be ready for the first deployment because they said it would be" would have been proven very wrong.

 

Oh, "faith" again, yeah, right. Did you see that I've said "most of the systems should be more or less operational"? I did not say "everything is fully operational by now". Do you see the difference? Strykers, in your example, were still shipped, for the most part. And even MGS was more or less operational, it just had problems.

 

So again. It is mid 2015 now. From what I've heard in one of the interviews, they might send existing vehicles to field trials this year already. So, I'll ask you again, can we assume that most of  the stuff is more or less operational?

Because I know that you failed to answer some very direct yes/no questions. I just don't remember if they were relevant to the part you are complaining about.

 

LOL, yeah, very convenient.

 

It worked fine for me

I know you think that the only reason why Maidan happened is because Nulland was giving away cookies, but I think several hundred thousand people that participated would not agree. As you know, one of our testers was present for some of the the Maidan period and as far as I know he didn't get a single cookie

 

Did it? You keep intentionally producing these silly statements on my behalf. And this one right here is aimed to spiral the discussion out of A/K/B topic. So you're intentionally derailing this thread. Is that how it suppose to work?

 

Vague predictions are of value if they are proven right when others, who have access to the whole Mariana Trench of information, weren't predicting it at all. But my predictions were not "vague". Besides correctly calling the invasion of Crimea, the faked uprisings in the south/east, and the insurgent war while so-called experts were baffled by what was going on, I've had other things correct that you did not. You might recall I even correctly pegged the day that Putin ordered the invasion when some people were still debating if there was an invasion at all. You argued against my conclusions of the date at the time, yet Putin himself (this year) admitted to the very same date. I made my argument without the "Mariana Trench", you made yours with it. Which should tell you something about the practical value of that "Mariana Trench".

Aside from that, my "vague" argument (which was actually very detailed) that Russia would fake the referendum was something you totally disagreed with. I explained how and why the results would be faked. You countered each point I made with what turned out to be wishful thinking. Again, I did this without the benefit of the "Maria Trench" that you had access to.

Though to be sure many of my predictions were not perfect in detail. For example, even though I expected the invasion years ago, I didn't think it would be so ridiculously lied about. I also thought Putin would follow the usual Russian "play book" by giving an artificial unrest in the Crimea time to develop prior to introducing "peace keepers". He did, however, do this in the east/south. Though in my defense, pretty much nobody has been able to predict his actions in detail even before this crisis. As far as I know you didn't think you were going to be invaded so soon, if at all, or that the Green Men would denny they were Russian military. And you have access to the "Mariana Trench".

So again I say that while I have my failings and my blind spots, on the big issues my track record is pretty good and not nearly as "vague" as you portray it.

 

So why is it exactly do you think that re-telling a bunch your predictions changes anything I've said? Looks more like a boasting attempt, trying to turn it into a pissing contest. If you don't have access to a whole bunch of information, your conclusions won't be as accurate as if you had that information, by default. And that accuracy gap depends on the size of that information. And the size of that information is freaking huge.

 

The less pieces of the puzzle you have on your hands, the less finished the picture would be when you've ran out of pieces. Yes, you'd be able to vaguely or even more or less accurately say what is portrayed on that picture, but if you'll try to fill the blank spots with your imagination you'll be prone to failure. And the person with more pieces of puzzle would be able to fill the blanks more accurately.

 

Sure, but I've done more than that even in this very thread. Although it would be foolish for me to claim how/when Putin's regime will fall, I've indicated the things to watch for. I've also identified things that Putin is doing to hasten an internal confrontation, the budget priorities being one of them. The rest is not really on topic.

 

And I've agreed with them.

 

Sure, theoretically. But I don't see that happening.

 

Neither do I.

Edited May 25, 2015 by L0ckAndL0ad

[BTR]

I think automatic driver is just junk translation. What T-14 is intended to have is a chassis OS that tells driver what's happening with "the wheels" as well as assist in translating steering input into actual steering. 

[L0ckAndL0ad]

I think automatic driver is just junk translation. What T-14 is intended to have is a chassis OS that tells driver what's happening with "the wheels" as well as assist in translating steering input into actual steering. 

 

The guy in the interview specifically said that there's no AI, and won't be for a while. The only thing he described is the ability to automatically back up 20-50 meters if crew gets KO. But the way he described it could be attributed to future, planned Armata "firmware" that isn't there yet.

[poesel]

With remote driving it is theoretically possible that this could be reduced to 1 man in the first tank and having the two following tanks slaved to it. This could quickly become a mess for tight tactical situations, but for getting three tanks out of a depot and down a fairly debris free path near to the front? Similarly, a long road march could allow the drivers of the following vehicles to rest while one drives the column.

 

Oh yes, that would be a cool feature for CM!

 

 

Oh, wait, you were talking about the Armata...

[Wicky]

If BFC can develop the AI 'auto-driver' algorithms and demonstrate it in game then there might be chance of a contract with Russia!   Imagine Armatas testing in Vermont driven by a virtual brain in a jar

 

Edited May 25, 2015 by Wicky

[bruhntasaur]

Possible image of a tower of the tank

 

https://youtu.be/40zz3I_Kuxc

Too bad no one seemed to notice your link!

Guys, I urge you to see the vid behind that link, the whole turret is presented in exquisite detail over there.

[akd]

Too bad no one seemed to notice your link!

Guys, I urge you to see the vid behind that link, the whole turret is presented in exquisite detail over there.

 

I already linked it a few pages back, and as far as I can tell it is just someone's idea of what might be under the shell, i.e. fan art (but perfectly plausible).

[Douglas Ruddd]

From Facebook - Interesting size comparison... Photos of both vehicles were taken from the same distance and under the same angle. Photos by Andrey Kryuchenko

 

[Battlefront.com]

I agree with highlighted part.

Well after 70+ pages it seems we agree more than we disagree.

 

 

Oh, "faith" again, yeah, right. Did you see that I've said "most of the systems should be more or less operational"? I did not say "everything is fully operational by now". Do you see the difference?

We were speaking *specifically* about the APS, not the vehicle or the program in general You made a logical statement (likely true) that the plan is to have it ready for testing 2016. You then based a conclusion upon that which is not supportable by the facts we have in front of us. Specifically, that the system is basically functional. It might be, but it could also be way behind schedule or, worse for Russia, afflicted with a fatal flaw such as the Sgt York that simply is not possible to work around at this time. We have absolutely no way of knowing at all, so I think it is inappropriate to presume everything is going according to plan.

 

Strykers, in your example, were still shipped, for the most part. And even MGS was more or less operational, it just had problems.

That's exactly my point. For all we know Armata could be 100% fully functional and capable right now, today, except for the APS. So just because the majority of the program is on track doesn't mean it is all on track.

 

So again. It is mid 2015 now. From what I've heard in one of the interviews, they might send existing vehicles to field trials this year already. So, I'll ask you again, can we assume that most of  the stuff is more or less operational?

And I'll answer the same way each and every single time you ask... NO, we can NOT assume that. Is it likely that it is complete enough for field trials? Yes, I think that it is likely. But in no way, shape, or form does this mean that all the different vehicles are equally ready for trials with each component on them also equally ready. I very much expect it's very mixed. Some vehicles in total are more ready than others, some systems on the vehicles are more ready than others. Some might be nearly ready for production today, already, others may be years away from functioning as intended. There could be some that never function as intended, others that may be cut for budget and/or manufacturing reasons.

 

LOL, yeah, very convenient.

I don't think it's important to spend more of my time on this issue, so if you like I'll just say "you're totally right" and be done with it.

 

 

Did it? You keep intentionally producing these silly statements on my behalf. And this one right here is aimed to spiral the discussion out of A/K/B topic. So you're intentionally derailing this thread. Is that how it suppose to work?

"It takes two to tango". You have your part to play in this continuing by "baiting" me to respond. But you're right, I should be resisting the temptation and so I shall now do that.

 

 

So why is it exactly do you think that re-telling a bunch your predictions changes anything I've said? Looks more like a boasting attempt, trying to turn it into a pissing contest. If you don't have access to a whole bunch of information, your conclusions won't be as accurate as if you had that information, by default. And that accuracy gap depends on the size of that information. And the size of that information is freaking huge.

Sigh, here we go again.

I make a statement, you disagree. We debate, you don't like where it's headed, then you resort to trying to (basically) say I'm not qualified to debate you because I am not Russian or Ukrainian and speak neither language. I then point out that I've somehow managed to more accurately predict certain critical aspects of this crisis better than you have. So either I'm a REALLY good guesser, or I am able to see the future, or apparently having direct access to the "Mariana Trench" of information isn't all that important.

Since you say you like yes/no questions, I am going to ask you a direct one right now. Do you think my correct assessments/predictions are the result of lucky guesses?

 

The less pieces of the puzzle you have on your hands, the less finished the picture would be when you've ran out of pieces. Yes, you'd be able to vaguely or even more or less accurately say what is portrayed on that picture, but if you'll try to fill the blank spots with your imagination you'll be prone to failure. And the person with more pieces of puzzle would be able to fill the blanks more accurately.

The person who has less puzzle pieces, but puts them together correctly, will do a lot better than a person with all the puzzle pieces who doesn't know how to put a puzzle together. Especially when there's someone else deliberately putting incorrect puzzle pieces into the box.

Now, as I've said Putin has acted in ways that are surprising to pretty much everybody no matter how many puzzle pieces are on hand. However, some people see the puzzle's picture as a real life picture of a white horse ridden by a jockey. Even if they are unsure about the details in the background and around the edges, they're doing a lot better than those who think the puzzle is real picture of a unicorn ridden by a bare chested Putin.

 

 

And I've agreed with them.

 

 

Neither do I.

As I already said, it seems we're in more agreement than disagreement. To summarize my point:

In total this is a very ambitious and expensive program even for countries with solid track records of successfully completing such programs. Russia does not have a great track record in this regard. Though on more narrowly focused developments it has proven itself capable of doing big things well. So it is not about Russia being incompetent and prone to failure more than it is being prone to failure because its taking on too much at once.

The development schedule relies heavily on being fully funded and nothing much going wrong. Given Russia's budget problems, it's past development history, and the general "laws of military development" it is highly unlikely everything will go according to plan. However, it is impossible to know which vehicles and which parts of those vehicles will run into the most trouble. It is also impossible to know if some of the vehicles or features will ever be produced due to one or more factors. However, we can speculate to some degree.

It's pretty clear that some aspects of these vehicles are "givens". Suspensions, track strength, power to weight ratios for the engine and transmission being good, etc. are all things that none of us expect to have significant issues. It's the new higher tech stuff that's more likely to experience issues. Since it's illogical to assume that the projects are all going to go off without any significant issues, then the logical place to look for potential problems is the high tech stuff.

The second part of the equation is production. We know when Russia expects to go into full production, but nobody knows if they will hit the date. It's not an unrealistic date so they could do it, though there is plenty of room for doubt that they will since it is such an ambitious and large program. Therefore, it is pretty safe to assume that some aspect of the program will not be ready for production in the 2019-2020 timeframe. It could be a specific variant, it could be a specific system, we don't know.

The third part of this is the affordability of producing the vehicles in quantities that make the whole program worth the R&D costs. Meaning, the cost of each vehicle is the production cost + a proportion of the R&D costs. For example, if $10B are spent in R&D and only 100 vehicles are produced, that means each vehicle cost $10M each + production cost + lifetime maintenance cost. If 1000 vehicles are made, then the numbers look much better per vehicle.

The last part is if the Russian state can afford to produce the vehicles in significant quantities and maintain them over time. Significant quantities is defined by what Russia's intended operational use is for them. If Russia wishes to replace 70% of its active force with these new vehicles, but can only afford 25%, then that's a problem. If it only wishes to replace 25% and does, then theoretically it's not a problem unless the goal itself is flawed (e.g. 25% isn't sufficient to support the strategic concept the vehicles were designed to fulfill).

The issue of whether or not Putin's regime will survive long enough to see the project through to significant fielding is directly related, but a totally separate issue. History and logic does tell us that adding to his regime's stability is an unlikely outcome. In fact, history and logic tend to support the notion that it may contribute, in some way, to regime instability. Again, no way to know if/when/how this might happen at this point, but in 2-3 years time we likely will have a pretty good sense of it.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

From Facebook - Interesting size comparison... Photos of both vehicles were taken from the same distance and under the same angle.

Wow, that really hammers home how much larger Armata is overall compared to the T-72/90. I would love to see an overhead side by side of Boomerang vs. BTR-80/82.

As for the driving thing... I think it's pretty safe to say that this is a "wish list" item and it likely won't be a part of the initial production. Even backing up automatically after crew incapacitation is fraught with many technical problems and a lot of potential for negative consequences, yet at the same time not achieving much.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

If BFC can develop the AI 'auto-driver' algorithms and demonstrate it in game then there might be chance of a contract with Russia!   Imagine Armatas testing in Vermont driven by a virtual brain in a jar

 

BTW, nice one

Steve

[L0ckAndL0ad]

We were speaking *specifically* about the APS, not the vehicle or the program in general You made a logical statement (likely true) that the plan is to have it ready for testing 2016. You then based a conclusion upon that which is not supportable by the facts we have in front of us. Specifically, that the system is basically functional. It might be, but it could also be way behind schedule or, worse for Russia, afflicted with a fatal flaw such as the Sgt York that simply is not possible to work around at this time. We have absolutely no way of knowing at all, so I think it is inappropriate to presume everything is going according to plan.

That's exactly my point. For all we know Armata could be 100% fully functional and capable right now, today, except for the APS. So just because the majority of the program is on track doesn't mean it is all on track.

 

Lets talk about APS specifically.

 

So, say, you have to construct new line of vehicles, that are going to be equipped with specific APS by default. And all of them now look like they're made specifically for those setups, especially T-14 and Kurganets. In order to plan how to incorporate such APS into their design, you need to work on APS first. Even the form and size (plus minus) of kill munitions should be decided beforehand. So you need to R&D and test that APS before you're done with vehicles' designs. Compare kill munitions and radars installment & setups, especially on Kurganets, to previous Arena setups. APS equipment form-factor affects vehicle design. When it came to Arena, they've had to change vehicle's design here and there to install the system. With newgen vehicles, they had to think about APS first, so that they won't have to change vehicle's design later.

 

Therefore, even if Afghanit hasn't been fully tested and made 100% complete when installed on the new vehicles, its base sub-systems and the munition should've undergone some preliminary trials on a test stand long, long time ago. Does that sound logical?

 

And I'll answer the same way each and every single time you ask... NO, we can NOT assume that. Is it likely that it is complete enough for field trials? Yes, I think that it is likely. But in no way, shape, or form does this mean that all the different vehicles are equally ready for trials with each component on them also equally ready. I very much expect it's very mixed. Some vehicles in total are more ready than others, some systems on the vehicles are more ready than others. Some might be nearly ready for production today, already, others may be years away from functioning as intended. There could be some that never function as intended, others that may be cut for budget and/or manufacturing reasons.

 

I agree. Move over, here's what I think. As much as I know how production works, factory will unlikely send equipment for field trials before making preliminary tests on their own. Some components might be missing or even disabled, but those that are there and not disabled should be at least somewhat operational. Otherwise there's no point in mounting and sending them to field trials that should start soon.

 

Sigh, here we go again.

I make a statement, you disagree. We debate, you don't like where it's headed, then you resort to trying to (basically) say I'm not qualified to debate you because I am not Russian or Ukrainian and speak neither language. I then point out that I've somehow managed to more accurately predict certain critical aspects of this crisis better than you have. So either I'm a REALLY good guesser, or I am able to see the future, or apparently having direct access to the "Mariana Trench" of information isn't all that important.

Since you say you like yes/no questions, I am going to ask you a direct one right now. Do you think my correct assessments/predictions are the result of lucky guesses?

 

The person who has less puzzle pieces, but puts them together correctly, will do a lot better than a person with all the puzzle pieces who doesn't know how to put a puzzle together. Especially when there's someone else deliberately putting incorrect puzzle pieces into the box.

Now, as I've said Putin has acted in ways that are surprising to pretty much everybody no matter how many puzzle pieces are on hand. However, some people see the puzzle's picture as a real life picture of a white horse ridden by a jockey. Even if they are unsure about the details in the background and around the edges, they're doing a lot better than those who think the puzzle is real picture of a unicorn ridden by a bare chested Putin.

 

No, they are not lucky guesses. However, I disagree with quite a few of your statements on what happened/is happening and why, because I think that you're not seeing the full picture, due to being limited in terms of information you've got. But I am not going to discuss these statements here, because this is A/K/B thread, and not a political one.

 

As I already said, it seems we're in more agreement than disagreement. To summarize my point:

In total this is a very ambitious and expensive program even for countries with solid track records of successfully completing such programs. Russia does not have a great track record in this regard. Though on more narrowly focused developments it has proven itself capable of doing big things well. So it is not about Russia being incompetent and prone to failure more than it is being prone to failure because its taking on too much at once.

The development schedule relies heavily on being fully funded and nothing much going wrong. Given Russia's budget problems, it's past development history, and the general "laws of military development" it is highly unlikely everything will go according to plan. However, it is impossible to know which vehicles and which parts of those vehicles will run into the most trouble. It is also impossible to know if some of the vehicles or features will ever be produced due to one or more factors. However, we can speculate to some degree.

It's pretty clear that some aspects of these vehicles are "givens". Suspensions, track strength, power to weight ratios for the engine and transmission being good, etc. are all things that none of us expect to have significant issues. It's the new higher tech stuff that's more likely to experience issues. Since it's illogical to assume that the projects are all going to go off without any significant issues, then the logical place to look for potential problems is the high tech stuff.

The second part of the equation is production. We know when Russia expects to go into full production, but nobody knows if they will hit the date. It's not an unrealistic date so they could do it, though there is plenty of room for doubt that they will since it is such an ambitious and large program. Therefore, it is pretty safe to assume that some aspect of the program will not be ready for production in the 2019-2020 timeframe. It could be a specific variant, it could be a specific system, we don't know.

The third part of this is the affordability of producing the vehicles in quantities that make the whole program worth the R&D costs. Meaning, the cost of each vehicle is the production cost + a proportion of the R&D costs. For example, if $10B are spent in R&D and only 100 vehicles are produced, that means each vehicle cost $10M each + production cost + lifetime maintenance cost. If 1000 vehicles are made, then the numbers look much better per vehicle.

The last part is if the Russian state can afford to produce the vehicles in significant quantities and maintain them over time. Significant quantities is defined by what Russia's intended operational use is for them. If Russia wishes to replace 70% of its active force with these new vehicles, but can only afford 25%, then that's a problem. If it only wishes to replace 25% and does, then theoretically it's not a problem unless the goal itself is flawed (e.g. 25% isn't sufficient to support the strategic concept the vehicles were designed to fulfill).

The issue of whether or not Putin's regime will survive long enough to see the project through to significant fielding is directly related, but a totally separate issue. History and logic does tell us that adding to his regime's stability is an unlikely outcome. In fact, history and logic tend to support the notion that it may contribute, in some way, to regime instability. Again, no way to know if/when/how this might happen at this point, but in 2-3 years time we likely will have a pretty good sense of it.

 

I more or less agree.

Edited May 26, 2015 by L0ckAndL0ad

[Battlefront.com]

Lets talk about APS specifically.

 

So, say, you have to construct new line of vehicles, that are going to be equipped with specific APS by default. And all of them now look like they're made specifically for those setups, especially T-14 and Kurganets. In order to plan how to incorporate such APS into their design, you need to work on APS first. Even the form and size (plus minus) of kill munitions should be decided beforehand. So you need to R&D and test that APS before you're done with vehicles' designs. Compare kill munitions and radars installment & setups, especially on Kurganets, to previous Arena setups. APS equipment form-factor affects vehicle design. When it came to Arena, they've had to change vehicle's design here and there to install the system. With newgen vehicles, they had to think about APS first, so that they won't have to change vehicle's design later.

 

Therefore, even if Afghanit hasn't been fully tested and made 100% complete when installed on the new vehicles, its base sub-systems and the munition should've undergone some preliminary trials on a test stand long, long time ago. Does that sound logical?

Logical? Only if you isolate this aspect from other aspects. If you ask if it is logical to fall 30cm to the ground safely, I agree if the person is in control of his actions, doesn't have any major health problems and that the ground itself isn't dangerous. If you then ask me if it is logical to fall 30cm safely if pushed hard and that there is broken glass on the ground then I say it is illogical that the end outcome will be safe.

Let's look at my favorite Sgt. York example. The entire purpose of the vehicle was to shoot down low flying aircraft. It had no other purpose. The obvious key piece of equipment was the tracking/guidance system. The US had, even at the time, a very long and successful track record for producing what later became known as "smart technology". Billions of Dollars were allocated to the project and plenty of time was allowed for.

Logically the US had everything it needed to build a successful weapons system. Logically they should not have built even one vehicle armed with a system that wasn't proven to work. Certainly, logically speaking, they would not have built 50 with a system that wasn't proven to work.

Yet it turned out that none of this happened logically.

Which is why I keep insisting that you are making a "leap of faith" that logic = fact. It does not. It very well could turn out that the APS is 100% ready for production right now, today. But it could also be like the Sgt. York in that it works as intended 95% of the time, but the 5% of the time it fails is fatal to the system's usefulness.

So how could the starting logic fail so miserably in this instance? Easily explained...

 

 

I agree. Move over, here's what I think. As much as I know how production works, factory will unlikely send equipment for field trials before making preliminary tests on their own. Some components might be missing or even disabled, but those that are there and not disabled should be at least somewhat operational. Otherwise there's no point in mounting and sending them to field trials that should start soon.

Logically this is true, but only in a very limited sense because it is isolated from other logic. Specifically, that logically politics and corruption are two major factors at play in any large government project, Russia or otherwise. Logically the more politics are a factor and the more inherently corrupt the system is, the more impact politics and corruption have on outcome. Remember the BMP-3 disaster? From a R&D/production standpoint it should never have happened the way it did because it was illogical on an engineering basis. Yet it did have major issues because politics and corruption were more powerful forces. If you include that in the equation, then logically the BMP-3 R&D led to a poor outcome.

A/K/B are politically charged already and Russian corruption is some of the worst in the world. Therefore, it is logical to assume that politics and corruption will have an impact on their development and production. It is also logical to assume that the impact will be decidedly negative in terms of outcome.

I absolutely can see vehicles being rushed into "testing" because to delay it until it is ready would mean losing face. Corruption kicks in to keep it quiet. This is logical.

BTW, I knew one of the lead programmers on the Sgt. York project. I even stayed at his house for two nights back in the early 1990s. I've got a little more insight into what went wrong than most people because I heard it first hand from one of the guys who was tasked with fixing the specific part that wasn't working right. And he said they just couldn't do it with the technology available to them at the time.

 

No, they are not lucky guesses.

Good, and thanks. Next question. Knowing that I don't have direct access to the "Mariana Trench" of Ukrainian and Russian language sources or first hand experience with either culture, how was I able to make those predictions? Your logic suggests this is not possible because direct access to the information is a prerequisite for understanding, which is what non-guess predictions are based on. Your logic also suggests that a person with full access to the information should make predictions that are proven incorrect, especially when someone without the information is proven correct.

Which leads to the follow up question... how is it possible that someone with less information can make better predictions than someone with more information if, as you say, the missing information is so critical to understanding? I know it's not a yes/no question, so I'll simplify:

If the "Mariana Trench" information is so critically important to understanding, should someone with full access to it be proven wrong by someone with limited access to it?

However, I disagree with quite a few of your statements on what happened/is happening and why, because I think that you're not seeing the full picture, due to being limited in terms of information you've got.

Keeping things generic, so as not to derail this thread, the answer is that although I do not see the full picture, more-or-less what I do see is sufficient for understanding what is going on. This is in large part due to me spending the last 25 years of studying this sort of thing. Autocratic regimes tend to follow similar patterns, therefore I can predict some basic trends of Putin's regime without reading a single thing in any language. It is like someone who studies the flight of birds knowing, inherently, that if you drop a bunch of turkeys out of a helicopter the results are not going to be pretty (that is an obscure US cultural reference that does date me!).

At the same time, I am not bombarded daily by a "Mariana Trench" of deliberate and coordinated disinformation coming from the same people who are directing the events in Ukraine. Which means I am not distracted nor confused by this information because, for the most part, I am not exposed to it. When I am exposed to it I find it pretty easy to identify as crap information. Much like the things I've said about Russia Today's self declared "experts" that are, in fact, totally unqualified people selected to peddle nonsense.

Would I prefer to speak Russian and Ukrainian to decide for myself? Yes, absolutely. But is it necessary for understanding the larger forces at work and roughly how they interact with each other? No, it absolutely is not.

 

 

I more or less agree.

Great. This is as I suspected and therefore 70+ pages later we're pretty much at the same point I put forward 70+ pages earlier. And that is we should be prepared for some portion of A/K/B to produce a suboptimal end result. Which part and to what extent? Insufficient data at this time, as Spock would say