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Strategic and tactical realities in CMBS

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Steve, probably you just don't understand what the Ukrainian military are. They dont have any air force left, they dont have any weapons younger than 20 years in reasonable numbers. Actually they have like 3 Oplot tanks in the whole country, and they tank plant in Kharkov degradation to the monkey level.BTR-3E what they've build for sell were too bad what customers.

They have no reservs left, and they fighting will are too low due to corruption, idiotism of the government and bad organisation.

 

Also Steve, do you really believe to the words of that woman?

 

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They have no reservs left, and they fighting will are too low due to corruption, idiotism of the government and bad organisation.

 

You're still stuck in a Spring 2014 timeframe.

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You're still stuck in a Spring 2014 timeframe.

So explain me where they will get new APCs, tanks and choppers?

They started war on BTR-80s and BMP-2s, now they ride on BTR-70 and BMP-1. First they use Kharcov produced T-64 now they tryng to throw in the fight old T-72 from tank graveyards.

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Last I heard (some months ago) Ukraine was refurbishing and modernizing their extensive tank stockpile to the tune of 40 per week. T64BM Bulat is as good as any T72s the Russians may be fielding. One number I saw recently had 130 Oplots in Ukrainan hands, not 3. Over the winter they've been busily restocking their artillery ammo supply and the other former satellite states in the region are more than happy to help out. Ukrainian government has been exponentially more accurate and truthful than the Russians in reporting events. Heck, according to the Kremlin half their two thousand odd casualties have occurred while the soldier was 'on vacation'!

Edited by MikeyD

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T64BM Bulat is as good as any T72s the Russians may be fielding.

T-64BM is the old T-64BM from the soviet union.

It dont have IRs or modern ERA, its ammo for gun are realy old since they have no lekalo shells or svinec.

I dont realy belive what they are comparable to the T-72B2 or T-72B3. And for sure they are no much for gloriousT-80UM and T-90A.

One number I saw recently had 130 Oplots in Ukrainan hands, not 3.

Give me the link pls.

They plan to have 50 Oplot tanks at the end of 2020. But anyway they dont have money for that right now.

and the other former satellite states in the region are more than happy

 

Only Hungary give them some T-72 but they are basic model from early 70s. And they are at realy bad shape.

Heck, according to the Kremlin half their two thousand odd casualties have occurred while the soldier was 'on vacation'!

 

Kremlin didnt confurm any russian regular presents in UA. Volotiers - yes, but not the army.

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I for one am disgusted that a nation would make a questionable comment regadring the abilities of one of its tanks

 

The very nation infuriates me

 

To my very core, at that.

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I do find it amusing that showing a photo of an unattractive government spokesperson qualifies as evidence here.

 

Could we get back to the actual scenario stuff?  The RUSSIUA STRONK is a bit tiresome, if there's something relevant and incorrect about it, cool, but simple disbelief and "glorious T80!" is not worth the text.

 

So more or less, more H1ND,ikalugin and Steve.  

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Oh good old Panzer, you will never change.

At least stop this useless trolling attempts. The only one who throws crap here - is you.

Edited by Weer

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Steve, probably you just don't understand what the Ukrainian military are. They dont have any air force left, they dont have any weapons younger than 20 years in reasonable numbers. Actually they have like 3 Oplot tanks in the whole country, and they tank plant in Kharkov degradation to the monkey level.BTR-3E what they've build for sell were too bad what customers.

They have no reservs left, and they fighting will are too low due to corruption, idiotism of the government and bad organisation.

 

Just saying this was not the peak of deep military analysis.  The contributions of the folks I mentioned are things worth reading, and was why I originally regretting posting concerns this post was turning to crap.  BTR also chipped in stuff worth reading.  That much was interesting.

 

Steve clearly showed he has done more than a small mount of research.  Assuming he somehow just doesn't understand/know the status of the Ukrainian military is either arrogant or very misguided.  A BTR or ikalugin response I am sure, will be worth reading because that is likely something more researched than dismissing the Ukrainian government out of hand, considering especially it has made by even fairly jaded perspectives, at least some form of improved capabilities.  To that end I eagerly await the continued discussion here now that rusknight's "NATO is coming to eat our babies" stuff has been warned out, and honestly I'm just more interested in hearing the Russian perspective from someone who's done more than decide the Ukrainians are idiots.

 

If the military problem was as simple as one side was all idiots and using dinosaur equipment, we'd be talking about unified Ukraine or the new Russian supported state of East Ukraine/whatever it'd be called.  To that end a more rounded perspective is required.

 

 

 

How would they have replenished their stocks, etc since then though?

The Ukrainian military is sitting on a literal mountain of old hardware, and has more than a fair share of industry that focused on military type equipment.  To that end a lot of the more basic items like small arms, BTRs, etc are likely the sort of thing that can be pulled out of storage and refurbed.  In terms of more advanced stuff. the Ukrainians have plenty of bright people and the materials.  What they historically lacked was the funding, and the purpose.  Now that the Ukraine is under threat, there certainly is what funding is available, and there certainly is a purpose to the Ukrainian military these days.

 

Is it a mighty juggernaut?  Not likely.  But it has had the time and some breathing space to become a more capable force.  The question just remains how much more capable.  

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If The contributions of the folks I mentioned are things worth reading, and was why I originally regretting posting concerns this post was turning to crap.

Then if you dont want to speak with me, why do you speak with me?

The Ukrainian military is sitting on a literal mountain of old hardware

 

From the graveyards.

They need billions of USD to repair and modernise all that old stuff. 

fair share of industry that focused on military type equipment

 

It has degradated too long. Even longer then russian one in 90s.

of thing that can be pulled out of storage and refurbed

 

Refurbe this.

That is Kharcov tank plant's "storage".

there certainly is what funding is available

 

Have you seen theyr budget?

They still have less founding then most of african states.

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In case you do not know, I've been studying warfare for almost 30 years. I received my degree in history, with a specific focus on the Eastern Front and the war between the Third Reich and Soviet Union. I have a very good knowledge of the post war European/Soviet stand off. I am fairly familiar with the Soviet's actions in Afghanistan and the various Russian wars/incursions/interferences since the fall of the Soviet Union. I did the research and design for CM Shock Force. I have been following the war in Ukraine nearly every single day since the start of the war (I peg it to Feb 20th) using a wide range of sources.

In short... yes, I am quite serious.

 

As I said, this argument of yours is basically correct as of last Spring and earlier. But I am examining what the facts are on the ground today, not where they were a year a go. Hitler and many of his top generals were fools to base their perception of Soviet capabilities each year based on their performance the previous years. This did not serve them well. These same people dismissed the capabilities of the US Army of 1944 based on the disasters of 1942/43 in North Africa. Despite Germany losing that theater.

So when I make a statement about how I see forces fighting this Spring, I am basing it on current information and not old information.

Now, to get one thing out of the way. The Russian armed forces, as it exists on paper within the Russian Federation, has not fought any war in Ukraine except for the takeover of Crimea. This means it has not executed a full scale combined arms war against Ukrainian forces, which means we must be careful about examining Russia's total military capabilities based on what Russian forces *have* (and are) fighting in Ukraine.

In August there was a large scale Russian Army counter offensive in Ukraine. These units were made up of mostly "volunteers" from standing Russian military units. They were not, however, organically trained with each other and they lacked many supporting arms and equipment they were used to. This means the Russian forces fighting in Ukraine during the summer were not the same as the Russian military units that stayed on Russian soil. For supporting documentation of direct Russian involvement, see this thread starting here:

http://community.battlefront.com/topic/116661-ukraine-military-vs-russia/page-8#entry1557383

This means the full effect of a Russian combined arms offensive has not been seen so far in this war. Therefore, just because the August counter offensive did not go as well as Russia hoped it would (I am convinced of this, but it is just an opinion), that does not mean if Russia had committed full spectrum forces the result would have been equally mixed. I expect it would have been significantly better. But of course it could not do that since it had to pretend it wasn't in Ukraine at all. Well, except for "lost" soldiers and those "on vacation".

OK, so what about today?

The Russian military has absolutely no history of fighting a protracted war of maneuver AT ALL and no history of a war against a mechanized enemy that lasted more than a few days (Georgia). The performance of Russian logistics even in these limited circumstances was not good. Putin has done a lot to improve the logistics side of things, but only in anticipation of small scale, quick attack scenarios. Which is why the attack on Crimea was very well executed.

While it is true that Russia has gained a lot of experience with the logistics of supporting a prolonged unconventional war in Ukraine, it still hasn't had to deal with the difficulties of a large scale organized attack. Based on what I know about the current and past history of Russian and Soviet capabilities... I do not think they can sustain the size, scope, and duration necessary to knock Ukraine out before things go very badly for Russian forces. *AGAIN* I am saying this about this coming Spring, not last Spring. Last Spring Russia would have done quite well.

The other thing that Russia lacks is a history of effectively fighting a war of maneuver in the face of a determined, mechanized enemy capable of causing major casualties in a very short space of time. Here is where traditionally Russia has done OK with. In the past there were always more warm bodies in boots to send forward to replace those who had fallen before them. I personally do not believe that modern Russia will find such behavior acceptable, so I don't think this is a viable strategy any more.

On the topic of fighting forces. Putin has invested heavily in updating and modernizing the Russian armed forces, and it shows very positively in places. And that is the KEY to this whole discussion. The improvements have been far from even.

After Chechnya and Georgia, Putin recognized that a largely conscript army using outdated equipment and doctrine simply wasn't going to work any more. He saw what the West was doing and realized that he had to do something similar, but on a scale that Russia could afford. Wisely, Putin assessed what Russia was most likely need a military for... interfering in the affairs of a neighboring state and internal security. He probably knows, deep down, that there's 0.00% chance of winning a conventional war against NATO in a military sense.

The correct response to the anticipated needs of the Russian state caused Russia to focus on making a fairly small amount of its armed forces VERY GOOD and not spend much resources on the rest. If you think you only need 50k forces to solve your problems, why would you spend the resources to improve the rest of the military? It would be a very big waste of money and time. Georgia was the first test case and it showed that this reshaping of the Russian military was working, though still in need of improvements.

The problem for Putin is that his modernization program was based on a Georgian scenario, not a Ukraine 2015 scenario. The two are ENTIRELY different.

Currently the Ukrainian ATO has forces equal to Russia's top line force. While I agree that Russia's force is overall superior, attacking Ukraine on its home territory is going to require a lot better force ratios than 1:1 even with quality taken into consideration. Especially since by the time Spring arrives the ATO will likely have 2:1 numerical superiority in the immediate theater. This is not a recipe for Russian success, but a near certain script for Russian disaster.

As I said in my previous post, any buildup of Russian forces along the Ukrainian border would be easily detected and documented as it was during the Spring of 2014 and into the Summer. This would allow Ukraine sufficient time to redeploy forces as needed. To cover the approaches to Kiev better it would mean reducing the ATO force size, but with its superiority in numbers that wouldn't be a problem for a defensive battle.

The rest of what I said before remains my prediction.

Steve

I don't really bother whether your a war expert and historian or not. I just read what you write here and you write quite weird things for anybody who made even a minimal research about Ukraine and Russian armies capabilities and their current state.

1. What about diference in millitary budgets I mentioned before (3rd place in the word for Russia, 37th place in the world for Ukraine)? Do you really belive that country which spends so little on it's army can stand against the country which spends so much?

2. What about the fact that Ukraine has almost no aviation? 160 outdated planes vs 2000 russian ones where at least a half is modern or upgraded? 160 planes is a very optimistic evaluation in fact becouse they lost some of these planes already. Besides nobody knows how many of these planes can fly becouse they obviously didn't spent enough money on them before. They also doen't have enough pilots since they didn't invest enough money in training either. So Russia will simply rule the sky in any massive conflict with Urkaine.

3. Ukrainian army might got some experience durring the last year but they also lost most of their best armoured vehicles and helicopters in these fights.They lost so many  t64 already that they now even take old t72a from reserve on pair with btr70 and other equipment 30 years old. Do you belive that equipment which spent 30 years somewhere in reserve is a good equipment in fact?

To summarize if a massive Russian invasion happen and NATO won't help Ukraine, instead of some world war II tactics with close range fights Russia would rather play with Ukraine in a modern war using  great advantage in aviation, artillery and recon - the same way US did in Irac against outdated Saddam forces. What for to have a tank vs tank battle if enemy tanks can be eliminated with modern ground assault planes or AT helos which Russia has for example or with ground ATGMs Kornet - 5500m range, 1300mm penetration...

Edited by Rusknight

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Moving back to the original topic of the thread I wanted to ask how the game will present strategical and tactical realities to the player, in particular to the scenario designer.

 

In the WW2 games you could research operations and single battles, you knew who fought where, etc.

 

Will the game present actual campaigns (Or battles) that are not stock scenarios in any kind of way? We know how the war played out overall (I really like the idea of win branches in the manual), but information seems pretty scarce to me. Any information on that?

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They said somewhere they didn't want too get too specific, they want to encourage maximum community creativity.  If the level of interest being shown holds up it appears there are going to be multiple story lines backing up a lot of campaigns and scenarios.   

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Will the game present actual campaigns (Or battles) that are not stock scenarios in any kind of way? We know how the war played out overall (I really like the idea of win branches in the manual), but information seems pretty scarce to me. Any information on that?

 

It is intentionally vague, both to accommodate future modules and to provide a somewhat blank slate for user content creation.

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Some comments on the topic. I apologise in advance if you find this post too long or somewhat incoherent.

 

First of all, the Russian Armed Forces evolution post 1991 - the short version. Originally Russian Armed Forces derived from the Soviet ones and thus were an army made for a single and one purpose only - to fight a major mechanised war. Thus it was mostly made out of reserve (cadre) units, often with the older equipment internal MDs would be left with. However young Russian Federation could not sustain such Armed Forces, not if there were intended to have a given active component (as a lot of manpower was used up in cadre units), thus leading to transformation of the VDV (and a number of other units) into those elite forces mentioned by the Battlefront (the Admin), they have performed with mixed result in the first Chechen war, in the 080808 war. 

The 080808 war lead to the expansion of this "elite constant combat readiness" tag onto the entire armed forces, first creating the constant combat readiness brigades, beginning their rearmament (Armed Forces did not receive much of anything prior to the GPV2015). The second part of the reform (happening under Shoigu) is the expansion of those brigades into divisions, large combined arms exercises, ie Russian armed forces never lost the sight of fighting a major (regional on one front) war and have began preparations for such war before the Ukrainian events. A historic parallel could be made with WW2 events - the mechanised corps were disbanded and tnk brigades were formed, which later were expanded into new mechanised and tank corps. Thus talking about Russian Armed Forces being limited to the elite parts (which ones by the way?) is simply wrong in the post 2008 world.

A summary of those events (pre Shoigu) written by CAST could be found here:

http://www.cast.ru/files/book/NewArmy_sm.pdf

 

Secondly, the build up on Ukrainian border was of demonstrative nature (show of force, a deterrent and so on), and thus is not indicative of Russian capabilities to deploy such forces in that area. If anything Russian exercises some distance from the border have shown the capability to rapidly redeploy forces into the theatre, into the range of possible single leap manuever operations. Ie - Russian forces do not have to sit across the border looking scary to attack, they would attack from some space within the border, from movement, as to preclude identification of the time place and intent of the attack. That much should be obvious to any student of the Soviet (and by the extension Russian) way of war. 

 

Thirdly - onto the balance of forces. The factors one must account here are:

- shortage of weapons for the Ukrainian loyalists (they loose more than they could repair/produce, and currently the level of equipment is dropping severely as they pull out equipment that was not properly stored, much less properly maintained or upgraded in the past 25 years and send those items to the front line without critical parts such as radios. Unless there is some sort of massive aid to the Ukrainian loyalists they would be fighting on the unreliable (due to bad maintenance) 1970s vintage systems.

- shortage of trained men on both sides, the mobilisation you have mentioned would be that of essentially untrained (Ukrainian Armed Forces were hit even worse than Russian ones) or elderly (whose who may remember their Soviet training) men. While the separatist draw on the pool of Russian volunteers (who may have decent training due to the post 2008 reforms) and maintaining their size means that most of their troops would have combat experience and training, the expansion of Ukrainian Armed Forces (the kind you envisioned, though from past experience I would say that the new waves of mobilisation would fail) would lead to the majority of their troops not having anything but most basic training (the kind provided semi accidentally by more experienced troops) and poor morale (being forcefully conscripted out of their houses).

- complete dissaray of Ukrainian loyalists chain of command, not only are the troops micro managed from up high (the local sectoral and brigade command has very little authority about what they are doing), there are signs of double command (from the High Command and from the Command of Land Forces - later normally being purely admin body before the ambitions of the man in question took over his sense of duty) and this is Armed Forces alone (ie in reality there are more than 2 authorities in command of forces there, leading to poor operational security and troop command).

While one could argue that this overview is based on past experience (as recent as this winter actually) I see there no movement for improvement in the direction of improvement. Thus while the local commanders (battalion and below) may have some form of tactical experience, they have no successful experience of fighting war on the level above battalion, nor do they have experience of fighting a mobile war (those who did were cauldron'ed this summer).

- the efforts of Russia to equip and organise the separatist forces into new units (numbered brigades) and into operational level formations (corps) with unity of command on operational axis. While those efforts did meet some friction (recent events with "Batman" illustrate this) overall they are progressing forward, essentially bringing those forces under (essentially) direct Moscow command, eliminating any opposition or competition inside the separatists ranks. Those forces would provide a substantial threat to the Counter Terrorism Operation Forces as they would have superior or equal equipment, high morale (all are volunteers, vs forcibly conscripted Ukrainian troops).

- ultimate superiority of Russian Federation in air (both fixed and rotary wing), in operational level firepower (recon-strike complexes, recon-fire complexes, TBMs, anti missile SAMs such as the S300V4 and so on), in C3 (deployment of new command systems post 2008 through out the armed forces, especially above company), intelligence (ability to gain intel from Ukrainian HQs due to poor operational security, ability to locate and intercept unprotected communication means Ukrainian CTO Forces use and so on) and logistics (logistics are centralised, have organic rail road element and so on) and others.

 

As to the operations themselves. The likely scenario on strategic level in my opinion would:

- consists of advance on 4 separate operational axis.

- be conducted by 4 Combined Arms Armies (that is around 16 combat brigades and divisions), all of VDV troops, most of Specnas forces, the Black Sea Fleet.

- be supported by the (nearly) entire Russian Airforce and intelligence gathering means.

- be conducted from the posture of an exercise (in south-west of Russia and an exercise with Belarus), of the "readiness check" type, thus precluding any obvious and lengthy build up (which for some reason people assume for both Russian and Soviet scenarios).

- be supported by extensive under ground movement in the potentially pro Russian areas, as well as special forces operation.

- be supported with the newly formed separatist forces under direct Russian command, within the Russian chain of command (under the Army level HQ, hence corps designation vs army designation).

 

Such preparation would take less time than any extensive aid efforts by the US, weapons would take time to be delivered and more so to be trained with and pushed into service, there is a degree of political drag in decision making, this means that by the time the aid from US reaches the front lines the mobile phase of operation would be over.

 

The effect of the war on public - according to my media acquaintance Russia has essentially mobilised population at the moment, thus allowing for standard 30 percent losses of the first echelon troops (and more). 

 

as a p.s. - I think I really should work out this scenario with OOBs and what not. currently I got in contact with hind, I think we may work this one out at some point.

 

p.p.s. "cargo 200" and the owner of that resource - the lady shown above are completely mad and murder poor book characters, football team members and those from the university acceptance lists. I would strongly advise against using their materials as source information.

Edited by ikalugin

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Sorry, to move off-topic, but this question has been bugging me for a while.

 

How does the Russian armed forces compare to China's?

At the moment PRC is de facto Russian ally. Why ask?

Edited by ikalugin

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p.p.s. "cargo 200" and the owner of that resource - the lady shown above are completely mad and murder poor book characters, football team members and those from the university acceptance lists. I would strongly advise against using their materials as source information.

 

sort of off topic, but what about the list of 227 Russian casualties reported by "Open Russia". Is that one more reliable?

 

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/report-names-birthplaces-of-russian-soldiers-killed-in-ukraine/514112.html

 

btw, are you the same Ikalugin from the Subsim forums?

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sort of off topic, but what about the list of 227 Russian casualties reported by "Open Russia". Is that one more reliable?

 

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/report-names-birthplaces-of-russian-soldiers-killed-in-ukraine/514112.html

 

btw, are you the same Ikalugin from the Subsim forums?

Yes, I am the same Ikalugin.

 

The report is based on a list of names released in November by the Gruz-200 group

 

Unless we see actual verification of this data (ie actual interviews with relatives and so on) I would assume that that report is based entirely on Gruz-200 information, which is not credible. Over all, sadly, a number of Russian organisations (such as Gruz-200 and others) use the alleged losses by Russian Armed Forces and Ukrainian CTO Forces to gather funds for their reburial and (if they were allegedly captured) their return to their homes.

 

As far as I am aware there were no credible reports on success of such operations nor any materials on how those funds were spent, thus leading to a suspicion that those organisations are simple war profiteers. As this topic is entirely political in nature and possibly inflammatory I would try to avoid discussing it any further.

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Yes, I am the same Ikalugin.

 

 

welcome to the forum.

 

Personally I am happy we have a lot of Russian posters showing up. It is always nice to have a different point of view, even though we will not always agree. :)

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sort of off topic, but what about the list of 227 Russian casualties reported by "Open Russia". Is that one more reliable?

 

If they took that number from the "cargo 200" website - nope.

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welcome to the forum.

 

Personally I am happy we have a lot of Russian posters showing up. It is always nice to have a different point of view, even though we will not always agree. :)

Thanks.

 

On the topic:

I agree with BTR that the correct historic comparison would be with the Desert storm of 1991, only without the lengthy build up of Allied forces in theatre. The other historic parallel of current Ukrainian situation would be with the 2nd Chechen war - tactical groups ripped from their parent units, disunity of command, poor logistics and so on. The difference is that unlike in 2nd Chechen war they are (now) going to fight a ready, mechanised force (the numbered brigades of separatists and maybe Russian Armed Forces), rather than (well armed and trained but still infantry heavy) militias.

Edited by ikalugin

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1. What about diference in millitary budgets I mentioned before (3rd place in the word for Russia, 37th place in the world for Ukraine)? Do you really belive that country which spends so little on it's army can stand against the country which spends so much?

 

Has it happened historically?

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