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Discussion of Soviet Offensive Tactics


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This is absolutely true. But holding ground for political/economic reasons should never trump sound military strategy. Especially if attempting to hold said territory means losing it anyway. There was room for improvements in the 1944 Spring/Summer positions without wholesale abandonment of Soviet territory.

Personally, I doubt German could have survived very long after 1944 even without the military defeats. Natural resource depletion and food shortages were issues independent of the military disasters.

But when you boil it all down, the Third Reich lost the war in 1940 when focus switched from the UK to the SU. Entanglements in the Balkans, Greece, and North Africa weren't well advised either, but with the UK defeated and the SU on the back burner they wouldn't have been killers either.

Don't even get me started on the total idiocy of declaring war on the US. That is one of the most underrated blunders of WW2. US politics were already against starting a war with Nazi Germany, but after Pearl Harbor it would have been even more difficult to convince Congress to authorize such a war. Hitler made it easy.

Steve

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But when you boil it all down, the Third Reich lost the war in 1940 when focus switched from the UK to the SU. Entanglements in the Balkans, Greece, and North Africa weren't well advised either, but with the UK defeated and the SU on the back burner they wouldn't have been killers either.

In your opinion, how could Germany have defeated the British Empire? The only thing that comes to my mind is to field U-boats faster than Macdonalds fries burgers and hope to strangle British imports enough to cause a political upheaval that would remove Churchill and his cabinet from power. And there are problems even with that scenario.

Michael

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The thing of it is, Germany didn't really have to defeat the UK. The UK was not a serious threat to Germany's continental gains.

And I agree with Steve that declaring war on the US was Hitler's most monumental miscalculation. At least attacking the Soviet Union offered some prospect of territorial gains if they won. Germany had nothing to gain by a war against the US except for hope that Japan would reciprocate by declaring on the Soviet Union. We know how that worked out.

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Michael, I agree there was little hope of the UK falling through politics - the army was behind the King and I've nowhere read that the King was inclined to submit to Hitler. The alliance of the City banks was hardly in dispute either - the UK still had the Global Reserve currency at this stage, half the globe under it's flag providing resources, the gold and ties of history and language to pull the US banks in behind the war effort against Nazi Germany.

The UK did have a stranglehold on Germany's trade routes through it's navy. At the start of the war Germany wasn't self-sustaining in food - the idea of expanding into the Soviet Union was about redressing this state of affairs; it was one of Hitler's prime motivations, to gain land to feed the German populace. One of the reasons Germany didn't gear its war effort up until so late was the need to have fighting age men farming the land: once it had to pull men from the land to go to the front it was on a downhill slope all the way to starvation, just as it was in WW1 (the war effort took up available machinery and fuel that would counter this reduction in efficiency, in effect multiplied the inefficiencies.) It had the advantage of a de facto reserve currency in occupied territories (that is, Germany set a favourable exchange rate that enabled German businesses to buy materials and labour cheaply and convert the difference to profit) but this introduced the unintended consequences of making businesses in the occupied states uncompetitive - they lost business and skills to Germany and the occupied states were unable to provide their conqueror with excess goods, food or finished manufactures. As ever throughout history, the conquered states become burdens on the Empire and the choice is made to either forego profits and centrally plan the whole economy (horror of horrors and the antithesis of the business backing of the Nazi Party, though not so much disliked by those who gained through being corrupt), or turn the conquered populations into slaves. In the end, it depended on where you lived and which God you prayed to whether or not you were enslaved. The rest were robbed of as much as could be managed without sparking further resistance (it is a costly business, fighting an insurgency in an occupied territory) and the Third Reich was well and truly on it's way into a terminal economic decline.

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It would not have worked, maybe in the so called Fulda gap, but look at the North where the Germans and the BAOR were expected to parry a Soviet shock Army (3rd) which was only the first echelon of the attack. The force ratios are worse than at Bagration.

There is a reason why the French and the British needed "tactical" Nukes and the experimentation with "tiny" tactical nukes such as M28/9 with were carried out and employed for a time. This weapon was short ranged enough that employment would quite likely dose the operators as well as nearby friendly units.

Safer tac nukes such as shells for M109's were only withdrawn from US units in Germany in 1991

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Davy_Crockett_(nuclear_device).

I dunno, once nuke shells, no matter how small they are, started flying it could easily escalate to MAD (mutually assured destruction). Therefore from today's perspective it was simply a deterrent, as neither side has any real incentive to use it.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_assured_destruction

I'm sure someone smart can explain the Nash Equilibrium (or counter it!)

In the event of a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe, NATO planned to use tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union countered this threat by issuing a statement that any use of nuclear weapons (tactical or otherwise) against Soviet forces would be grounds for a full-scale Soviet retaliatory strike. Thus it was generally assumed that any combat in Europe would end with apocalyptic conclusions.

At the end of the day I don't generally consider these WMDs as they are simply too... far out.

Back to conventional means, in the later cold war years technology played a heavier role in combat where air power became essential. The 91 Gulf War caused quite a few WTF and jaw dropping moments in the eastern bloc countries. So despite the fewer numbers NATO had I'm sure they'll get some help. Interdiction sorties over soviet columns can absolutely rain havoc, provided the fights of air supremacy and SEAD are won ofc.

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I dunno, once nuke shells, no matter how small they are, started flying it could easily escalate to MAD (mutually assured destruction). Therefore from today's perspective it was simply a deterrent, as neither side has any real incentive to use it.

Actually, multiple tactical nuke strikes were part of Warsaw Pact plans in the event of war, ensuring quick advancement and taking of objectives that would otherwise take weeks/months to achieve in WWII conditions. Nukes were much more than a deterrent.

There was a misconception in the West, starting in the 60s that the Soviets understand a total destruction concept and share the policy of nukes as only a deterrent while this was not the case. Nukes were considered by the Soviets as a sort of more powerful artillery, helping to achieve goals on a tactical level and help Warsaw Pact troops advance.

In 70s and 80s, when it was clear that the Soviets were losing the technological arms race, plans for nuke usage on tactical level was further reinforced and many more tactical nukes were being delivered to Soviet troops in East Germany. The first few days of war were planned as a tactical nuke strike bonanza - for example just the Hamburg area was meant to be hit by around 40 tactical charges.

You may think it unwise or not logical but that was the case :)

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The thing of it is, Germany didn't really have to defeat the UK. The UK was not a serious threat to Germany's continental gains.

Napoleon thought the same. Then the British Navy crushed the combined Spanish-French armada at Trafalgar. And then the British Empire paid pretty much for every army the continental powers tried to raise against Bonaparte, and kept a field army on the Peninsula from 1810 through 1813 which was a major pain in the bum for him.

La perfide Albion didn't quite sit down on her hands :)

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Actually, multiple tactical nuke strikes were part of Warsaw Pact plans in the event of war, ensuring quick advancement and taking of objectives that would otherwise take weeks/months to achieve in WWII conditions. Nukes were much more than a deterrent.

There was a misconception in the West, starting in the 60s that the Soviets understand a total destruction concept and share the policy of nukes as only a deterrent while this was not the case. Nukes were considered by the Soviets as a sort of more powerful artillery, helping to achieve goals on a tactical level and help Warsaw Pact troops advance.

In 70s and 80s, when it was clear that the Soviets were losing the technological arms race, plans for nuke usage on tactical level was further reinforced and many more tactical nukes were being delivered to Soviet troops in East Germany. The first few days of war were planned as a tactical nuke strike bonanza - for example just the Hamburg area was meant to be hit by around 40 tactical charges.

You may think it unwise or not logical but that was the case :)

Tis is about to develop into a discussion based on smoke and mirror and heresies. I'm sure some of you lived thru the tense period and have some strong sentiment about it, but for me the apocalypse didn't happen and the nuclear peace, although tense, was in the end peace. I leave this discussion to you wiser gents.

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On Hitler declaring war on the US... I'm not sure I remember it correctly, but didn't the U-boat arm press for just that? Someone more knowledgeable may correct me, but my impression is that as far as the U-boat captains were concerned the US had already been in the war for some time, escorting convoys and attacking U-boats, while they had had to "restrain" themselves from attacking US warships and American-flagged transports ("Reuben James"? What "Reuben James"?). After the declaration of war, it was no holds barred, and the initial period of attacks in American coastal waters were called "the second happy times" by the German submariners.

And, if the recently discovered typed pages are indeed authentic and have been correctly identified as the dictated second volume of "Mein Kampf", Hitler considered a war with the US eventually inevitable, anyway. To him, the moment must have felt right.

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On Hitler declaring war on the US... I'm not sure I remember it correctly, but didn't the U-boat arm press for just that?

Roosevelt was also pressing hard to get the US involved in a war with Germany. He deliberately provoked a war by sending massive quantities of war material to the UK and then escorting them with US Coast Guard and then (IIRC) US Navy ships. There was an incident where the Germans sank one of the USCG cutters and Roosevelt tried to use that as a pretext for war. Congress said "hey, the ship was in a declared war zone... what did you think they were going to do? Sorry, no dice".

The point is that the US aide and military involvement had to be kept to a minimum because of the political reality in Washington DC. Once Hitler declared war on the US, that all went away. Now Germany had to face the full on power of the US. And we know how well that turned out :D

And, if the recently discovered typed pages are indeed authentic and have been correctly identified as the dictated second volume of "Mein Kampf", Hitler considered a war with the US eventually inevitable, anyway. To him, the moment must have felt right.

Yup, and as with so many decisions Hitler made... he was flat out wrong :D War was only inevitable with the US if there was an active war going on. Had he simply said "that's it, I'm done" at worst there would have been a Cold War sort of event. But he kept the war going AND declared war on the US. Neither were smart.

Put another way, if you're a fairly good fighter and you go into a bar to pick a fight... is it really smart to start fighting two or three guys at once then, in the middle, punch some huge guy that was until then standing on the sideline because his girlfriend said "honey, don't get involved"? No :D

If you're going to pick a fight with opponents bigger and more numerous than you, it's a really good idea to have a plan on how to come out on top. Otherwise don't do it. The Third Reich, from top to bottom, had no plan other than "we're awesome, so of course we'll win".

With this in mind, it is true that Stalin also felt war with the Third Reich was inevitable. But unlike Hitler, the Soviets had a long range plan. It's not a plan that I think would have worked, but it was at least a plan. Because Hitler attacked first the plan was scrapped and instead they improvised. If Hitler had just sat back and waited for the Soviets to attack in 1942 (IIRC that was the target date, might have been 1943) it would have been a disaster even worse than the Winter War. Might have even resulted in a change in power over Moscow way.

Steve

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The other major mistake Hitler made was declaring war on the U.S. without first seeing if he could secure a reciprocal declaration of war by Japan on the Soviet Union.

Since Japan attacked the U.S. and not the other way around, The terms of the Axis alliance didn't technically obligate Germany to declare war on the U.S. once Japan did. He should have used this diplomatic leverage to at least try to secure more assistance from Japan in his war against the Soviets. Not sure he could have done so as Japan was not at all keen on the idea of a land war against the USSR, but Hitler never even tried.

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If Hitler had just sat back and waited for the Soviets to attack in 1942 (IIRC that was the target date, might have been 1943) it would have been a disaster even worse than the Winter War. Might have even resulted in a change in power over Moscow way.

Oo. That's a good question I've not really seen addressed before. I think most people assume the Red Army in '42-'43 would have been the same Grizzly if Hitler hadn't gone all Barbarossa in '41 as it was having learned a lot of difficult to bear lessons in the intervening years, so they conclude that Hitler had to gamble in '41, or just get steamrolled a couple of years later. Given that there would have been less incentive to mobilise German industry for war, if a truce had been called after France, say, what shape would the Wehrmacht have been in to resist the onslaught that Uncle Iosef was planning? How different would the Russian war machine have been (other than lacking in actual experience)?

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And then the pocket battles that came later in winter 1943 and again in winter 1944. What Hitler "missed" was that these battles were extremely costly and were themselves desperate actions resulting from major screwups. They were something the Germans should have tried hard to avoid, not basing an entire strategy on it!

This is akin to someone getting a flat tire, finding they don't have a spare, scrounging around in a junkyard for one that ALMOST fits, then driving on it slowly for many miles before getting the old one repaired. Did it work? Yes. But the lesson here is to have the correct spare tire for the next trip. Hitler, would have said "no need for that, because we can instead find a junkyard and take 3 times longer to get to where we need to go".

Back to the post war generals blaming Hitler for their own failings. I don't think many German generals thought that the Fester Platz idea was a good one. They certainly didn't think it was when they didn't get the labor and resources they needed to execute it correctly. Now, perhaps many of those Generals didn't really conceive of how badly things would go, but I'm pretty confident that if they had a choice they would have advocated a different strategy instead of finding out.

I also agree that the Soviets win the Gold for the "most improved nation at war" award. Silver would go to the Americans, since they started out fairly unprepared and quickly recovered. Bronze goes to the Free French, if only because they had a LOT of help. Germany was in the running earlier in the war, but they peaked shortly after and then declined ungracefully over the years.

Hungary and Romania actually did pretty well in improving their capabilities. But all sorts of factors hampered them throughout the war.

Italy... I think it's better to just leave that one alone :D

Steve

Fully agree, made even worse in that for a so called details guy he did not look/understand why Model's depositions worked, even minor things like

Hitler = one line

Model = multiple lines as per WWI plus everything else

The former is based on the fear that troops will be more likely to run if there are pre planed fall back positions. That if one makes contingencies it's an admittance of failure.

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The other major mistake Hitler made was declaring war on the U.S. without first seeing if he could secure a reciprocal declaration of war by Japan on the Soviet Union.

Since Japan attacked the U.S. and not the other way around, The terms of the Axis alliance didn't technically obligate Germany to declare war on the U.S. once Japan did. He should have used this diplomatic leverage to at least try to secure more assistance from Japan in his war against the Soviets. Not sure he could have done so as Japan was not at all keen on the idea of a land war against the USSR, but Hitler never even tried.

The Japanese had a understanding that they would join in vs Russia. They were in a undeclared war with Russia in 38 and 39 culminating in the Khalkhin Gol. The Molotov Ribbentrop pact occurred without Japan being told anything and resulted in Russia being able to fully commit in Aug39 resulting in Khalkhin Gol. Because the pact included the Germans promising to not aid another allied party aka Japan.

This resulted in the Japanese thinking they'd have to go it alone and they planned accordingly. Then in 41 Germany invaded Russia with only 48hr notice to Japan, 48 hrs is not enough time to change course for what would be the pacific war. So Japan just kept to it planning for a war in Asia and the Pacific as the army of Manchuria was being denuded of troops and resources for what would be the main effort. Plus Germany had hung Japan out to dry in 39.

Yeah Hitler/Nazi simply did not try or apparently know how to try properly.

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There were a lot of members of the British aristocracy who were inter-married with German 'aristocrats' with Nazi affiliations pre-war. The American Charles Lindberg was notorious for his admiration of Hitler. If only Hitler hadn't got it into his head to replay WWI over again he probably would have been a snug as a bug in a rug, maybe even got France and Britain as allies if he found himself facing a threat from the Soviet Union. Even after grabbing the free city of Danzig and folding the Czechs into his dominion. NOBODY wanted Stalin to move west. But its foolish to expect prudent policies from a psychopath megalomaniac. When you start talking about 'Arian supermen' annexing all the land west of the Urals and reducing the Slavic populations to slave status how do you expect things are going to work out?

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Gentlemen,

I think the discussion is starting to veer in an "alternate history" direction, and while I enjoy it thoroughly, I feel somewhat responsible for helping "hijack" the thread from its original theme. Maybe it will be more appropriate to move the discussion into a thread of its own - here or in the general forum - if there isn't one already.

Just a suggestion...

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Okay I will attempt to bring it back to the original subject. I have not played Italian armor, such as it is, from CMFI enough to determine what difference a lack of radios in AFVs makes. I assume sharing of spotting info is reduced and vehicles go out of command much easier.

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The Soviets committed to a front-wide offensive in 1943 and ended up paying more heavily in casualties than in 1941. It was a victory for sure, but one of pyrrhic proportions. STAVKA came to the conclusion in winter 43/44 that they could not hope to insure victory if they resorted to hammering the entire front in the following summer. So, they had to refine their operations even further.

Up to this point the Soviets were employing deception and masking(covered movement and deployment) at the tactical and operational level with confidence and skill. STAVKA decided it was time to conduct these tools at the strategic level now. Rather than employ the front-wide strategy, the new model was to manipulate German strategic response through front-wide coordination of deception and masking.

The result in summer of 1944 was a series of operations that were prepared and executed so as to draw German armor away from the Lvov area, which was the Soviets' primary direction of attack strategically. It began up north then shifted progressively southward. German forces were compelled to respond with their armor reserves as serious breakthroughs occurred up north. The Belorussian strategic offensive was the final draw in shifting German focus from the Lvov area and its massive success did much to reduce the number of panzers in position to oppose Soviet forces in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation.

The Yassy-Kishinev operation in August was planned for last, and ended up with relatively light casualties overall.

The interesting thing about Soviet tactics is that it was highly dependent on the operational planning prior. A lot of planning went into an operation, insuring that the battles to come were conducted under the most favorable terms possible.

The tank army was their means of fighting in a dynamic environment. It was to advance through 'holes' created by Soviet assault forces (introduction usually occurred once the third line of tactical defense had been breached). From there a tank army was responsible for meeting their objectives, advancing along identified routes and only fighting when necessary. These were the Soviet troops most like the Germans in terms of tactics, their forward detachments being the recognized army elite within. The TOE of a tank army in 1944 was about as balanced as anything the Germans ever put together operationally. Add the Assault Air Regiments dedicated to tank armies during exploitation and you have the recipe for some rip-roaring battles.

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Okay I will attempt to bring it back to the original subject. I have not played Italian armor, such as it is, from CMFI enough to determine what difference a lack of radios in AFVs makes. I assume sharing of spotting info is reduced and vehicles go out of command much easier.

Given the inadequacy of most Italian armour, the lack of radios is the last thing you notice.

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Why so many doubts about splitting squads? During city battles splitting units in assault groups, when squads were split to 3-men teams, were common since Stalingrad.

Also, forward units had more options for actions, why tank commander can't send halfsquad of tankodesantniki to watch around corner instead of sending full squad? When team is near squad leader, in voice command range - not a problem at all, there should be no moral penalty, in my opinion.

Ingame formatioms are tight, inf platoon witout splitting squads can defend 50-100 m of frontline staying in voice range, while according to soviet doctrine it must defend 300m line. Splitting squads is essential feature.

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I'm thinking the easiest way to model the Soviets is to just give them a higher mark up for having experienced troops. Conscripts get no mark up, green get a reasonable mark-up. Anything above green gets a huge markup. That way the force will be composed of mostly conscript/green replacements and a small number of regular/vets. Whereas the German force is all Vet. Simply forcing the Soviet side to always be conscript implicitly models all the personnel issues.

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I'm thinking the easiest way to model the Soviets is to just give them a higher mark up for having experienced troops. Conscripts get no mark up, green get a reasonable mark-up. Anything above green gets a huge markup. That way the force will be composed of mostly conscript/green replacements and a small number of regular/vets. Whereas the German force is all Vet. Simply forcing the Soviet side to always be conscript implicitly models all the personnel issues.

Playing Syrian side in CMSF (US always veterans, Syrians usually green) was not too fun. You make perfect kill zone - U.S. marines squad come, nobody can hit them from 150m, then MGL soldier makes few shots - Syrians run away. That makes red side unplayable.

By the 1944 German veterans of Blitzkried were mostly beaten out, so it wouldn't be historical either.

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