Why doesn't the US Air Support roster in CMBS have the A-10 on it?

[Sublime]

 

"So to that end the USAAF would be some number of A-10s, some of the more strike-centric F-16 airframes, and C-130s, while the USAF would be all the F-22, F-35, B-52, B-2, C-17 type platforms, with the nuclear and cyberwarfare missions they already run."

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I think theres a reason that for CAS by the time the USAAF and RAF got fairly good at real CAS in the battlefield theyd have observer tanks with pilots who had flown inderdiction and CAS missions.  I think also the marked improvement (true also helped by adding radio sets that could communicate with ground forces) probably has something to do with this.  Since WW2 it seems that though obviously the US military is excellent at welll.. most things it does, its trump card always seems to be massive firepower instead of bodies.  In WW2 this was arty and air.  Now arty of course is still essential but air support, especially US air support has grown by several generations in 60 years. for christs sake, we're fairly at the point we can choose to fight air force (with naval air if possible) wars.  Friendly fire systems need to be improved. I think the A10 could survive even in a 2017 enviroment. However, planes like puff th magic dragon are done for in real war.  Unless its counterinsurgency, they wont make it. Do not also forget the Marines control their own air and are famed for their excellent CAS. In fact ISTR reading an 80's Janes book on the Soviet military that stated the Soviets considered the whole USMC an 'elite unit'.  Not that I necessarily disagree.  FInally the US Army does have some limited fixed wing assets, I dont remembr what kind.  But also a fleet of death spewing high tech helicopters.

[Apocal]

Re: CAS

 

You're shooting footage from 1991.  The blue on blue we're discussing occurred in 2003 during the day.  Eyeball acquisition, and later model targeting pods were potentially a factor.  Additionally the fact the gun camera footage was "accidentally taped over" sort of builds on the ground to air distrust.

 

Yes, footage from 1991... taken from the exact same model of IR Maverick that was used, in the exact same manner. Eyeball acquisition wasn't used on account of there being too much dust and smoke raised up and the A-10s involved did not have targeting pods -- they used the Maverick's IR seeker in that role.

 

In terms of practices, the USMC is frankly superior given the cultural mindset, training, and emphasis on the CAS mission.  It's on call, it's synced well to the ground controller, and its focus is on "what can we provide for the ground force?" instead of "what can I do to get back to buying more F-22s?"  The wide gap between customer and service provider is strongly evident in the "B-1 as CAS" example simply because it's one of those "This is what the USAF actually thinks" moments.  The distinction between "I am dropping bombs on bad guys" and "I am dropping bad guys in support of good guys" is something the USAF doesn't appear to make the distinction on. 

 

There's absolutely nothing (nothing) lost by releasing the CAS mission to the Army vs the Air Force.  It's an artificial artifact of the USAF walking off with anything that has guns and wings in 1947, and we would all be better serviced by an Army that has its own CAS and a USAF that's left to focus on distinctly air based/strategic depth style missions.  

 

CAS procedures throughout the US military are joint and have been for the better part of at least twenty and probably closer to thirty years now. There was one exceptional period, encompassing all of one battle that lasted a grand total of ten days.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

That's why I said practices.  The procedures are by design, joint/multiserviceblahblah etc.  The implementation of those procedures, as in the actual practice is better when the USAF is not part of the process.  The USMC Fixed/Rotary Wing coordination is vastly superior to the USAF-Army interaction, and the Army rotary wing to Army ground forces coordination is very good.  In practice from my experience while US Army rotary wing was less capable in terms of damage than fixed wing CAS, it was many times more effective in terms of actually supporting ground forces.  And the USMC fixed/rotary wing interaction in practice is both much tighter (given the integration of the air wing into the ground forces planning cycle), and significantly less likely to bomb the hell out of the supported forces given the shared operating picture and CAS centric training focus.

 

USAF does CAS.  It does not do it as well as the Army could given the CCA/USMC template for air support.  And they'd never have to try to retire the A-10 ever again.  Seems win-win unless you're the USAF looking to use CAS funding to keep the B-1 in service.  

 

[Apocal]

That's why I said practices.  The procedures are by design, joint/multiserviceblahblah etc.  The implementation of those procedures, as in the actual practice is better when the USAF is not part of the process.

 

The USAF has been a part of the process in every war since ODS. JFACC (usually USAF, sometimes USN) determines in what manner aircraft are going to be used, sets the ground rules for their use and is the ultimate arbiter of who gets what specifically. The USMC gets their CAS requests filled the exact same way the Army does. And once it has the aircraft, the actual implementation is still the exact same, you have the exact same coordination and clearing agencies, the exact same system of checks and balances, the exact same process for calling down ordnance using (in most cases, exceptions exist) the exact same weapons, etc.

 

The Army gets better results from helos because they are helos, not because the guys flying them wear green to work instead of blue.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Just saying, I've called for both.  If I could call for CAS from someone who wasn't from the USAF, I would in a heartbeat. And the difference was not rotary wing vs fixed wing, it was spatial awareness on the battlefield, and a common operating picture.  As illustrated in the video I posted, the USAF apparently lacks both, and from my interactions I got the general impression they were going to bomb the first thing that looked about right before heading back to base.

 

You're speaking to the process of how a plane gets on station, not to the reality of on station to bomb release.  And I'm saying in that gap between "plane arrives" and "plane leaves" the USMC is superior in coordinating with the dudes on the ground, while I was never sure if the USAF guys were going to dive on me, the OPFOR, the other training area over, or go chase friendly helicopters because they might be OPFOR helicopters!

 

To that end I've worked with multiple branches and agencies in different training and other situations.  The USAF outside of their technical guys (like the computer dudes, support agencies) was hands down the least helpful, least useful, and often most dangerous to work with.  Which is not to say totally lacking positive experiences, but by god were the negative ones memorable (I can distinctly recall the look on one of our JTAC's face the third time the CAS made us cease fire during a live fire exercise by departing from the safe approach lanes, and misidentifying targets)

 

If I've just been followed by the two or three worst pilots in the USAF, my apologies.  But clearly something is missing from the USAF's CAS implementation, and I would rather be able to blame someone in house, than someone who tapes over their gun camera footage.  

[Michael Emrys]

FWIW, soldiers in Korea were always glad when their CAS showed up and it was the Marines. The feeling was that the Marines would bomb closer to them without actually hitting them than the USAF would. During WW II the Marines had worked out CAS to a fine art of working in close proximity to the guys on the ground because in the Pacific they were usually in very close contact with the enemy. In Europe there was also a lot of improvement in CAS during the last year of the war, but it seems that between the war and Korea that was no longer a high priority in the USAF whereas it remained so in the Marines.

 

From what I've read so far and heard from vets, the USAF CAS in Vietnam was greatly improved. But again, I think that that is not such a high priority among the top brass who gravitate towards the more glamorous jobs.

 

Michael

[Apocal]

Just saying, I've called for both.  If I could call for CAS from someone who wasn't from the USAF, I would in a heartbeat. And the difference was not rotary wing vs fixed wing, it was spatial awareness on the battlefield, and a common operating picture.

 

How did the Marine aircraft gain additional situational awareness over USAF or USN aircraft when showing up over the battlefield? How did you establish this so-called "common operating picture" with Marine aircraft as compared to USAF aircraft?

 

 

You're speaking to the process of how a plane gets on station, not to the reality of on station to bomb release.  And I'm saying in that gap between "plane arrives" and "plane leaves" the USMC is superior in coordinating with the dudes on the ground, while I was never sure if the USAF guys were going to dive on me, the OPFOR, the other training area over, or go chase friendly helicopters because they might be OPFOR helicopters!

 

I did in fact talk about the time between the aircraft arriving on-station and ordnance being delivered. In case you forgot:

 

And once it has the aircraft, the actual implementation is still the exact same, you have the exact same coordination and clearing agencies, the exact same system of checks and balances, the exact same process for calling down ordnance, using (in most cases, exceptions exist) the exact same weapons, etc.

 

 

As a practical matter, A-10s and USMC fixed-wing operate the exact same via the same inter-service ATO, joint CAS procedures, joint agencies, etc. There was one notable difference -- keyhole CAS -- but that was restricted to one battle, well after the end of conventional fighting in Iraq.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Practice and procedures.  The procedures itself may not vary, but I am telling you the USAF's service delivered practices are subpar compared to anything else that I've worked with that flew.  I note you're not debating the performance, but simply that the USMC/Army CCA has the same in the book process.  

 

So I'll use an analogy.

 

Many Mexican restaurants have hamburgers on the menu.  They exist to ensure that when that one dumb guy who doesn't like Mexican food gets dragged in, he'll buy something and eat it too.  The burger exists within the same health and cleanliness standards of other burgers.  It is comprised of the same sort of parts of every other hamburger on the planet.  

 

However the restaurant does not do hamburgers because it sees them as its primary mission, it does them to get money from the customers who don't want burritos and tacos.  And while the effort expended is within the confines of achieving a "hamburger" the hamburger is still inferior to the some place who's focus is on making hamburgers because that's the product they make to achieve mission.

 

The Air Force has a cultural disconnect between the forces on the ground and the CAS provider.  We had a swap sort of thing between one of my courses and the similar course with the USAF, they sent over six of their guys one day, we sent over six of ours a different day.  Even talking to the USAF guys, EVEN THE A-10 ONES it was like talking to martians.  We were at the point in our class in which we were planning company level operations, and they had zero idea about anything we were talking about outside of making sure we'd deconflcted the airspace for them.  

 

To the other end, the basic Marine/Army level stuff both of those sets of aviators have to complete at least gives them a remote idea of tactics of things on ground, and what the unit in contact is attempting to achieve.  Further from that, a familiarity of what the supported units look like and are supposed to be doing as part of their mission.  To that end working with the USMC and CCA was very much you told them what you wanted them to do, and they were able to put together a thing to support you, if that was suppression gun and rocket runs, if that was knocking out that OPFOR PC you could see inside the village, but couldn't get a TOW to, they could do that, and could contribute to the overall mission.

 

When working with the USAF, even with the good experiences we were just the "do not shoot this" blue boxes on the map. 

 

Which gets to the heart of the matter really, is that the USAF views CAS as "dropping bombs near friendly forces" which might just be better called as DCA (Danger Close Attack or something), while the USMC/USA CCA focus is much stronger on supporting the ground effort, which may be something more integrated, and less dump bombs RTB high fives rounds complete.

 

It was readily apparent in the A-10s we had along for the ride during one of our live fires.  We needed them to fly down a visually identifiable corridor (it wasn't magic lines on a map, as long as their movement was between two large, well marked with towers and flashy lights/IR panel ridgelines they were 100% safe a-okay) in order to deconflict indirect fires, and to avoid overflying the random small town that managed to endure being this close to a life fire facility.  In scenario terms the artillery was suppressing enemy on an objective our infantry was about to assault, the armor conducting the live fire was killing the near enemy mounted  forces, and the CAS was supposed to be hitting the enemy reserve force that was represented by a series of large panel type targets set up on the mountain that serves as backstop for the range.

 

The following key events occurred:

 

1. The A-10s showed up three hours late.  This was a training event that was coordinated about five months prior, and their base was at worse about 30-40 minutes away once wheels left pavement.

2. On three separate occasions violated the approach corridor (and not like, sort of wandered out of it, like spent more time cutting across it than actually flying along it).  While the artillery was not firing a mission at that point (thankfully) it was still in a "hot" status which resulted in having to do an emergency shut down/stop freeze THERE IS A PLANE IN THE PLACE WERE BIG BULLETS MAY GO drill.

3. While the A-10 was waved off once he'd violated the approach, it became apparent the reason he was adjusting his approach was to engage the tank-type targets at the base of the mountain (which were 100% not designed to be hit by training bombs, or bursts of GAU-8 from the sky), instead of the "okay to bomb" targets on the mountain.

 

He (well, possibly she, and certainly they as there were two of them) were dancing to their own set of music.  And that's been my experience with the USAF fixed wing support to be honest.  

 

The USMC guy wants to know what you're doing and I honestly believe if you didn't need air support, but were short a rifleman he'd land his platform, get out and join on your squad.  The only complaint I've ever managed to leverage with the USMC dudes is once their AH-1s were supposed to support us, but for some reason we couldn't get them on coms, so all their stuff was relayed from BDE, down to Squadron, then down to the troop they were orbiting.  Army CCA is great, they're too pragmatic to dismount from the chopper, but again in terms of customer support, outside of being a little antsy to kill something*, they were very helpful.

 

Which gets back to the bad analogy I used.  Much like the Mexican Restaurant hamburger, CAS isn't the primary mission or focus of the USAF.  It's something they do because they have to.  Moving CAS away from the USAF, and to the US Army, where it would be the primary focus and mission for fixed wing makes sense, because instead of getting the bare minimum to ensure the Army doesn't go to congress or something, the training, mission, and mentality would reflect the primacy of CAS for CAS platforms, while leaving the USAF to cross into the blue or whatever it does. 

 

 

*I liked Kiowas a lot because most of my rotary stuff interaction was when I was a scout, so we were both on the same sort of "find things" mindset.  Also they pretty much dive bomb stuff to do a gun run.  When an Apache enters the net it's pretty much "THIS IS BADASS CALL SIGN 62 I HAVE EIGHT HELLFIRES 38 70 MM ROCKETS AND 400 ROUNDS 30 MM READY TO KILL."  That's a bit of an exaggeration, not sure about the round count, but by god if there was something worth shooting somewhere in your AO, they knew about it, and really wanted to put holes in it.   

[Apocal]

Practice and procedures.  The procedures itself may not vary, but I am telling you the USAF's service delivered practices are subpar compared to anything else that I've worked with that flew.  I note you're not debating the performance, but simply that the USMC/Army CCA has the same in the book process. 

 

I'm not debating performance with you, because the actual performance of USAF air has been pretty much top-notch as far as I've seen while at war. So has Marine air. So has Navy Air. There are mix-ups and mishaps, but friendly-fire issues have generally been ground-side issues since (doctrinally) air only delivers ordnance when and where they say when it comes to CAS, such as the JTAC who gave a B-52 the wrong data for a JDAM strike and got himself (and his team) blown to ****. Or An Nasiriyah, when the A-10s asked (more than once) if the FAC was sure there were only hostile vehicles north of the bridge. Or the latest (I think) example:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/09/04/investigation-friendly-fire-airstrike-that-killed-u-s-special-forces-was-avoidable/

 

"Significantly, the soldiers who were later killed by the airstrike maneuvered up a hill after taking enemy fire without it being understood by the U.S. commander on the ground, an Army captain, or the joint terminal attack controller (JTAC), whose job is to communicate with fighter jets and bombers to ensure the right targets are hit. The miscommunication resulted in other U.S. troops believing that muzzle flashes they saw from the Americans’ weapons marked the location of insurgents, the investigation found.

 

There were numerous other problems. All key leaders in the mission, including the ground commander, JTAC and air crew, thought that sensors on the bomber would be able to see infrared strobe markers. The targeting pod on the B-1B bomber cannot do that, leading the air crew to incorrectly believe there were not troops on the ridgeline they bombed, investigators determined.

 

Troops on the ground directing the airstrike repeatedly told the B-1B crew that all friendly troops were 300 meters away from the ridgeline about to be targeted. The bombs were dropped shortly after 8:24 p.m., and almost immediately questions were raised about whether a fatal mistake had been made. Soldiers at the base of the ridgeline reported that the bombs had hit “our hill,” and survivors scrambled to the site to check.

 

“All personnel were conducting their assigned tasks,” another Special Forces member told investigators, according to a copy of his witness statement included in the report. “I assumed the enemy was maneuvering, but I told my guys to stay put and make sure they had their strobes on. My understanding was that all my guys had strobes on and that the aircraft had identified guys without strobes on. It was clear to me that it had been relayed to aircraft that that there were American elements with [infrared] strobes on.”

 

A member of the Air Force crew, interviewed June 27 at a U.S. Central Command facility at Udeid Air Base in Qatar, said it was hard to communicate with the troops on the ground with radios, but they were clear that the JTAC wanted two bombs dropped on the hill.

 

“The JTAC’s focus on IR strobes was moer [sic] than normal, but I’m not going to question the JTAC in a situation like this,” the B-1B crew member said. “I can hear the stress in his voice and see… the [targeting] pod, so given the comms condition I’m not going to waste precious time questioning the information the JTAC is passing.”

 

 

So I'll use an analogy.

 

Many Mexican restaurants have hamburgers on the menu.  They exist to ensure that when that one dumb guy who doesn't like Mexican food gets dragged in, he'll buy something and eat it too.  The burger exists within the same health and cleanliness standards of other burgers.  It is comprised of the same sort of parts of every other hamburger on the planet.  

 

However the restaurant does not do hamburgers because it sees them as its primary mission, it does them to get money from the customers who don't want burritos and tacos.  And while the effort expended is within the confines of achieving a "hamburger" the hamburger is still inferior to the some place who's focus is on making hamburgers because that's the product they make to achieve mission.

 

This analogy falls apart since, for the last decade or more, the USAF has done nothing but "make hamburgers." It is the only real show in town.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

It hardly falls apart simply because they're still making the same Mexican restaurant quality hamburgers.  You're losing sight of the fact that just because they have not performed the normal USAF preferred missions, does not mean their focus is not still the USAF centric missions.  The A-10 retirement fracas and the "everything for the F-35!" mentality both are signs not of an institution adapting to the current operating environment, but instead performing what it has to do to get back to the "real" missions of shocking and awing or something. 

 

I mean even now the A-10 is back in combat.  If it's capabilities are so easily replicated by something with the F-35's payload, then why hasn't it been supplanted by more F-16s and F-15Es or something?  If it's so old and useless, then it really shouldn't offer the capabilities it is offering over Syria-Iraq.  As much as I griped about them, at least they're operating in an envelope that can reasonably identify and engage targets on the ground beyond tossing a bomb from 30,000 AGL or whatever.

 

Closest I can come up with in terms of more CAS centric thinking in the last 10 years was the small diameter bombs or whatever but that's equally useful for coutnerpalace missions.  It's still not a close support mission, it's danger close strike which is something that isn't nearly as useful as actual support.  

Edited January 23, 2015 by panzersaurkrautwerfer

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

My point was so important that it needed to be repeated. 

 

Apologies on double post

Edited January 23, 2015 by panzersaurkrautwerfer

[ikalugin]

I think you were talking about this:

Edited January 23, 2015 by ikalugin

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Yep.  Exactly what I'm referring to.  While it's heavily touted as a CAS/COIN type weapon, it actually even further fills the USAF's palaceduster mission type.  Not that it isn't useful, but again it's not "The USAF takes CAS as a mission seriously" it's "the USAF is capable of performing CAS when it has to"

 

Which again as a CAS enduser is sort of an annoying propostion to fight through.  Further the B-1B story illustrates the reliance on dedicated specialist teams by the apparent CAS master B-1 platform, and other similar fast movers.  This is contrast to other ground-pounder acclimated assets that are much better able to operate with degraded marking assets, or other than specialist spotter teams.  

[Migo441]

Article touching on A-10 / F-35 issues here.

Not sure which is more shocking: shenanigans with F-35 testing metrics or the quote from the USAF two-star (directed at fellow officers), "...anyone who is passing information to Congress about A-10 capabilities is committing treason."

[Apocal]

It hardly falls apart simply because they're still making the same Mexican restaurant quality hamburgers.  You're losing sight of the fact that just because they have not performed the normal USAF preferred missions, does not mean their focus is not still the USAF centric missions.

 

In my experience and from actually looking through the Iraq and Afghanistan AARs, the USAF has done as well as any other service that uses fixed-wing aircraft when it comes to CAS. And their focus has been (or was, it might be shifting back now that the wars are over) on delivering CAS. They've stripped out a lot of their more advanced training to replace with relevant stuff for the conflicts; the same way the Marines replaced CAX with Mojave Viper and the Army shifted from a conventional war fighting at NTC to counter-insurgency exercises. They'll probably return to air superiority, strike, etc. just like the Army is going to shift from counter-insurgency back to conventional warfare.

 

I mean even now the A-10 is back in combat.  If it's capabilities are so easily replicated by something with the F-35's payload, then why hasn't it been supplanted by more F-16s and F-15Es or something?  If it's so old and useless, then it really shouldn't offer the capabilities it is offering over Syria-Iraq.  As much as I griped about them, at least they're operating in an envelope that can reasonably identify and engage targets on the ground beyond tossing a bomb from 30,000 AGL or whatever.

 

.I never said the A-10 was useless. It certainly is old though, not sure why you deny that.

 

 

Closest I can come up with in terms of more CAS centric thinking in the last 10 years was the small diameter bombs or whatever but that's equally useful for coutnerpalace missions.  It's still not a close support mission, it's danger close strike which is something that isn't nearly as useful as actual support.  

 

That weapon was developed and fielded because dudes on the ground wanted an option available between a Hellfire and a 500lbs. JDAM w/ delay fuze. It doesn't actually advance the USAF's core missions otherwise, since they've had perfectly functional glide bombs that are a) bigger and longer-ranged since well prior to the SDB being introduced.

 

 

 Further the B-1B story illustrates the reliance on dedicated specialist teams by the apparent CAS master B-1 platform, and other similar fast movers.  This is contrast to other ground-pounder acclimated assets that are much better able to operate with degraded marking assets, or other than specialist spotter teams.  

 

Huh?  Neither the A-10 nor any Marine fixed-wing air would have done any better in that situation. The troops quite literally called a strike on their own position during a TIC and got it, no questions asked, no answered questioned.

 

 

As an aside, it'd be nice if you would answer my questions about this enhanced situational awareness Marine aircraft receive from ground troops via radio.

Edited January 23, 2015 by Apocal

[JonS]

As an aside, it'd be nice if you would answer my questions about this enhanced situational awareness Marine aircraft receive from ground troops via radio.

 

he did:

 

 

 

To the other end, the basic Marine/Army level stuff both of those sets of aviators have to complete at least gives them a remote idea of tactics of things on ground, and what the unit in contact is attempting to achieve.  Further from that, a familiarity of what the supported units look like and are supposed to be doing as part of their mission.  To that end working with the USMC and CCA was very much you told them what you wanted them to do, and they were able to put together a thing to support you, if that was suppression gun and rocket runs, if that was knocking out that OPFOR PC you could see inside the village, but couldn't get a TOW to, they could do that, and could contribute to the overall mission.

 

When working with the USAF, even with the good experiences we were just the "do not shoot this" blue boxes on the map.

 

It's not that they get additional or different information in the mission, but they have a much sounder mental model of what the information means, and can create a better picture what it all looks like for the guys in the mud.

 

That said, I think it'd be absurd to give CAS to the Army. There wouldn't be enough mass or institutional knowledge - or interest - to sustain it. Sure, they'd probably do great keeping the A-10s in the air for another decade or so, and maybe the F-16s for a decade beyond that, but by then the planes would be falling out of the sky even without enemy GBAD, there'd be no plan or funding to replace the airframe, and the schools and squadrons would get wound up to buy a couple more tanks. And that's aside from the absurd inefficiencies you'd get from trying to maintain and sustain a fourth (or fifth?) national airforce.

Edited January 24, 2015 by JonS

[Apocal]

he did:

 

It's not that they get additional or different information in the mission, but they have a much sounder mental model of what the information means, and can create a better picture what it all looks like for the guys in the mud.

 

I've never had that experience with Marine air. They showed up overhead just as clueless as anyone and we fed them the same information; generally dumbed-down in the form of "yes it is clear, bomb this grid ref" rather than "we are doing this."

Edited January 24, 2015 by Apocal

[John Kettler]

panzersaurkrautwerfer,

 

Absolutely love your #108. With it, you may have entered the hallowed realms of Bullethead and his M4 nomenclature breakdown, though he was much more terse. Since I've so far not yet figured out how to get past the quote box, I'll end here.

 

Regards,

 

John kettler

 

Quote

You've discovered a little-known WW2 tank-grog thing here that BTS, in its search for the ultimate in realism, has modeled in CM. I've been waiting to see if anybody else noticed this.

Most people assume that the M in US vehicle designations means "Model". Thus, the Medium Tank M4 Sherman would be the "Model #4" Medium tank. This is incorrect. The M actually stands for "Mortality" and the number represents the life expectancy of the vehicle in minutes. Thus, Shermans were rated officially at 4 minutes of survival in a combat situation, which is reflected accurately in CM by having them die on turn 4.

After the Sherman had been in production for some time and combat experience had been gained, it was noticed in many cases, particularly for the earlier production runs of Shermans, that the official Mortality rating was a bit optimistic. Thus, the designation was changed to reflect the new data. This involved appending the letter A and another number to the M4 designation, the A standing for "Actually" and the new number being the revised Mortality rating. For example, the M4A2 had a combat-proven life expectancy of "Actually 2" minutes.

Later on, the designation system got even more accurate by appending a number in parentheses and the letter W. Despite the widely held conviction that the parenthetical number was the caliber of the gun, what these symbols really meant was that the tank had a 75% or 76% chance of going WHOOSH in a big fireball when penetrated. However, some models of Sherman were so inflammable that calcualtions showed they had a 105% chance of brewing up, so they just left it at that and didn't bother with the W, because they were going to WHOOSH regardless.

Towards the end of the war, some Shermans gained an E and another number in their designations. The E meant "Extra Cost" and the number was a designator for the manufacturer, to ensure that company got extra money for making the tank. CM accurately reflects this by making these types of Shermans cost more to buy in DYO.

Thus, the M4A3E8(76)W designation meant a tank with an official Mortality of 4 minutes, Actually 3 minutes, cost Extra, and had a 76% chance of going WHOOSH.

[John Kettler]

ikalugin,

 

Things were simpler when the Tunguska was called the 2S6 and Russian tracked guns and SAMs were on separate platforms, with the nomenclators instantly understood as to which was which. Now, though, I'm stuck. if I use its ASCC designator (Air Standards Coordinating Committee), colloquially called the NATO reporting system, I have to call this tracked AFV gun/missile hybrid an SA-19 GRISSON or, using Russian nomenclature, 9K22. Am not sure how the Ukrainians designate theirs. In any event, I think the SDB will make a dandy Tunguska target drone, being both slowish and highly predictable in its descent. Won't be pulling a 10G terminal avoidance maneuver. The SDB was developed to both reduce collateral damage and allow greater carriage of munitions by Stealth aircraft with highly limited internal weapon capacity. But my favorite ingenious piece of US aerial ordnance is this, the concrete bomb. Almost fell off my chair when I first read about this innovative weapon in Aviation Week long ago. This isn't from that magazine, but per this respected source, the concrete bomb debuted in 1999. 

 

Regards,

 

John Kettler

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

 

That weapon was developed and fielded because dudes on the ground wanted an option available between a Hellfire and a 500lbs. JDAM w/ delay fuze. It doesn't actually advance the USAF's core missions otherwise, since they've had perfectly functional glide bombs that are a) bigger and   longer-ranged since well prior to the SDB being introduced.

 

The principle limitations coming out of Kosovo 1999 in terms of bombing performance:

 

1. Finding the target (targeting pods helped with this later on)

 

2. Hitting targets in places were collateral damage is unacceptable.

 

The point isn't SDBs are magic CAS weapons, it's the practical reality that we may need to kill a 2S6 parked in a playground surrounded by orphans who've been doused in gasoline.  If anything they're an excellent strike weapon, and a good COIN type CAS weapon, but against a high intensity type threat, the larger bombs would be preferred in a troop in contact type situation.

 

Collateral damage is one of the many albratrosses the USAF has hung around its neck.  SBD is just a more effective version of when they were dropping concrete filled bombs during operation Northern Watch in lieu of real bombs.  

 

 

 

There were numerous other problems. All key leaders in the mission, including the ground commander, JTAC and air crew, thought that sensors on the bomber would be able to see infrared strobe markers. The targeting pod on the B-1B bomber cannot do that, leading the air crew to incorrectly believe there were not troops on the ridgeline they bombed, investigators determined.

 

This is a prime example of a thing a Marine or Army aviator would know.  You know why I know this?  It's part of the CCA capabilities briefing.  CCA can see it when whey're operating with NODs for the obvious reasons (another reason to like them actually, and I believe part of the A-10's night profile).  It's another sign of institutional failing to consider a B1 a great idea for a TIC type situation given it's sensor and pilot visibility issues.

 

Which gets to why the A-10 is beautiful and should be loved and worshiped.  It CAN see troops on the ground visually, and it is capable of performance envelopes that let it find dudes on the ground (or at least the IR strobes). 

 

 

 

“The JTAC’s focus on IR strobes was moer [sic] than normal, but I’m not going to question the JTAC in a situation like this,” the B-1B crew member said. “I can hear the stress in his voice and see… the [targeting] pod, so given the comms condition I’m not going to waste precious time questioning the information the JTAC is passing.”

 

This is another one of those USAF problems.  You know how many JTACs a battalion has?  One team. You know how many company teams a CAB generates?  Four.  You know the odds of the JTAC being with the Company that makes contact?

 

....

 

Yeah.  So given this reliance on a special JTAC team for normal operations, it is a weakness.  And looking at the fact that each one of those companies DOES have a JTAC qualified FSO team is good, but the USAF won't train with them because they're not "USAF JTACS"

 

I wish I was making this up.

 

The key to any sort of support relationship is training together as much as possible, and at that focusing hard on the redundancy or contingency type coordination pieces.  Any idiot (except for the dudes that hosed up at our live fire apparently) can do a CAS-like mission when the weather is clear, the JTAC is sitting on top of his HMMWV fully exposed with full up coms, but the USAF's insistence on this super optimal training situation goes beyond safety and well into  smug superiority territory about effectively not telling them what we need, they'll let us know what we need.  

 

Which well and deeply breeds the sort of mistrust the USAF has rather extensively sowed.

 

The Marines show up to our briefings too.  And usually on time.  They may be swarmy smug aviator types but you got the impression they at least knew what was going on.  And again that understanding of what's supposed to be happening on the ground payed dividends.  I watched brand new 2LTs call in USMC aviation with confidence once they got past "ZOMG THERE IS A THING IN THE SKY I HOPE CPT PANZERSAURKRAUTWERFER WONT THROAT PUNCH ME FOR BEING A D-BAG" factor.  

 

USAF?  Nadda.  They wanted the JTAC.  We could talk to them through the JTAC, but they needed the majick sweet sounds of that USAF E-6 on coms to tell him things I guess.

 

Re: CAS to the Army

 

Oh it'll never happen.  I'm also one of those heretics that believe the USMC and Army should merge, get the tactical type air, Navy and Air Force should be some manner of strategic branch, and then some sort of "purple" branch that covers the current multi-service logistics/cyberwarefare/SOF crap. It doesn't make sense that we separate the shooting people in the face service and replicate capabilities, while preventing services from doing certain missions they should be capable of as a matter of effectively job protection for the other branch.  USAF's actual level of focus aligns fairly well with USN's level of focus, and would allow for even more consolidation of mission and personnel.

 

Will positively never happen, as the sort of clout the Marines have will ensure we'll still have a USMC long after we've evolved into hyper intelligent peaceful beings of pure light, and the USAF has less clout but it historically has fought harder to keep armed aviation away from the Army than it did actual opponents.

 

Re; M4 Sherman

 

I am an avowed Sherman fan and shalt not listen to such heresy (I mean,  I have a realistic view of it's actual capabilities, but it's not the terrible tank it gets credit for being)

[Apocal]

The principle limitations coming out of Kosovo 1999 in terms of bombing performance:

 

1. Finding the target (targeting pods helped with this later on)

 

2. Hitting targets in places were collateral damage is unacceptable.

 

The point isn't SDBs are magic CAS weapons, it's the practical reality that we may need to kill a 2S6 parked in a playground surrounded by orphans who've been doused in gasoline.  If anything they're an excellent strike weapon, and a good COIN type CAS weapon, but against a high intensity type threat, the larger bombs would be preferred in a troop in contact type situation.

 

Targeting pods wouldn't have helped over Kosovo, the ones we use (even now) can't see though overcast. And I never said SDBs are magical. But the idea you want to use the larger bombs in a TIC is just nuts; nobody wants to call for a 500lbs. bomb when some bad guys initiate contact from <100m. That's insane.

 

 

This is a prime example of a thing a Marine or Army aviator would know.  You know why I know this?  It's part of the CCA capabilities briefing.  CCA can see it when whey're operating with NODs for the obvious reasons (another reason to like them actually, and I believe part of the A-10's night profile).  It's another sign of institutional failing to consider a B1 a great idea for a TIC type situation given it's sensor and pilot visibility issues.

 

Which gets to why the A-10 is beautiful and should be loved and worshiped.  It CAN see troops on the ground visually, and it is capable of performance envelopes that let it find dudes on the ground (or at least the IR strobes). 

 

The A-10 uses the exact same pod as the B-1B. And nobody considers the B-1B ideal for TIC situations (since those are frequently close enough to require gun runs rather than any kind of bomb and the B-1B has no gun), but their tasking in that situation was to cover an exfil and were the only aircraft in-theater with the loiter time to cover the whole event without breaking away to refuel.

 

This is another one of those USAF problems.  You know how many JTACs a battalion has?  One team. You know how many company teams a CAB generates?  Four.  You know the odds of the JTAC being with the Company that makes contact?

 

....

 

Yeah.  So given this reliance on a special JTAC team for normal operations, it is a weakness.  And looking at the fact that each one of those companies DOES have a JTAC qualified FSO team is good, but the USAF won't train with them because they're not "USAF JTACS"

 

I wish I was making this up.

 

The key to any sort of support relationship is training together as much as possible, and at that focusing hard on the redundancy or contingency type coordination pieces.  Any idiot (except for the dudes that hosed up at our live fire apparently) can do a CAS-like mission when the weather is clear, the JTAC is sitting on top of his HMMWV fully exposed with full up coms, but the USAF's insistence on this super optimal training situation goes beyond safety and well into  smug superiority territory about effectively not telling them what we need, they'll let us know what we need.  

 

Which well and deeply breeds the sort of mistrust the USAF has rather extensively sowed.

 

The Marines show up to our briefings too.  And usually on time.  They may be swarmy smug aviator types but you got the impression they at least knew what was going on.  And again that understanding of what's supposed to be happening on the ground payed dividends.  I watched brand new 2LTs call in USMC aviation with confidence once they got past "ZOMG THERE IS A THING IN THE SKY I HOPE CPT PANZERSAURKRAUTWERFER WONT THROAT PUNCH ME FOR BEING A D-BAG" factor.  

 

USAF?  Nadda.  They wanted the JTAC.  We could talk to them through the JTAC, but they needed the majick sweet sounds of that USAF E-6 on coms to tell him things I guess.

 

The USMC only has one FAC per battalion (on-paper) as well. And it has the hard-and-fast requirement for the guy talking to the aircraft to be a wing aviator himself. Although there is one difference here between common USMC and other service's practice; the Army lets non-aviators call for rotary-wing CAS, the USMC does not.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Finally these are getting shorter:

 

Re: Target pods

 

It wasn't overcast that resulted in poor bombing results.  It certainly did not help, don't get me wrong, but the greater problem was target discrimination.  Targeting pods were pairing the advances in optics with the realization future conflicts were going to be against enemies that weren't going to be as obvious as a Soviet tank battalion rolling through Fulda.

 

Re: TIC

 

TIC is "troops in contact" there's a variety of flavors of contact, but they all involve troops being somethinged by the enemy (electronic warfare effects, obstacles and CBRN without actual enemy troops in sight are all forms of contact for instance).  So to that end, in terms of CAS TIC could refer to the enemy 100 meters away....or it could refer to an Abrams company shooting up  stuff from 2.5 KM out.  

 

In terms of weapons, effects and the enemy, in a COIN environment in much more restrictive on what we can do to the environment, and the targets much lower value.  Flattening a building to kill a guy with an AK is usually not a prefered amount of force, and the expectations of real estate preservation are high enough that it can be mission detrimental.  

 

If that same building is full of Krasnovian regulars with AT weapons, MGs, and this is a full spectrum kinetic fight, if I turn the building into literal rubble, it's okay.  SDBs are a great choice for murdering mortar teams, knocking out individual vehicles, etc, etc.  If I'm facing down AFVs and larger infantry formations, I'd rather have the 500 LBS to make an impression.

 

Also generally missiles are preferred for TIC.  A hellfire knows where it's going and will try super hard to get to that point for instance.  Gun rounds are totally slaves to physics once they come out of the tube.  The CEP is a lot higher and 30 MM will ruin days. If we're talking about SDB or Hellfires, it's much better to know that the building on the left is about to disappear, everyone get down, than be somewhere in the area where it's going to start raining 30 MM.

 

Of course this assumes the USAF doesn't just pickle on you anyway.

 

Re; B-1

 

Look at the crew visibility from the cockpit of a B-1 vs an A-10.  The reason the B-1 blue on blued friendly troops was it was unable to spot the IR strobes on the soldiers on the ground.  Targeting pods use thermal optics, which cannot see the IR spectrum because it cannot see any sort of light, it just sees heat.  However as per other CAS platforms, pilots flying using NODs, with the ability to see outside the flight deck can see IR strobes which pretty much resolves the question about which set of guys are our guys.  Once the friendlies are identified (and IR strobes are the sort of thing you can make out for miles if you've got them on), then switching to thermal optics type systems for target acquisition is the preferred method.

 

Additionally by totally lacking the ability to acquire the friendlies with eyeballs using NODs  the B-1 cannot utilize the PEQ-15 type lasers the friendly forces would have had, that could have been used to direct the CAS onto target (this is something I've done with CCA "you see the building with the lasers pointed at it?" "Rog"  "in there" "Rog."  

 

It's a lot easier than having a ten minute conversation about it, and GPS grids are marginal when dealing with things that are pretty close to each other (while the coordinates for two buildings will be different, it's much easier to unambiguously point to the building, than try to establish if the building on the right or left is grid 12345678 or 12345669).

 

Which again points to the USAF using a suboptimal platform that cannot coordinate, and thus cannot fill the S part of CAS. 

 

 

 

The USMC only has one FAC per battalion (on-paper) as well. And it has the hard-and-fast requirement for the guy talking to the aircraft to be a wing aviator himself. Although there is one difference here between common USMC and other service's practice; the Army lets non-aviators call for rotary-wing CAS, the USMC does not.

I've been present for non-aviators calling for USMC fixed wing, and I've called for USMC rotary wing.  Unless I forgot I'm a pilot, I do not think you are correct.  Or at the least the USMC had a flexible enough operating procedure to recognize we did not have a FAC or JTAC type guy handy and the Army ground dude on the phone was as good as it was going to get.   USAF wouldn't even show up unless it was their JTAC.  

 

Here's the genius of calling for CCA. There's a set format to talking to the birds, but here's more or less how it worked out:

 

Helicopter enters your net after being pushed from higher

He gives you who he is (callsign, weapons on board)

You give your call sign(s), force disposition

He acknowledges all, locates you

You give him tactical task and purpose

He sends back coordination measures if required

Mission.

 

So it'd look something like:

 

CCA: "Any station this net, this is Bandit 64, we are two times AH-64 with eight hellfire, 38 rockets, and 200 rounds 30 mm each"

Ground: "This is Demon White 1, we are four times tanks located vicinity OBJ Jabberwocky, stationary, defending.  Enemy infantry to our front

CCA: "Roger White 1.  We see you.  See bad guys

Ground "Bandit 64 I need you to attack to destroy enemy infantry located 400 meters my front vicinity hill mass. Watch for my tracer."

CCA: "Roger, watching for tracer....I see it, see target.  Check fire on my mark, we'll be coming in with rockets"

Ground" Roger Bandit 64"

CCA" Check fire" <white ceases fire>

 

This is just my sort of off the top of my head, but CCA was just that easy.  And that's possible through the sort of working relationship that CCA has with Army units, and USMC units have through their attached aviation elements in the MEU type structure.  USAF you can't trust with that because:

 

a. They don't trust you because you're not a JTAC

b. They really do not have the SA required to understand what you're doing

c. If it's a B-1 it likely cannot see you.

[Michael Emrys]

Targeting pods use thermal optics, which cannot see the IR spectrum because it cannot see any sort of light, it just sees heat.

 

Okay, I am confused here. What do you mean by IR? I've been following this discussion with the assumption that IR usually stands for InfraRed. In which case IR is heat; it is a part of the electromagnetic spectrum emitted by warm objects, same as visible light, but of a slightly longer wavelength and not visible to humans. So, what do you mean by IR?

 

Michael

Edited January 25, 2015 by Michael Emrys

[Apocal]

Okay, I am confused here. What do you mean by IR? I've been following this discussion with the assumption that IR usually stands for InfraRed. In which case IR is heat; it is a part of the electromagnetic spectrum emitted by warm objects, same as visible light, but of a slightly longer wavelength and not visible to humans. So, what do you mean by IR?

 

Michael

 

They actually are IR, just a different band of the spectrum.

 

 

Finally these are getting shorter:

 

Re: Target pods

 

It wasn't overcast that resulted in poor bombing results.  It certainly did not help, don't get me wrong, but the greater problem was target discrimination.  Targeting pods were pairing the advances in optics with the realization future conflicts were going to be against enemies that weren't going to be as obvious as a Soviet tank battalion rolling through Fulda.

 

The new pods still cannot see through solid overcast such as that was found above Kosovo. The clouds were the issue with finding targets, since manned aircraft had the altitude and route limits in place and Predators kept getting shot down when they ducked underneath.

 

 

Re: TIC

 

TIC is "troops in contact" there's a variety of flavors of contact, but they all involve troops being somethinged by the enemy (electronic warfare effects, obstacles and CBRN without actual enemy troops in sight are all forms of contact for instance).  So to that end, in terms of CAS TIC could refer to the enemy 100 meters away....or it could refer to an Abrams company shooting up  stuff from 2.5 KM out.  

 

In terms of weapons, effects and the enemy, in a COIN environment in much more restrictive on what we can do to the environment, and the targets much lower value.  Flattening a building to kill a guy with an AK is usually not a prefered amount of force, and the expectations of real estate preservation are high enough that it can be mission detrimental.  

 

If that same building is full of Krasnovian regulars with AT weapons, MGs, and this is a full spectrum kinetic fight, if I turn the building into literal rubble, it's okay.  SDBs are a great choice for murdering mortar teams, knocking out individual vehicles, etc, etc.  If I'm facing down AFVs and larger infantry formations, I'd rather have the 500 LBS to make an impression.

 

Also generally missiles are preferred for TIC.  A hellfire knows where it's going and will try super hard to get to that point for instance.  Gun rounds are totally slaves to physics once they come out of the tube.  The CEP is a lot higher and 30 MM will ruin days. If we're talking about SDB or Hellfires, it's much better to know that the building on the left is about to disappear, everyone get down, than be somewhere in the area where it's going to start raining 30 MM.

 

Of course this assumes the USAF doesn't just pickle on you anyway.

 

Krasnovian?

 

Anyway, I agree missiles are preferred, but fact is gun runs get called down a helluva lot closer than Mavs and 500lbs. bombs dude.

 

As for the rest of the "B-1B sucks" **** you keep saying, they were covering an event for well over an hour; what other fixed wing does that? I mean, if you can get Reapers, cool, but you know damned well how hard it is to get those pulled and everything else gasses out after like 30-45 minutes.

 

Which again points to the USAF using a suboptimal platform that cannot coordinate, and thus cannot fill the S part of CAS. 

 

I've been present for non-aviators calling for USMC fixed wing, and I've called for USMC rotary wing.  Unless I forgot I'm a pilot, I do not think you are correct.  Or at the least the USMC had a flexible enough operating procedure to recognize we did not have a FAC or JTAC type guy handy and the Army ground dude on the phone was as good as it was going to get.   USAF wouldn't even show up unless it was their JTAC. 

 

Where was this?

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Re: IR

 

Your thermal optics (tank/bradley optics, PAS-13, etc) cannot see things like IR chemlights, strobes, or IR lasers.  The process for each of them is different, in effect NODs/IR emitters are working on the IR "light" emitted, while thermal is receiving the heat emitted by objects.  

 

I'm not an engineer, nor will pretend to be.  But that's the easiest break down.  If you see "night vision" style optics at work, you'll notice while the world is now green colored, the brighter spots are still light emitters because they're giving off IR emissions. IR chemlights/strobes/lasers are just IR light only emitters, which is super sweet when working in the dark against non-night vision equipped enemies as you can do all sorts of stuff with those, but everyone with night vision equipment (even older models that usually require an IR spotlight) will see you easily.

 

Thermal optics will not see any of this because they do not have anything to do with "light" but it's all in heat emitters (you see the light bulb because it's hot, and it's warning things around it, not because it's emitting light)..  

 

Which is where the blue on blue came in, the B-1 lacked the ability to see the IR light strobes on friendly forces, but it could see their heat sources, so it assumed it had acquired hostile targets, and bombed the hell out of them.  Many other more effective CAS platforms have the pilots flying with night vision goggles that can see the IR lights used by friendly troops, which is likely where the breakdown occurred, that the JTAC was unaware the B-1 lacked the ability to see IR lights, the B-1 crew did not understand they could not see IR strobes.

 

The TTP used to get around this at least to some extent usually is clipping two 9-volt batteries together (negative to positive, positive to negative, try it at home if you've got 9 volts you don't want to use!) and short circuiting them, as it'll glow very right in thermal optics for some hours.  Not as obvious as IR, but if the dudes you're looking at all have glowy rectangles on their heads, you might be about to bomb friendlies.  

 

 

 

The new pods still cannot see through solid overcast such as that was found above Kosovo. The clouds were the issue with finding targets, since manned aircraft had the altitude and route limits in place and Predators kept getting shot down when they ducked underneath.

 

Here's the greater problem of Kosovo:

 

 

 

 Newsweek, the second-largest news weekly magazine in the U.S, gained access to a suppressed US Air Force report that claimed the real numbers were "3 tanks, not 120; 18 armored personnel carriers, not 220; 20 artillery pieces, not 450".

 

Quote shamelessly lifted from Wikipedia, but I imagine you could find the original with digging I'm too lazy to do if you care to dispute it.

 

That many bad attacks, on decoys or dubious targets is a bigger problem than weather.  Nothing outside of radar really sees through clouds especially well.  And of those 117 not actually tanks, 202 not really APCs, and 430 not artillery pieces, something was seen, acquired and dropped on to no effect.  The actually engaged targets covered the range of constructed decoys (tarps, heat source, and telephone poles apparently made up most of those), sacrificial targets (T-34s or old towed artillery left in the open) and just a lot of "we don't know what we bombed."

 

This would be the driving focus behind targeting pods, being able to tell the difference between tarps and targets if you will.

 

 

Krasnovian?

 

Anyway, I agree missiles are preferred, but fact is gun runs get called down a helluva lot closer than Mavs and 500lbs. bombs dude.

 

Krasnovian is old timey fake country for NTC if I remember right.  I never dealt with them as that was before my time, and we've seen moved on to Atropians or something, but they're pretty popular stand ins for when you're describing generic conventional enemy forces.

 

Gun runs can be called in pretty close.  Not as close as smaller missiles, and they're not laser beams.  And again, TICs can cover anything from "they're next door!" to "I see enemy and he sees me across this 4 KM wide valley"  So if you needed a enemy tank platoon type target hit, or enemy troops in a fortified building, mavericks and JDAMs please.

 

 

 

As for the rest of the "B-1B sucks" **** you keep saying, they were covering an event for well over an hour; what other fixed wing does that? I mean, if you can get Reapers, cool, but you know damned well how hard it is to get those pulled and everything else gasses out after like 30-45 minutes.

Dunno, seems that day if it'd been something else or nothing at all some US Soldiers might be in better shape.  At the very least it's a system that was unable to discriminate between friendly and hostile forces as equipped, and it failed both the soldiers it was supporting, and the mission at hand.  That much is not in dispute.

 

High duration is an important attribute.  However continued reliance on the B-1 for "CAS" is a way to avoid having to address the problems with other platforms, or of CAS as a system in terms of providing continued support.

 

 

 

Where was this?

 

USMC rotary was:

 

Baghdad Iraq 2009 I think.  It was election day and the Army stuff was tasked out of our AO, so it was AH-1s or bust.  This one was routed through higher HQ because of commo issues but we lacked Marines or aviators at said HQ.

They also supported one of our Troops in some sort of cordon and search thing later, I think it was Feburary.  Either way we didn't have Marines or JTACs, coordination was done through Troop FSO and Platoon leader.

Fort Benning Training exercise.  This was the one with the 2LTs on hand.  They didn't seem too disturbed by the whole affair.

 

USMC Fixed wing 

 

NTC 2008

 

That's about it. However USAF wouldn't play with us at all out there though because we were JTACless.  We got a visit from the RAF then too, and they weren't too disturbed by our lack of Limey aviators.  The fact the USMC would talk to us during the training event though does indicate an ability or at least not refusal to work without Marines on the ground.