John Kettler Posted February 23, 2015 Share Posted February 23, 2015 (edited) Codename Duchess, I never said they were. I don't. My purpose was to point out that, in my estimation, the ability of the US/NATO to dominate the CMBS battlefield was overblown, thus positively impacting the Russian CAS situation. Unlike Iraq, there will be no free ride for US AD when it comes to Russia. What used to drive me nuts, though, in my Hughes days was that we routinely modeled a whole series of degrades (P this and that x P something else detrimental x something inefficiency creating x asleep at the switch = lousy PK) of Russian SAMs, yet didn't do so to our own. Consequently, this kept attrition down to (defense customer) acceptable levels, yet our AD shone, because otherwise NATO would've been overwhelmed. I'd point out, too, that Hughes had dogs in both ends of the hunt: AMRAAM for AD, Maverick and GBU-15 for CAS and strike and Roland mobile SAM for SHORAD. panzersaurkrautwerfer, Thank you for your self-censorship. The gibes do nothing, after all, to advance the core discussion. Hard kill of major C4 nodes is indeed hard to fix, particularly under rapidly unfolding combat conditions. I do find it interesting that the Air Force, at least, was so late to the party on the fiber optics, but wonder when the ground force intel and SpecOps types first noticed them? sburke, Well said. Regards, John Kettler Edited February 23, 2015 by John Kettler 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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