Vulnerability of Hanomag halftrack gunners..

[JasonC]

bisu - you are wrong, they were backfield buses and they were largely unused for fire support in combat. The proof is simple - there are not enough dead SPWs for the opposite hypothesis of routine front line combat use.

There are a few exceptions, to be sure. They were sometimes used in "coup de main" descents, where the idea was to get infantry into a large body of cover / objective in a short period of time, across some distance of open ground (without a covered approach for dismounts etc). A typical case is pushing into a lightly defended village. Another would be night use in "raids", effectively.

The second main exception is when operating in a comparatively large formation directly behind a strong panzer spearhead (a battalion to an entire regiment of tanks, not one company), with the expectation that the panzers would completely smash the heavy AT weapon "network" before the trailing SPWs reached the effective range of those weapons. Then the SPWs might be used - along with mounted fire, even - to mop up behind the tanks, dropping dismounts only here or there to surround bypassed infantry enemies, that were already deprived of all larger (gun or armor) support, by the panzers having already killed all that stuff and passed on.

Even in that case, however, the primary roles of the SPW was transport, getting the infantry around already weakened and isolated infantry elements. The protection from small arms they provided was critical in that case, the firepower of the 'tracks themselves much less important. You can certainly find occasional uses like this on the Russian front, particularly in open steppe terrain against unsupported rifle force opponents.

As for the evidence that they were not more extensively used in front line action, all it takes is a review of tank and infantry losses in periods of intense offensive action by panzer divisions, side by side with their reported SPW losses for the same periods. What you find at Kursk, e.g. is panzer divisions losing hundreds of panzer grenadiers per day, and seeing their "running" counts of tanks drop by double digit figures on the same days (though total write offs may be lower) - and on the same days, reporting 0 to 3 lost SPWs.

In Normandy, we get allied air reports of scores of SPWs parked and unoccupied behind a major attack - and attracting a disproportionate amount of air attention, incidentally. During the Lehr counterattack on the US sector in early July, for example. The front line reports do list an occasional small column (company to platoon of turreted tanks) that includes a modest number of SPWs trailing the tanks. They don't do particularly well. But Lehr had more SPWs than any other division in the German army at any time - every Panzergrenadier in the division had organic SPW transport - but they still play practically no role in the offensive itself, and certainly none in its outcome. While scads of them are seen parked behind the attack.

Even in the staff reporting, the Germans record their SPW strengths and losses along with automotive reporting (on trucks, transport compared to "requirements" or authorized strength, etc) - not their front line unit strength reporting. All transport was just way too useful and important for its operational role, to get it shot to pieces as very marginal battle armor.

Yes yes, we've all read the training documents that stress that the men should use the SPWs as true IFVs, etc. But they flat didn't actually do it in the field. It was a rear area, armor officer's conceit that they should or would, not a tactical reality. They were highly useful in getting infantry through the enemy's defended zone, through harassment barrages and long range MG fire and the like, for example. In a broader operational sense, that was an important and a combat use. But it wasn't blocking rifle bullets or hosing things down with their MGs, it was blocking over the horizon shrapnel while the whole formation shifted position on the map.

[Baneman]

I've always assumed that we use them in a "gamey" fashion - US and German HT's both.

Mostly because we can. Which is hardly surprising amongst wargamers

And the vulnerability of the vehicle itself feels pretty accurate - note in the test where they weren't firing, there were nevertheless 3-4 vehicle KO's from rifle fire. So you are risking the vehicle since you're hardly likely to encounter rifles only.

My tests were really only intended to address the gunner's protection ( or lack of it ) behind his shield.

[JasonC]

Understood Baneman, and they were great tests. Yes we get to use them "gamey". But understand, modern IFV "theory" suggests a role for them that they didn't actually play in the real war, and moderns trained in those roles can easily expect to use them that way, not as a gamey thing but thinking it is their realistic and proper use.

[JasonC]

More evidence that they were battle taxis, though somewhat "arguing by absence", can be seen from surveying cases where German panzer divisions attacked and we have combat narratives from the defending side to tell us how and with what, rather than training documents setting expectations or intentions. Basically, SPWs are not heroically represented in contemporary allied side battle narratives (as opposed to Hollywood and re-enactors, who love them as much as MP40s). They appear in a few roles and they matter for those, and as first line transport that is more "light firepower resistant". That is about it.

Here are some details for those who need them, to back up the generalization -

Alam el Halfa - Germans lose 49 tanks, half in short initial gun duel with British armor, rest scattered. Germans lose 400 "transport vehicles", including 57 to British armored cars in a raid, and many to continual air attacks. No mention of SPWs accomplishing anything, and they are included in "transport". The heavy AT defense grid was everywhere way too strong to put mere SPWs in the front line.

Sidi Bou Zid (opening of Kasserine campaign) - Germans tanks do all the shooting. Only role of SPWs is to let infantry keep up, and help surround bypassed US elements.

Kasserine, act the first 33 Recce tries to coup de main it (cyclists, SPWs, PSWs) but fails, gives up, dismounts proceed instead. Decision is achieved by dismounted Pz Gdrs infiltrating along ridges, followed hours later by a concentrated panzer attack.

Thala / final successful stand of Kasserine campaign, first attack tries tanks with infantry walking with, some SPWs mixed in, but artillery stops them. Second attack sends infantry ahead on foot with tanks in overwatch, no SPWs used. Artillery slaughters the dismounted infantry.

At El Guettar, SPWs lift elements of 10 Pz to the forward slope, where they dismount. Only mention of their role in the fighting. This is a combat movement to the objective body of cover of the sort I have described, as close to a battle role as they get, really.

In Gela counterattack, armor is the only serious threat to the beachhead and is stopped by gun-line of all arms plus naval fire support. HG armored infantry makes a separate attack and its easily check by US airborne. SPWs do not let them penetrate light infantry; they dismount to fight; fire support checks them after that.

Salerno counterattack, mostly armor that breaks through front line infantry defenders. At one stage 6 "scout cars" led by 2 tanks are mentioned, though the main body of the German Panzergrenadiers is described as "detrucking" in a draw before entering the fight.

The main break in is made by a company of Panzer IVs (15). Eventually checked by artillery, direct lay and indirect support. Then main stand the following day, a gun line of all weapons including SP TDs shoots the German tanks up, dismounted German infantry

accompanying them fails wherever the tanks do, which is soon everywhere. Not mentions of SPWs at all that second (main fight) day. There are mentions of a battery of SP guns and even one ammunition vehicle, but nothing about SPWs in the front line.

Anzio counterattack, heavy armor down the few roads is stoppered and fails. Infantry night infiltration makes better progress, but that is fighting dismounted. Eventually the Allies stop the attempt by indundating the battlefield with HE (heavy air, naval, artillery)

and making the low lying area a muddy craterfield, where tanks cannot maneuver. SPW role? None. The heavy firepower density is too high for them and the off road conditions quickly become impossible.

Lehr counterattack in early July, Normandy - initial night penetration. One half track reported accompanying several Panthers west of le Desert, destroyed by M-10s. Panzergrenadiers are described riding on a Panther with others accompanying it on foot - this despite Lehr having 100% infantry lift in SPWs available. "Aerial reconnaissance at 0900 had reported 40 enemy tanks, parked under trees, along the paved highway west of le Desert" - and shelled them, air was called in on them, etc. It is clear from German side reports and losses that these were not actually tanks, but SPWs, and they were undoubtedly empty. There was some attempt to use SPWs in coup de main

style in a night "raid", but it wasn't successful. "a message sent by runner from the roadblock toward Hill 91 announced that enemy tanks, each followed by about 20 infantry and armored vehicles, were moving toward the 3d Battalion CP." The result is a mere melee with bazookas, rifle grenades, and machineguns (including vehicle mounted 50 cals). Overall the raid cost the Germans 5 tanks, 4 "armored cars", and 60 PWs.

Note that this fighting started at 1:30 AM and continued until midmorning, by which time the remaining Germans gave up.

That is the entire impact on the defending side combat narrative of a day's heavy defensive fighting against a 1944 Panzer division equipped with *600* SPWs - 5 SPWs used in combat and destroyed, and 40-50 bombed while parked, empty, behind the frontage. And keep in mind that 600 SPW total for the division is *after* losses taking to air power on the march to theater, or fighting the Brits before then - they shipped out for Normandy with 693 of the things, and their permanent losses of SPWs before shifting to the US sector match their approach march losses to air.

Mortain counterattack, SPWs certainly used to lift infantry through the battle zone, along with plenty of unarmored transport. But US field artillery and tac air have a field day on both, and strip the overall offensive of combined arms as a result. Protection from 155mm fired by entire artillery groups, or scores of rocket firing Typhoons at a shot, provided by 8mm SPW sides? Not terribly effective, to put it charitably. The offensive as a whole was doomed from the beginning, but HE firepower being effective against its transport and infantry support was the proximate cause of its failure.

In the Lorraine fighting, Panzer brigades run into US combat commands and get shot to rags in a day or two. It is their tanks that form their cutting edge and it goes away with them. They have vehicle and infantry accompaniment, but it never matters for their fate, and is generally described fighting dismounted around the tanks. Yes SPWs (or trucks) lifted them on the approach marches etc, but in action, they were nowhere to be found in the Allied side combat narratives of the fighting. When the more experienced 11 Panzer and Italian-veteran Panzergrenadier divisions continue that fighting, their combined arms improves, and there is mention of local flanking marches by Panzergrenadiers, mounted, but they dismount to fight - and artillery is highly effective against them.

In the Bulge, SPWs certainly helped some infantry keep up with the spearheads operationally, arguably its most important role. And there are cases of the coup de main, night raid, or mounted ride into a village to dismount and secure it etc. But there are also cases of mounted SPW columns getting ambushed along narrow forested roads and they don't come out of those well. The assaults on fixed positions describe tank infantry attacks with the infantry uniformly dismounted, and the supporting fire coming from tanks and assault guns, not light armor. They get stripped by artillery fire on a sufficient scale. Nordwind similar story, but even less of a role for the light armor compared to heavy, since there wasn't as deep a break in.

That covers essentially every offensive use of armor forces by the Germans against Americans, or any scale, in the entire war. It is not cherry picked for low SPW involvement, it is a survey of all the main German mobile force attacks in the west. It includes the heaviest SPW equipped division of the entire war in an attack role with its SPW strength still near peak, but very little role for them in the resulting front line fighting.

There is the famous light armor SS counterattack at Arnhem against British 1st Para, where they actually try to use them as AFVs and to charge with them, and it is an utter disaster, against defenders with nothing heavier than a PIAT. Later full tanks do the job methodically with firepower.

When that is the scale of impact a weapon system has on the battle narrative of the opposing side, it is not being heavily used as a front line weapon, and the reason is it wouldn't help much in that role, and the item was too useful as first line transport to waste it that way.

[Erwin]

It does raise the question of why did the Germans waste thousands of MG34's or 42's by mounting em on their 251 and 250 series vehicles when according to your research such a weapon was utterly ineffective and actually attempting to use em was suicidal.

[JasonC]

Erwin - the Panzergrenadiers often just dismounted MGs from the 'track and took them with them, for ground use.

[dieseltaylor]

JasonC - Long posts to say that their function was transport. No one has said differently so it seems to be flogging a dead horse. Given the time troops spent not fighting to fighting the absence or otherwise of them being in action is not very conclusive in helping to decide how much they were used overall. One imagines in places like the Balkans, Italy or dealing with the Maquis or perhaps a paratroop dropthat in fact they were the heaviest armoured vehicle around and would be used for fire support. I am sure the Germans were familiar with what was dangerous to their vehicles and would not use them unwisely given the importance of being mobile. Obviously from your examples sometimes the Germans gambled or an officer was unwise.

Gamers are going to use them ahistorically as they are not required to move troops after the battle. There is an argument that in game they should actually be expensive items if lost so that us commanders treat them more historically/wisely.

[Doug Williams]

Interesting (and educational, for me) discussion about the halftracks, and yes, I'm sure I have been guilty of using them in a "gamey" way. Like dieseltaylor pointed out, CM isn't an operational game, so we the players don't really have to worry about transporting our troops after the battle. We are given (or purchase) certain assets for each battle, and I'm sure we all try to use those assets to "win" the battle.

But anyway, the main point of this thread is whether or not there is a bug that may have been introduced with version 2.0 that is causing halftrack gunners and unbuttoned tank commanders to be more vulnerable than they should be to small arms fire. I have little time for extensive testing, but I can say that I have lost what seemed to me to be an excessive number of HT gunners and TCs recently. So much so that I've pretty much given up on unbuttoning my tanks.

Thanks bisu for bringing the subject up, and Baneman for the extensive testing.

[winkelried]

I love flogging dead horses ... just one example I am deeply into researching (yess getting close to playtest the campaign ) to support Jason's point.

The operations of the 11th Panzer Division moving from Bordeaux to Avignon (some 600 km) with some occasional fights against the Maquis, and then retreating along the Rhône river to Lyon (some 250km) fighting off the Americans (mainly the 36th U.S. Infantry Division) and then the battle at Meximieux starting on 31. August:

The division lost some 11% of its personnel, almost 60% of its Panthers and as it seem not a single of its 170 250/251 ... only during the battle of Meximieux between 31. August and 3. September the loss of 2 251s is confirmed ...

On the other side: on the huge maps i designed (up to 2.6x4 kms) the 251s come quite handy to move the Panzer Grenadiers at acceptable speed.

[c3k]

Reading Spaeter's 3 volume history of the Grossdeutschland, he references an attack during the Bulge in which the unit left all their halftracks grouped in a wood. They drew the predictable US figher-bomber attack. No personnel casualties (the drivers only and some support folks were nearby, the fighting unit had left hours ago). No mention of halftrack damage caused by the air-to-ground attack.

It may be peculiar to Allied air supremecy on the West Front for them to've parked so far to the rear. Or not.

[ASL Veteran]

Reading Spaeter's 3 volume history of the Grossdeutschland, he references an attack during the Bulge in which the unit left all their halftracks grouped in a wood. They drew the predictable US figher-bomber attack. No personnel casualties (the drivers only and some support folks were nearby, the fighting unit had left hours ago). No mention of halftrack damage caused by the air-to-ground attack.

It may be peculiar to Allied air supremecy on the West Front for them to've parked so far to the rear. Or not.

The halftracks were used pretty extensively on the Eastern Front from what I can tell after reading first hand and operational accounts. The distances travelled are pretty vast and the unit density is much lower (at least on the German side). So the mobile units were used as fire brigades many times. Often times mounted panzergrenadier units would just bump into Soviet units since the front lines were often very fluid and the precise location of advancing or retreating Soviet units was often unknown.

[bisu]

JasonC , thanks for really impressive amount of data on Hanomags.

Well, I am basing my point of view on several monographs on Sdkfz 251, including those from Osprey (by Bruce Culver), as well as on pieces of archive footage showing Hanomags in action,as well as German training films for PzGrenadiers from the period (

). The German Panzer doctrine was modified after Poland 1939 where assaults made by tanks only proved to be frequently ineffective. It became clear that it is necessary to provide tanks with mobile support of infantry. But it could only happen when the Grenadiers operated in direct proximity of the assaulting tanks. Osprey says they followed about 150-200 meters behind the tanks, and infantry left the vehicles only about 100 m before enemy lines. So this is an engagement distance for the SPW gunner. It is absolutely logical for me. What do you think is the benefit of having Panzergrenadiers during an armored assault when their SPW's are parked somewhere back in the woods? I also don't quite understand why you are abitrary claiming that such an indispensable element (close collaboration of infantry and armor) of the german armored assault doctrine was neglected IRL on regular basis? Your examples, although multiple and intersting are still anecdotes and can't be used as prove that a behaviour other than official doctrine was standard. The lower numbers of lost SPWs in comparison to tanks does not prove that they were not used in supporting role. Are you referring to absolute numbers or ratios of vehicles lost? There was a scarcity of SPW and none of german pzgrenadier units (apart maybe from Panzer Lehr indeed) was fully equipped with them..

In summary, keeping in mind the initial topic of this thread I still claim that SPWs gunners had many opportunities to use their MGs in combat, so it is not at all gamey.

JasonC - Long posts to say that their function was transport. No one has said differently so it seems to be flogging a dead horse.

I have said differently. NOT ONLY transport.

[JasonC]

Bisu - we are all aware of the doctrine, it isn't news, but they didn't do it because it made no tactical sense in real life.

Tanks do most things way better than both infantry and light armor. Concentrated tanks attack very well. There are a few specific roles for which they need supporting arms, and coordination that gets them that support when and where they need it, is indeed vital. But those needs are limited in time and place, and can only be provided by the other arms acting as the other actual arm.

Facing gun lines, tanks need artillery support. The guns should be motorized to keep up with the tanks in an operational sense and subordinated to the tank commander. They don't need to be SPA though it helps some. When they are SPA, they would be useless for this role if they just acted as additional tanks by coming up to direct fire ranges. That tanks don't need 18 more tanks, they need fire support over the horizon, without exposing the firing guns - when they want artillery support. Clear enough?

Similarly, when tanks need infantry support, they need it as actual infantry to do things that only infantry can do. Which includes crossing obstacles the tanks cannot (streams, rough high ground, dense woodlands), clearing the interior of large bodies of cover of enemies who do not expose themselves to direct fire at its exterior edges (large woods, towns e.g.), stealthy scouting and night infiltration that rely on being very quiet, and the function related to scouting of putting eyes on everything, to sweep an area completely clear of hiding enemies, or get right down in their holes or trenches with them.

None of those actual infantry needs can be performed by an SPW. All of the fire support uses of an SPW can be performed and performed better, by the tanks themselves.

To give the tanks the "essence of infantry" in a combined arms sense, the men must dismount. As long as they stay mounted, they are just more light armor, like scout cars or the lightest tanks. Armor formations only use such actual light armor for scouting and flank screening work, retiring as soon as a serious enemy is faced. to let heavier arms take over.

The SPWs do usefully let the infantry keep up with the tanks, to give them local "essence of infantry" when they need it - check. But no, that doesn't happen only 100 yards from the enemy. The enemy isn't that located to start with, and their positions are not thin lines, but deep defended zones with interlocking strongpoints supporting each other by fire, and the like.

Anywhere in that zone where heavy AT weapons are still operating, it is too dangerous for light armor to move about, one, and tanks "want" infantry support only in dismounted form.

Thus, there *is* a battle role for SPWs - to get infantry through barrages and light MG fire etc, within the defended zone, if and only if the heavy AT network has already been smashed by the tanks - and to bus infantry to the defended zone, so the tanks can have dismounts where they need them (e.g. around large bodies of cover, stream crossings, etc). But the actual fighting, within range and sight of the enemy, is done by the tanks themselves, or by dismounts.

That may help understand the why. The "that", is mere history. There aren't enough dead SPWs for front line use to be happening, and the other side of the hill simply doesn't report them in action hosing down their positions.

[Erwin]

"...the Panzergrenadiers often just dismounted MGs from the 'track and took them with them, for ground use."

Makes sense. Shame we can't do that in the game. Since we can acquire AT weapons etc, one would have hoped this would be possible. I guess the problem is that one can't mount it back.

However, IIRC in CMSF there were vehicular units that had a MG which dismounted with the crew and would be remounted into the vehicle when the crew remounted. (I think it was a Brit unit.)

If Hanomags were not used for inf support, the game really needs this feature to discourage unrealistic use of the vehicle.

[Bil Hardenberger]

I have said differently. NOT ONLY transport.

Bisu, I for one agree with you, thought you needed some support. I have posted about it in my latest AAR thread.

Keep up the fight, you of course are correct in my opinion and just because "someone" says it's so does not actually make it so.

Have fun!

Bil

[Aragorn2002]

It does raise the question of why did the Germans waste thousands of MG34's or 42's by mounting em on their 251 and 250 series vehicles when according to your research such a weapon was utterly ineffective and actually attempting to use em was suicidal.

I'm not quite convinced about 251s being battlefield taxis either. The fact that the Germans equipped them with short barrel 75mm guns and flamethrowers appears to be prove that they used them in an offensive role. Those versions weren't armoured any better than the standard 251 as far as I know.

[womble]

"...the Panzergrenadiers often just dismounted MGs from the 'track and took them with them, for ground use."

Makes sense. Shame we can't do that in the game. Since we can acquire AT weapons etc, one would have hoped this would be possible. I guess the problem is that one can't mount it back.

I'd guess, rather, that it's not the work of moments to dismount the thing and load yourself up with the ammo. So you can simulate it at force pick time by eliding the track and adding an LMG team.

However, IIRC in CMSF there were vehicular units that had a MG which dismounted with the crew and would be remounted into the vehicle when the crew remounted. (I think it was a Brit unit.)

I think the Brits get something similar in BN too; one of the MG-carrying Bren carriers has an MMG team that can fire from the vehicle or dismounted, from what I've read on here.

[JasonC]

Aragorn - true. But then, the 75mm versions frequently fired indirect (as did the 81mm versions, of course). As for the flamethrower ones, find me all the combat accounts of their use and decisiveness. I've been reading action reports on the war from all sides for 30 years, and I've seen all of two.

[ASL Veteran]

They were frequently parked in the back on in the west in 1944 due to overwhelming Allied air superiority. This reason for leaving the vehicles behind is specified in numerous accounts that I've read regarding their use in the west. Also, the terrain that was most fought over in the west wasn't vehicle friendly. Normandy you have Bocage country and in Holland you have all the little waterways that jammed things up. Including them in an attack under those circumstances would just be inviting a Typhoon with rockets. It doesn't surprise me at all that in the west in 1944 they were mostly parked in the back.

For set piece battles in the west in 1944 the SPW should probably be a rare bird. I would hesitate to make a sweeping conclusion about their usage in all situations during all years of the war based upon that though. There is no doubt in my mind that there were times when they were used in accordance with the doctrine that was specified above.

[womble]

I'm not quite convinced about 251s being battlefield taxis either. The fact that the Germans equipped them with short barrel 75mm guns and flamethrowers...

And 20mm cannon, I think.

...appears to be prove that they used them in an offensive role. Those versions weren't armoured any better than the standard 251 as far as I know.

No, but their weapons were fired from inside the body of the vehicle rather than peering out over the top edge, IIRC, so the crew were a lot less vulnerable. And they didn't carry a full squad of infantry round to get roasted by light ATGs without shooting back.

Bil, the armour on the halftrack was there to stop "incidental" damage from area fire and distant small arms. You can drive 250/251s etc through areas that you'd never dream of driving a truck through. And even if the MGs on the vehicle were never fired from the mount, they were as wasted as all the .50 and .30cal MGs on US M2 and M3 half tracks which were even more vulnerable than Hanomags: that is, they were used for local laager defense more often than they were carried into the face of the enemy.

Sure, some REMF in Berlin in 1938 thought it would be a good idea to have the tracks capable of providing supporting fires, but by the end of the war, the battlefield was so hostile to light armour that the chances for commanders to employ them in such a role were rare.

Barring the apparent recently-introduced problem with the gunner's vulnerability at close range, CMx2 should actually be a fairly good engine for us to test how the Hanomag works as a fire support platform. Unfortunately, I think that we, as Borg Commanders, know a fair bit more about the tactical situation at any given time than any CO on the ground would, and so we can sneak the halfies into use far more often, because our intel about the Anti-armour threat at whatever location we're planning to use the MG platforms is so vastly superior to that of a RL Captain on the ground. Add that we're not dooming ourselves to being cut off, surrounded and wiped out (or being unable to keep up with the offensive) by losing the odd half track, and our in-game usage for fire support is going to be greatly over emphasised.

[MikeyD]

Folks who formulate warfighting doctrine in the inter-war years tend to be more brazen in their tactics than warfighting doctrine several years into a conflict. I'm thinking of 2003, Dick Cheney not bothering to ship uparmored humvees to Iraq for MPs to patrol in. 4-5 years later they're driving around in exotic-armored monster trucks. Live and learn. Early war German doctrine on conducting operations using half-tracks no doubt contained a great deal of élan and daring-do. I'd expect Russian anti-tank rifles would have blunted that enthusiasm somewhat. On the western front the combination of airpower and a seemingly never-ending supply of Sherman tanks would have dampened their enthusiasm for heroic HT assaults too. We see the same process at work playing CM titles. Our enthusiasm for brazen assault tend to diminish over time as our forces are left smouldering on the battlefield. Live and learn.

[Aragorn2002]

Aragorn - true. But then, the 75mm versions frequently fired indirect (as did the 81mm versions, of course). As for the flamethrower ones, find me all the combat accounts of their use and decisiveness. I've been reading action reports on the war from all sides for 30 years, and I've seen all of two.

I must admit action reports like that are very, very rare. In fact I was quite surprised reading about two 'armoured flame-throwing vehicles' (Hohenstaufen division) wreaking havoc upon units of the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers (44 Brigade) on 29 June 1944, during the fighting over Hill 112. I remember that clearly since it was the first time I've read about such vehicles having such an impact. Not even sure they were 251/16s, although I believe Hohenstaufen had some.

I'm curious to know which two action reports you are referring to. I bet the above story is one of them.

[Michael Emrys]

...I have lost what seemed to me to be an excessive number of HT gunners and TCs recently. So much so that I've pretty much given up on unbuttoning my tanks.

Actually, I reached that point long before 2.01 cane out. Maybe I am just overly sensitive to the loss of my TCs, but over a year ago I began having them button up as soon as they got into range of return fire, which on CM maps was usually right after the first turn. Sure, they lose some situational awareness as well as the use of the .50, but they lose even more if the TC gets pinged.

Michael

[Doug Williams]

This thread has diverged into two separate discussions, both interesting.

The original discussion of this thread was about whether or not halftrack gunners (and unbuttoned tank commanders) have or have not become more vulnerable to small arms fire since CMBN version 2.0. My "feel" is they have, based on my game experience, but Baneman has given us some very well done extensive testing, which I hope he and others (hello, BFC?) will continue.

The secondary discussion that developed is whether or not halftracks were historically used for anything other than troop transportation. While I find this as interesting as the rest of you, and have learned a good deal by reading this thread, I hope we don't let the original point of this thread (a possible game bug) get buried under this derailment.

[Michael Emrys]

It may be peculiar to Allied air supremecy on the West Front for them to've parked so far to the rear. Or not.

I am only speculating, but I can think of another possible explanation. And that is that the condition of the roads and the crowding on them might have led to anything lacking a big gun being left behind, at least temporarily until the gridlock could be cleared up.

Michael