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Armata soon to be in service.


Lee_Vincent

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Good lord this thread just goes too fast to keep up with.  So just some quick in passing points:

 

Re: Chechnya

 

I'm highly suspect of the "only" 30 tank losses.  I'll have to dig through my library and big box of books, but most sources seem to indicate somewhere in excess of three times that number.  I have not found a source outside of the posted documentation however that claims so low of an AFV loss rate which makes me suspect in to greater extent.  Also, given how hard the T-80 was thrown under the bus, 30 not really so bad losses strikes me as insufficient material to support that sort of behavior.  

 

Both Grozny and Lebanon are great examples of what happens when you suck at combined arms and armor-infantry operations though.  Grozny is pretty much the textbook of how to do urban operations wrong, while Lebanon is pretty much a rock solid example of making COIN too central of a doctrine, and mistaking "effects" for effects if you get my drift.

 

Re: BMP

 

I do have to say it's really refreshing to see someone take the damn things to task.  They're really not a survivable vehicle.  There were a few BMP-1 hulks floating around Iraq that you could see straight through thanks to .50 cal fire, even 40 MM grenades were apparently capable of first hit kills from anything but direct front.  Internal arrangement is terrible on BMP-1/BMP-2 too.  BMP-3 I've never seen inside of, but still boggles my mind why the Russians seem so adverse to troop ramps.  They're sort of the three man tank turret of the APC/IFV world, sure you can do it different, but why?

 

Again my opinions here are not exactly universal, but I think a better BMP, and an aggressive T-90 upgrade might have been more reasonable.  Or even some bizzaro unified T-90/72 upgrade package.  If they're really that similar, having one unified package would save a lot of heartache, and go a ways in making them closer to one fleet with modest differences (like say, M1A1 vs M1A2 differences).  Would also better preserve the mass that I think is dumb, but Russians seem to want to hold onto better.

 

Re: Spare turrets

 

Hahaha.  Lord no.  The amount of weight in a turret alone would require a tank transport sized vehicle just to tote in along.  In Abrams terms, there were kits and field repairs to make a badly damaged turret okay again (like using a plasma welder to melt a length of rebar to fill in a small penetration), but if they turret was badly damaged, the tank was going far to the rear to either be evaced out of theater for repairs, or if we're talking WW3, it might recieve a turret from storage in the US, but it is not something a BDE or even DIV would have just on hand.

 

It's a bit like having a spare frontal airframe for a fighter jet I imagine.

 

Re: Aircraft type redundancy on a tank!

 

That works for airplanes because of the level of maintenance they have even in fairly desolate locations.  Tanks do not have that intensity, or that frequency of "love."  Thinking back on it, I've seen enough faults that would leave an unmanned turret vehicle combat incapable, that on a manner turret was just a matter of some bypasses (electronic, mechanical, or procedural) or using more basic backups.  A lot of the ability of a tank to keep fighting on the battlefield is that it has a crew inside it, fighting and working to make it keep going.  I'm just uncertain anyone can really make a unmanned tank turret that would be reliable enough to use, while cheap enough to buy more than two or three, that would not require some weirdness like each tank having a crew chief, and a whole maintenance platoon for each tank company.  

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You did not answer the question.

 

Another one - what is the non oil and gas deficit, what is it's level in the current budget?

I did not write a masters thesis on the subject, but those numbers, from a well known and relatively apolitical international organization, provide a pretty good indication of how dependent the Russian economy is on oil revenue.  If you wish to provide your breakdown of the Russian budget I would be very interested to read it.  You clearly have excellent sources and speak the language.  I am very curious why you think those numbers don't give an accurate impression of the situation.  I really want to see the current Russian budget compared to what they said it would be 3 years ago.  % change in projected spending as a percentage of 2012 GDP in constant dollars comes to mind.  Do please do charts if you have the time.

Edited by dan/california
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Good lord this thread just goes too fast to keep up with.  So just some quick in passing points:

 

Re: Chechnya

 

I'm highly suspect of the "only" 30 tank losses.  I'll have to dig through my library and big box of books, but most sources seem to indicate somewhere in excess of three times that number.  I have not found a source outside of the posted documentation however that claims so low of an AFV loss rate which makes me suspect in to greater extent.  Also, given how hard the T-80 was thrown under the bus, 30 not really so bad losses strikes me as insufficient material to support that sort of behavior.  

 

Both Grozny and Lebanon are great examples of what happens when you suck at combined arms and armor-infantry operations though.  Grozny is pretty much the textbook of how to do urban operations wrong, while Lebanon is pretty much a rock solid example of making COIN too central of a doctrine, and mistaking "effects" for effects if you get my drift.

 

I'vealready corrected myself above: 30 tanks are not whole losses of Battle of Grozny, but tank losses with know crew fate. 

Overall tank losses from 31st Decemer 1994 up to 1st April 1995 consist of 49 vehicles.

 

Speaking of Lebanon I didn't quite get your point. What was wrong with IDF tactics?

 

And I still maintain my request for explanation. Unless you dismiss my data (which is quite acceptable but not very interesting possibility :) ) there should be some explanation. Russian tanks and Merkavas has shown equal crew fatality rate (~ 1 KIA per 1 lost vehicle) while Russian tanks are considered to be deadly for their crew and Israelli ones are one of the safest.

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Social and military spendings are the top priority. 2015 budged was corrected, and ГВП-2020 is now planned to be changed in 2018, as I've already said like twice in this thread by now. The word is that T-50 fighter initial orders are being decreased significantly, and, when it comes to Armata, they are considering to cut some fancy but not essential things for initial models, but with strong emphasis that they'll be kept for the mass production model, prices of which are significantly lower than of the initial ones. That's the word that can and should be discussed.

 

And, yes, budget problems are always a major concern in these sort of developments, but I don't see how discussing oil prices and Iran nuclear deals gets us anywhere but politics and eventually threadlocked. How many times should I ask to leave politics out of this thread?

Edited by L0ckAndL0ad
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If the Chechens had had the missiles that Hezbollah was using it would now be an independent country, or perhaps a sheet of  self heating glass.  Hezbollah was READY, and much better equipped than anyone thought.  If Trophy works as modeled though they will have less fun on the second go.

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The Super Hornet I fly is fly by wire with six levels of redundancy, so we trust the flight computers to work in the event of a fault/failure. But if they don't then the thing will fall out of the sky, as will most other modern aircraft. I'm not talking about that though.

I'm talking if a round hits and penetrates (or otherwise damages) to take out the hydraulic system to rotate the turret, you can still hand crank the damn thing. Maybe there's a redundant hydraulic system as well but those aren't nearly as compact as the control systems in a fly by wire plane so I couldn't imagine more than two. So if those systems go out in an unmanned turret, can you still crank it? If the primary optics go down, how will you use the good old fashion periscope along the barrel? (I forget what its called but I know the Abrams has one)

It seems like panzersauerkraut said, you have people inside working to keep the thing operational. It doesn't sound like you have that luxury in an unmanned an unaccessible turret. Maybe the Russians have designed around this in which case well done, or maybe they just expect to never get damaged enough to have to worry about those types of faults. The first is a challenge, and the second is ignorant.

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The most minimalistic requirement for redundancy would be an ability to drive back to safety. But combat redundancy? I know one technique - separate physical sensors for different optical channels. But if you're getting seriously wrecked, you'd need to back off anyway IMO.

 

There's Kongsberg MCT-30 Remote Turret that is currently being tested on Bradley. How redundant is it?

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If the Chechens had had the missiles that Hezbollah was using it would now be an independent country, or perhaps a sheet of  self heating glass.  Hezbollah was READY, and much better equipped than anyone thought.  If Trophy works as modeled though they will have less fun on the second go.

 

Chechens had that-day-modern equipment wich was on par with equipment of federal forces. They even had armoured formations (one of Russian tanks was lost to chechen-owned T-72A). And, in fact, they've won First Chechen war and were de facto independent until invasion into Dagestan in August 1999.

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I'm talking if a round hits and penetrates (or otherwise damages) to take out the hydraulic system to rotate the turret, you can still hand crank the damn thing. Maybe there's a redundant hydraulic system as well but those aren't nearly as compact as the control systems in a fly by wire plane so I couldn't imagine more than two. So if those systems go out in an unmanned turret, can you still crank it? If the primary optics go down, how will you use the good old fashion periscope along the barrel? (I forget what its called but I know the Abrams has one)

 

How many incoming rounds will come to your tank while you "hand cranking damn thing" into position to fire? :)

In CMBS we are arguing about seconds of reaction time which split life and death.

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And if you don't have the option to retreat from combat and your hydraulics go down, then what? Obviously in a split second situation you're doomed, but if you have the range or time to stay in the fight in a reduced role, you're still contributing. Hence why they're still in modern tanks. Optics can be more easily accommodated in the digital age, but can't see turret traverse mechanisms enjoying the same benefit. I'm just saying you have more options in a manned turret by design.

That said, we know nothing about the turret design so maybe they'be worked around this. As for the kongsberg turret, I know nothing about it. But an IFV isn't meant to take the same abuse that a MBT is and keep fighting, so redundancy is less of an issue. Although I'm willing to bet you can still crank a (manned) Bradley turret.

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The Soviets were the first to go with autoloaders on a massive scale. The West preferred not to because they found them to be slower and less reliable than a well trained crew member. This thinking has remained a part of Western tank development to this day. Autoloaders, though, are now used in various vehicles including the Stryker MGS. But not MBTs.

Now it seems Russia is going to go one further by having a fully automated turret. For sure there must be some drawbacks to this approach. What they are, or are not, can only be guessed at. However, anybody that guesses there will be no drawbacks is not very well informed about engineering tradeoffs. I suspect the same as others... less redundancy in adverse circumstances. How important might this be? I have no idea, but it certainly is a logical assumption to put on the table.

Regarding the notion of unused interior space somehow being a comfort to the crew when it is hit by a Javelin is a strange position to take. A direct hit by a Javelin in top attack mode has enough power to shred internal compartments. And since the Javelin is standard equipment for US forces it must be considered in any discussion of survivability.

Regarding discussing budgets and economic realities... totally on topic if it is kept focused on its impact on the ability to produce military equipment in quantity. The point about the Tiger II is totally relevant when discussing Armata. Even if Armata becomes the most capable tank on the battlefield it has to be produced in sufficient numbers to matter. A Ferrari is one of the fastest, best built cars in the world. But the pricetag is probably why we all don't own one :) As long as the goal of Ferrari is to make a superior car to sell to elite customers, then the price and small numbers produced isn't an issue. However, if Ferrari wanted to dominate the global car market, well it's got the wrong car for that.

The point is as I said earlier. For Russia to even achieve parity with the West's tanks it has to both produce at least an equivalent tank (something it has not yet achieved) and produce them in numbers sufficient to matter. Those are two factors that are within Russia's theoretical control, but industrial and economic limitations may (once again) preclude either happening.

Even if Russia does manage to produce a tank at least equal to a Western tank, and somehow manages to produce them in sufficient quantities to have an impact on the battlefield, how long will this take to do? At least a decade based on prior Soviet and Russian timetables. Anybody want to guess what the West will do in those 10 years if Russia suddenly comes up with an Abrams, Challenger 2, or Leo 2 killer? The only correct answer is make a better tank or a counter to Armata *and* field it faster than Armata can get into service. The West has the capability to do this.

The bottom line point is for Russia to have a winning tank design it most be a better vehicle that can also be built within the industrial and budgetary capabilities of Russia faster than the West can counter it. I'm not saying that it is impossible for Russia to finally have a winning combination of factors, just that it's reasonable to be skeptical that it has.

Steve

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I'vealready corrected myself above: 30 tanks are not whole losses of Battle of Grozny, but tank losses with know crew fate. 

Overall tank losses from 31st Decemer 1994 up to 1st April 1995 consist of 49 vehicles.

 

Still dramatic lowball.  Most sources point it to be somewhere in the 100-115 on the low side.

 

In terms of survival, don't you think it's likely that the tanks that did not suffer total crew losses are the ones we have the total report of the nature of the loss?  The Israeli Merkavas on a whole did not have any total crew losses I was aware of (I do have vague memories of one or two as a result of massive IEDs or something, but not sure), but the Russian accounts from Chechnya we had to read at armor school (again, translated from Russian sources) seemed to indicate whole tanks were being ghosted left and right, and the fate of the Malikop element read terribly Custerlike (and while only losing 20 tanks, that was from a total number of 26, so not exactly a ringing endorsement).

 

 

 

 

What was wrong with IDF tactics?

 

IDF tactics of the era placed a heavy emphasis on "convincing" the enemy he was defeated through information operations, aviation, and the like, while Israeli ground forces high intensity conflict skills atrophied.  Despite being shot at by ATGMs, many Israeli tank crews simply did not employ smoke grenades at all, and often coordination between armor and infantry simply did not exist.  Tanks also on several occasions attempted unsupported operations in complex terrain, which frankly is like, 1939 level mistakes.

 

We put a lot of study into the matter simply because of world military forces, the Israelis look terribly American at times, and have similar operational priorities and constraints (loss adverse populations, fighting chiefly insurgent forces, and a strong emphasis on technology).  It basically was a cautionary tale if we let ourselves get too tech-dependant, and lost sight of the reality that some guy with an M4 was going to have to close those last few meters to clear the enemy out of his hole.

 

 

 

There's Kongsberg MCT-30 Remote Turret that is currently being tested on Bradley. How redundant is it?

 

I think the best way to describe that is the bait is in the water, but the fish are not nibbling.  All future Bradley models, or similar ground vehicles have included manned turrets.  Its a lot like the Abrams diesel in that its something being offered but the Army response has been ambivalent.   

 

 

 

How many incoming rounds will come to your tank while you "hand cranking damn thing" into position to fire?  :)

 

The hand cranking is pretty fubar.  On the other hand it's better than nothing.  A more likely, and dangerous possibility is dealing with a bad round, or a breach malfunction.  During my winter gunnery last year, we had a problem with our breach, it was not fully returning to the open position after firing.  It was locking halfway open.  On our tank, it meant PFC my loader to actuate it the last few inches using the breach handle (it's not fixed, it's basically a bar with a bit that clips into a socket).  We were still able to shoot 965/1000 on our tables despite the breach hanging every few shots, my loader just cranked the handle and away we went.  It turned out to be just the perfect storm of needing some cleaning, lube, and a little bit of maintenance.

 

In an unmanned turret the vehicle would have simply been a firepower kill.  It also helped that when it came time to troubleshoot it, we could access the entire breach assembly ourselves without special help, troubleshoot it, and fix it with common hand tools.  I don't know how tightly packed an unmanned turret might be, but just the sheer number of things that can go slightly wrong, but can be fixed by a crewman in the turret that otherwise would stop the tank from being able to shoot makes me leery of taking the crew out of the turret.  Also with any system, adding complexity tends to impart its own flavor of friction.  While certain complexities seem to pay off rather well (see thermal optics, fire control computers), unmanned turrets are a lot of complexity being given to a military who's maintenance and supply has been spotty historically.  

 

Maybe it'll work great.  All the same as a recent tanker, even if there was a M1A3 with an unmanned turret that came with free beer and attractive women of ill repute, I'd still be disinclined to pick it given the choice of a similar tank with a manned turret.  

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Maybe it'll work great.  All the same as a recent tanker, even if there was a M1A3 with an unmanned turret that came with free beer and attractive women of ill repute, I'd still be disinclined to pick it given the choice of a similar tank with a manned turret.

So, not a fan of FCS? :) I mean aside from the $1.5b spent on a whole lot of nothing but boats and cars for defense contractors.

Steve

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Steve, new western tanks actually are moving towards autoloaders (since Leclerc) as this decreases internal volume and thus allows better protection in the same mass limit.

 

The idea behind Armata is the same (as behind T64) - to increase internal density and thus get a better tank within given mass limits and tech level. I would highly reccomend reading Morozov's diaries, where he describes the T74 (aka obj 450) desighn in comparison to T64A (you could make a T90AM-Armata paralel there).

Edited by ikalugin
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I did cover a topic of numbers quite a few pages back, but I'll reiterate my points:

 

1) Russia have publicly accepted the fact that it cannot compete with NATO on equal terms, thus only capable of making asymmetric answers;

2) Thus Russia does not necessarily need to produce sufficient amount of new vehicles ASAP to be able to fight NATO on the ground, especially knowing that the chances of such conflict are very slim;

3) Knowing how awful (in my understanding) previous vehicle designs were (both MBTs, IFVs and APCs), even if they can't come up with large numbers of such vehicles, but still be able to make vehicles that are "good", it can already be called a success.

 

Armata does not need to be "the most capable tank on the battlefield", in my opinion. It does not need to be "the best tank in the world". It just needs to be "good". Meaning, does it matter which of the following tanks is "best" - Abrams, Leopard 2, Challenger 2, Leclerc? Neither needs to be the best, they just need to be good.

 

The most important point in current developments is moving away from bad designs, and starting actually making good designed vehicles.

 

Now, lets go back to redundancy. While Kongsberg MCT-30 Remote Turret might not be selected for future Bradley upgrades, there's Puma IFV, which is often mentioned by the creators of Kurganets-25. I take it that Puma is very good at redundancy, isn't it?

Edited by L0ckAndL0ad
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Still dramatic lowball.  Most sources point it to be somewhere in the 100-115 on the low side.

 

In terms of survival, don't you think it's likely that the tanks that did not suffer total crew losses are the ones we have the total report of the nature of the loss?  The Israeli Merkavas on a whole did not have any total crew losses I was aware of (I do have vague memories of one or two as a result of massive IEDs or something, but not sure), but the Russian accounts from Chechnya we had to read at armor school (again, translated from Russian sources) seemed to indicate whole tanks were being ghosted left and right, and the fate of the Malikop element read terribly Custerlike (and while only losing 20 tanks, that was from a total number of 26, so not exactly a ringing endorsement).

 

Another source: http://topwar.ru/26962-tanki-v-chechenskoy-voyne.html 

49 tanks, 132 BMPs, 98 BTRs. Time frame is not clearly stated. Next paragraph says about "three months".

Source referred is "по сведениям Главного автобронетанкового управления МО РФ", i.e. "according to Main Automotive-Armoured Tank Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Agency_of_Automobiles_and_Tanks_of_the_Ministry_of_Defense_of_the_Soviet_Union)

 

If it is true, then 30 tanks with known crew fate seem to be quite representative selection and give opportunity to draw conclusions.

 

One interesting detail is mentioned in many documents: many tanks were lacking ERA. And even on those who had it ERA blocks were not loaded with explosive charges.

 

 

 

 

IDF tactics of the era placed a heavy emphasis on "convincing" the enemy he was defeated through information operations, aviation, and the like, while Israeli ground forces high intensity conflict skills atrophied.  Despite being shot at by ATGMs, many Israeli tank crews simply did not employ smoke grenades at all, and often coordination between armor and infantry simply did not exist.  Tanks also on several occasions attempted unsupported operations in complex terrain, which frankly is like, 1939 level mistakes.

 

We put a lot of study into the matter simply because of world military forces, the Israelis look terribly American at times, and have similar operational priorities and constraints (loss adverse populations, fighting chiefly insurgent forces, and a strong emphasis on technology).  It basically was a cautionary tale if we let ourselves get too tech-dependant, and lost sight of the reality that some guy with an M4 was going to have to close those last few meters to clear the enemy out of his hole.

 

 

 

Hmm. That's very interesting point indeed. Actually I was convinced that IDF is one of most hardened and professional armed forces in the world because they often engage insurgents.

Nevertheless, IDF in 2006 seems to be an order of magnitude better organized and equipped than Russian Army in 1994.

Edited by Alexey K
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