Today in History

[JonS]

20 November 1943

Assault on Tarawa. Lieutenants Forbes, Webster and Page, all RNZNVR, act as pilots for USN ships in the amphibious force.

[JonS]

29 November 1940

HMS LEANDER bombards Banda Alula (Mogadishu), destroying a fish factory. Thus began the downfall of Mussolini's empire.

[JonS]

03 December 1917

Belgium: the New Zealand Division attacks Poldehoek Chateau. Note the scale - a division attacking a chateau. The divisional attack frontage was narrower than some CM maps, and these days that chateau would barely be a platoon task. Private Henry Nicholas (1 Bn, Canterbury Infantry Regiment) earns the Victoria Cross for his actions during the attack for almost single-handedly capturing an enemy strongpoint, and afterward collecting ammunition while under heavy machine gun and rifle fire.

[Stalins Organ]

Yeah but it wasn't really a whole division attaching a Chateau:

Operation Orders for the attack on Polderhoek Chateau and grounds were issued on December 1st. The assault was to be delivered on December 3rd with two Battalions of the 2nd Infantry Brigade in line, namely, the 1st Battalion of Otago on the left, and the 1st Battalion of Canterbury on the right. The number to be thrown into the attack by each Battalion was two officers and 100 other ranks per Company.

So now we're down to 2 half-battalions....and they formed:

Each Battalion was to attack in depth, two companies being in the front line, one in support for dealing with any counter-attack that might develop, and one in reserve.

-source

so the "Division" is actually only half of 1 brigade, attacking on the frontage of 4 companies!

And it being 1917, the attack was, of course, a total screw up....

By some fatal miscalculation or influence a considerable part of the entire weight of the barrage fell across the area occupied by the first waves of the assaulting troops. The immediate outcome was that the two leading Companies, 4th on the left and 10th on the right, became seriously involved in the destructive fire of our own artillery. The losses incurred were at once severe. To move forward was accepted as the quickest method of escaping our own fire, because more appeared to be falling to the rear than to the front. Captain Hines, commanding 4th Company, accordingly gave the order to advance, and 10th Company on the right almost immediately followed suit. But the irregularity of the barrage was such that some distance had to be covered before it was cleared, and by that time casualties, now increased by enemy machine gun fire, were so heavy as to seriously prejudice the success of the attack.

Plus although the Chateau had been hammered by artillery and was little more than a pile of bricks, the subsurface shelter had not been damaged, and it had been heavily fortified.

Casualties were heavy - this source is the history of the Otago regiment, which had about 400 officers and men involved - of these:

Killed, two officers and 43 other ranks; wounded, seven officers and 153 other ranks; missing, 26 other ranks; total, 231.

[JonS]

Presumably the infantry weren't sent in naked, and had support from divisional and corps artillery, brigade and divisional MGs, mortars, and all the rest of the typical supporting panoply.

Casualties were always heavy. Broodseinde (04 Oct 17) was a wildly successful attack ... that still cost the NZ Div over 1,800 casualties in less than 24 hours.

[Noba]

6th December 1940

Egypt: General O'Connor issues orders for Operation Compass.

Initially planned as a raid, Wavell was open to a "wait and see" policy as

to further developments and possible continuation of the attack.

Wavell had given his commanders the outline to break the Italian fortified

camps in the desert at Sidi Barrani and to the south. An estimated four Italian Divisions were situated from Bardia to the front having been digging

into fortified camps since September.

4th Indian Division plus 7th Armoured Division with support from Corps Artillery were given the task.

A complication was that 4th Indian was to be sent to Italian East Africa after the initial battles, to be replaced by 6th Division from Australia.

[Stalins Organ]

Presumably the infantry weren't sent in naked, and had support from divisional and corps artillery, brigade and divisional MGs, mortars, and all the rest of the typical supporting panoply.

the divisional artillery was not used, and the rest of the artillery support landed on the start lines - did you not read that??:confused:

Casualties were always heavy. Broodseinde (04 Oct 17) was a wildly successful attack ... that still cost the NZ Div over 1,800 casualties in less than 24 hours.

Casualties did not always start with the debacle of being shelled by your own artillery!

[Noba]

8th December 1940

After moving up to a position 5 miles south of Nibeiwa camp the

7th RTR and 1/6th Rajputana Rifles of 11th Indian Brigade form up for the attack early the next morning.

7th Armoured Div moves to screen any Italian forces that might try to intervene form the west.

Covered by the sound of aircraft and artillery fire they were able to move undetected.

[Noba]

9th December 1940

At 4:45am Indian artillery from another battalion opens fire at Nibeiwa from the east to divert the attention of the defenders.

At 7:15am the main artillery fire starts supporting the main attack

and within an hour the camp had surrendered.

Two thousand prisoners and 35 tanks were captured. Six of twenty eight

Matilda tanks were disabled on a minefield when leaving the camp.

Meanwhile 5th Indian Brigade had moved north to be west of the Tummar

camps. The attack went in at 1:30pm with the support of the remaining

Matildas, by next morning there were another 3,500 men captured from the Tummar camps.

Meanwhile 4th Brigade of 7th Arm Div had cut the road between Sidi Barrani and Buq Buq and "Matruh Force" had advanced along the coast

road towards Maktila without making contact with the defenders.

[Noba]

10th December 1940

4th Arm Brigade was positioned between Sidi Barrani and Buq Buq effectively stopping any reinforcement from the west. 16th Brigade had started an attack on Sidi Barrani from the south alone at dawn in a dust storm but was held by effective artillery fire and it was only when 11th Brigade and divisional artillery arrived that the attack was successful and Sidi Barrani Fell by late afternoon.

1st Libyan Division had resisted poorly coordinated attacks by the Coldstream and 6 RTR from the east so effectively that it was still an effective force and had support of the 4th Blackshirt Division in the area.

Plans were put in place for the next days fighting with the Armoured division changing over the 4th and 7th brigades with orders to stop any retreat by the Italian troops in the south at the Sofafi camps.

[Noba]

11th December 1940

In the morning attacks were made on the remaining Italian troops east of Sidi Barrani with the resultant pressure forcing the surrender of 1st Libyan and 4th Blackshirt divisions. With the surrender of the troops on Point 90 it became clear that all the forward defenses had been overcome.

With the initial battles over and the escape of 64th Division and part of the 2nd Blackshirt, both moving back to Bardia, the scale of the victory became apparent. 38,300 men, 237 guns, 73 tanks and four Generals were captured.

Detachments of 7th Arm Div moved to follow up the retreating Italians.

[JonS]

16 December 1915

Gallipoli - All ranks are warned that the Gallipoli Peninsula is to be evacuated.

[Noba]

13th - 17th December 1940

The Italians withdrew from garrison positions at Sidi Omar, Fort Capuzzo, and Salum on the coast and by the 16th was to be found in the Bardia fortress and the Giarabub Oasis to the south.

Units of 7th Armoured Div had cut the road to Tobruk and the 4th Indian Div has been sent to attack Italian East Africa. The 6th Australian Div had been tasked to replace the Indian troops and the 16th Aust Brigade moved up to Salum to join 16th British brigade outside Bardia.

The movement over the same period of thousands of Italian prisoners also hampered the British abilities to move up supplies to the front for the attack on Bardia.

[JonS]

19 December 1941

HMS NEPTUNE is lost in a Mediterranean minefield, New Zealand’s worst naval tragedy – 150 NZers are lost.

[JonS]

20 December 1915

Evacuation from Anzac Cove, Gallipoli, ends. Of the New Zealanders who served on Gallipoli 2,721 died and 4,752 were wounded, an 87% casualty rate.

[Noba]

18th - 21st December 1940

2/2nd and 2/3rd Battalions had taken up positions along the west face of the of the fortress, about 5,000 yards at their closest to the Italian perimeter. The overall length of the defenses were 18 miles in length consisting of an outer Anti Tank ditch and a double line of underground concrete posts with the front line linked with rows of barbed wire.

7th Arm Div continued to screen Bardia from any relief from the west.

Supply was a continuing problem with trucks from the newly arrived 7th Aust. Div being seconded to build up the requirements for the upcoming battle.

[Noba]

21st - 26th December 1940

The Australian troops settled into their positions to the west and south west of the defenses and proceeded to dominate by patrols the gap between themselves and the Italian front line. Part of their task was to measure the anti tank ditch and wire in order to build up a picture of possible attack routes into the fortress area.

Meanwhile the slow process of getting sufficient supplies for an attack hampered the planning of the timing of the coming battle.

[Noba]

27th December 1940

By the 27th the commanding General, MacKay, had the Aust 16th and British 16th brigades under him with 17th Aust Brigade slated to relieve the 16th British as soon as was practical. 16th British made it's way back to Buq Buq for a rest and to become the infantry reserve.

Supporting artillery of the Australian division was now in place in part, and plans were laid to move closer to the Italian lines over the next few days.

[Noba]

2nd January 1940

On January 1st the Western Desert Force officially became 13th Corps.

Plans were made for the Australians to break into the Italian perimeter between posts 45 and 47 on the western face of the fortress. The RAF had supported the coming attack with bombing attacks along with Royal Navy support with bombardments.

The attack was due to be launched on January 3rd by 16th Aust Brigade with a feint attack along the southern perimeter to be launched by 17th Aust. Artillery support was formidable in the number of gun tubes but slightly hampered by the general shortages of ammunition.

[Michael Emrys]

Just wanted to say thanks, Noba, for your running account. Although I fancy myself being reasonably familiar with the history of these battles, you have brought details to light that I had not previously encountered. Are you working from official unit histories, especially those of the Australian Expeditionary Corps?

Michael

[Noba]

Hi Michael.

I'm using a variety of accounts. Yes, the Official Histories - 'To Benghazi' by Gavin Long. They are superb and full of details a scenario designer could use. Osprey's 'Operation Compass'. 'Gunners at War' by Shelford Bidwell and Alan Moorehead's 'The Desert War'. Barrie Pitt's Books on the desert war don't have quite as much detail on the early battles.

Noba.

[Noba]

3rd January 1941

In the lead up to the main attack 2/6th Battalion had moved up to the south facing Italian defenses along the Wadi el Muatered in stages and had been ordered to probe the defenses. This helped focus the Italian defenders in anticipating an attack from the south and south west.

General O'Connor had suggested the main attack should be infantry led with the aim to create a bridgehead over the front line defenses enabling the anti tank ditch to be bridged so that the remaining Matilda tanks could then move into a support role.

General McKay had initially only six of his nine battalions with the 19th Brigade still being in the delta area which arrived just before the battle started. To back this small assault force up he had 118 guns and 25 remaining Matilda tanks. They were facing approximately 20,000 to 30,000 defenders according to the Intelligence officers.** 7th Arm Div was not to be used for the attack, they were given the task of masking Tobruk and preventing the escape of any defenders.

During the lead up to the battle the artillery fire into the fortress and patrolling had been kept south of post 40 again in the hope of deceiving the defenders about the thrust of the main attack. It was known that the majority of the Italian artillery was also in the southern half, a point which it was hoped could make it easier for the attackers.

The actual plan for the battle was later criticized as being too complicated and led to some problems. The aim of the break in battle was to take the posts around post 47 with the engineers blowing the wire first at around 6:00am after moving up and laying in the anti tank ditch. Italian defensive fire started and was largely behind the front troops of the 2/1st Battalion who on hearing the explosions of the Bangalore torpedoes rose from their start lines and advanced to their first objectives.

In less than half an hour the assault platoons had taken posts 45 to 48 and an accurate and heavy artillery fire had started. It's main effect was to raise a huge amount of dust both helping and hindering the attack. The last two companies of the 2/1st were through the gap and advancing in open order over about a 600 metre frontage onto a line of stone walls. The fire coming from them was ineffective in the poor light and after a melee around 400 prisoners were taken and sent back.

Meanwhile the engineers had created breaks for the tanks and 23 Matildas accompanied the 2/2nd Battalion into the fray. The columns swung to the right and started to engage the Italian posts. The Italians in the first few posts fought hard and the thick armour of the tanks were sprayed with tracer. The posts were finally subdued by infantry advancing and firing into the dugouts after the tanks had kept them suppressed. The inner and outer lines of posts were about 400 yards apart making the attackers spread out. Because of this separation a group of platoons were tasked with taking on the gun batteries in the gap, taking steady casualties this group managed to keep pace with the flanking companies with the gunners fighting until the advancing infantry got to within 100 yards in most cases. The gap in the defenses now was quite extensive extending to the Bardia - Capuzzo road. Extra cuts in the wire and ditch were made south along the defenses as they were passed by the attackers.

The 2/1st had one company with the whole of the 2/3rd and had attacked east into the fortress area with the 2/1st then swinging north along the defenses taking the posts up to post 55 on the perimeter. The fighting in the area around post 51 was held up for a time by an Italian battery firing from about 800 yards, a range at which the infantry could not effectively reply. The appearance of a Matilda tipped the battle in the attacker's favour and the post was taken.

2/3rd occupied a blocking position facing north with their men split facing along Wadi el Ghereidia and also facing Wadi el Gerfan after fighting in the dust to subdue the defenders in the triangular area. Fighting into the Wadi el Ghereidia the men found a headquarters and took over 400 prisoners. Further to the left the next company found an oval sanger about 250 yards long with a wall about four to six feet high. The defenders fought until flanked and surrendered as did another group in about 200 metres away when rushed.

A little later the 2/3rd faced a counter attack led by tanks. This group of tanks moved forward to an area where there were about 500 prisoners guarded by six men. The tanks captured the guards, one of whom was sent to a nearby headquarters saying they must surrender. After being fired on by Bren guns they moved away. A few more bursts into the Italian prisoners caused them to re-surrender.

The Italian tanks moved to another section of the front not far away and were met by three 2 pounder guns carried on the back of trucks. In the ensuing fight all six of the tanks were knocked out for the loss of two of the guns.

17th Brigade now swung into the right of the line heading south east along the defensive posts at around midday. 2/5th had to advance without tank support and would pay a heavy price. The fighting in and around Wadi Scemmas was fierce and the Italian guns put up a stout defense. Fighting along the Wadi the Australian troops had effectively cracked the shell of the defense and started to take many prisoners. Approximately 3,000 were taken all up in the area.

The battles along the forward posts continued sometimes without tanks, the infantry firing Bren's to suppress the defenders who often surrendered when the attackers were in grenade range. The defense had a line of wire and posts heading east into the fortress starting at post 19. This switch line gave the attackers pause to re combine disparate groups and consolidate the survivors.

By the evening the position in the fortress was such that the whole of the front line posts were captured form 18 in the south to 55 in the north, a distance of about seven miles. The inland facing troops had broken the defense in depth and were now readying themselves to fight again in the morning. Only on the south facing perimeter was there to be any more fighting that night.

** These numbered were to increase markedly when prisoners were counted after the battle.

[Noba]

The Night of 3/4 December 1940

Over night the attackers attempted to move south and east along the perimeter posts and also along the "switch line" which formed a right angle extending from post 19 on the perimeter.

The attackers along the switch line used stealth to get as close to the first post, number 16, before they charged and dropped grenades into the concrete posts then dropping down into the defenders demanding their surrender. They used the same tactics on the next post in the line (R11) and then had to halt because they had lost their compass. They had to wait for dawn to take post R9. Fighting around this area was very heavy and the men had trouble with a battery about 600 yards away. They would not make their objective which was the next post, R7.

Meanwhile on the perimeter the attack was made to take post 19 and by splitting the platoon into groups and attacking from the far side the post was taken by 2:30am. Prisoners in this fight amounted to 73. Post 14 which was situated to their left between themselves and the attackers along the switch line was taken by 4:00am with the loss of one man killed and seven wounded. The company now held 103 prisoners with a strength of 46, parties having been sent back with other prisoners. This group managed to take the next post, 17 by dawn but could go no further.

The attack plan that night was complicated and the lack of tanks and artillery had hampered the attacking troops. Their skill and determination had made it possible for them to reach and surpass the "infantry objectives", the objectives not taken had been earmarked for tanks to attack followed by an infantry company in support.

[Noba]

3rd December 1940 - The Southern Perimeter "Diversion attack"

16th Brigade on the southernmost part of the perimeter had moved up to the south side of the Wadi Muatered and established fire bases using their attached heavy machine gunners from the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers. The aggressive patrolling of this group was part of an elaborate attempt to convince the Italians that a serious attack was to be made northwards into the defenses.

The terrain was a steep sided wadi with wire placed in the bottom. The depth was around 150 to 200 feet and the Italians had established sangars between the main posts to cover all approaches. There were two tributary wadis approximately at right angles to the main wadi which itself ran approximately east west. These were to be used as cover for the attackers as they approached. The length of the front to be attacked was about a 1000 yards.

The preliminary artillery bombardment was planned to shield the approach of two platoons from the 2/6th battalion that were to take the western post, number 11. The next two posts to be taken were numbers 9 and 7, the furthest east. The posts were about 350 yards apart. After the artillery lifted the MG fire form the RNF was to try and suppress the defenders. The attackers also stripped the assault platoons of their Bren guns to provide more long range support.

The attack on post 11 went in under Italian shell fire but the attackers cut through the wire, silenced a machine gun outpost with one grenade and all forty three attackers made it unscathed to the perimeter wire. A flare was set off a signal to stop the supporting fires and even though they were sure they could be seen, the Italians did not open fire.

As they charged the 40 yards to the post, flares lit up the area and fierce defensive fire caused all the attackers to go to ground. Only small groups managed to get to the trenches and the fire from the centre of the post beyond the trenches proved deadly. By dawn there were not many survivors of the attack and they tried to move back down into the safety of the wadi but received fire from post 9. Mortar support helped keep the Italians away but only 4 men returned to their lines that day.

The remaining platoon had tried to support the assault group by firing from directly in front of the post but they too took casualties and had to withdraw. The RNF had taken casualties as well, with gun after gun being knocked out until only one was left.

The attack on the right tasked to take post 9 started with a rush up the slope, grenades flying to take the outlying sangars across a frontage of about 150 yards.

The attack on post 7 at the right hand end was successful and an Italian counter attack lasting an hour was held. Two other attacks were held off with ammunition parties in constant resupply along the area. By the end of the day, post 7 and part of post 9 were occupied but at the cost of 38 killed or missing and 26 wounded.

An observation post on the extreme right of the battalion line was set up and had high overlooking view deep into the defenses. It was an exposed position with no effective infantry support but the men were able to direct artillery fire into the rear areas. Italian shells forced the party into a concrete building where they were later captured by an infantry patrol form the fortress.

[Noba]

4th/5th January 1940

With both the 16th and 17th Brigades heavily involved in the initial attack and having sustained casualties, the Australian Commanders decided to use a fresh brigade to push the attack deeper into the defenses. Whilst the original attackers were tired, they were not as badly disorganized as was thought by the staff. The two remaining battalions of the 19th Brigade were tasked and although O'Connor had asked that only two brigades were to be used at Bardia, permission was given to add them to the attack.

Plans were made to attack south along the perimeter posts and along the switch line. Fire was also accurately placed onto post 11 in the extreme south. The attack was planned to be launched later in the afternoon and the rest was taken by the companies, there being around only 35 -40 men in each.

At the end of the fighting on the 3rd, the 16th Brigade was stretched along a four mile front overlooking the Wadi Gerfan, two roads from the Australian right led to Lower and Upper Bardia with the main road to Tobruk being to their immediate front.

2/1st on the Brigade left was to attack along the perimeter posts in a repeat of the break in attacks. 2/3 was in the centre and tasked with attacking to the north east across the wadi Gerfan and the Bardia Tobruk road beyond it, swinging one company to the right towards Bardia. On the Brigade right, the 2/2nd was to move directly down the Scemmas to take ground in support.

In the early afternoon the perimeter attackers on the left had taken post 54 which had proved unable to be subdued the previous day,there were heavy casualties in the post. This proved to be the final fight on the northern perimeter with white flags appearing over the next 8 posts and also at the artillery battery that had also been troublesome.

By early afternoon it was obvious that resistance was crumbling in the northern sectors. By dusk around 10,000 Italians had surrendered. A small group moved into town around 4pm. Plans were being made to further the attacks next day.

In the south the attack along the perimeter had started after midday and progressed with coordinated artillery and tank support. The attacking troops were late to the start line and need to hurry catch up to the creeping barrage. On the attackers left the support company was held up and Italian artillery fired but caused no casualties. As the attackers approached a post it was enough for the defenders to surrender, fire from posts further away being the most problem. In this way the attack progressed south towards post 11.

As the attack moving south got closer to the post the original attackers from the previous day had moved into sangars close by. They lined up carriers and charged the post, one carrier blowing up on a mine just short of the anti tank ditch. The rest fired in support of the attacking platoons and soon a white flag was flying.

The post was found to contain 350 men, 25 officers and included 2 field guns, 2 three inch mortars, and 6 anti tank guns. There were also 12 medium and 27 light machine guns. This post had been attacked confidently by 50 Australians the day before.

When the fighting had stopped the British took stock. Exact figures were not known, but from a ration strength of around 45,000 men approximately 40,000 were captured. An Italian staff report on 15th January estimated that 80,000 officers and men had been lost since the Sidi Barrani battles.

Captured guns in the Bardia fortress outnumbered the British guns two to one. 12 medium and 115 light tanks were also captured in running order.

The British now sent the 7th Arm Div to screen Tobruk whilst the infantry handled the prisoners and got ready for the attack.