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H1nd

Strategic and tactical realities in CMBS

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I just googled the famous "Pripet Marshes" and it appears to mostly involve Belarus right above the northwest Ukrainian border. The Pripet river actually flows into Ukraine. It appears that northwest Ukraine might not be ideal tank country, or at the very least the Russian approaches to Ukraine in the area would be limited. Ukraine is a big country, almost as big as France. Its got several major rivers (and BFC has supplied you with several types of loooong bridges to cross them).  :D

 

Ahem, it is larger than France ;)

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I am just following the main road from Kiev to Moscow on Google Earth.  I just don't see a single spot that would truly inconvenience a major armored push in good, dry weather.  The forest blocks are all very broken up and there no large watercourses on the route.  All the rivers, and there are several in Northwestern Ukraine seem to parallel this road.  I am referring to M3/E391 to the E101, to the E95.  I just don't see any thing on the entire route to hang a defensive position on that couldn't be flanked in a hour.  The Russians are not known for making it complicated when simple and very hard will suffice.

 

 I am just trying to start thinking through some scenarios for the Initial Ukrainian defense that end better for the Ukrainians than their suicidal defense of hill 347.

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Dnieper is a major, major operational obstacle. Whatever bridges aren't blown ahead of advancing Russian forces would be major high value targets for Ukrainian and NATO (if they are included for consideration) air and artillery. Let's keep in mind that smart munitions are becoming fairly common for artillery pieces, so even if one removes air power from the equation there's still a major threat of interdiction.

The Soviet and Russian amphibious capability includes tracked vehicles designed for deep water amphibious operations. But this capability is really only sufficient for keeping a bridgehead supplied under more-or-less good conditions. It is not a capability that could sustain a large force or a deep penetration.

Pontoon bridges, a few seized bridges, and amphibious together could sustain a decent force if that force were concentrated and not expected to do heavy fighting in an expansion role. Especially considering how vulnerable bridges are.

As the Germans learned during the failed 1944 Ardennes offensive, one can not mount a major offensive operation with significant supply constraints. It's a matter of math of taking the road capacity and determining how much stuff can be moved vs. the need. Then you factor in breakdowns, interdiction, road damage, lost minor bridges, etc. have to be factored in since life is rarely perfect. Oh, and weather! These are the things the Germans didn't take into account and it doomed the offensive before it even started.

Steve

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So you are really more or less agreeing that it would be hard to stop the Russians from reaching the Dneiper without significant NATO support, but it gets vastly trickier from there.  Which side of Kiev has the main center of government?

Edited by dan/california

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Interesting reading but one thing that sticks out for my mind is the presence of a local sepratist force/militia in the first place. Strategically this would have to provide some level of support for Russian intervention in the first place - not to mention an excuse to enter the conflict. Was the modelling of Ukraine sepratist militia / irregular units ever considered as part of Black Sea or deemed out of scope? Just thinking of the scenario possibilities for Red Force if you could model militia fighting alongside Russian Army 'advisers.'

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So you are really more or less agreeing that it would be hard to stop the Russians from reaching the Dneiper without significant NATO support, but it gets vastly trickier from there.  Which side of Kiev has the main center of government?

The original storyline pitted the Russian forces against the same surprised, corrupt, and conflicted Ukrainian forces that existed prior to Yanucovych fleeing and had to deal with the "uprising". If Russia had launched a broad offensive into eastern Ukraine in March or April would have been a relatively "easy" fight to the Dnieper.

That was then, this is now (as the saying goes!). Since this time Ukraine has had time to fix many of their fundamental problems and now have considerable combat experience, greater numbers, increased military spending, and months of preparation under their belt. If Russia launches a general offensive into eastern Ukraine this Spring or Summer I highly doubt Russia would get anywhere close to the Dnieper.

Russia no longer has the strategic element of surprise it had back in Winter/Spring 2014. An offensive in 2015 would be characterized by a major Russian buildup along the border where they intended to invade or act as a decoy. NATO would be very quick to pass along intel about this buildup. Unlike last Spring, Ukraine would be quick to respond to with their own deployments to counter the Russian intentions. This would most assuredly doom a Russian invasion to major casualties and slow progress. Or at the very least, unequal progress.

Where Russia experienced breakthroughs it would quickly find itself challenged to the point of stalling, or at least hesitating. This would allow rear echelon and frontline shifts to help counter the actions. Which, in turn, would limit Russia's overall ability to advance beyond a fairly narrow strip of territory.

Realistically Ukraine of 2014 would have needed NATO support prior to have achieved similar results. Now? No. By Spring the Ukrainian forces intend on having roughly 100,000 forces available for the war they are already fighting. That's about double what it is now. The increase is coming from new forces being built right now and rotating in the older units forward. These forces are very motivated to fight. Russia, on the other hand, has only about 50,000 non-conscript dependent forces to put into the battle. That means it would have to use *all* of its best forces *and* at least 150,000 largely conscript forces to have enough to do the initial attack, plus about another 100,000 in reasonably close proximity to move in for replacement and occupation duties. Russia, simply put, doesn't have these sorts of forces ready to fight such a campaign. They certainly lack the logistics infrastructure and experience to support such an effort in the face of significant opposition.

In short... if Russia attacked today's Ukraine it would be almost a national suicide mission. They would be effectively defeated on the battlefield, which would likely mean Putin would be deposed. Which is why I think we have thankfully moved past the prospect of a full Russian invasion.

 

Interesting reading but one thing that sticks out for my mind is the presence of a local sepratist force/militia in the first place. Strategically this would have to provide some level of support for Russian intervention in the first place - not to mention an excuse to enter the conflict. Was the modelling of Ukraine sepratist militia / irregular units ever considered as part of Black Sea or deemed out of scope? Just thinking of the scenario possibilities for Red Force if you could model militia fighting alongside Russian Army 'advisers.'

We are going to include irregular forces, for both sides, in a future Module. It was simply too much to do all at once.

Steve

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The original storyline pitted the Russian forces against the same surprised, corrupt, and conflicted Ukrainian forces that existed prior to Yanucovych fleeing and had to deal with the "uprising". If Russia had launched a broad offensive into eastern Ukraine in March or April would have been a relatively "easy" fight to the Dnieper.

[snip]

In short... if Russia attacked today's Ukraine it would be almost a national suicide mission.

So, are you making any adjustments to the back story in light of experience? While it's enlightening to hear your informed position on the current real conflict, how do you see the fractured fictional Ukraine forces having enough cohesion to hold even at the Dneipr, or is it assumed the NATO reinforcements will have deployed in time to exploit the natural defense?

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Quite interested to see people generally considering that Summer-Autumn operation in Ukraine involved actual Russian military personnel beyond the SF/Advisers currently present there. I'm happy to see confirmation of that though. Also quite interesting to see people considering stated numbers for mobilization waves and desired outcomes as actual manpower. Historically, actual number of combatants to declared numbers in the Ukrainian army have varied greatly. 

 

Ukraine has no effective air-power, and fairly limited G2A capabilities. Any confrontation with Ukraine would play out by the gulf scenario, where RuAF would be used as the driving force in the conflict. 

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The original storyline pitted the Russian forces against the same surprised, corrupt, and conflicted Ukrainian forces that existed prior to Yanucovych fleeing and had to deal with the "uprising". If Russia had launched a broad offensive into eastern Ukraine in March or April would have been a relatively "easy" fight to the Dnieper.

That was then, this is now (as the saying goes!). Since this time Ukraine has had time to fix many of their fundamental problems and now have considerable combat experience, greater numbers, increased military spending, and months of preparation under their belt. If Russia launches a general offensive into eastern Ukraine this Spring or Summer I highly doubt Russia would get anywhere close to the Dnieper.

Russia no longer has the strategic element of surprise it had back in Winter/Spring 2014. An offensive in 2015 would be characterized by a major Russian buildup along the border where they intended to invade or act as a decoy. NATO would be very quick to pass along intel about this buildup. Unlike last Spring, Ukraine would be quick to respond to with their own deployments to counter the Russian intentions. This would most assuredly doom a Russian invasion to major casualties and slow progress. Or at the very least, unequal progress.

Where Russia experienced breakthroughs it would quickly find itself challenged to the point of stalling, or at least hesitating. This would allow rear echelon and frontline shifts to help counter the actions. Which, in turn, would limit Russia's overall ability to advance beyond a fairly narrow strip of territory.

Realistically Ukraine of 2014 would have needed NATO support prior to have achieved similar results. Now? No. By Spring the Ukrainian forces intend on having roughly 100,000 forces available for the war they are already fighting. That's about double what it is now. The increase is coming from new forces being built right now and rotating in the older units forward. These forces are very motivated to fight. Russia, on the other hand, has only about 50,000 non-conscript dependent forces to put into the battle. That means it would have to use *all* of its best forces *and* at least 150,000 largely conscript forces to have enough to do the initial attack, plus about another 100,000 in reasonably close proximity to move in for replacement and occupation duties. Russia, simply put, doesn't have these sorts of forces ready to fight such a campaign. They certainly lack the logistics infrastructure and experience to support such an effort in the face of significant opposition.

In short... if Russia attacked today's Ukraine it would be almost a national suicide mission. They would be effectively defeated on the battlefield, which would likely mean Putin would be deposed. Which is why I think we have thankfully moved past the prospect of a full Russian invasion.

 

We are going to include irregular forces, for both sides, in a future Module. It was simply too much to do all at once.

Steve

 

Are you serious? OMG...

Ukraninan and Russian armies are simmply incomparable to each other from the point of scale, equipment and trainig.  The simple fact that Ukraine has almost no aviation says a lot. It's like discussing how long Mexico can stand against US if US decide to invade it - a week maybe?  I have nothing against Ukraine and actually hope that such a war won't happen, but they simply didn't invest enough money and efforts in their army for years and it's impossible to build a powerfull army just at once even if you get millions of dollars and some equipment for it from EU and US. Ukranian officials actually understand it and say that in the case of the massive russian invasion they won't be able to stop it without dirrect NATO help.

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Are you serious? OMG...

Ukraninan and Russian armies are simmply incomparable to each other from the point of scale, equipment and trainig.  The simple fact that Ukraine has almost no aviation says a lot. It's like discussing how long Mexico can stand against US if US decide to invade it - a week maybe?  I have nothing against Ukraine and actually hope that such a war won't happen, but they simply didn't invest enough money and efforts in their army for years and it's impossible to build a powerfull army just at once even if you get millions of dollars and some equipment for it from EU and US. Ukranian officials actually understand it and say that in the case of the massive russian invasion they won't be able to stop it without dirrect NATO help.

Unless Steve has his numbers wrong, and, being the professional in the field, I'd tend to place more confidence in that than yours, your estimation of the scale of the Russian army's troop strength is perhaps a little high. Oh, and don't forget the Russians' other commitments, when you count heads and available forces. Edited by womble

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Unless Steve has his numbers wrong, and, being the professional in the field, I'd tend to place more confidence in that than yours, your estimation of the scale of the Russian army's troop strength is perhaps a little high. Oh, and don't forget the Russians' other commitments, when you count heads and available forces.

What are you even talking about? Do you have Google? Use it!

According to open sources Ukrainian army has 160 millitary jets + 23 transport planes in service now. Almost all of them they got from USSR  - so they are quite outdated and Ukraine didn't upgrade them.

Russian Army has 2 000 millitary jets in service now (not counting those that are in reserve). A big part of them are made in USSR either but many are upgraded already. Besides Russian army gets some new jets every year. In 2014 they got 90 completly new jets for example. It's a half of all Ukranian Air force!

The scale difference is simmilar for other weapons: like helos, tanks, artillery e.t.c.

I don't even speak here about level of training and about how many people can Russia mobilize if it needs so, while Ukraine is almost out of it's reserves already.

Russia spent 87,8$ milliards on it's army in 2013. It's in a  3-rd place of millitary expences in the world after US and China.

Ukraine spent 5$ milliards on it's army in 2013. It's in a 37-th place of millitary expences in the world.

So, again, what are you even talking about? Without direct NATO millitary help, Ukraine has no a single chance to stand against Russian army for more than a couple of weeks in the best case.

The reason why Russian army is not in Kiev yet is simple - what's the reason for Russia to take Kiev in fact? Nobody needs world war III here just to expand a big country a little bit more. While Russia took Crimea becouse majority of people there really wanted to be with Russia and it was historically a part of Russa, while it supports Donbas becouse a lot of people there were isnpired with Crimea precedent and it's histotically a russian land either with russian population mostly, it would be suicide for Russia to go to Kiev simply becouse most of the people there are Ukranians and they don't want to be in Russia. So even if Russia capture Kiev with millitary forces what profit would it get? Nothing. Just problems.

Edited by Rusknight

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How many pairs of boots on the ground with the motivation to actually push do the RF have? How many of those would be needed to hold what they take? The Ukraine's air power is minimal, but US/NATO air can be delivered as soon as the first Russian air strike goes in, give or take a few hours. So, at best, that's a wash; at worst the RF air force is grounded pretty rapidly and unable to conduct air support operations sooner than that.

Much of Russia's military expenditure had to go to securing it's astonishingly long land borders. The army is mostly conscripts, and as you say, why would they want Kiev, even if their political masters went off the deep end and started something they couldn't come out of with any credit? And it's still a shadow of its Warsaw Pact days. If Steve is right about the 50000 career/volunteer soldiers, the UK alone has a larger professional force than that. Trying to grind a conscript army into an asymmetric war wouldn't get the Russians any further in Ukraine than it did in Afghanistan.

Why is Russia kvetching so about Ukraine choosing the West's apron strings over Moscow's? That's the reason Russia might go into Kiev: non-rational macho brinksmanship, of the "If we take their capital they will sue for peace and cede us control of the Donbass region," kind. Not with the intention of holding it.

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How many pairs of boots on the ground with the motivation to actually push do the RF have? How many of those would be needed to hold what they take? The Ukraine's air power is minimal, but US/NATO air can be delivered as soon as the first Russian air strike goes in, give or take a few hours. So, at best, that's a wash; at worst the RF air force is grounded pretty rapidly and unable to conduct air support operations sooner than that.

Much of Russia's military expenditure had to go to securing it's astonishingly long land borders. The army is mostly conscripts, and as you say, why would they want Kiev, even if their political masters went off the deep end and started something they couldn't come out of with any credit? And it's still a shadow of its Warsaw Pact days. If Steve is right about the 50000 career/volunteer soldiers, the UK alone has a larger professional force than that. Trying to grind a conscript army into an asymmetric war wouldn't get the Russians any further in Ukraine than it did in Afghanistan.

Why is Russia kvetching so about Ukraine choosing the West's apron strings over Moscow's? That's the reason Russia might go into Kiev: non-rational macho brinksmanship, of the "If we take their capital they will sue for peace and cede us control of the Donbass region," kind. Not with the intention of holding it.

So you admit that Ukraine cannot fight against Russia without dirrect NATO support? Nice, that's what I was talking about actually.

It's not 19-th century anymore to evaluate army power by pairs of boots first of all. LOL. How many US soldiers were fighting in Irac in 2003 against how many Saddam soldiers? Internet sources says US forces had 5 divisions against 23 divisions of Saddam? So what? US army was much more powerfull becouse of better equipment and training.

Why is Russia kvetching so about Ukraine choosing the West's apron strings over Moscow's? - you ask... Well why USA was and still furious about Cuba choosing the red way? The answer is simple - no country in the world would like it's neighbours getting influenced by its opponents too much. So Russia treats possible Ukraine affiliation to EU and NATO as a direct threat to Russian national security. It's an obvious logic.

Edited by Rusknight

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 - no country in the world would like it's neighbours getting influenced by its opponents too much. So Russia treats possible Ukraine affiliation to EU and NATO as a direct threat to Russian national security.

 

The question for me is - why does Russia see the EU and/or NATO as a threat to its national security ? Who wants to invade Russia nowadays ? Why ?

 

Even in the Cold War days, it was always a case of "Stopping the Soviets invading" not "Invade Soviet Russia"

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 why does Russia see the EU and/or NATO as a threat to its national security ?

 

Why does NATO see RF as a threat?

Obama puts Russia in one line with IS as world threat in his public speeches. So does NATO officials too.

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Why does NATO see RF as a threat?

Obama puts Russia in one line with IS as world threat in his public speeches. So does NATO officials too.

 

Well, they do now.

But prior to the events in Ukraine, NATO was practically at the point of deciding it no longer had a raison d'etre.

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The question for me is - why does Russia see the EU and/or NATO as a threat to its national security ? Who wants to invade Russia nowadays ? Why ?

 

Even in the Cold War days, it was always a case of "Stopping the Soviets invading" not "Invade Soviet Russia

Why Russia shouldn't see it as a treat?

NATO was created even before Warsaw PACT as a dirrect opponent to USSR durring cold war. You are wrong saying that western plans was only about stopping the Soviets invading. West actually had some offensive plans either. The first plan called Peancer made by US in 1945 (even before NATO creation) was about bombing USSR with nuclear weapon which USSR didn't have yet.

While cold war ended in 91 and Warsaw PACT with USSR disappeared, NATO still exists and even growing taking new members, but not Russia. NATO and US as a real leader of NATO performed several invasions already to various countries over the world like Irac, Afganistan, Yugoslavia while these countries didn't attack NATO, so it was offence actions from US and NATO. Of course they stated some reasons for such invasions but it was invasions anyway. So how Russia can be sure that NATO or US wouldn't like to invade it for some reason sooner or later?

Edited by Rusknight

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The question for me is - why does Russia see the EU and/or NATO as a threat to its national security ? Who wants to invade Russia nowadays ? Why ?

 

Even in the Cold War days, it was always a case of "Stopping the Soviets invading" not "Invade Soviet Russia"

 

Well you don't need to invade a country to threaten its national security.  NATO viewed it as 'Stop the Soviets invading' however by the late 1960s it was viewed as 'Stop NATO from attacking' in the Soviet Union.

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As the OP I would humbly ask people to refrain from turning this thread as argument war on nature of NATO/WP/Modern day Russia and instead let us focus on the tactical and strategic plausibilities. Thank you. 

 

-H1nd

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This view (that I am about to express) is hypo-theoretical only. It comes from my personal point of view, and open source information I could gather. I would try to keep this scenario going, if it is of interest to the local community.
 
First of all, what are the Russian (political) objectives in this conflict? To sum up - precluding Ukraine from joining NATO military-political block, precluding Ukraine from being a valid threat to Russia in the future, negating any claim Ukraine has on Crimea, to defend the interests of pro-Russian people of Ukraine.

(p.s. - I seriously doubt NATO intervention should Russia openly intervene in the conflict, not in the time scale I think it would happen in).
 
To accomplish this Russia requires a substantial buffer zone with friendly (or at least neutral) population, with sufficient economic power to sustain that region, at least partially, to destroy Ukrainian means of fighting war (ie it's armed forces and defence related industry). Such buffer zone would probably be in the form of the Pro-Yanukovich regions (could be seen from voting patterns here)
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Hence from military perspective we have the objectives of:
- rapidly defeating the Counter Terrorist Operation Forces east of Dnepr.
- securing the designated territory, installing pro Russian regime there.

What is the balance of forces (I would expand this if requested)?
- Russia has a complete control of air and complete superiority in terms of reckon-strike complexes, intelligence gathering, superiority in quality of equipment and of troop control and command (above battalion).
- Russia currently arms and trains the separatist forces, organising their brigades into corps type structures, restructuring brigades up to mechanised standards.
- both parties (Ukrainian loyalists and Separatists) suffer from major corruption issues, both sides are primarily limited by the supplies of weapons in equipment when rising their military units, as well from manpower deficiency (currently separatists did not enact mobilisation, previous waves of mobilisation has proven to be inefficient for the loyalist forces). Thus any estimates of their forces must be made with utmost caution.

Due to the military-political situation, ie the ongoing Counter Terrorism Operation, poor intelligence (even with NATO support from means such as imint, humint, elint and so on), poor leadership, presence of real and present threat from separatist forces, I doubt that Ukrainian Counter Terrorism Operation Forces would be capable of sending any substantial force out of their area of operation before Russian Armed Forces strike or blow the bridges prior to such an attack.

What is the military geography of the region? The depth of operation is approx. 250km (from Russian jump of points next to the border to the Dnepr river line, objectives in Odessa would be achieved by forces out of Crimea - with amphib, airborne and land borne advances). This constitutes 1, maybe 2 days of advance. There are no valid obstacles before Dnepr, Dnepr itself would be crossed using pantoon bridges and amphib vehicles at points of convenience, providing the encirclement of any actually defended bridgeheads (which were not yet taken by the VDV forces). Pripyat marshes may appear to be a formidable obstacle (to a strike from the north), however they were crossed by Soviet forces in 1944. The road network is sufficient to allow bypassing all of major cities (which would be controlled by special forces, local separatists), the terrain is fairly open, allowing movement away from roads.

What is the required force, to enact the plan? 4 combined arms armies (southern MD, western MD, partially - central MD), VDV forces, Black Sea Fleet.

If so requested I could draw a more complete plan, with OOB for all sides, map of operations and so on. I hope you find this post of interest to you.

p.s. What I don't understand - where does NATO intervention come from? In the scenarios that I for see there is no time for NATO to respond to the developments (unless NATO forces attempt to mount an offensive after Russia has secured it's objectives, but this would be stupid in my opinion).

I would also suggest reading on:

- Bagartion, Vistula-Oder, Manchurian offensives (1944-1945), especially from the point of logistics.

- Reading the articles by the Office of Soviet Studies such as "The high roads of war" (or atleast I think that is what it was called).

- Reading "Red Army" by Ralph Peters if all else fails.

Edited by ikalugin

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Given the repeated failures to take the Donetsk Airport, despite repeated set piece attacks, it seems rather optimistic to assume anything of true military use will emerge from the current area of Russian control in Ukraine.  I also think you are gravely underestimating the amount of friction even token amounts of opposition can impose on an advance.  I  mostly agree the Russians could march to the Dneiper in two WEEKS, although Steve is making a coherent case against even that.

 

 To say they could do it in two DAYS is the kind of magical thinking that sunk Hitler.  PUTIN said it would take two weeks, and he is not noted for pessimism on such subjects.

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Donetsk Airport (as you may have noted) has been attacked mainly by non numbered brigades/corps, thus making the use of that example rather dubious, and comparable to (for example) the inability of Counter Terrorism Operation Forces to take the Saur Mogila heights. 

 

Considering that there would be token forces in the area at best, meaning lack of continued defence and lack of substantial mechanised reserves for counter strokes, Russian air and fire, troop command, intelligence and control superiority, enfixing attacks of separatists against the bulk of Counter Terrorism Operation Forces, I do not see anything that would preclude rapid advance, on the post breakthrough WW2 rates (if you are interested I would gladly provide those, as well as the depths of such operations). Morever 250km is not all that deep (by Russian/Soviet terms) - this is completely within a single operational bound.

 

Weeks would be spent consolidating ground, reducing pockets of resistance, installing the pro Russian authorities and so on. The initial advance itself would be rapid (days). Thus while the entire operation could (and most likely would) take time, due to the small depth of the objectives and afore mentioned conditions, the initial advance would be conducted in one leap (with relevant airborne and amphib assaults), which would (most likely) go at a high rate of advance (100+ km/day).

 

p.s. I assume that the war begins in Spring, after the likely offensive by Ukrainian loyalists.

Edited by ikalugin

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People keep bringing up separatist failures at securing Donetsk airport.

 

Separatists have a very limited amount of essentially everything, ranging from armored transports (APC's/IFV's) to guided munitions needed to secure what is a fortified bunker with underground tunnels surrounded by absolutely flat terrain. Against them is a poorly supplied, but fairly well supported entrenched infantry. Their support included tanks and, up until late autumn, IFV's.

 

To be noted, the Ukrainian side could not secure the airport even with grossly larger numbers and better equipment earlier this year essentially for the same reason. Separatists fortified their portion of the airport surrounded by flat terrain. With the additions of irregular forces to CMBS I'm sure this would be an interesting scenario to build and try. 

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