Reassessment of Italian Combat Prowess

[dieseltaylor]

A consideration I have now as I grow older is that perhaps losing a war quickly as the Italians did in Libya was actually a much smarter option in preserving Italian lives. It may sound heretical to suggest that not dying is actually a very acceptable outcome for most combatants.

Obviously the officer class and the politicians being that much further away from death can afford to be brave longer. It helps of course if their children are not in danger either.

As it happens there were many overly brave Italian soldiers and many sensible ones where preserving Mussolini in power seemed a very poor reward.

Ditto the French who having bled the most of the Western Allies in WW1 and having a series of rubbish Governments did not wish to fight to the death. Sensible. After all Germans taking a country and retreating out with terms as in 1871 was surely an option worth considering compared to losing 4% of your population and 10% or your remaining population carrying wounds as from 1914-18.

Where you have a large moat like the UK and the US it is much easier to be heroic and be scornful of other nations not blessed with the right geography.

BTW the French "jokes" are normally applied to the Italians in the UK. Possibly a better education means we have heard of the Napoleonic wars. This was when France trounced most of Europe for a number of years around 1800. : )

[Badger73]

A consideration I have now as I grow older is that perhaps losing a war quickly as the Italians did in Libya was actually a much smarter option in preserving Italian lives. It may sound heretical to suggest that not dying is actually a very acceptable outcome for most combatants.

<snipped>

Interestingly enough, someone wrote a book about that very premise 40 years ago; "The White Flag Principle".

https://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/shimon-tzabar/the-white-flag-principle-how-to-lose-a-war-and-/

[Cuirassier]

usgubgub,

I recommend this thread to further flesh out the "superior operational play by the Soviets" thesis:

http://www.battlefront.com/community/showthread.php?t=90838

FWIW.

[ASL Veteran]

The Germans had 7 panzer divisions in France and the median tank was a Panzer II with 20mm main armament. They were able to send 50% more than that number to Normandy even with their main weight in the east, in 1944, and not only had better tanks, had a better match up against the types opposite in gun and armor terms.

Of course, you must know that an early war panzer division had two panzer regiments in it instead of just one.

[kensal]

Interestingly enough, someone wrote a book about that very premise 40 years ago; "The White Flag Principle".

https://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/shimon-tzabar/the-white-flag-principle-how-to-lose-a-war-and-/

It says something about the respective national characteristics of the Italian and German peoples in the 1930s and 1940s.

The outcome of WWI, the German education system from 1933 and Hitler's regime together created a mentality amongst many / perhaps most Germans that war was an acceptable or necessary route for the country and, as the war deteriorated, an acceptance or belief that losing involved an existential threat to Germany and the German people, leading to a fatalism amongst soldiers that they had no option but to fight to the bitter end and an unwillingness to accept the possibility of defeat.

The situation in Italy was very different - they were winners in WWI, they did not have the same exposure to an education of the sort given to young Germans in the 1930s emphasising German racial superiority and the destiny of the German people to dominate Europe and their entry to the war was almost an afterthought by Mussolini following the collapse of France. The outcome of that was that the majority of Italians probably did not understand why they were fighting or what they were fighting for and they did not see an existential threat to Italy and the Italian people arising out of the possibility of losing the war. Hence the most pressing motivation for most Italian soldiers was surviving rather than fighting to the bitter end, with possible exceptions amongst the blackshirts.

[JasonC]

ASL Vet - with much less fighting power in those panzers than a late war Panzer division. A third with MG main armament, another quarter or so with 20mm main armament, etc. No, the early war PD was not a stronger force than a late war PD - the late war PD was, hands down. The latter had a tactically superior mix of weapons, tuned by experience; a better suite of all forms of support weapons; superior weapons in every role; superior coordination of all of the above, etc.

[JonS]

A 1944 pattern Pz Div is 'better' than a 1940 pattern Pz Div? NO WAY!?

Next you'll be telling us that a 2012 Volkswagen Golf GTI is 'better' than a 2004 Volkswagen GTI ... even though the 2004 version won Top Gear's COTY, but the 2012 model didn't :confused:

Edit: The 1944 edition of the Pz Div might have been a theoretically more efficient mix of assets, but the 1940 model was undoubtedly a more effective tool. Even with individually weaker tanks.

[Apocal]

Edit: The 1944 edition of the Pz Div might have been a theoretically more efficient mix of assets, but the 1940 model was undoubtedly a more effective tool. Even with individually weaker tanks.

What is the point of having two regiments of tanks when your supporting infantry's staying power is the limiting factor?

[sburke]

This may be a stupid question, but that's never stopped me before. Are we really doing an apples to apples comparison? The enemy that the 1940 Pz Div was used against was different than that faced by the 1944 pz Div. As well Germany actually had a much more effective air force in 1940...hell they had an air force. To say one division organization is better than the other is kind of hard when the the situation for the two was so vastly different. The 1940 division was certainly effective given the conditions under which it was employed.

[Erwin]

Yes, it's like saying the deadly British archers at Crecy or Agincourt were much more effective than WW1 artillery.

[ASL Veteran]

I wasn't following this thread very closely and debating something with Jason C is the equivalent of discussing something with a shifty brick wall.

If the debate is that Panther tanks are better than Pz II tanks then thanks for stating the obvious. Generally speaking the human material that makes up a national army declines in quality the longer the war goes on. In order to make up the gaps in the ranks the pool of men that you have to choose from has to keep expanding because the 'class of x' is all dead or injured after a year of battle or you have to call up both the class of x and then the class of y a year early to make up a shortfall. The motivation level of the new troops is also generally going to be a lot lower than those who were in the military before the war began.

Sure, there is an increase in combat efficiency for a while after the beginning of the war but by 1944 many German units had been rebuilt many times over. Trying to pin down when any unit is at 'the peak of it's experience' is a bit of a joke. I can say with 100% certainty that there wasn't a single German division of any type in 1944 that didn't have a large proportion of green troops in it. Very few of them were ever at full TO&E strength. In fact, many didn't even resemble the TO&E. Officers were constantly in short supply and the training period for new officers and NCOs was being reduced to meet the demand for replacements. Ammunition shortages were prevalent as well.

Perhaps if the issue being discussed could be defined a little better it would be helpful.

[JasonC]

If given the same physical assets available in 1940, you reorganized the limited high impact ones along mid to late war lines, you could get more not less combat effectiveness out of them, in 1940. The actual tuning of the mix of assets improved over the course of the war. The changes made to TOEs and to typical tasking and such, were not debilitating consequences of mythical shortages or declining command ability, they were intelligent adaptations to lessons in the field.

This means things like have more motorized infantry per panzer division, have more guns per infantry battalion in the infantry divisions, have more panzer divisions rather than a few larger ones, give motorized infantry divisions some of their own armor, use "fast" = motorized anti tank formations to give AT ability to infantry divisions, use any available SPWs in battalion sized formations operating right with the armor (not company sized packets or as stiffening to recon).

Yes, the 1944 Panzer divison or say the 1943-4 pattern SS panzergrenadier division were superior *organizations* to the tank heavy, recon focused, shutzen lite formations (and "MG battalion" as only infantry, hacks) of 1940. And you could have had twice as many of them on the map.

"The late war formations were crap because they were all beat up" is just nonsense. Everyone went through the same learning curve to get tank infantry mixes right and to learn how to use them in practice - the Germans rather faster than most.

Just as the tank heavy US armor division of the 1-3rd was inferior to the triangular US AD of later in the war - which was still too infantry light - and the practically unsupported British ADs of 1940-41, with a single "support" formation detached from the tanks and containing an inadequate dosage of all other arms, was inferior to a late war British Armor division - and as a late war Russian mechanized or tank corps was superior to the unwieldy monstrosities of the summer of 1941 - the first organizations fielded on all sides, had serious "bugs" in them.

In the case of armor formations, that took the particular form of never enough of all of the non-armor formations, all of it fast motorized and all of it trained to work with *and under* the tanks. The German panzer formations of 1939 and 1940 had those problems. They were not more successful *due* to that different organization but *in spite of it*, because they faced very weak enemies who did not know what they were doing. Some of those poor designs stretched into 1941 and the initial attack on Russia, some had been corrected by then. By 1943 they had mostly all been corrected, in the German army - though the Heer as opposed to SS Panzer division remained somewhat too infantry light clear to the end of the war. (Between those dates they had various half measure experiments with their "light" divisions, tried to adapt the use of motorized with panzer divisions to cover the latter's inadequate infantry, etc).

Concretely, a tank infantry mix of 2 full tank regiments to a couple of motorized infantry battalions and a few motorcyclists was not nearly enough infantry back up for any sustained combat. One tank regiment of only 2 battalions, plus 1 half-sized battalion of AFV equipped Panzerjaegers, to 4 infantry battalions plus 1 each of recon and engineers, was *still* too armor heavy for the best combined arms for sustained combat. Add 2 more infantry battalions and it is about perfect - and that is what the SS Panzergrenadier formations had by midwar.

2 to 1 tanks to infantry, way too tank heavy, and way too many people start there (the Brits in some cases seem to have started at 3 to 1, insanely tank heavy). The US got theirs down to 1 to 1 by late war and found it way too infantry light. The Russians had about 1 to 2 to 1 to 2.67 in their later war tank corps (3 tank brigades of battalion size in armor terms, each with 1 infantry battalion, plus 3 more motorized, then add motorcycle recon and pioneers).

There is a reason all the good formations and those of the combatants with the longest combat experience are all converging on 1 to 2 to 1 to 3, tanks to infantry. And it isn't shortages of anything, it is just the right ratio. The "3" sometimes needed just because the infantry is likely to take heavier losses in action, and a formation that starts with a 1 to 3 ratio will keep close to the 1 to 2 optimal point for longer, in action.

[dieseltaylor]

Seems to me that the nature of the war you are fighting has far more to do with the ideal mix than just quoting an infantry to armour number that fighting a war in northern Europe in WW2 seems to be right.

I have my doubts about that proportion being right for the Western Desert battles, Partly because of the supply needs, partly because of the very large terrain, and particularly as infantry versus tanks was rather one-sided. Basically if the terrain ain't favourable then you need to adjust the mix.

[ASL Veteran]

If given the same physical assets available in 1940, you reorganized the limited high impact ones along mid to late war lines, you could get more not less combat effectiveness out of them, in 1940. The actual tuning of the mix of assets improved over the course of the war. The changes made to TOEs and to typical tasking and such, were not debilitating consequences of mythical shortages or declining command ability, they were intelligent adaptations to lessons in the field.

Jason, Jason .... you are getting yourself confused. From what I can tell there are three issues here that you are lumping into one

1. TO&E of various formations

2. The soldiers who 'fill out' those formations

3. The ability to maintain those formations in the field

I think most of those who are reading this thread would agree that ... 1944 was a pretty busy year for Germany. I hope that you can agree to that as well ....? So is it your position that throughout the year 1944 every German division was fully staffed and equipped? Every German division had full access to all the fuel and ammunition they need for conducting operations? If not, then I would suggest that your use of 'mythical' in the bit I quoted above is a bit over the top wouldn't you agree?

1. Is the organization of the 1944 Panzer Division better than the organization of the 1940 Panzer Division .... sure I'll give you that. Is the organization of the 1944 infantry division better than the 1940 infantry division? That's a little unclear.

2. Is the average Landser in the German army of 1944 a superior warrior to the average Landser of 1940 or 1941? You have got to be kidding me. I think it's safe to say that most German soldiers in 1944 knew that the war wasn't going to go their way. The soldier of 1941 had known nothing but victory and was riding high in the saddle. The soldier of 1944 on average was not as well trained or led than the soldier of 1940. It's not even close. Even your pet SS Panzer divisions were drafting soldiers into their ranks from questionable sources. Most of the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine transfers didn't want to be there. They usually deserted at the first opportunity. They actually viewed it as a serious 'demotion' to go from Luftwaffe ground crew to common mud eating infantryman - and who can blame them? The Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine transfers are actually the pick of the litter too! German soldiers were actually conducting human wave attacks by the last months of 1944.

3. You really think that the divisions of 1944 were as well supplied or equipped as the armies of 1941? Perhaps if the US Airforce wasn't bombing every moving train into oblivion, but even then after the Rumanian oil fields were lost ..... ? Laquered ammunition was starting to get issued because of a shortage of brass by the end of 1944. Even during Normandy the German artillery was no match for the Allied artillery. Many accounts state something to the effect that the Allies were firing 20 rounds of artillery for every one the Germans fired. Even then, German preparatory barrages for attacks had to be cut short because of .... wait for it .... insufficient artillery ammunition.

Please try to stay grounded Jason.

[LukeFF]

This is akin to saying that JG 54 was a better unit in the fall of 1944, simply because they were equipped with FW 190 D-9s - widely regarded as an excellent fighter plane. However, in comparison to 1940, JG 54 in the fall of 1944 was a unit filled out with half-trained replacement pilots who had no business being in a frontline unit. Hans Dortenmann, a veteran JG 54 pilot evaluating recently "graduated" student pilots, described the state of Luftwaffe pilot training in late 1944 perfectly: "My God, what are they teaching these guys?"

[JasonC]

dt - I deny it. The Brits had very tank heavy armor forces in the western desert and their combined arms blew chunks because of it, and it got entire armor brigades annihilated in an afternoon, on more than one occasion. The Germans had a better tank infantry ratio and more combined arms formations, and those formations outperformed dramatically. Was tank artillery cooperation even more important than tank infantry cooperation in the desert? Sure. But they went hand in hand - lopsided tank heavy forces still were lousy at that, and balanced ones were superior. Sometimes the cooperating force was a gun front or a timely barrage indirect - the principle was the same.

ASL - asked and answered - I deny that the typical average performance of the later war fighting men was appreciably inferior to the early war ones, until the very end (last 6 months of the war or so). Entirely green formations in Normandy fought extremely well - 12SS was one, for example, despite its rep on the Allied side of the line. So did many of the green VG infantry divisions at the west wall. Meanwhile, the early war formations were also often quite green. They just faced enemies who were unprepared for modern war, to an outstanding extent. Basically the Germans were not getting significantly worse until very late, but their opponents were getting light-years better.

A similar comment can be made about the Luftwaffe. It was stronger in late 1943 or even the beginning of 1944 than it was in the early war (in equipment, in raw numbers, in tech, in experience too, etc). It just lost the air war in the west in early 1944 anyway, because it was up against a vastly stronger set of opponents. (Not that it did so hot in the battle of Britain early, but it faced much, much weaker opponents in the early war). In the *fall* of 1944? Sure, by then the air war was already lost, the oil plants bombed, the veterans shot down, etc. Irrelevant, that part of the war was over by then.

The Luftwaffe fighters and formations that lost the decisive battles of the air war from about February to May 1944, however, were not a bunch of green untrained students. They were not down to just a few planes, or out of gas to fly. They were flying arguably the most advanced airplanes in the world; they included the highest scoring aces in world history; their force was quite numerous and was fed by a large replacement stream of modern aircraft, and had massive ground support (Flak etc) and a defender's edge. They still got creamed because what came after them was a monster of a force, not a shoestring force of a few hundred single seaters as in 1940.

It was the enemy that moved on them, from the fall of 1940 to the spring of 1944. They were not worse themselves, until actually beaten in the air, at that specific time - quite late. No, they were not all ground down in mid 1943 or something - the air defeat was quite concentrated in time (just as the defeat of the U-boats had been, a year earlier - and again because of an improving opponent not a worsening German force).

[Michael Emrys]

If the debate is that Panther tanks are better than Pz II tanks then thanks for stating the obvious. Generally speaking the human material that makes up a national army declines in quality the longer the war goes on. In order to make up the gaps in the ranks the pool of men that you have to choose from has to keep expanding because the 'class of x' is all dead or injured after a year of battle or you have to call up both the class of x and then the class of y a year early to make up a shortfall. The motivation level of the new troops is also generally going to be a lot lower than those who were in the military before the war began.

Sure, there is an increase in combat efficiency for a while after the beginning of the war but by 1944 many German units had been rebuilt many times over. Trying to pin down when any unit is at 'the peak of it's experience' is a bit of a joke. I can say with 100% certainty that there wasn't a single German division of any type in 1944 that didn't have a large proportion of green troops in it. Very few of them were ever at full TO&E strength. In fact, many didn't even resemble the TO&E. Officers were constantly in short supply and the training period for new officers and NCOs was being reduced to meet the demand for replacements. Ammunition shortages were prevalent as well.

Perhaps if the issue being discussed could be defined a little better it would be helpful.

This thread has wandered far from the point I initially was trying to make, beginning with JasonC's observations. It's not so much that he is wrong—Jason is seldom wrong and anybody who intends to take him on is asking for a hard task ( ). But it did miss the point I was trying to make. ASL Veteran's reply quoted above is much more on the mark.

My initial point was that one of the preconditions for the success of the Normandy invasion was that the German army had gone through the meatgrinder of the war in the East for three long years. When I made that statement, I thought it was so blindingly obvious that it needed no explanation. Perhaps I was mistaken about that. So let me clarify by saying that I had no intention whatsoever of implying that the Allies would have had a rougher time if faced with the German army of 1940 than that of 1944. Jason has done a pretty fair job of explaining why that is not the case. But since that was not my claim, it was beside the point.

To my mind, the only important counterargument that could be put forward against my point is that absent the war in the East the German army would not have evolved into the form that it had arrived at by 1944. There is some truth in that, but on the other hand, it had had plenty of experience to drive its evolution in the desert and other places it might have found employment.

All this though, both pro and con, is highly speculative. I find it hard to even imagine any likely turn of events in real world history, given the situation at the start of 1941, that would not produce a supremely violent conflict between Germany and the USSR. It might have begun in a different way at a different time, but happen it was bound to. And as it happened, the beneficiaries were the armies of the Western Allies. The Heer of 1944 may well have been in a number of areas superior to the Heer of 1940, but it is not, I maintain, superior to the Heer that might have been had it not been worn down by three long years of very intense warfare against an enemy that got year by year better at killing Germans.

Michael

[Sublime]

<snip>

The Luftwaffe fighters and formations that lost the decisive battles of the air war from about February to May 1944,

I'd peg the loss to one week in February, starting Feb 20th 44 with the onset of Operation Argument. By May the Luftwaffe was done. I'd agree if you said February/March but after March/April it's really becoming a non-entity in any meaningful way.

Though you're right - they weren't simply ground down in 43, after all Black Thursday in October 43 lost 60 US bombers and daylight bombing was put on hold while we scrambled to decide what to do.

[Sgt Joch]

Its hard to peg a date for when the Luftwaffe lost its edge since it was not a single lost battle, but steady atrrition. The Jadgwaffe was in top form in 40-41, but by 42, it was already shortening its training programs to make up for its Russian losses. It managed to keep a qualitative edge until late 43, at least on the Russian front, but that was more because it still had a hard nucleus of veterans. However, by summer-fall 44, it was pretty obvious the average German fighter pilot was "greener" than the average Allied pilot.

The back of the Luftwaffe was broken over Germany in early 44, but I would see it more as a tipping point. Once Allied fighters could accompany Heavy Bombers all the way to the target and back, it was inevitable.

[Wodin]

I always thought the Luftwaffe was ruined during the Battle of Britain. I presumed after that it was never the same.

[JasonC]

Michael - so put, I entirely agree with you. The Russians had to break the German army's teeth before the westerners could invade profitably. I think man for man the German army of 1944 before the invasion was stronger than in the early war, but certainly it helped enormously that it wasn't twice its actual size on June 1944, which is could easily have been - with extra efficiency and better weapons as well - if the Russians hadn't chewed through several million men by then.

[JasonC]

Wodin and Joch - I don't think so, Sublime is more nearly right. The Luftwaffe was very strong going into Russia, back in its preferred role of "armed recce" in support of ground operations, also just attacking airfields and winning in the air against a less prepared opponent than Britain. It was also very effective in the Med at sea denial, until land base air was strong enough, close enough. In the west, it effectively defended the continent and the German homeland against the Allied bomber offensive, inflicting serious losses on that offensive, and getting progressively better at night fighting, Flak etc. The Brits could area bomb by night and impose some costs, certainly, but the Germans were not losing the war in the air even at mid 1943, not seriously so.

That all changed in early 1944. P-51s show up, the force attacking ramps in size, the attacks triple in intensity, and the Luftwaffe has to fight a pitched battle in the air to defend the aircraft factories etc. It loses that fight, not to the bombers primarily but to the fighters. The German air defense grid is smashed. This is a battle and climax period as definite as the spring of 1943 in the battle of the Atlantic - before it, allied bombers flying over Germany are taking heavy losses and the Germans have thousands of fighter aircraft in the air in defense. After it, the Allied bombers over Germany can hit entire target sets at will, and such fighters as get up to meet them are hopelessly outnumbered and soon also outclassed in pilot quality terms, because the vets (in quantity) have been shot down already.

And it was not because they ran out of planes due to losses in 1943 or 1942, or both cumulatively, or anything like it. New aircraft production is running well ahead of aircraft losses, despite such bombing as the allies can muster in those years. The German fighter force is improving in mix and increasing not decreasing in number - it peaks in early 1944, not 1942. The allied force is just increasing faster, and once it has long range fighters to bring that numerical edge to bear, beats the Luftwaffe in open combat. Quite rapidly and suddenly, an affair of a few months.

[JasonC]

For evidence, relevant sections of the US strategic bombing survey detailing the growth of fighter cover and total attacking air strength in the critical period -

"h. January 1944. At this juncture, a change in the tactical employment of US fighters took place which was more far-reaching in its effects than any of the increases in range. Up to this point, because of the limited number of escort fighters available, they had operated under the strict Injunction that their duty was to "protect the bombers." This method of employment resulted in flying relatively close to the bombers in order to block enemy attacks. It placed US fighters in a defensive position, leaving the initiative to the enemy. US pilots spent all their time "looking over their shoulder. With the increased strength of fighter escort, tactics were changed to more fully exploit the characteristics of fighter aircraft. The fighters were now charged with the primary duty of "pursuing and destroying the enemy." Although a third of the escort remained in constant final defense of the bombers, the rest ranged out from the bomber formations, watching for the appearance of hostile aircraft. Upon sighting the enemy, this "ranging escort" would attack and pursue him wherever he fled. The enemy soon lost the initiative. He was hunted and harassed wherever he flew. Enemy losses began to rise sharply. Lieutenant General Karl Koller, Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, stated in this connection that the American long-range fighter cover came as something new and fatal to Germany. Without this cover, Koller had hoped to be able to inflict losses as high as 30 per cent upon un-escorted bombers which, in his opinion, would have made the continuation of the attacks impossible. He laid considerable stress on the fact that neither the British nor the Germans thought of fighters except in terms of the last war and of narrow ranges associated with land warfare in Europe. The German aircraft industry had claimed that an effective long-range fighter could not be built (Reference Note 4).

i. 30 January 1944. The Fifteenth AF carried out a counter air force mission in the Po River Valley with important consequences. While the bombers attacked airfields and aircraft repair depots from high level, the escort formed an "umbrella" which held down most of the Axis fighters, resulting in serious losses to the Germans on the ground. Those enemy fighters which were able to rise in interception were engaged by the US escort and many were destroyed. Air opposition in Italy to strategic day missions virtually ceased after this date.

j. February 1944. In this month 150-gallon belly tanks became available for the F-47s based in England, extending their range another 50 miles, and later in the month, two 108-gallon external tanks were fitted to the wings of the F-47s, adding still another 50 miles of range. P-38s received an addition of 60 gallons internally, extending their range of effective escort beyond Berlin; P-51s became available in somewhat greater numbers. The result of all this increase in Allied fighter capabilities was the dispatch, in the fourth week of February, of a series of missions against the German fighter aircraft factories as deep into Germany as Leipzig. During this phase of transition from evasion of the enemy to forcing the battle, the task forces of US bombers and fighters became bolder and more provocative. Actually, a month later, the Allied day bombers began to fly selected routes to force the GAF to fight. Enemy fighter loss rates, in planes and pilots, mounted rapidly, and replacement difficulties multiplied at a time when Allied air power was being increased and reinforced.

k. March 1944. During this month, more P-5ls and P-38s became operational in the Eighth AF and the F-51S began to carry external wing tanks. With two 75-gallon wing tanks, the P-51 could escort far beyond Berlin and even Prague. With two 108-gallon external wing tanks, escort, if desired, could be flown beyond Vienna. Flying with an increased number of these long-range fighters as escorts, the heavy bombers initiated a series of attacks on Berlin.

The air fights mounted in number and intensity. On one of these missions the bombers lost their largest number - 69. However this was only the ninth most serious loss of the Eighth AF in percentage of bombers attacking and it resulted in overwhelming the German ability to resist in the air. On the third mission, enemy resistance had declined and at the end of the series enemy fighters failed to put in an appearance. Heavy losses in planes destroyed and damaged had weakened the GAF operational ability to such an extent that it could not sustain the air fighting on a continuing basis even over German territory.

l. April 1944. The Fifteenth AF converted its P-47 group to F-51s and received additional groups of P-51s. Its fighter force then consisted entirely of P-51s and P-38s. The P-51s had sufficient range to permit escort to targets as deep as Brux in German-held Sudetenland and Blechhammer in a German Silesia. The P-38s were used for additional fighter support during both penetrations and withdrawals.

m. May 1944. Enemy loss rates mounted rapidly on the Western Front while US bomber and fighter losses declined at the same rate. Enemy opposition to the bomber raids had grown very little numerically in the last nine months. The number of bombers in US task forces had multiplied by four in the same period, and fighter escort numbers also had become four times as great (Figure 4). For example, in the fall of 1943, 300 bombers and 200 escort fighters had been opposed by 200 or more enemy fighters. In May 1944 comparative figures show 1,000 bombers with 900 escort fighters opposed by some 300 enemy interceptors. The GAF by this time could oppose only part of one of the US task forces. The remainder of that task force plus two other entire air divisions were often able to fly the full route without seeing a hostile fighter. By late May 1944, the war in the air against the GAF was won. The exploitation of air superiority was now possible."

Basically, between late 1943 when the Germans had been able to defeat the raids (though at exchange costs) and early 1944, the specifically American daytime air force attacks quadrupled in numbers sent and increased by huge leaps in technical capability (range, maneuverability, tactics of escorts etc). The German fighter attrition rate hit 50% per month of the fighter strength at the beginning of a given month, in the middle of this period. Their aircraft factories might have covered even that, but their pilot schools definitely could not, and they were driven from the skies.

FWIW...

[Rokko]

How severe were personell losses in aerial combat during 1944? Surely aircraft losses could be easier sustained than pilot losses, but at what rate or in what ratio were pilots actually lost back then?

[JonS]

Rokko; see "strategy for defeat". It's a very interesting book, available free online as a pdf.